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DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 
1918-1945 



Series D (1937-1945) 

Volume XIII 
THE WAR YEARS 

June 23-December 11, 1941 



DOCUMENTS ON 

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

1918-1945 



UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1954 



TX 



/-. „ i Thlt itrtto U also published in (treat Britain by 

^5 3 J Her Majetty'i Stationery Office, London 



MS 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
Publication 7682 



For sale by the 

Superintendent of Documents 

Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C., 20402 

Price £4.00 (Buckram) 



BOARD OF EDITORS 1 

United States: Howard M. Smyth, Editor-in-Chief; Arthur G. 

Kogan ; George O. Kent. 
Great Britain: The Hon. Margaret Lambert, Editor-in-Chief; 

K.H.M. Duke; F. G. Stambrook; D. C. Watt; E. C. M. Breuning. 
France: Maurice Baumont, Editor-in-Chief; Georges Bounin; 

Andre Scherer; Jacques Bariety. 



1 This list shows the members of the Board of Editors in Washington at the 
time of the final editorial work on the volume. For Great Britain and France 
it lists the members in the closing phase of the work of the Project at Whaddon 
Hall, Buckinghamshire. Former editors, with their terms of service, were: 

United States: Raymond James Sontag, Editor-in-Chief, September 1946- 
July 1849; Bernadotte E. Schmltt, Editor-in-Chief, July 1949-July 1952; 
Paul R. Sweet, Editor-in-Chief, July 1952-March 1959; Fredrick Aandahl, 
January 1951-September 1953; B. Malcolm Carroll, October 1946-August 
1949; Jean Brownell Dulaney. December 1946-April 1951; Fritz Epstein, 
October 1946-July 1948; Anna Maria Herbert, April 1951-August 1952; 
John Huizenga, January 1947-September 1952; Otto Pfianze, January 
1948-August 1949; Joachim Remak, December 1947-July 1951; Norman 
Rich, August 1949-August 1954; James Stuart Beddie, September 1946- 
August 1959. 

Great Bhitain : Sir John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Editor-in-Chief, September 
1946-May 1948, thereafter Historical Adviser until 1956 ; James Joll, Editor- 
in-Chief, June-December 1948; General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, 
Editor-in-Chief, June 1948-January 1951 ; B. K. Bramsted, January 1948- 
February 1952 ; L. Branney, September 1946-July 1948 ; P. Ericsson, January 
1948-May 1952; M. H. Fisher, May 1949-May 1356; W. H. C. Frend, 
March 1947-October 1951; K. Ronau, April 1952-June 1956; D. C. Watt, 
October 1951-October 1954; T. F. D. Williams, September 1947-September 
1949 ; Z. A. B. Zeman, January 1956-October 1957. 

France : Jeau Bstienne, July 1947-April 1950; Won de Groer, July 1947-October 
1950; Jacques Grunewald, October 1950-October 1955. 



-"\ 



CONTENTS 

Page 

Pbepace IX 

Analytical List op Documents . xm 

Documents 1 

Appendices: 

I. Organization of the German Foreign Ministry . . . . . 1011 

II. List of German Files Used 1017 

III. List of Principal Persons 1023 

IV. Glossary of German Terms and Abbreviations 1033 

VII 



PREFACE 1 

This volume concludes the work of the Tripartite Project which 
originated with the agreement of June 1946 between the United States 
Department of State and the British Foreign Office and to which the 
French Government adhered in 1947. The agreement provided for the 
publication of selected documents from the archives of the former 
German Foreign Ministry in order "to establish the record of German 
diplomacy preceding and during World War II," and it stipulated 
that the editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of highest 
scholarly objectivity." The editors have made their selections of docu- 
ments for publication on this basis alone. They have exercised com- 
plete freedom in the selection of documents and in their editing of 
this volume and of all volumes published under the terms of the 
Project. The editors, therefore, accept full responsibility for the 
volumes as published. 

Microfilming- of the files of the German Foreign Ministry archives 
was begun in Marburg in 1945 by American and British experts for 
intelligence purposes and was continued in Berlin by teams of his- 
torians representing the three Governments in the Project. In 1948 
the collection was moved to Whaddon Hall, Buckinghamshire, Eng- 
land where it remained for ten years in the custody of the British 
, and United States Governments. Before the archives were moved 
from Berlin over 800,000 pages of documents for the period since 1914 
had been recorded on film. By the end of 1958, when the last of the 
archives were made ready for restoration to the German Federal Ke- 
public, almost three million microfilm frames had been made. Each 
document printed in this publication bears a microfilm serial and frame 
number in the upper left-hand corner. The microfilm copy of the 
original German text can be located by reference to Appendix II, 
"List of German Files Used." 

It was originally intended to complete the entire publication for the 
period 1918-1945 in some twenty volumes. When, however, the pre- 
liminary work on the selections for the years from 1933 to 1945 was 
completed in 1954 it became apparent that an adequate selection of 
the documents for this period would require a publication on a scale 
approximately double the size which had been anticipated at the out- 

' In each of the first four volumes published in the series there appears a 
"General Introduction" which describes some of the principles which have guided 
the editors in their work. 



PREFACE 

set. 



After considering the length of time it would take to carry out 
a program on this enlarged scale, the participating Governments de- 
cided to limit the publication in English to the years 1933 to 1941— 
beginning January 30, 1933, when Hitler became Reich Chancellor 
and ending in December 1941 with the German declaration of war on 
the United States. Series D comprises 13 volumes. Series C, in six 
volumes, covers the period 1933 to 1937. 

In the exchange of notes with the custodial Governments which 
provided for the restitution of the political archives of the former 
German Foreign Ministry, the Federal Republic gave assurance that 
it would "keep the returned files in an orderly manner and grant 
German and foreign scholars access to the files at all times." 

In 1952 the custodial Governments decided to permit universities, 
private foundations, and even individuals to sponsor filming programs 
m the pre-1920 files. Thus it came about that a very large portion of 
the files of the Political Department for the period before 1920 were 

a ™ T?,' Aft6r th6Se Vari0US P r °i e<!ts wei- e completed a grant by 
the *ord Foundation enabled the Committee for the Study of War 
Documents of the American Historical Association to publish A Cata- 
logue of Fzles and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Ar- 
chives 1867-1920 (Oxford University Press, 1959) . 

All of the microfilms made by the Project are now freely available 
to public research at the National Archives in Washington and at the 
Public Record Office in London. Scholars who wish to check the 
translation of any printed document, or to consult the full language 
of a document which is summarized or referred to by footnote, can 
identify the desired German text by serial and frame number. Those 
who might wish to test the selection of documents printed can consult 
the films of the files listed in the appendix according to serial number. 
After the completion of the microfilming program at Whaddon Hall 
the Historical Office of the Department of State undertook the prepara- 
tion of a comprehensive guide of the official filming: A Catalog of 
Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives 1920- 
im Compiled and edited by George O. Kent, and published as a 
joint project of the Department of State and the Hoover Institution 
on War, Revolution, and Peace, volume I was issued by the Hoover 
Institution in the summer of 1962. 



Volume XIII of the Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series 
D, covers German foreign policy for the second half of the year 1941 
It opens on June 23, the day following announcement of the attack 
on the Soviet Union, and it ends on December 11 with the German 
declaration of war following Pearl Harbor. The relations of Germany 



PREFACE XI 

with the United States and with the Imperial Japanese Government 
constitute the principal topics of this period. The editors have en- 
deavored to present all of the German diplomatic evidence of how 
Hitler came to his decision to declare war on the United States. Cer- 
tain of the crucial documents in this story are classified in the Ana- 
lytical List under the subject, Tripartite Pact. 

There is a decided shift of emphasis between the previous volume 
and this one. Until June 22 negotiations with the Soviet Union con- 
stitute a large fraction of the work of the German Foreign Ministry. 
As German policy toward Russia after that date is continued by other 
means, the diplomatic relations sink to the level of those of belligerent 
powers without direct connection. Moreover, in the period of volume 
XII the Balkans constitute an area of intense diplomatic activity. 
For volume XIII the area becomes predominantly one of occupation, 
veiled or overt. Although the line beween foreign policy and occupa- 
tion policy is not always obvious, the editors have tried to restrict their 
selections of documents to the field of diplomacy. Where the policies 
of Germany as an occupying power affect her relations with other 
states the occupation policy needs to be illustrated. Under the head- 
ing, Yugoslavia, are comprised documents relating both to the govern- 
ment established by the Axis in Croatia and to the occupational regime 
in Serbia. 

A generous selection of documents illustrates the Rome-Berlin Axis 
relationship. Here the editors have continued to present tlie texts of 
all known letters of Hitler and Mussolini. The Axis in the period of 
this volume begins to show considerable strain : because of the in- 
adequate deliveries of raw materials to Italy ; because of the treatment 
of Italian laborers in Germany; because of friction in the Balkans; 
and because of the German failure to achieve quick victory, an Axis 
article of faith in which the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, 
ceases to believe. German relations with France, with the govern- 
ment at Vichy and through the office at Paris, are also fully portrayed 
in this period of collaboration under handicap. 

With the cutting off of the flow of raw materials and other supplies 
from Russia, the economic relations of Germany with Rumania, 
Sweden, Turkey, and the Iberian Peninsula loom larger. It has not 
been possible to cover these topics with complete satisfaction or to 
illustrate fully the economic negotiations of Germany with Italy and 
with Japan because of gaps in the record arising from the absence 
of the files of the Economic Policy Department. 

In accordance with past practice in this series all of the numbered 
Fiihrer Directives issued in this period have been printed although 
some are almost completely tactical and have little foreign policy 

COIlltJI 1 L r 



XII PREFACE 

The documents are printed in chronological order, but the Analytical 
List at the beginning of the volume presents them by subject for the 
convenience of the reader. Here will be found in alphabetical order 
additional important topics of German policy covered by this volume. 
The documents have been selected jointly by United States, British, 
and French editors, but the United States editors have had full edi- 
torial responsibility for this volume. The editors wish to express their 
appreciation to various officials of the Department of State for co- 
operation and assistance, and particularly to G. Bernard Noble, former 
Director of the Historical Office, to his successor William M. Franklin, 
and to members of the American Advisory Committee : Sidney B. Fay, 
Hans W. Gatzke, Oron J. Hale, Hajo Holborn, William L. Langer, 
and Raymond J. Sontag. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, a former editor-in- 
chief, has most generously rendered guidance on an informal basis. 
The translations were drafted by the Division of Language Services 
of the Department of State, but the editors have final responsibility 
for the translations as well as full responsibility for the footnotes and 
other editorial matter. 

The American editors are particularly grateful to Dr. Vincent Kroll 
and other members of the German Editorial Group within the 
Quadripartite Project for the publication of the documents on the 
foreign policy of the Weimar Eepublic; they undertook the onerous 
task of comparing the completed typescript text with the original 
documents and thereby prevented many an error. 

Valuable aid in preparing the typescript was rendered by Barbara 
A. Griffith and by Elizabeth Baird, Linda Swauger, and Willa Mae 
Kuhn. The technical preparation of edited copy for the printer was 
done in the Division of Publishing Services of the Department of 
State under the direction of Jerome H. Perlmutter; the editors ac- 
knowledge gratefully the assistance of Elizabeth Vary, Collie E. 
Halbert, and other members of the staff of that Division. 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS * 



Afghanistan 



Date 



Subject 



1941 
June 29 



July 14 



July 31 



Aug. 9 



Aug. 16 



Sept. S 



107 



169 



190 301 



Unsigned Memorandum 

Th Jit^i° n '" ^fBhanistan to the Foreign. Ministvn 

abandoned because th^^j SUch "Potions be 
Save the B^ft E^^^ 

there is increasing ; we Jure or ^tS» -* 81 ? Iran £ Ut that 
fomented by the BriKSSV^™^ ™* 
^ ReSthat i& k T?- a Z i0 J^ e Forei ^ Minify 

man and Italian commu"^ but th^^Af"^ th ? Ger ' 
request their free departure across J£>M.^ fgl ? , ™ tan ' s 
neutral country w aS pSeT Sh * emt0ry to a 

(See also under ' India" and "Middle East.") 



SI 



206 



289 



318 



463 



Oct. 12 



308 



640 




XIV 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Anti-Comintern Pact 



Date 

1941 
Aug. 12 



Oct. 17 



Nov. 2 



Nov. 3 



Nov. 15 



Nov. 15 



Subject 



Doe. No. 



Nov. 15 



Nov. 17 



Nov. 20 



Memorandum by the Stale Secretary 

Records a conversation with the Finnish Minister, 
Kivimaki, who expressed the view that Finland's acces- 
sion to the Anti-Comintern Pact was not necessary and 
that her accession to the Tripartite Pact would not be 
useful. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy 

Explains that Ambassador O'tt has been instructed to 
propose to Japan that a protocol for the extension of the 
Anti-Comintern Pact be signed in Berlin. Directs 
that the Italian Government be asked to agree. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy 

Suggests that Rumania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and 
Croatia might wish to join the Anti-Comintern Pact and 
that Finland and Denmark should also be considered. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy 

Suggests that the representatives for the German, 
Italian, and Japanese Governments approach the 
Governments of Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain and 
invite them to sign the document for the extension of 
the Anti-Comintern Pact. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland 

Explains that other governments, in addition to the 
original signatories, have agreed to join the Anti-Comin- 
tern Pact and directs that the Finnish Government be 
urged to join in the accession and extension. 

The Slate Secretary to the Foreign Minister 

Transmits a report by Grundherr on his conversation 
with the Finnish Minister about Finnish accession to 
the Anti- Comintern Pact. Kivimaki stated, as his 
personal opinion, that while he was in favor of Finland's 
joining the Pact he considered the present moment 
unsuited. 

Memorandum by the Minister to Portugal 

Explains the position of Portugal on the Anti- Comin- 
tern Pact: her opposition to Bolshevism is well known 
but adherence to the Pact would involve great risk be- 
cause of her economic dependence on Britain. 

The Minister in Finland to Ike Foreign Ministry 

Refers to telegram No. 1469 (document No. 472) 
and reports on his conversation with President Ryti 
regarding Finland's accession to the Anti-Comintern 
Pact. Ryti stressed the great difficulties Finland was 
having at the time and said that the moment did not 
seem propitious for Finland to join the Pact. Bliicher 
pointed out that Finland's accession would only for- 
malize existing policies. 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the President has decided to empower 
the Foreign Minister to adhere to the Anti-Comintern 
Pact. 



Pags 



197 



405 



442 



443 



472 



474 



310 



650 



727 



728 



783 



785 



476 



787 



477 788 



485 



804 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Anti-Comintern Pact — Continued 



XV 



Subject 



Doc. NO. 



Page 



1941 
Nov. 24 



Nov. 25 



Nov. 25 



Memoranchim by the director of the Legal Department 496 818 

Records meeting with Kase for the exchange of notes 
concerning the Secret Additional Agreement to the 
Anti-Comintern Pact (document No, 498) and with 
whom it was agreed that secrecy of the pertinent doc- 
ument would be maintained. 

Protocol on the Extension of the Period of Validity of 498 820 
the Agreement Against the Communist Inter- 
national 
Text. 

The Japanese Ambassador in Germany to the Foreign 502 834 
Minister 
States that Japanese and German Governments are 
in agreement in considering the Secret Additional 
Agreement to the Anti-Comintern Agreement of 1936 
to be no longer in force with the signing of the new 
Protocol (document No. 498). 

(See also under "Bulgaria," "Italy," and "Ru- 
mania.") 



Baltic States 



Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI 

Records having been told by the former Lithuanian 
Minister Skirpa that the Kaunas radio station an- 
nounced the formation of a Lithuanian government 
headed by him. He admitted having been in contact 
with the Abwehr. 

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI 

Records receiving unofficially M. Kreewinsch, the 
former Latvian Minister, No hope was offered regard- 
ing fulfillment of his wish to be recognized again as 
Latvian Minister in Berlin, 

Kazys Skirpa to the FHhrer and Chancellor 

States that he is willing to head the national Lithu- 
anian government which has been proclaimed by the 
Lithuanian activist movement following the advance of 
the German troops into Lithuania. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 18 22 

Secretariat 
Refers to Grundherr's memorandum of June 23 
(document No. 3) and records the Foreign Minister's 
decision that no contact whatever is to be established 
with Skirpa. 

The State Secretary to the Embassy to the Holy See 37 42 

Directs that no contact be established with the Mis- 
sions of the former Baltic States; that any discussion of 
the political future of the Baltic area is undesirable. 

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI 39 43 

Records that the Foreign Ministry in a communica- 
tion sent to the OK W welcomed the cooperation of local 
elements in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with the 
German troops, requesting, however, that political 
promises to these elements be avoided. 



1941 
June 23 


June 23 


June 23 


June 25 


June 28 


June 28 



XVI 



Date 

1941 
Aug. 21 



Oct. 



1941 
Oct. 13 



Oct. 21 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Baltic States — Continued 



Subject 



Memorandum by an Official of the Department for Ger- 
man Internal Affairs 
Requests that the Foreign Minister be informed of 
a proposal by the former Estonian Minister President 
regarding the formation of an Estonian government 
and army. 

The Acting Deputy Director in the Political Department 
to the Legation in Finland 
Directs that the political reorganization of the 
Baltic states not be discussed with foreigners. Ex- 
plains that it is intended to bring these states into very 
close association with the Reich, but that the details 
have not as yet been worked out. 

(See also under "U.S.S.R.") 



Page 



348 



620 



Belgium 



The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmachl to the 
Chief of the Reich Chancellery 
Lists the military, political, economic, and adminis- 
trative reasons why the current military administration 
in Belgium should not be replaced by a civil adminis- 
tration. 

Memorandum by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery 

Records that Hitler, who intended to set up a civilian 
administration in Belgium, dismissed Keitel's reasons 
against this procedure as stated in his report of October 
13 (document No. 401). 



Bulgaria 



1941 
July 9 



July 11 



July 14 



July 31 



Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records a visit of the Bulgarian Minister who ex- 
plained the changes desired by the Italians in the 
Albanian-Bulgarian frontier as drawn in Vienna. 
Recommends encouraging the Bulgarians to resist the 
Italian claims. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records giving the Bulgarian Minister a map of the 
Vienna boundary line between Albania and Bulgaria 
and suggesting the argument be used with the Italians 
that a change in the line would need German consent. 

The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry 

Confirms that the Vienna boundary line of Albania 
and Bulgaria was deliberately drawn so that the Jesse- 
rina mine would fall to Bulgaria; King Boris was 
informed of this; the Italians were aware of it. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records having been informed by the Bulgarian 
Minister regarding the visit of the Bulgarian Foreign 
Minister to Rome. 



643 



672 



87 



94 



106 



170 



107 



120 



135 



271 



Date 



1941 
Sept. 20 



Oct. 31 



Nov. 22 



Nov. 27 



Nov. 29 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Bulgaria — Continued 



Subject 



The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria 

Directs that a noncommittal attitude be taken in the 
question whether or not Bulgaria should break off rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union, 

Memorandum by the Slate Secretary 

Records mentioning to Draganov the Bulgarian mal- 
treatment of the Greek population in Thrace. 

German-Bulgarian Secret Additional Protocol to the 

Tripartite Pact Regarding the Press, News, and 

Propaganda 

Provision for German-Bulgarian cooperation in the 

sphere of press, news, and propaganda support of the 

Tripartite Pact; specialists from each country will be 

attached to its Legation in the other country to consult 

on appropriate steps to be taken. 

Memorandum by the Dirigetd of the Political Depart-, 
ment 
Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and 
Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov on November 26; 
discussion of the possibility for increased Bulgarian 
grain deliveries to Germany, Bulgarian methods in 
putting down an uprising in Thrace, Bulgarian demands 
for more protection by the German military against the 
Greeks in Macedonia, and the difficulties in carrying out 
anti-Jewish laws in Bulgaria. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Personal Staff 
Record of Hitler's reception on November 27 of the 
Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov. Hitler contrasted 
Germany's policy with England's; described his plans for 
European reconstruction; and denounced Russian 
Communism. 

(See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact.") 



Doc. No. 



XVII 



Page 



341 



435 



490 



537 



718 



811 



504 



840 



509 



858 



1941 
June 25 



June 27 



June 27 



China 



The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 13 17 

Reports that Matsuoka, in compliance with a request 
by Wang Ching-wei, has instructed the Japanese 
Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome to obtain German 
and Italian recognition of the Nanking government. 

The Charge 1 d' Affaires in China to the Foreign Ministry 27 29 

States that the reasons heretofore arguing against 
German recognition of the Wang Ching-wei govern- 
ment still exist and urges that no decisive steps 
regarding recognition be taken before the conclusion 
of the German-Russian conflict. 

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan 32 35 

Informs Ott that Ribbentrop told Oshima that 
Hitler had decided to recognize the Wang Ching-wei 
regime on July 1. States that he himself has discussed 
with Oshima the details regarding recognition. 



682-905—64- 



xvin 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
China — Continued 



Date 


Subject 


Doc. No. 


Page 


1941 








June 28 


The State Secretary to the Embassy in China 

Sends instructions to hand Wang Ching-wei the 
Foreign Minister's telegram recognizing his govern- 
ment. 


38 


42 


June 30 


Circular of the State Secretary 

States that Germany does not intend to break off 
automatically relations with Chungking following rec- 
ognition of the Wang Ching-wei government. 


47 


53 


June 30 


The State Secretary to the Field Office in Chungking 

Tells of his conversation with the Chinese Ambassa- 
dor regarding the effects of a German recognition of the 
Wang Ching-wei government. Gives instructions not 
to notify the Government in Chungking of Germany's 
impending recognition of Wang Ching-wei, 


48 


53 


July 3 


Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Records his conversation with the Chinese Ambassa- 
dor who stated orally that the Government of Chiang 
Kai-shek was breaking off relations with Germany 
following German recognition of Wang Ching-wei. 

(See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact.") 


68 


79 



Denmark 



1941 
July 23 



Aug. 12 



Nov. 4 



Nov. 10 



Nov. 17 



Memorandum by Ambassador Hitter 

Recommends compliance with a Danish request for 
an increase of their Army which has the approval of 
General Fromm on condition that a regiment of the 
Danish Army participates in the war against Soviet 
Russia. 

The Commander of German Troops in Denmark to the 
High Command of the Army 
Transmits the reply of the Danish General Staff re- 
garding an increase of effectives of the Danish Army 
and a memorandum giving some reasons for the Dan- 
ish reply. From this reply it appears that the Danish 
Ministry of War in agreement with the Government 
disapproved the request of the General Staff. 

Memorandum by ike Head of Political Division VI 

Examines the attitude of the Danish Government 
and people toward Germany and concludes that while 
there is much cooperation with German policy many 
Danes would prefer to have the war between Germany 
and Great Britain end in a draw. 

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the 
Foreign Minister 
Informs Ribbentrop of the renewed Danish request 
for a revaluation of the Danish currency and asks au- 
thorization for its approval. 

Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department 
Informs Weizsacker that Hitler approved a continua- 
tion of German policy toward Denmark as set forth in 
an enclosed memorandum by the Foreign Minister. 



142 



198 



447 



459 



479 



204 



311 



737 



762 



795 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Den mark — Continued 



XIX 



Date 

1941 
Nov. 27 



Nov. 30 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Page 



Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 510 861 

Personal Staff 
Records Hitler s remarks on the economic future of 
Europe, and on American and British economic policy 
on the occasion of the visit of Danish Foreign Min- 
ister Scavenius at Hitler's headquarters; 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 518 887 

Secretariat 
Records a conversation between Ribbentrop and 
Scavenius in Berlin on November 28. Ribbentrop talks 
about German-Danish relations and about the progress 
of the war in general. 

fSee also under "Anti-Comintern Pact" and "Ice- 
land.") 



Directives fob the Conduct of the War 



1941 
July 19 



July 30 
Sept. 1 



Sept. 6 
Sept. 13 

Sept. 16 
Sept. 20 



Fuhrer's Directive Mo. 38: Continuation of the War in 128 181 
the Bast 
Outlines the aims and operations for the next phase 
of the campaign against Soviet Russia. 

Fuhrer's Directive No. 34 164 235 

Modifies directive No. 33 (document No. 128) in 
view of changes in the situation. 

The Chief of the High Command of the Wekrmacht to 265 422 
the Reichsmarschall and Commander in Chief of the 
Luftwaffe, to the Commander in Chief of the Navy, 
to the Commander in Chief of the Army, and to the 
Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Forwards a memorandum of August 27 entitled "The 

Strategic Situation in Late Summer 1941 as Basis for 

Further Political and Military Plans." 

Fuhrer's Directive No. 85 283 456 

Outlines the next operations on the various sectors of 
the front. 

Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 312 496 

Directs that in view of the situation in Norway far 
stricter punishments, including the death penalty, be 
administered for offenses committed directly or in- 
directly against Germany. 

Fuhrer's Directive 326 517 

Assigns to Field Marshal List the tasks of crushing 
insurrections in southeastern Europe and outlines the 
necessary measures; all army units in the area of insur- 
rection are to be concentrated under the command of 
General Boehme. 

Circular of the Foreign Ministry 344 541 

Forwards text of a directive of September 16 by 
Keitel regarding the suppression of insurrectionary 
movements in the areas under German occupation. 



XX 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Directives for the Conduct of the War— Continued 



Date 

1941 
Sept, 22 



Oct. 7 



Oct. 10 



Dec. 2 



Dec. 8 



Subject 



FHhrer's Directive No. 36 

Outlines operations to be conducted by the forces 
operating on the Finnish front against Soviet Russia. 

Directive of Che High Command of Die Wekrmacht 

Hitler's decision that no capitulation be accepted 
from Leningrad or Moscow. 

Fiihrer's Directive No. 37 

Directs a shift from the offensive by the forces operat- 
ing in Finland. 

Fiihrer's Directive No. 38 

Provides for the transfer of a Luftwaffe Corps to the 
Mediterranean theater under Command of Field 
Marshal Kesselring as Commander in Chief, South. 

Fukrer's Directive No, 39 

Directs a shift to the defensive on the eastern front 
because of early winter weather. 



Doe. No. 



Pago 



349 



388 



395 



535 



564 



549 



623 



634 



938 



984 



Egypt 



1941 
June 30 



July 3 



Oct. 6 



The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran 

Instructs Ettel to continue with the Egyptian Am- 
bassador in Iran the discussions which had been begun 
in April 1941. 

The Minister in Iran to Vie Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conference with the Egyptian Ambassa- 
dor who stated that on instruction he had informed 
the Shah that King Farouk had definite information of 
a plan by the British General Staff to occupy the Iran- 
ian oil region. 

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports on a conversation with an emissary of King 
Farouk who also represents three Egyptian politicai 
parties. He wished to clarify Germany's plans with 
regard to Egypt in case of a German victory in Africa 
and also sought to induce the Axis to treat Cairo as an 
open city. 

(See also under "Middle East.") 



49 



66 



54 



77 



385 



618 



Finland 



1941 
June 25 



June 27 



The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that Russian air attacks had created a new 
situation for Finland, and that he had pointed out to the 
Finnish Foreign Minister that there how existed a state 
of war between Finland and Russia. The Finnish 
Cabinet will issue a new governmental declaration. 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with Foreign Minister 
Witting who mentioned the possibility of a break with 
England or America but stated that Finland would 
prefer the initiative for such to come from the other side. 



15 



29 



19 



32 



ANALYTICAL LIST OP DOCUMENTS 
Finla Nr> — Continued 



XXI 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Page 



1941 
July 1 



July 9 



July 22 



July 28 



Aug. 22 



Aug. 26 



Sept. 1 



Sept. 


1 


Sept. 


11 


Sept. 


18 



The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister 

Transmits a letter from the Finnish President to 
Hitler in which Ryti expressed his appreciation for 
Germany's military assistance and the hope that it 
would lead to a successful conclusion of Finland's fight 
for independence. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland 

Directs that the Finnish Government be urged to 
break off diplomatic relations with Great Britain in view 
of her close cooperation with the Soviet Union. 

Editors' Note 

Reference to a letter of Hitler to Ryti urging that 
Finland break relations with Great Britain. 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Finnish Cabinet has authorized the 
Foreign Minister in dealing with England to go as far 
as breaking off diplomatic relations. 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Finnish Foreign Minister informed 
the British Minister that Finland, because of British- 
Soviet cooperation, would close her Legation in London. 
Bliicher requests that the German press minimize the 
matter. 

Field Marshal Keitel to Field Marshal Manntrheim 

Explains his views on the military situation regarding 
the northern part of the Russian front and suggests 
where Finnish and German troops could cooperate 
most profitably in their struggle to defeat the Soviet 
Union. 

Field Marshal Mannerheim to Field Marshal Keitel 

Replies to Keitel's letter of August 22 (document 
No. 228) and gives his views on the current military 
operations and the conditions of the Finnish armed forces. 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Explains that the official version is that Finland is 
fighting a defensive war which is connected with the 
German-Russian war only operationally, and that 
although no official aims have been announced by the 
Government, some circles would like to acquire Eastern 
Karelia. 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports differences within the Finnish Government 
about the future conduct of the war, especially on the 
question of advancing beyond the former boundary. 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with President Ryti who 
denied rumors of a separate peace, mentioned the need 
for a reduction of the army in order to alleviate the 
economy, and outlined Finland's territorial aims. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland 

Refers to Bhjcher's telegram of September 11 (docu- 
ment No. 301) and informs him that the German atti- 
tude toward Finland's territorial wishes was positive 
but that Germany herself was interested in the Kola 
Peninsula. 



52 



85 



140 



160 



228 



248 



262 



60 



105 



185 



202 



227 



355 



395 



417 



264 



301 



331 



421 



477 



527 



xxn 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Finland — Continued 



Date 



Subject 



Doc, No. 



1941 

Sept. 24 



Oct. 25 



Oct. 28 



Oct. 31 



Nov. 4 



Nov. 10 



Nov. 14 



Nov. 23 



Nov. 28 



Dec. 2 



Dec. 2 



Page 



The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the former Norwegian Minister de- 
livered to Witting a communication of the British 
Government stating that Finland waged aggressive war 
against England's ally, Russia, and that if Finland con- 
tinued to invade purely Russian territory England 
could be compelled to treat her as an open foe. 

The Legation in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports the main economic preoccupation of the 
Finnish Government to be the food situation which 
shows a deficit of 175,000 tons of bread grains. 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports on a proposal made to the Finnish Govern- 
ment regarding reorganization of the nickel concession 
The plan for a German-Finnish company was approved 
in principle by the President. 

Memorandum by the Head of Division W IV in the 
Economic Policy Department _ 

Records a conversation with President Ryti who 
talked about Finnish territorial aims, the forthcoming 
winter campaign, and Finnish attitude toward Great 
Britain and Sweden. 

Memorandum by Minister Leitner _ 

Records the statements of Ramsay, Finnish Minister 
of Supply, regarding Finland's overseas ships and the 
Finnish wish to sell a portion of these to Sweden, 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Records a brief discussion with the Finnish Minister 
regarding the new American memorandum in regard to 
the Finnish campaign against Russia. 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with the Foreign Minister 
who is opposed to a change in the existing arrangements 
for the Petsamo niekel mines. 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the German promise of 75,000 tons of 

grain has brought great joy although the grain deficit 

is now estimated to be much larger than was thought 

earlier. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Personal Staff 
Records the conversation at a reception of the 

Finnish Foreign Minister by Hitler on November 27. 
Hitler explained the strategic and political situation. 

his future plans in the east, and his determination to 

support Finland in all circumstances: 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Finnish Cabinet continues to discuss 
the British ultimatum but that the reply is certain to be 
negative. 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with the Foreign Minister 
who complained about the treatment of Finnish 
volunteers in German military units. 



353 



558 



423 



429 



436 



448 



461 



469 



493 



507 



685 



705 



719 



740 



768 



780 



814 



849 



533 



534 



936 



937 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Finland — Continued 



XXIII 



Date 


Subject 


Doe. No. 


Pago 


1941 
Dec. 4 


The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Finnish reply to the British ulti- 
matum is expected to be handed to the American 
Minister this evening. The wording is polite and is 
designed to place the blame for a declaration of war 
on England. 

(See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact," "Directives 
for the Conduct of the War," and "Sweden.") 


540 


949 



France 



1941 
June 26 


June 26 


June 26 


June 27 


July 2 


July 5 


July 6 



The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that Darlan wished to break off relations 
with the Russian Government but needed a suitable 
pretext for reasons of domestic policy. 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 

Transmits Plain's letter of June 25 to Hitler re- 
questing that members of the Gardes Territoriaux 
not be treated by the German military authorities as 
snipers. 

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter 

Presents his views regarding French occupation 
costs, advocating: (1) the reduction to the figure of 
10 million reichsmarks effective with fulfillment of 
German demands regarding Bizerte and Dakar; and 
(2) renunciation of the transfer of securities, foreign 
exchange and gold. 

The Foreign Minister to the Chief of the High Command 
of the Wekrmacht 
In reply to Keitel's letter of June 15 (Volume XII, 
document No. 633) explains the need to secure Ger- 
many's military interests by negotiation with France 
and discusses the need for Bizerte and Dakar. 

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmachi to 
the Foreign Minister 
Replies to Ribbentrop's letter of June 27 (document 
No. 31) agreeing with Ribbentrop's conceptions; ex- 
plaining the intended routing of transports to Bizerte; 
and indicating that the exploitation of Dakar by the 
German Navy should precede its use as a German air 
base. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris 

Replies to telegram No. 1909 of June 26 (document 
No. 23) directing Abetz to inform Darlan that Ger- 
many would be willing to consider a pardon for the 
French territorial guards provided that Reynaud and 
Mandel be imprisoned for life by the French Govern- 
ment. 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having convoked the leaders of certain French 
groups to facilitate the organization of French volunteers 
in the struggle against Russia. 



20 



23 



24 



31 



61 



74 



78 



24 



25 



27 



33 



70 



88 



94 



XXIV 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
France — Continued 



Date 

1041 
July 8 



July 12 



July 15 



July 16 



Subject 



July 30 



Aug. 7 



Aug. 8 



Aug. 13 



Aug. 18 



Doc. No. 



Page 



Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Minister 

Reports a conversation with Darlan on problems 
concerning the Mediterranean area, particularly those 
relating to supply transports through Bizerte and the 
possibility of British attacks on Dakar. 

The Embassy in Parts to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports receiving a communication from the French 
Cabinet stating that it is unable to carry out further 
military cooperation because the political negotiations 
which constitute the framework have not been con- 
cluded. 

The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat 
Instructs Abetz to expedite the shipments via Bizerte 
but to treat other questions with France in a dilatory 
manner. Explains that a meeting of the Foreign Min- 
ister with Darlan would not be opportune. 

Memorandum for the Ftihrer 

Ribbentrop submits to Hitler the French note verb ale 
of July 14 with the notation that with Hitler's approval 
it was to be returned to Abetz as not received. The 
note verbale urges that recent developments have 
changed the conditions under which the Paris Protocols 
of May 27 and 28 (Volume XII, document No. 559) 
were concluded ; proposes a meeting of Darlan and Rib- 
bentrop; and outlines a new Franco-German policy to 
take account of the changed situation. 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with Benoist-Mechin in 
which Abetz informs him of Germany's rejection of 
the French note of July 14 (see document No. 113) and 
reproves him for the uncooperative attitude of the 
French Government. 

An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the 
Embassy in Paris 
Transmits a communication from the Military 
Commander in France with a report of de Brinon about 
his recent conversations with Petain, Darlan, and 
Huntziger, on the current French political crisis. 
Ribbentrop asks that Abetz check the report. 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 

Corroborates General Stulpnagel's report (docu- 
ment No. 186) . Cites additional reasons for the delay 
in French cooperation regarding Bizerte and explains 
the difficult position of Darlan. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris 

Instructs Abetz to tell Darlan that because of ;the 
eastern campaign a personal meeting could not be 
arranged at the moment but that the German Govern- 
ment was anxious to reach a sincere understanding with 
the French as soon as possible. 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with Darlan on French- 
American relations and British and Free French in- 
trigues. Darlan reasserted his intention to proceed 
forcefully against these elements. 



82 



100 



110 



113 



99 



127 



139 



142 



162 



186 



231 



293 



189 



199 



211 



300 



312 



326 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
France — Continued 



XXV 



Date 


1941 
Aug. 21 


Sept. 


16 


Sept. 


19 


Oct. 


21 


Oct. 


22 


Oct. 


24 


Oct. 


25 


Nov. 


4 


Nov 


10 



Subject 



Doe. No. 



Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy 222 345 
Department 
Reviews the course of negotiations with the French 
Government over occupation costs explaining the 
French unilateral action in reducing the daily rate of 
payment to 15 million reichsmarks. Discusses various 
courses and suggests a note which would reserve Ger- 
many's rights to full payment. 

Unsigned Memorandum 327 518 

Resume 1 of Hitler's remarks to Ambassador Abetz: 
The French a decent people but no change in their 
tactical treatment while the eastern campaign lasts; 
occupation troops to be increased; territorial claims; 
Italian claims excessive; the question of occupation 
costs and of uniforms for the militia; the Filhrer's plans 
for the east. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris 338 534 

Instructs Abetz to support in every way the strong 
military measures against Communist intrigues which 
have been ordered by the OKW. 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 415 671 

Reports Weygand's unwillingness voluntarily to re- 
sign and requests instructions as to what to reply to 
Darlan who will formally ask about the German attitude 
toward Weygand. 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 417 673 

Transmits text of a letter from Pe'tain to Hitler, ex- 
pressing hopes for a fruitful German-French collabora- 
tion in the future. 

The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Embassy 419 676 
in Paris 
Directs Abetz to tell Darlan that Weygand does not 
in any way enjoy the confidence of the Reich Govern- 
ment. 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 422 682 

Abetz reports having maintained complete re- 
serve regarding the reprisals for the recent assassina- 
tions of members of the Wehrmacht. He discusses the 
possible political consequences of the reprisals ; relates 
Pfitain's plan to turn himself over to German authori- 
ties; and recommends that further shootings of 
hostages be suspended. 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 445 730 

Reports on the French Government's problem re- 
garding Weygand and of the maneuvers of Weygand's 
supporters in the Ministerial Council. Explains that 
Petain would be willing to dismiss Weygand but wishes 
concessions to compensate for the loss of prestige such 
as a trip to the occupied area and the opportunity to 
meet Goring. 

Chancellor Hitler to Marshal Pilain 460 764 

Replies to Plain's letter (see document No. 417) 
and states his views regarding Franco-German coopera- 
tion, the shooting of French hostages, and Germany's 
war against the Soviet Union. 



XXVI 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 



France — Continued 



1941 
Nov. 12 



Nov. 17 



Nov. IS 



Dee. 3 



[Dec. 1] 



Deo. 10 



Subject 



The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris 

Directs that the French Government be informed 
that the Reich Government has already stated its lack 
of confidence in Weygand. 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports on a trip to Vichy on the occasion of the 
funeral of General Huntziger and on conversations with 
Pe"tain and Darlan regarding Hitler's letter to Pfitain 
(document No. 460) and the dismissal of Weygand. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris 

Instructs Abetz to inform P6tain that Goring would 
be willing to meet him secretly in the course of the 
coming week. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Record of the conversation between Reichsmarschali 
Goring and Marshal Petain on December 1, 1941, in 
Florentin-Vergigny. Pfitain presented a note verbale of 
the French Government (document No. 531) which 
was read in translation. Darlan was drawn into the 
discussion. Goring rejected the note but suggested it 
be modified before being presented to Hitler. 

Note Verbale From the French Government 

Explains the desire of the French Government to 
collaborate with Germany but that the policy needs the 
support of the French people which cannot be expected 
unless they can see positive advantages from the policy. 
France needs to defend her empire and requires the 
means for this. Other necessary concessions are listed. 

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division IM 
Records the decision of Hitler to have a meeting 
arranged among Goring, General Juin, and Admiral 
Platon for the discussion of defense plans for the 
French colonial possessions in Africa. 

(See also under "Indochina," "Italy," and "Middle 
East.") 



463 



478 



481 



529 



Pago 



770 



791 



800 



914 



531 



930 



573 



1000 



Greece 



1941 
July 25 



Aug. 14 



Aug. 18 



Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy 
Department 
Delineates the critical food situation in Greece and 
discusses possible solutions. 

Ambassador Riiter to the Foreign Ministry and to the 
Reich Plenipotentiary in Greece 
Explains that in deference to Italian wishes no Greek 
volunteers will be permitted on the Russian front. Di- 
rects that the decision be tactfully explained to the 
Greeks, 

The Foreign Minister to the Reich Plenipotentiary in 
Greece 
Directs that policy in the Mediterranean area must 
be subordinate to the basic principle of the alliance with 
Italy. 



155 



201 



212 



218 



313 



328 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Gbeece — Continued 



xxvn 



Date 



1941 

Aug. 26 



Sept. 15 



Oct. 24 



Subject 



Doe. No. 



Page 



The Foreign Minister lo the Reich Plenipotentiary in 246 394 

Greece 
Directs Aitenburg to maintain complete reserve re- 
garding reorganization of the Greek Government leav- 
ing every initiative in the matter to his Italian col- 
league.- 

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy 323 512 
Department 
Discusses the situation of Greece with regard to the 
food supply in view of recent unfavorable developments. 

Memorandum by Minister Eisenlohr 420 676 

Records the breakdown of German-Italian plans to 
supply Greece with grain from Turkey and Bulgaria. 
lhe German military provide supplementary allow- 
ances to Greeks who work for them. 



Hungary 



1941 
June 24 



June 24 



June 26 



June 26 



June 26 



JuneI28 



July 1 



The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Hungarian Minister President 
requested clarification as to whether Germany desired 
Hungarian participation in the advance against the 
bo viet Union in view of statements to that effect made 
by the German General with the Hungarian Hieh 
Command. 

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a discussion with General Himer who de- 
clared that the statements attributed to him by 
Minister President Bardossy (see document No. 10) 
were not in accordance with the facta. Forwards text 
of General Himer's note to Colonel Laszlo. 

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that Bardossy inquired whether the Gov- 
ernment had sent a reply to his inquiry (documents 
Nos. 10 and 11) regarding Hungarian participation in 
the German operation against the Soviet Union. 

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports the statement of Bardossy that Russian 
planes had bombed a train and town in Hungary in 
consequence of which Hungary considered herself at 
war with the Soviet Union. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Records receiving from the Hungarian Minister a 
memorandum regarding efforts to incorporate the 
former 1 ugoslav Banat into the German Reich. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Records a statement by the Hungarian Minister that 
he was not misled by the Foreign Ministry regarding 
developments leading to the German-Russian conflict 
but that there was a certain confusion in the military 
field. 

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I 

Records text of General Himer's report of June 23 
to the OKW regarding Hungarian participation in the 
campaign against Soviet Russia. 



10 



13 



11 



21 



22 



25 



40 



54 



15 



24 



25 



28 



43 



63 



xxvm 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Hun oart — Continued 



Data 

1941 
July 1 



July 1 
Aug. 16 

Sept. 6 



Sept. 16 



Sept. 18 



Nov. 27 



Nov. 28 



Dec. 7 



1941 
July 13 



Subject 



Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Records a complaint by the Hungarian Minister re- 
garding the treatment of the Hungarian population in 
Banat. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Records having received from the Hungarian Minister 
a letter from Horthy to Hitler. 

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic 
Policy Department 
Records his negotiations with Hungarian Minister 
President Bardossy leading to German controlling in- 
terest in the Maort oil company. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records that the Foreign Minister would postpone 
conclusion of a frontier treaty with Hungary. 

Editors' Note 

Reference to the visit of Minister President Bardossy 
and Field Marshal Szombathelyi at Hitler's field head- 
quarters in East Prussia on September 8 and 9. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Records a request by the Hungarian Minister that 
Hungary occupy points in the former Yugoslav Banat 
inasmuch as Rumanian troops are said to have occupied 
the right bank of the Danube opposite the Iron Gate. 

Memorandum by Ike Stale Secretary 

Records a discussion with Sztojay in regard to his 
demarche of September 16 (document No. 328). The 
Hungarian Government was asked to drop the idea of 
occupying points in the former Yugoslav Banat. 

Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department 
Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and 
B&rdossv on November 26. Ribbentrop urged in- 
creased Hungarian grain and oil deliveries to Germany; 
advised the greatest possible calm in Hungary's rela- 
tions with Rumania; and inquired about Bardossy's 
ideas regarding a ban on listening to foreign broadcasts. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Personal Staff 
Record of Hitler's reception of Bardossy on Novem- 
ber 27; Hitler expressed optimism about the prospects 
of the war in the east and in North Africa. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records that Sztojay inquired about the possibility 
of issuing an officially inspired press report concerning 
the cancellation of Rjbbentrop's visit with Horthy. 

(See also under "Rumania" and "Slovakia.") 



Doc. No. Page 



Iceland 



The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark 

Directs the Legation to induce the Danish Govern- 
ment to protest against the occupation of Iceland by 
American troops. 



55 



56 



208 



284 



328 



333 



503 



65 



508 



556 



319 



459 



466 



520 



528 



835 



856 



973 



102 



129 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Iceland — Continued 



XXIX 



Date 



1941 
July 17 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Pago 



The Chargi d' Affaires in Denmark to the Foreign Minis- 
try 
Reports his conversation with Seavenius on the 
landing of American forces in Iceland and his attempt 
to persuade the Minister President to issue a strong 
declaration of protest against this undertaking. 

(See also under "United States.") 



118 



161 



India 



1641 
July 17 



Aug. 18 



Sept. 6 



Sept. 10 



Oct. 4 



Oct. 16 



Nov. 29 



Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records a conversation with Subhas Chandra Bose 
who stated with respect to the German-Russian war 
that Indian sympathies were on the side of Russia as an 
anti-imperialist power. He urged that the proclama- 
tion regarding a free India be issued at once. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records a conversation with Bose who presented a 
letter for the Foreign Minister and urged that the 
declaration regarding free India be issued soon. Bose 
argued that the declaration was necessary as a weapon 
of the nationalists against Gandhi's willingness to com- 
promise under Anglo-American influence. Recom- 
mends that the Foreign Minister write to Bose. 

Minute by the Director of the Political Department 

Records a decision by Hitler that a declaration 
regarding India is to be postponed for the time being 
lest the British have a pretext for invading Afghanis- 
tan. 

The Dtrigent of the Political Department to the Director 
of the Political Department 
Refers to Woermann's memorandum of August 18 
(document No, 213) and forwards the instruction of the 
Foreign Minister that Bose be told that a declaration 
regarding free India should be postponed until German 
operations in the east have made a greater impact. 

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports the establishment of a special office in 
Rome where all activities connected with the Indian 
liberation movement are to be coordinated. 

Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department 
Transmits Ribbentrop's request for examination of 
propaganda possibilities regarding Indian prisoners 
of war, the Pan-Turanian movement and South African 
opposition to the Smuts Government. Keppler is to 
deal with India, Hentig with Pan-Turanian matters, 
and Karlowa with South Africa. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Record of the conversation of Ribbentrop with Bose 
in Berlin. Ribbentrop stated that Germany did not 
want to issue a declaration regarding India until Ger- 
man power had a firm basis in the Near East. Bose 
pointed to the effectiveness of British propaganda 
and to the importance of letting the Indian people know 
Hitler's views regarding their country. 



120 



213 



165 



328 



286 



296 



461 



472 



379 



404 



611 



649 



521 



896 



XXX 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

India — Continued 



Date 


Subject 


Doc. No. 


Page 


1941 
Dec. 1 


The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Japanese Counselor of Embassy 
stated that his Government was willing to issue a dec- 
laration on Indian independence upon the outbreak 
of war between Japan and Great Britain which he said 
was imminent. 

(See also under "Afghanistan.") 


526 


909 



Indochina 



1941 
July 19 



July 24 



Oct. 6 



The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Embassy 
in Japan and to the Embassy in Paris 
Transmits the text of a memorandum and appendix, 
handed to Ribbentrop by Oshima, setting forth the 
Japanese demands regarding Indochina which had been 
presented to the French Government. Directs the 
Embassies to observe restraint in the matter. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been told by the Japanese Foreign 
Minister of the conclusion of a Japanese- French agree- 
ment on the occupation of bases in Indochina. 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been told by Benoist-Mechin that 
Japan's aggressive actions against French sovereignty 
in Indochina have caused doubts within the French 
Government regarding the correctness of Darlan's 
poliey. 



178 



208 



616 



Ireland 



1941 
Aug. 24 



Memorandum by SS-Standartenfuhrer Veesenmayer 

Outlines the details of an intelligence operation 
in Ireland with the aim of establishing liaison with the 
Irish Republican Army, transmitting military in- 
formation, and preparing underground resistance in 
case of an Anglo-American occupation of Ireland. 




363 



Italy 



1941 
June 23 



June 30 



Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler 

Supports Hitler's decision in declaring war on the 
Soviet Union and states his views on common policy 
toward Turkey, France, Spain, Great Britain, and the 
United States. 

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini 

Replies to Mussolini's letter of June 23 (document 
No. 7); describes the military action on the eastern 
front, suggests arrangements for the Italian army corps, 
and proposes a new meeting. 



50 



55 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Italy — Continued 



XXXI 



Date 



Subject 



1941 
July 2 



Aug. 25 



Aug. 26 



Sept. 2 



Sept. 2 



Sept. 5 



Doc. No. 



62 



134 



156 



175 



Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler 

Replies to Hitler's letter of June 30 (document No 
50), reaffirms his belief in an Axis victory, and accepts 
the proposal for a meeting at Hitler's headquarters? 
July 20 Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini 

Refers to Mussolini's letter of July 2 (document No 
b2), and discusses France, North Africa, Spain. Turkey 
Japan, and the war in the east. 

July 26 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

lransmits the text of a letter dated July 24 from 
Mussolini to Hitler in reply to Hitler's letter of July 

l£ a ^ C e me - nt S°-, 134 \ Mussolini gives his views on 
.France, Spam, Turkey, Japan, and Russia. 

Aug. 2 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Keports discussion with Greifelt and Bene regarding 
the South Tu-ol Because Buffarini's deputy, who it 
also Prefect of Bolzano, combines tasks which tend to 
impede a radical, ethnic solution, the proposal was 
made for the appointment of a special Commissioner 
on the Italian side. 

Record of the Duce's Conversation With the Fiihrer 242 

Hitler discussed the campaign against Soviet Russia 
indicating surprise at the Russian equipment but ex- 
pressing confidence in defeating the Red Army bv 
October. He briefly mentioned England and France 
in a second conversation there was a discussion of 

Jni $1 t? T ? B J £?? m > J T&Rce > the neutrals, Japan, 
and the United States; the war in the Mediterranean 1 
and Italian participation in the Russian campaign. '. 

The Chargi d' 'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 245 

Transmits text of a letter from Riccardi to Clodius 
complaining of the German failure to maintain the 
agreed schedule of deliveries of critical materials to 

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 268 

Keports a conversation with Giannini about Italian 
complaints concerning arrearages of German imports of 
certain critical materials. Clodius belittled these 
complaints m the meeting with the Italians but in the 
report admits the seriousness of the situation. 

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 269 

Reports that with reference to Riccardi 's recent letter 
(see document No. 245) it was explained to the Italians 
that the apparent passive trade balance with Italy was 
a matter of bookkeeping since war materials were a 
separate account. 

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 281 

Keports that Mussolini was painfully affected over a 
report by an Italian official in Germany according to 
which Kreisleiter Goldbeek of Recklinghausen had 
signed a circular expressing preference for interbreeding 
of German women with Norwegians, Danes, and even 
Englishmen over that with Italians, 



72 



190 



220 



279 



383 



392 



435 



436 



453 



XXXII 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Italy — Continued 



Date 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



1941 
Sept. 13 



Sept. 24 

Sept. 25 

Sept. 25 
Sept. 27 

Oct. 2 

Oct. 11 



Oct. 18 



Oct. 18 



Page 



Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat tj„;„i, 

Beeord of the conversation between the Keicii 
Foreign Minister and Ambassador Alneri at General 
Headquarters on September 12. Subject: The war in 
the east, the Greer incident and German-US relations, 
Japanese policy, Italian workers in Germany, and short- 
ages of strategic raw materials in Italy. 

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Forwards a memorandum by an informant regarding 
Ciano's -views on the war: Neither the Axis nor ling- 
land can win, and a compromise peace is necessary. 

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with Oiano who showed him 
a copv of an Italian report (document No. 356) describ- 
ing maltreatment of Italian laborers in Germany. 

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Transmits the text of the Italian report referred to 
in telegram No. 2315 (document No. 655). 

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports in detail on the situation in the South lirol, 
the problem of the resettlement of the German popula- 
tion; the attitude of the Italian authorities, and the 
future tasks of the German High Commissioner. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary ,. d 

Records a conversation with Alfieri who mentioned 
the complaints of the Italian laborers in Germany and 
suggested the possibility of returning all Italian la- 
borers in Germany to Italy. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Hecords a conversation with Allien about the treat- 
ment of Italian laborers in Germany. While many of 
the Italian complaints appeared to be unfounded there 
were enough discrepancies to deserve investigation by 
everts from both sides. Alfieri was ^^ ™?^ 
the circular attributed to Kreisleiter Goldbeck of Reck- 
linghausen (see document No. 281). 
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister 1 * 

Record of the conversation between the foreign Min- 
ister and Ambassador Alfieri at Headquarters on Octo- 
ber 17 Ribbentrop discussed the Russian campaign, 
the prospects for England and America, the case of 
KreiSr Goldbeck, g the problem of Italian workers 
in Germany, Alfieri's report on Hitler's latest speech. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy *»/*".ty.. _ . . 
Explains that the alleged circular of Kreisleiter Gold- 
beck has been investigated and the document proved 
to be the work of two delegates of the Italian Govern- 

m Directs the Ambassador to request a copy of the 
document; to submit the German report on the matter 
to Ciano or Anfuso; and to insist that Mussolini be 
fully informed. 



308 



483 



354 



355 



356 



362 



375 



397 



560 



562 



563 



575 



605 



639 



409 



653 



410 



662 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 



xxxin 



Italy — Continued 



Date 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Page 



1941 
Oct. 19 Ambassador Alfieri to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop 

Refers to his recent meeting with Eibbentrop (see 
document No. 409) and defends his reports about 
complaints of Italian workers in Germany. Alfieri 
also stated that the sentiment of the German people, 
in general, was not favorable to Italy. 

Oct. 25 The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry 

Glodius reports about his recent conversations in 
Rome regarding the dwindling Italian supplies of oil 
and grain. According to Admiral Riccardi 54,000 tons 
of oil were needed immediately; otherwise transport 
operations to Libya would have to be suspended during 
November. 

Oct. 26 Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Records the conversation at Headquarters on October 
25 between Hitler and Ciano. Hitler reviewed the 
campaign in Russia, and his pla ns f or the future . Ciano 
mentioned the food situation in Italy, Italian workers 
in Germany, and increased Italian military participa- 
tion in the war in the East. 

Oct. 29 Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini 

Explains the latest military developments on the 
eastern front; lists all possible moves by Britain 
against Germany and his own countermeasures; and 
suggests to Mussolini more effective methods of opera- 
tions in North Africa. 

Kov. 1 Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic 
Policy Department 
Reports having refused the request of Riccardi for 
German consent to his purchase of 100,000 tons of 
Rumanian grain for Italy. 

Nov. 3 Memorandum by the Director of the Department for Ger- 
man Internal Affairs 
Records a discussion with Brigadefuhrer Muller 
regarding the treatment of Italian laborers in Ger- 
many. Those guilty of infractions are no longer to 
be sent to labor training camps but sent back to Italy. 

Nov. 4 Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Alfieri 

Replies to Alfieri' s letter of October 19 (docu- 
ment No. 411), minimizes the seriousness of the com- 
plaints of Italian workers in Germany and asserts 
that, contrary to Alfieri 's information, the attitude of 
the German people toward Italy is friendly. 

Nov. 6 Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler 

Replies to Hitler's letter of October 29 (document 
No. 433) and reaffirms his belief in victory over 
Bolshevism. He is convinced that America will 
actively intervene and land an expeditionary force 
in Egypt; he examines the various possibilities of 
enemy action and declares that Italy is well pre- 
pared for all eventualities. He gratefully accepts 
Hitler's offers of raw materials, weapons, and of the 
X German Air Corps. 



411 



421 



664 



679 



424 



687 



433 



440 



444 



446 



454 



709 



725 



730 



733 



749 



682-903—64- 



XXXIV 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Italy — Continued 



Date 

1941 
Nov. 7 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Nov. 24 



Nov. 25 



Nov. 28 



Nov. 30 



The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with Ciano who drew at- 
tention to certain anti-Italian activities in the Mitro- 
vica area which allegedly enjoyed German support. 

The Director of the Political Department to the Pleni- 
potentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Mili- 
tary Commander in Serbia 
States that incoming reports indicate a tendency of 
the military administration in the Mitrovica area to 
sympathize with anti-Italian Albanian elements. Di- 
rects that the problem be taken up with the Military 
Commander to prevent the area from becoming a 
Bource of Italo-German friction. 

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy 

In response to telegram No. 2828 (document No. 
456) directs Mackensen to assure Ciano that there is no 
support of anti-Italian elements by the German mili- 
tary in the Mitrovica area. There should be no re- 
sponse to the earlier suggestion of Italian incorporation 
of Mitrovica. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Eecords a conversation held on November 25 be- 
tween Ribbentrop and Ciano which Serrano Buner 
joined at a later stage. They discussed relations with 
France, Croatia, Greece, the campaign in Russia and its 
significance for England and for Turkey. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 

Records a conversation of November 29 between 
Hitler and Ciano in which Hitler explained the military 
operations and problems in the east. Ciano transmitted 
a request of Mussolini to contribute additional 
Italian divisions to the eastern front. Both agreed on 
the stability of the domestic situation in Germany and 
Italy. 

The Military Attache in Italy to the General Staff of the 
Army, Attache Department _ 

Reports a conversation on December 1 with Musso- 
lini who insisted that the only possibility of radically 
improving the supply traffic with Libya lay in the use 
of the harbor of Bizerte. 

The High Commissioner of the Reick Government for the 
South Tirolese Resettlement to the Ambassador zn 

Writes that a discussion with the Italian High Com- 
missioner, Signor Podesta, brought out that the resettle- 
ment had reached a dead point. PodesU urged that 
the Reich designate a resettlement area but it appears 
that he wishes to push the German side into applying 
for a moratorium on the resettlement. 

Dec 7 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy 

Explains the intention of Mussolini, as expounded to 
Rintelen (see document No. 532), to gain use of Bizerte 
as the only means to relieve the supply situation of 
North Africa. Directs Mackensen to tell Ciano that 
the French should not be approached on the matter 
until the Axis had reestablished command of the sea and 
air in the Central Mediterranean. 



Dec. 2 



Dec. 4 



456 



495 



Fags 



758 



817 



497 



S19 



501 



826 



522 



900 



532 



544 



934 



954 



552 



967 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Italy — Continued 



XXXV 



Date 

1941 
Dec. 7 



Dec. 10 



Subject 



Pege 



The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having spoken about Bizerte to Ciano who 
had not yet received instructions for the Turin meeting. 
Ciano stated that he would not enter into concrete 
discussion of a matter like Bizerte without first reaching 
full agreement with Germany. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Records a conversation between Ribbentrop and 
Alfieri on December 9. Alfieri asked about Germany's 
position regarding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
and about the contents of the G6ring-P6tain conver- 
sation at Florentin-Vergigny (see document No. 529). 
Ribbentrop expressed his great satisfaction over Japan's 
entrance into the war and stated that information about 
the Florentin meeting had already been sent to Rome, 

(See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact," "Bulgaria," 
"Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Prance," 
"Greece," "Tripartite Pact," and "Yugoslavia.") 



557 



569 



974 



994 



Japan 



1941 
June 23 



June 25 



June 28 



June 28 



June 28 



The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with Matsuoka in order to 
explain the German attack on Soviet Russia. Mat- 
suoka asked if Germany reckoned on a quick collapse 
of the Stalin regime and mentioned that Oshima's 
reports indicated that Hitler and Ribbentrop did not 
expect the active participation of Japan against Russia. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a visit by Matsuoka who stated that the 
Russian Ambassador had asked if Japan would remain 
neutral in the Russo-German war. Matsuoka had 
intentionally left Smetanin in the dark in order to 
prevent Russian troop withdrawals from the Far 
East. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports on the discussion in Japanese Government 
and Army circles as to whether Japan should attack 
the Soviet Union or take vigorous military action in 
the South. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

Explains that he has arranged with Oshima to in- 
fluence his Government in favor of speedy military 
action against the Soviet Union. Instructs Ott to use 
all his influence toward the same end and suggests 
seven arguments to be used. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

States that Russian military resistance may collapse 
sooner than previously expected and that his earlier 
advice that Japan should intervene actively against 
the Soviet Union therefore assumes special impor- 
tance. 



14 



18 



33 



35 



36 



36 



40 



41 



XXXVI 



Date 



1941 
July 1 



July 3 



July 3 



July 3 



July 5 



July 10 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Japan — Continued 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



July 10 



Pflge 



The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

Directs Ott to deliver to Matsuoka a personal tele- 
gram in which Ribbentrop states that Russia is on the 
verge of collapse and urges that Japan take the oppor- 
tunity to seize Vladivostok and advance westward so 
that the defeat of Russia would free both Europe and 
the Far East, prepare the final defeat of England, and 
paralyze any tendency of the United States to inter- 
vene. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Refers to the instructions from Ribbentrop (docu- 
ments Nos. 35 and 36) and reports that he has brought 
influences to bear on the Japanese leaders in favor of a 
rapid action against the Soviet Union. Reports that 
Matsuoka gave him a statement for Ribbentrop and 
that he explained that Japan was not at present in a 
position to enter the war against the Soviet Union. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Refers to his telegram of July 2 (document No. 63) 
and transmits a statement from Matsuoka informing 
Ribbentrop that Japan, while preparing for all possible 
eventualities regarding the U.S.S.R., has also decided 
to secure points d'appui in French Indochina in order 
to increase her pressure on Britain and the United 
States which will constitute a contribution to the com- 
mon cause no less vital than Japanese intervention in 
the German-Soviet war. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having carried out the instructions conveyed 
in telegram No. 942 (document No. 53) whereupon 
Matsuoka expressed full agreement with Ribbentrop 
and regretted that his opinions could not prevail in the 
Cabinet. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

Offers a correction of the account which Matsuoka 
gave Ott in May 1941 regarding his discussions with 
Ribbentrop in Berlin prior to the conclusion of the 
Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact of April 1941. 
Explains that conclusion of the Pact was not appro- 
priate and came as a surprise. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Minister 

Reports having been told by Matsuoka that no 
American replv to Japan's latest proposals had been 
received but that he had learned from an informant 
that an American reply was verbally received. Re- 
quests information on this new American move to 
counteract the pro-American clique in the Japanese 
Government. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

Requests more detailed information on Japanese- 
American relations, on the Japanese attitude toward 
the landing of American forces in Iceland, and on 
Japanese reactions to his message of July 1 to Matsuoka 
(see document No. 53). Expresses confidence that the 
Japanese Government will seize this unique oppor- 
tunity for settling the Russian and the Chinese prob- 
lems and securing Japan's southward expansion. 



53 



61 



63 



73 



64 



75 



65 



72 



76 



84 



88 



108 



89 



110 



.ANALYTICAL LIST OP DOCUMENTS 



xxxvn 



Japan — Continued 



Bate 



1)941 
July 12 



July 14 



July 17 



July 18 



July 18 



July 19 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



July 20 



July 20 



The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

States that his report of July 10 based on confidential 
information regarding the receipt of an American 
reply to the latest Japanese proposals (document No. 
88) was confirmed by Deputy Foreign Minister Ohashi 
who supplied additional details on the subject. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Replies to the instructions of July 10 (document No. 
80) and refers to his previous reports on Japanese- 
American relations. States that the Japanese Gov- 
ernment, including Matsuoka, views the possibility of 
an American entry into the war with concern. Em- 
phasizes that he is using all his influence to bring about 
an early participation of Japan in the war. 

Editors' Note 

Reference to Hitler's conversation with Ambassador 
Oshima on July 15. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports regarding discussions with influential leaders 
of the Japanese Army military who emphasized the 
need for making extensive preparations for any cam- 
paign against Soviet Russia, in view of the strength 
of the Soviet forces facing Japan. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Summarizes the main points of the American reply 
to the Japanese proposals of May 1941 (see volume 
XII, of this series, document No. 512) and of the 
Japanese counterproposals about to be sent to Am- 
bassador Nomura, both of which had been communi- 
cated to Ambassador Ott by an official of the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry. 

Memorandum by Ambassador Stahmer 

Comments in a brief for Ribbentrop and Hitler on the 
resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and considers it 
likely that the next Cabinet will have a Foreign 
Minister who will promote developments in accordance 
with the Tripartite Pact. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

Refers to the negotiations between Japan and the 
United States and directs Ott to express as his own 
the view that the toning down in the Japanese counter- 
proposals of passages of importance to the powers of the 
Tripartite Pact would only encourage further demands 
by the United States. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Forwards the text of a statement by the new Japa- 
nese Foreign Minister Toyoda addressed to the Ambas- 
sadors of Germany and Italy assuring them that Japan's 
attitude will not change and that Toyoda will continue 
Matsuoka's foreign policy. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Discusses the composition and policies of the new 
Japanese Cabinet and states that the elimination of 
Matsuoka was the aim of the resignation of the previous 
Cabinet. Does not expect the new Cabinet to pursue a 
vigorous poliey with respect to the United States or to 
the Soviet Union or China. 



Page 



95 



105 



121 



131 



117 



123 



141 



158 



169 



124 



127 



173 



179 



130 



131 



185 



186 



xxxvin 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS. 
Ja pan — Continued 



Dat« 



Subject 



Doc. No, 



Page 



1941 
July 21 



July 21 



Aug. 5 



Aug. 20 



Aug, 22 



Aug. 24 



Aug. 25 



Aug. 29 



The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

Refers to Ott's telegram of July 19 (document 
No. 131) and asks for clarification regarding the part 
played in Matsuoka's dismissal by his negotiation of 
the Neutrality Pact with Russia. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Refers to the instruction of July 19 f document 
No. 127) and reports having told the Deputy Foreign 
Minister of his personal objections to the toning down 
of passages in the Japanese counterproposals to the 
United States. Reports that the counterproposals 
had already been sent before Matsuoka's resignation. 

Memorandum by an Officer in the Intelligence Depart- 
ment of the Army General Staff 
Records the visit on August 4 at the Intelligence 
Department of Japanese Military Attach^ General 
Banzai who, on instructions from the Japanese General 
Staff, stated that the Japanese Army and Government 
were determined to enter the war against Soviet Russia 
as soon as the strategic concentration of the forces 
would permit. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy 
Department 
Reviews the course of the negotiations with Japan 
regarding rubber and general economic matters and 
emphasizes the difficulties raised by the Japanese with 
regard to Germany's imports of rubber. Suggests that 
the Foreign Minister discuss these issues with Oshima. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the announcement of American ship- 
ments of aviation gasoline has placed the Japanese 
Government in a dilemma in the face of which no de- 
cision has been reached, for the Navy tends to exag- 
gerate the dangers of an operation in the North and the 
Army feels greater misgivings about an early war with 
the Soviet Union, 

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter 

Forwards a report of August 22 from the Naval 
Attache" in Tokyo based on conversations with leading 
Japanese Naval officers. The Japanese Navy believes 
that there will be no Japanese attack on Russia but 
that Japan, after consolidation of her bases in 
Indochina, will occupy Thailand and the Dutch oil- 
fields, attack Manila, and blockade Singapore. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

Refers to Ott's report of August 22 (document No. 
225) and outlines several arguments with which Ott 
is directed to counter the irresolution of the Japanese 
Government: the Red Army is practically destroyed; 
the United States has reacted with economic sanctions 
and words only to Japan's occupation of Indochina; 
Japan now has a freedom of choice; and can end the 
threat of encirclement by an active policy. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having learned from Japanese Deputy For- 

, eign Minister Amau that Prime Minister Konoye had 

1 sent a message to President Roosevelt. Ott expressed 

, serious doubts about the advisability of a conciliatory 

gesture by Japan. 



136 



137 



197 



198 



177 



282 



216 



338 



225 



351 



235 



367 



239 



375 



256 



410 



Date 

1941 
Aug. 30 



Sept. 4 



Sept. 4 



Sept. 8 



Sept. 13 



Sept. 14 



Sept. 16 



Sept. 16 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Japan — Continued 



XXXIX 



Subject 



The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Refers to the instruction of August 25 (document 
No. 239) and reports having given the Japanese For- 
eign Minister a picture of the situation. Toyoda de- 
clined to give particulars about Konoye's message to 
President Roosevelt and acted with reserve. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports on the Japanese domestic situation which 
led to Konoye's message to President Roosevelt. Ex- 
presses the opinion that the attempt of the circles 
around Konoye to seek a modus vivendi with the 
United States cannot succeed in view of the deep-seated 
conflicts of Interest between the two countries. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Records a discussion with Oshima regarding the 
German-Japanese negotiations relating to rubber and 
raw materials and having urged that the important 
economic questions not be decided by departmental 
particularism detached from joint policy. 

Extract From the Notes of the Representative of the For- 
eign Ministry With the High Command of the Army 
Record of Weizsacker's view that Japan should be 
pressed to attack Vladivostok and of Hitler's view 
opposing such pressure lest it be interpreted as a sign 
of weakness. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been assured by Foreign Minister 
Toyoda that the recent messages exchanged between 
Roosevelt and Konoye merely meant a resumption of 
Japanese-American talks that had broken off and that 
.Japan would not assume any commitment contrary to 
the Tripartite Pact. Toyoda, however, refused to 
reveal the texts of these messages. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

Refers to President Roosevelt's speech of September 
11 and directs Ott to criticize it and to explain that 
Germany will not be deflected from the policy followed 
so far. Refers to the negotiations of Japan with the 
United States and directs Ott to urge Japan to state 
clearly in Washington that further acts of aggression by 
the United States will evoke the case of the alliance 
under the Tripartite Pact. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

With reference to the instruction of September 13 
(document No. 316) reports that Toyoda gave assur- 
ances that Japan would come to the aid of the Axis 
Powers in case of an American attack and that he 
would submit the German suggestions to the Cabinet. 

The Slate Secretary to the Embassy in Japan 

Explains that Oshima was received by Ribbentrop at 
Headquarters on August 23, and that he was informed 
of the Japanese-American conversations by Weizsacker 
on September 4. Oshima was grateful because he had 
been kept in the dark by his own Government. 



Doc. No. 



Page 



259 



276 



414 



446 



278 



291 



310 



450 



466 



490 



316 



503 



324 



325 



515 



516 



XL 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Ja pa n — Continued 



Date 



Subject 



Doc. No. Page 



1941 
Sept. 20 



Sept. 21 



Sept. 26 



Oct. 4 



Oct. 6 



Oct. 20 



Oct. 31 



The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports the text of the Japanese Government's reply 
to the German suggestion for a Japanese statement to 
be addressed to the United States. It assures Germany 
that in the negotiations thus far, Japan, in accordance 
with the Tripartite Pact, has fulfilled her task of re- 
straining America from entering the war. Ott con- 
sidered the statement as far from precise. 

The Embassy in Ike United States to the Foreign Ministry 
Reports a discussion with the Japanese Military At- 
tache, General Isoda, who on instruction discussed the 
possibility of British or American intervention if Japan 
should attack Russia or occupy Thailand or the Neth- 
erlands Indies. Botticher presented the views given 
in his own reports, pointing to weaknesses in the British 
position and in America. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Forwards the text of the Japanese statement intended 
for the United States which points out that the threat of 
a German-American war would cause grave concern 
to Japan as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact. Reports 
having told Amau that it seemed doubtful that the 
statement would deter the United States from further 
aggressive action. 

The Ambassador in, Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Presents a picture of Japan's position as sketched 
by leaders of the Army : a disinclination to consider an 
attack against Soviet Russia before next spring; a pref- 
erence for an attack against the Anglo-Saxon position 
in the south which would not be dependent on the time 
of year; a tendency to regard the British Empire as the 
enemy and to ignore the possibility of intervention by 
the united States, yet with a growing feeling that con- 
flict with the United States is unavoidable. 

The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Recommends that for economic as well as political 
reasons consideration be shown for Japan's wishes. 
Argues that a halt in the production or a confiscation of 
goods ordered by Japan would result in the cessation 
of Japanese deliveries of strategic materials, would 
frustrate hopes in the Tripartite Pact and increase the 
danger of a Japanese-American detente. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Comments upon the members of the new Tojo 
Cabinet and emphasizes that certain Ministers who 
represented conservative and business elements are 
no longer in the government. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with Foreign Minister Togo 
who stated that no decision had yet been taken regard- 
ing an intensified warning to the United States and 
who asked how the German Government visualized 
the further conduct of the war. Ott explains his im- 
pression that the Japanese Government is still uncertain 
about the policy to be adopted. 



342 



537 



345 



543 



359 



569 



378 



608 



381 



613 



413 



434 



667 



717 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Japan — -Continued 



XM 



Data 



Subject 



Doo. No. 



Page 



1941 
Nov. 6 



Nov. 9 



Nov. 18 



Nov. 21 



Nov. 21 



Nov. 22 



Nov. 23 



The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 451 744 

Reports a conversation with Foreign Minister Togo 
regarding the dispatch of Ambassador Kurusu to 
Washington. Togo stated that instructions for a 
warning to Roosevelt which Japan had promised had 
not been issued, but explained that definite limits had 
been set for Kurusu's negotiations which he might not 
exceed. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 458 760 

Directs Ott to make use in his conversations of an 
appraisal of American-Japanese relations based on the 
reports from the Military Attache 1 in Washington. 
This appraisal emphasizes that America is unable to 
support a war in the Pacific and Atlantic and that 
Japan, therefore, should not fail to act at such a 
favorable moment. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 480 798 

Reports that the Military Attache was told that the 
Japanese General Staff is not reckoning on a peaceful 
settlement with the United States; that the Japanese 
thrust to the south will come before Germany shifts 
her main effort from Russia to the Near East; and that 
the Japanese General Staff wishes a mutual obligation 
by Germany and Japan not to conclude any separate 
peace or armistice. 

The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 486 805 

The Military Attache 1 reports that the objectives of 
any Japanese operations in the south are possibly the 
'occupation of Thailand and the oil fields of British and 
Dutch Borneo and a surprise attack on the Philippines 
"in the event of a threatening American attitude about 
which there can hardly be any doubt." 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 487 806 

Directs Ott to inform the Head of the Department 
of Foreign Armies of the Japanese General Staff that 
Germany considered it a matter of course that in case 
Germany or Japan became involved in a war with the 
United States they would only conclude a peace or 
armistice jointly. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 488 807 

Reports having been assured by Foreign Minister 
Togo that Japan was taking a firm attitude in the nego- 
tiations . with the United States and having received 
confidential information regarding these discussions. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 492 813 

Reports having carried out the instruction of Novem- 
ber 21 (document No. 487) and that General Okamoto 
asked whether Germany would consider herself at war 
with the United States if Japan opened hostilities 
against that country. 

Unsigned Memorandum 512 868 

Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and 
Oshima on November 28. Ribbentrop inquired about 
the state of the Japanese-American conversations, and 
about Japanese intentions regarding Thailand and 
Indochina. He expressed the view thnt it might be best 
for Japan to have a showdown with the United States 
at this most favorable moment. 



xlh 



ANALYTICAL LIST OP DOCUMENTS 



Japan — Continued 



Data 



1941 
Nov. 30 



Deo. 5 



Dec. 6 



Dee. 6 



Dec. 9 



Subject 



The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been informed by the Japanese 
Foreign Minister that the American note of November 
26 indicated a wide divergence of the respective posi- 
tions in the Japanese-American negotiations. States 
that Foreign Minister Togo emphasized that American 
efforts to make the Tripartite Pact inoperative were a 
principal obstacle to success in the negotiations. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports Japanese determination following the receipt 
of the American note of November 26. States that he 
has so far advised against an attack on the United 
States and requests instructions. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been informed by the Japanese 
Foreign Minister of the Japanese reply to a recent 
American inquiry regarding concentration of Japanese 
forces in Indochina. States that the Foreign Minister's 
line of conversation indicated the resistance which 
Japan has to overcome while she is reaching a decision. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy, in Japan 

Refers to Ott's telegram of December 5 (document 
No. 545) and states that it would be inappropriate to 
suggest to the Japanese Government a particular course 
of action with regard to the United States. Directs 
Ott to tell the Japanese that the Axis Powers and Japan 
must fight this struggle together regardless of the 
tactical moves of one or the other partner in the indi- 
vidual case. 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that Foreign Minister Togo personally 
informed him about Japan's decision to enter the war 
and of his expectation that Germany would promptly 
declare war on the United States. Says that he made 
the statement as directed in Ribbentrop's telegram of 
December 6 (document No. 551). 



(See also under 
"Indochina," 

States.") 



"Anti-Comintern 
"Tripartite Pact, 



Pact," 
" and 



"China," 

"United 



Latin America 



Doc. No. 



524 



906 



545 



550 



956 



964 



551 



966 



567 



990 



1941 
July 5 



July 11 



The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry 73 86 

Reports a conversation with the Argentine Foreign 
Minister who explained that after Russia's impending 
defeat neither Germany nor England would be able to 
defeat the other and who urged a mediation by Presi- 
dent Roosevelt. Reports that he objected that 
Roosevelt was unsuitable. 

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the 93 119 

Embassy in Brazil 
Directs that the Brazilian Government be informed 
that the execution of the Krupp contract regarding 
deliveries of war material would be upheld and a new 
production plan would be worked out. 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Latin America — Continued 



XLIII 



Date 



Subject 



Doe. No. 



1941 
July 16 



July 20 



July 25 



July 27 



Aug. 14 



Aug. 27 



Sept. 3 



Sept. 4 



Sept. 9 



Sept. 23 



The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina 

Refers to the report of July 5 (document No. 73) and 
expresses agreement with the Ambassador's view 
toward the suggestion of mediation by Roosevelt. 
Directs Thermann not to touch on the idea of good 
offices of the Argentine Government. 

The Minister in Bolivia to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that a state of siege has been proclaimed 
by the Bolivian Government which has declared him 
to be persona non grata. 

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the 
Embassy in Argentina 
Transmits the text of a memorandum about Ger- 
many's attitude toward the proposed Argentine- 
Brazilian customs union. Germany favored it because 
it would increase South American resistance to United 
States political and economic encroachments and be- 
cause it would provide a greater market for a future 
greater German economic area, 

The Director of the News Service and Press Department 
to Various Missions 
Explains that Major Belmonte, Bolivian Military 
Attach^, will brand the letter allegedly written by him 
to Minister Wendler as a falsification. Directs that the 
"Belmonte Case" be prominently publicized. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records Ribbentrop's view that the arrest of five 
Party members in Chile automatically justified official 
reprisals and notes that preparations for these were 
being made. 

Memorandum by the Stale Secretary 

Records a conversation with the Argentine Ambassa- 
dor in which he protested about various incidents in 
Argentina which had worsened the relations between 
the two countries. 

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports an interpellation in the Chamber of Deputies 
suggesting that the German Ambassador be declared 
persona non grata. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records a conversation with the Argentine Am- 
bassador who inquired about the arrest of 11 Argen- 
tineans in Paris and whether these were reprisals for 
the arrest of Germans in Argentina. Woermann 
denied any relationship between the two actions. 

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with the Argentine Foreign 
Minister who suggested the possibility that the German 
Government itself bring about the recall of Ambassador 
Thermann. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records that the arrest of Chileans in Germany has 
had an effect on the Chilean Government, especially 
in connection with the arrest of Germans in Chile. To 
prevent a further deterioration of the relationship 
between the two countries, Woermann suggests an 
elastic use of reprisals and at least a temporary release 
of the arrested Chilean citizens. 



112 



135 



154 



Page 



142 



195 



217 



158 



202 



251 



274 



279 



293 



351 



224 



314 



401 



443 



451 



469 



555 



XLIV 



Date 



1941 
Nov. 6 



Nov. 29 



Deo. 1 



Dec. 10 



Dec. 11 



1941 

June 25 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Latin America — Continued 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



The Embassy in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that General Miller, Chief of the U.S. Mili- 
tary Mission, demanded cooperation of the Brazilian 
Minister of War for the establishment of U.S. bases 
in Brazil, but that the Minister of War refused and 
the American Ambassador disavowed General Miller. 

The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with Colonel Benjamin 
Vargas, the brother of the President, who conveyed 
the President's desire to remain on good terms with 
Germany and explained that concessions made to the 
United States did not mean any fundamental change 
in Brazil's foreign policy. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina 

Directs Ambassador Thermann to explain that now 
that the agitation against his person has subsided, the 
German Government would be willing to consider a 
simultaneous replacement of its Ambassador in 
Buenos Aires and of the Argentine Ambassador in 
Berlin. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile, and to the Legation in Peru 
Instructs the German representative to inform the 
Foreign Minister of the state of war between the United 
States and Germany, Japan, and Italy; to explain that 
this was entirely due to the policy of the United States; 
and was the exclusive responsibility of President 
Roosevelt. 

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry 

Refers to the Foreign Minister's instruction of De- 
cember 10 (document No. 570) and reports his con- 
versation with the Argentine Foreign Minister who 
explained that future German-Argentine relations 
would have to take account of Argentina's adherence 
to the principles of Pan-American solidarity, assistance 
and defense. 

(See also under "Portugal," and "United States.") 



Page 



Middle East 



July 4 



450 



520 



743 



895 



528 



912 



570 



996 



575 



1002 



Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 19 

Notes the suggestion from the French Government 
that in case of a French request for military aid in 
Syria, Germany issue a declaration recognizing French 
rights there. Advises against an unqualified declara- 
tion which would run counter to German policy toward 
the Arabs. 

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 71 

Reports a conversation with French State Secretary 
Benoist-Mechin dealing with Turkish wishes with 
regard to occupation of Syria, German-French rela- 
tions, and German intentions with regard to the occu- 
pied countries. 



22 



82 



DiitO 

1941 
July 9 



July 12 



July 20 



July 30 



Aug. 1 



Aug. 5 



Aug. 6 



Aug. 19 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Middle East — Continued 



XLV 



Subject 



Doe. No. 



The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that Iran is taking military measures to 
defend herself against any English attack and that 
she would appeal to Germany for help if such an attack 
should be made. 

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy 
in Italy and to the Embassy in Paris 
Explains that Minister Cosmelli has been informed 
that the English have proposed to General Dentz a sus- 
pension of hostilities, and that the German Govern- 
ment, while warning the French of English insincerity, 
left the decision to them. 

The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secre- 
tariat 
Directs all Foreign Ministry personnel concerned 
with Arab propaganda to support henceforth Arab 
wishes for unlimited political freedom; the collapse of 
French resistance in Syria has eliminated the hitherto 
existing reasons for German reserve in this matter. 

Memorandum, by Minister Rahn 

Report on the German mission in Syria from May 9 
to July 11, 1941 : I Mission (p. 237) ; II Journey (p. 238) ; 
III First Meeting with High Commissioner General 
Dentz (p. 239); IV Damascus (p. 242); V First Arms 
Transports (p. 243) ; VI Additional Arms Transports 
(p. 244); VII War Preparations in Syria (p. 245); VIII 
Representatives of the Wehrmacht in Syria (p. 248) ; 
IX The "Arab Movement" (p. 250); X German Inter- 
vention in Syria (p. 251) ; XI The English Attack (p. 253) ; 
XII Economic Matters (p. 256) ; XIII Supplies (p. 258) ; 
XIV "Desert War" (p. 260) ; XV The Armistice (p. 264) ; 
XVI Conclusion (p. 265). 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the British Minister presented a note 
to the Iranian Foreign Ministry recommending the 
removal of Germans from the country. 

Memorandum by Minister Grobba 

Reviews Gaylani's proposal for German-Iraq coop- 
eration. Recommends that Germany aim for his rein- 
statement aS Iraq Minister President. Proposes that 
Germany negotiate agreements with Iraq which would 
become effective when German occupation of Iraq is 
imminent. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Refers to Grobba's memorandum of August 5 (docu- 
ment No. 180) and explains that some degree of Italian 
participation will be necessary. Recommends careful 
internal preparation prior to discussions with Gaylani. 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with the Iranian Minister Presi- 
dent regarding the British demand for the removal of 
Germans from Iraq. Agrees with the Minister Presi- 
dent that an organized, official departure of German 
residents would have a devastating effect on Iranian 
morale. 



Page 



84 



101 



103 



128 



132 



188 



165 



237 



171 



180 



272 



285 



183 



215 



288 



335 



XLVI 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Middle East — Continued 



Date 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



1941 
Aug. 21 



Aug. 23 



Aug. 25 



Aug. 25 



Aug. 25 

Aug. 28 
Sept. 1 

Sept. 4 



Sept. 7 



The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been told by the secretary of the 
Grand Mufti of Italian attempts to induce the Grand 
Mufti and Gaylani to conclude political and economic 
agreements with Italy at this time. 

The Foreign Minister to Ike Legation in Iran 

Instructs Ettel to convey to the Shah a message 
expressing hope that he will continue to resist 
encroachment on Iran's sovereignty for a short while 
longer and explaining that Germany meanwhile was 
advancing farther into the Ukraine and that Russia's 
power to resist was plainly ebbing. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy 
Department 
Record of interministerial conference of August 23. 
Agreement was readied on the basic principles for the 
economic provisions of a German-Iraq draft treaty to 
be discussed with Gaylani on his forthcoming visit to 
Germany. 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having conveyed Hitler's message to the 
Shah (see document No. 230) who stated that the Soviet 
Ambassador and British Ambassador had presented a 
note explaining that their troops were entering Iran 
because of failure of her Government to expel the Reich 
Germans. The Shah asks that Turkey be approached 
to bring about a cessation of hostilities. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Notes foreign reports of an Anglo- Russian invasion 
of Iran. Proposes a seven-point program for immedi- 
ate action. 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Shah has ordered the Iranian troops 
to make no further use of arms. 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with the Foreign Minister and 
Minister President regarding the fate of the German 
colony in Iran and that he warned against expulsion of 
the Reich Germans without assurances of safe conduct 
to Turkey. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Personal Staff 
Records having discussed with Hitler the situation 
of the German colony in Iran. Hitler approved the 
proposal by the Foreign Minister that the German 
Legation not be withdrawn until the fate of the Ger- 
mans in Iran had been decided. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran 

Advises Ettel that internment of the members of the 
German colony in Iran by the British is to be preferred 
over their surrender to the Bolshevists. Informs Ettel 
of a communication for the British Government by 
way of Switzerland threatening reprisals against Eng- 
lish residents of the Channel Islands in case of refusal to 
grant safe conduct to the German colony in Iran. 



221 



230 



344 



358 



233 



361 



240 



379 



243 



252 



263 



280 



388 



402 



419 



452 



287 



461 



ANALYTICAL LIST OP DOCUMENTS 
Middle East — Continued 



XLvn 



Date 

1941 
Sept. 9 



Sept. 12 



Sept. 12 



Sept. 13 



Sept. 14 



Sept. 15 



Oct. 13 



Oct. 28 



Nov. 5 



Subject 



The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Iranian Foreign Minister made 
public an exchange of notes indicating that the Allies 
were demanding the surrender of the German colony 
to the British or Russians. 

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister 

States with respect to a Soviet demand for the sur- 
render of a number of Germans in Iran that reprisals 
will be taken against Soviet citizens in areas under 
German control. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Personal Staff 
Records Hitler's wish that 10 Englishmen be de- 
ported from the Channel Islands to the Pripet Marshes 
for every German deported from Iran. 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports on his negotiations with Iranian Foreign 
Ministry officials requesting an extension of the time 
limit for the deportation of the German colony. States 
that he informed the men of the colony that their de- 
parture could be no longer delayed lest the Bafe con- 
duct promised for the women and children be jeop- 
ardized. 

The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Reiterates that for every German from Iran interned 
by the British, 10 British subjects from the Channel 
Islands are to be interned in the Pripet Marshes. 
Directs that such measures be prepared for execution 
at a moment's notice but that the effective date will 
be given later. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records that Ribbentrop rejected a proposal by 
Bohle that Stalin's son and high-ranking Russian 
officers who had been taken prisoner be used as bar- 
gaining points in negotiations with the Soviet Union 
regarding the Germans in Iran. 

The Charge d' Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been told by Anfuso in strictest 
secrecy that the Grand Mufti had arrived in Italy a 
short while ago. 

The Charge d' Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been told by Anfuso that the Grand 
Mufti had made a favorable impression on Mussolini 
and had told him that his aim was political independ- 
ence for Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. 

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that Anfuso handed Bismarck the text of 
a declaration agreed upon by Mussolini, Ciano, and 
the Grand Mufti which was to be issued by the Grand 
Mufti after German consent had been obtained. 



Doe. No. Pags 



295 



305 



306 



311 



317 



322 



399 



428 



449 



471 



482 



482 



494 



508 



512 



641 



704 



742 



xlvhi 



Date 



1941 
Nov. 6 



Nov. 13 



Nov. 15 



Nov. 19 



Nov. 23 



Nov. 28 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Middle East — Continued 



Subject 



Nov. 30 



Nov. 28 



Doc. No. 



Memorandum by Minister Grobba 

Records the arrival of the Grand Mufti m Berlin 
and the discussions held with him and Alberto Mellini 
of the Italian Foreign Ministry with regard to the text 
of the proposed declaration transmitted in Mackensen'a 
telegram of November 5 (document No. 449). 

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister 

Submits to Hitler a summary of developments in 
the Arab, Indian, and Pan-Turanian questions together 
with proposals for German activities in these matters. 
Recommends that the Grand Mufti be received by 
Hitler. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Personal Staff 
Records Hitler's comments on Ribbentrop s memo- 
randum of November 13 (document No. 468). Notes 
that Hitler will receive the Grand Mufti but regards 
the Pan-Arab question as pertaining to the Italian 
sphere of influence and that he considers it contrary 
to German interests to promote a Pan-Turanian feel- 
ing. 

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy 
in Italy 
Asks Mackensen to ascertain the views of the Italian 
Government concerning the idea under consideration 
in Berlin that a council of Arab leaders with head- 
quarters in Rome should be set up. 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 

States that the projected German-Italian declaration 
on the independence of Uie Arab states in the Near 
East would adversely affect German-French collabora- 
tion and weaken the will to resist in French North 
and West Africa. Urges that the French be informed 
beforehand of the declaration and that its issuance be 
postponed until a later date. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and 
the Grand Mufti. The Foreign Minister promised 
support for the Arab cause but expressed doubt, in 
spite of the Grand Mufti's insistence, whether an Axis 
declaration in favor of Arab independence should be 
issued right away. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretarial 
Record of the conversation between Hitler and the 
Grand Mufti on November 28. Hitler promised to 
announce the hour of Arab liberation once the German 
armies stood south of the Caucasus but suggested that 
the declaration requested by the Mufti be put off for 
a few months. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records that following the Grand Mufti's reception 
by Hitler the decision was made to postpone the dec- 
laration on Arab Freedom; also a suggestion was to 
be made to the Italians that a communique" be issued 
concerning the Grand Mufti's reception by Mussolini 
which would be followed by a similar communique on 
his reception by Hitler. 



Page 



452 



468 



475 



746 



774 



786 



483 



494 



803 



815 



514 



876 



515 



881 



516 



885 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Middle East — Continued 



Date 



1941 
Dec. 2 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 

,* Jr?? rd ? tJ ? e I lslt of the former Ira 1 Minister Presi- 
dent Wlani who expressed the wish to be recognized 
immediately as Iraq Minister President and to con- 
clude with Germany a comprehensive treaty proceed- 
ing for various forms of cooperation. 

(See also under "Egypt," "India," and "Turkey.") 



536 



XLDC 



Page 



940 



Nethehlands 



1941 
June 30 



July . 3 



July 



Oct. 



Oct. 13 



Oct. 20 



The Foreign Minister to the Representative of the Foreign 

NeZ'rlanJs Commissar for the Occupied 

Instructs Bene to inquire if the Dutch have expressed 

Soviet &ET ^ VOlUnteer Units t0 fi S ht «*** 

Eeichsleiier Bormann to Reich Minister hammers 

Informs Lammers that, as a result of the radio speech 
of Queen Wilhelmma in support of Russia, Hitler had 

2S? SSJShSSS "*™ ° f thG ^^ ° f thG Nether " 

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the 
Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to 
the foreign Ministry 
Reports on the political situation and the attitude of 
the population following the outbreak of the war against 
the Soviet Union, and discusses the measures under- 
taken and planned by the Reich Commissar. 

The Representative of ike Foreign Ministry With the 
Ketch Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the 
toreign Ministry 

Reports Seyss-Inquart's account of his meeting with 
Hitler on September 26. Hitler expressed satisfaction 
oyer the current German policies and requested that 
Mussert and his NSB should become thinly political 
party in the occupied Netherlands. v 

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Depart- 

Records a conversation with the Swedish Minister 
who requested permission to visit the Mauthausen 
concentration camp where 400 Dutch Jews had died 
since February 1941. a 

The Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to 
the Chief of the Retch Chancellery 
Request a decision about the transfer of Dutch 
hostages from concentration camps in Germany to 
camps in the Netherlands to prevent an investigation 
by the Swedish Legation. 



45 



69 



75 



51 



80 



373 



598 



400 



412 



642 



666 



682-905—64- 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Portugal 



Date 

1941 
July 2 



July 13 
July 20 

July 22 

July 31 
Aug. 21 
Sept. 2 

Sept. 21 

Sept. 30 



Subject 



Doe. No. 



rasa 



The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Mtntstry 

Reports a conversation with Salazar on the possi- 
Wlftv of sending Portuguese volunteers to the eastern 
Sent- °ktazar "did not g conaider this feasible but ^ndi- 
cated his intention publicly to express his sympathy 
wit! Germany in the fight against Bolshevism. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal 

Directs the Minister to call the attention of the 
Portuguese Government to statements by American 
nolSns urging American occupation of the Azores 
ffio report the Portuguese evaluation of this matter. 

The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 

Reports that President Roosevelt Has for the present 
postponed plans for the occupation of the Cape yerde 
Islands, Azores, and Dakar and provides details about 
the President's policy and attitude. 
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 

Records a conversation with the Portuguese Minister 
about the United States' attitude toward the Azores; 
Portuguese-Spanish relations; and economic conditions 
in Spain. 
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 

Reports having learned of American plans for the 
occupation of the Azores. 

The Minister in Portugal to ^f ^.^^^ and 
Renorts on the tungsten situation in Portugal and 

the aKies of German firms in acquiring interests ,n 

tungsten mines. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records a conversation with the Portuguese Minister 

regarding attempts by the United States to interest 

BrSl^the occupation of the Azores; Portuguese^ 

Brazilian relations; and the general attitude of bpain 

and Portugal to Latin America. 

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been assured that no of^ c ° m ; 
munication has been transmitted to the P °rtuguese 
Government by Brazil regarding the Azores, but that 
the United States would inform Brazil prior to any 
American action in the Azores. 

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division IM 

Records statements by State Secretary Santos Costa 
as reported by the Air Attaclie: Portugal intended to 
maiaS strict neutrality ; she would call on ; Germany 
for help in case of an Eng ish or American landing, 
but would call on England in case of a German inva- 
sion. 



60 



103 



133 



141 



168 



224 



271 



346 



370 



69 



130 



189 



202 



267 



349 



439 



545 



594 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 



LI 



Portugal — Continued 



Data 



1941 
Nov. 22 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Page 



The Head of Division W II in the Economic Policy 
Department to the Legation in Portugal 
Informs the Legation of discussions with representa- 
tives of the Ministry of Economies and of the OKW 
leading to a plan for a guaranteed monthly supply of 
tungsten from Portugal in return for certain manu- 
factured products from Germany. 

(See also under "Spain.") 



489 



808 



Rumania 



1941 
July 1 



July 2 



July 27 



July 30 



Aug. 6 



Aug. 10 



Aug. 14 



Aug. 14 



General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 57 (j(j 

Discusses the joint military operations against the 
Soviet Union. 

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 58 68 

Reports that General Antonescu wants a common 
German-Rumanian frontier and that he opposes the 
employment of Rumanians and Hungarian troops side 
by side. 

Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu 159 225 

Expresses praise for the performance of the Ruma- 
nian troops and satisfaction over the course of the 
operations in Russia; urges Antonescu to advance with 
his forces into the area southwest of the Bug river 
and places under his command the LIV Army Corps. 

General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 167 266 

Expresses thanks for Hitler's appreciation of the 
Rumanian military achievement in the war against 
Soviet Russia and promises to carry out the military 
tasks requested by Hitler in his letter of July 27 (docu- 
ment No. 159). 

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 182 287 

Reports that a roundup of 60,000 Jews for road- 
building in Bessarabia severely damaged the Ruma- 
nian economy. Mihai Antonescu was advised to 
proeeed slowly with elimination of the Jews. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 188 296 

Secretariat 
Record of Hitler's remarks on August 7 on bestowing 
the Knight's Cross on General Antonescu. Antonescu's 
reply. 

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 200 312 

Reports that the Rumanian Government has reports 
of the intention of Hungary to occupy the Banat on 
August 16. Rumania refers to an intention of Hitler 
to settle that question only after the war. 

Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu 204 316 

Expresses his views on the future conduct of opera- 
tions. Suggests that Rumanian forces occupy the area 
between the Dneister and the Dnieper and that Ru- 
manian mobile units participate in operations east of 
the Dnieper. 



LII 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Rumania — Continued 



Date 



1941 
Aug. 16 



Aug. 17 



Aug. 21 



Sept. 18 



Sept. 30 



Oct. 17 



Oct. 21 



Subject 



Oct. 27 



Nov. S 



The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a request by General Antonescu that Ger- 
man military authorities be prevented from moving 
Jews back from the Ukraine into Bessarabia. 

General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 

In reply to Hitler's letter of August 14 (document No. 
204) states that Rumanian forces will occupy the area 
between the Dniester and the Dnieper but that Ru- 
mania can assume responsibility for the administration 
and economic exploitation of the area between the 
Dniester and the Bug only. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania 

In response to telegram No. 2588 (document No. 
200), directs Killinger to remain entirely noncommital 
regarding the Banat. 

The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania 

Informs the Legation of the order by the OKW for- 
bidding any intervention by the German military for 
moving Jews from Rumanian territory to the occupied 
territory or vice versa. 

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign, Ministry 

Reports strong complaints by Mihai Antonescu of 
the economic and military sacrifices made by Rumania 
and his urging of radical change in Germany's economic 
policy. 

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a discussion regarding Rumania's economic 
difficulties with Marshal Antonescu who complained 
especially about purchases by the German troops 
contrary to existing agreements. 

Ambassador Hitter to the Legation in Rumania 

In response to telegram No. 3346 (document No. 
406), explains that the whole problem of German 
expenditures in Rumania is under review; that some 
Rumanian complaints appear to be unfounded; that 
a long-term financial plan will be sought which will 
protect Rumanian interests. 

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a discussion with Mihai Antonescu regard- 
ing the relationship of the Rumanian Government 
and the Legion; increased tension between Marshal 
Antonescu and the Legion; unwillingness of Mihai 
Antonescu to continue the role of conciliation. 

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy 

Mentions the mutual Hungarian and Rumanian 
accusations. Directs Mackensen to inquire if these 
come to the Italian Government also and if it has any 
idea of how to deal with them. 



Doc. No. 



Page 



207 



210 



318 



324 



218 



332 



369 



406 



414 



342 



528 



592 



651 



669 



426 



457 



700 



759 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 



Lni 



Rumania — Continued 



Date 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Page 



1941 
Nov. 13 



Nov. 30 



[Nov. 28] 



Deo. 3 



Dec. 5 



The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 466 773 

Reports that the Rumanian Government would leave 
it up to Germany to deport the Rumanian Jews to the 
Ghettos in the east. 

Unsigned Memorandum 505 844 

Record of a conversation between Goring and Mihai 
Antonescu, apparently held on November 26, regarding 
German-Rumanian economic relations. Goring urged 
the greatest possible increase of Rumanian petroleum 
production even at the risk of exhausting the oil wells. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 513 870 
Secretariat 
Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and 
Mihai Antonescu on November 28. Ribbentrop dis- 
cussed the course of the war, urged Rumania to 
increase her deliveries of oil and food to Germany, and 
asked that the peace be kept between Rumania and 
Hungary, 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 519 891 
Secretariat 
Record of the conversation between Hitler and 
Mihai Antonescu on November 28; Antonescu promised 
increased Rumanian deliveries of petroleum and grain 
to Germany; Hitler promised a reduction of German 
troops and support for Rumania's currency. 

Marshal Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 549 963 

Suggests several ways for increasing the export of 
Rumanian oil to Germany and Italy. Asks that a 
German expert be sent to examine the situation on the 
spot. 

(See also under "Hungary" and "U.S.S.R.") 



Slovakia 



1941 



Nov. 1 



Nov. 26 



Editors' Note 

Reference to conversations of President Tiso and 
Minister President Tuka with Hitler on October 20. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia 

Directs that Tuka be advised against an official visit 
to Rumania in view of recent Rumanian efforts toward 
establishing closer ties between Rumania, Slovakia, 
and Croatia which aroused concern in Hungary. 

Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department 
Record of the reception on November 25 of the 
Slovak Minister President Tuka by the Foreign Min- 
ister in Berlin. They discussed Slovakia's attitude 
toward Germany, the war against Soviet Russia, 
Slovak-Hungarian relations, the activities of the former 
Minister Durcansky, and Tuka's relations with Presi- 
dent Tiso. 



669 



723 



823 



LIV 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Spain 



Date 

1941 
June 25 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Page 



The Ambassador in Spam to the Foreign ^rmlry 

Reports that Serrano Sufier was pleased that Oer- 
many agreed to the expedition of Spanish volunteers 
™a°n S t Hussia, but that as regards a declaration of 
war against Russia, he feared an economic blockade by 
England and possibly by America. 

June 28 The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 
June Sports that a series of recent moves by Serrano 

Sufler, such as winning over Franco for sending volun- 
teers against Russia, indicate clearly the intention of 
preparing Spain's entrance into the war. 

Tulv 4 The Charge d' Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 
July Reports that 40 times the number needed .volun- 

teered for the Blue Division which is soon to be moved 
to Germany. The division is to comprise 641 officers, 
2,272 noncommissioned officers, and 15.7KU men. 
Tulv 18 Memorandum, by an Official of Political Division I M 
July 18 Memo ^ ^ ^fJLVder 

supplying of a German submarine by a German tender 
?n the Canary Islands; although the Spaniards would 
probably not be deterred by the English protest, the 
German Naval Attache has discontinued these supply 
operations for the next months. 

Julv 27 The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

July a ™ ~^ t long con Cersation with Serrano Suner on 
the ?pan?sh attftude toward the .Allies and his fears 
of English or American landings m the Azores, North 
Africa, or Portugal. 

Auk 22 The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 
S ' Reports a conversation with the Spanish Foreign 

Mmister who was distressed that the new Spanish 
Ambassador, Count Mayalde, had not yet been 
received by Hitler. 

Auk 22 The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 
g ' Adds to his earlier telegram (document No. 228) 

that Serrano Sutler was hurt that his confidant, 
Mayalde, had not been received after 4 weeks whereas 
the former Ambassador, Espinosahadtw.ee been re- 
ceived in farewell visits at Hitler's headquarters. 

Aug. 23 An Official of the Embassy in Spain to the Foreign 

Reforts'the signing of the agreement concerning 
employment of Spanish workers in Germany. 

Sent 2 The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreiw Ministry 
bept. " Transmits a r eport of the Military Attache regarding 

a discussion with General Asensio, Chief of Staff, who 
advocated an operation against Gibraltar by Spam 
afone Comments that this ^ea is probaby inspired 
bv Minister of War, Varela, who is Anglophile. Urges 
?hat a new approach to Spain for mlitary. cooperation 
would probably be successful and asks for instructions. 



12 



34 



70 



122 



16 



38 



81 



168 



157 



226 



229 



231 



273 



222 



353 



357 



360 



441 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 



LV 



Spain — Continued 



Date 



1941 
Sept. 3 



Sept. 6 



Sept. 11 



Sept. 13 



Oct. 4 



Oct. 



Oct. 


10 


Oct. 


10 


Oct. 


10 



Subject 



Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy 
Department 
Records a conversation with Carceller who argued 
that a more moderate tone of the Spanish press toward 
Britain and the United States would result in Increased 
imports of raw materials from overseas. He urged 
that this would not mean an abandonment of Spain's 
pro-German policy. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy 
Department 
Refers to his earlier memorandum of September 3 
(document No. 275) and records a c6nversation between 
Carceller and Brandau, of the Protocol Division, ac- 
cording to which the Spanish Minister of Commerce had 
emphasized that it was up to Germany to decide if she 
wanted Spain to participate in her European policy 
as an equal partner. 

Minister Eisenlokr to the Embassy in Spain 

Directs Stohrer to make preparations and get per- 
mission to increase the loading capacity of the railroad 
station at Irun. 

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the 
Foreign Ministry 
States the view of the OKW, which was approved by 
Hitler, that political and military relations with Spain 
are to be expanded, yet military action on the Iberian 
Peninsula is considered undesirable until conclusion of 
the Russian campaign. A reserved attitude is recom- 
mended in economic discussions. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Records a visit by the Spanish Ambassador who 
stated that his Government was for some time without 
news of the Blue Division and who requested permis- 
sion to make a personal visit to the Division. 

State Secretary Weizs&cker to Ambassador Stohrer 

Explains the situation in regard to Mayalde. With 
both Hitler and Ribbentrop away from Berlin it is 
exceptional if Chiefs of Mission are able to see either of 
them. 

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Spain 

Expresses resentment over Spanish compliance with 
a British protest over two German ships supplying 
German submarines in Las Palmas. Asks Stohrer to 
arrange with Spanish authorities to have this operation 
continued as had been agreed upon with the Spanish 
Government in 1939. 

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports on the internal political crisis and especially 
the opposition to Serrano Suner and to his pro- German 
foreign policy. 

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports the gist of the conversation between Franco, 
Serrano Suner, and Weddell as told to him by the 
Foreign Minister. Weddell suggested far-reaching 
economic concessions in return for a friendlier policy 
on the part of Spain regarding Britain and America. 



Doc. No. 



275 



Page 



444 



285 



302 



314 



459 



380 



383 



391 



478 



498 



392 



394 



612 



617 



628 



630 



633 



LVI 



Date 

1941 

Oct. 14 



Nov. 6 



Nov. 13 



Nov. 15 



Nov. 30 



Dec. 9 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Sp ai n — Continued 



Subject 



1941 
Aug. 23 



Nov. 7 



Nov. 25 



The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

Refers to the instruction of October 9 (document No. 
391) and explains the action of the Spanish Minister of 
the Navy in regard to the two German supply ships 
at Las Palmas. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Spain 

Records that recruitment of Spanish workers for 
Germany has come to a standstill; that not a single 
worker has left for Germany. 

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy 
in Spain 
Directs that no discussions about joint military 
action or the entry of Spain into the war be undertaken 
with members of the Spanish Government. 

The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

Transmits a report according to which Franco stated 
in a letter to Don Juan that he considered the restora- 
tion of the monarchy in Spain the coronation of the 
revolution. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Records the conversation of Hitler, Ciano, Suiier, 
Ribbentrop, and Stohrer on November 29 in which 
Hitler discussed American and Turkish attitudes 
toward the war, and Serrano Suiter talked about the 
problems of Spanish policy. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Protocol Department 

Records a conversation between Hitler and General 
Moscardo on December 7 about Spanish-Portuguese 
relations, and Spanish economic difficulties. Hitler 
expressed his regrets that he was unable to do any- 
thing regarding the capture of Gibraltar at that time. 

(See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact" and "Por- 
tugal.") 



Doc. No. Page 



403 



453 



467 



471 



523 



555 



647 



748 



774 



782 



904 



971 



Spanish Morocco 



An Official of Political Division II to the Consulate at 
Tetuan n , „. 

Directs that in view of the needs of Germany s allies 
there should be no discussion in Morocco of Germany's 
policy regarding the Arabs. 

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with the Spanish Foreign 
Minister and Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco 
regarding German propaganda in Spanish Morocco. 
Asks for more personnel and funds to counteract ex- 
tensive American and British activities. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Information Depart- 
ment 
Records a meeting of November 14 in the German 
Embassy, Madrid, in which details of future propa- 
ganda activities for Spanish Morocco were discussed. 



361 



756 



822 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Sweden 



LVII 



Date 



1941 
June 24 



June 24 



June 25 



June 25 



June 27 



June 27 



June 29 



June 29 



June 29 



July 2 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



The Legation in Sweden to Ike Foreign Ministry 

Reports that although no definite reply has been 
received, the Swedish Government will most likely 
agree to the German military requests, particularly 
for the transit of one division from Norway over 
Sweden to Finland. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that Finland's emphasis on her neutrality 
respecting the German-Russian war is having a re- 
tarding effect on conversations with Sweden on political 
and military questions. 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with the King who expressed 
his satisfaction that the principal German request for 
the transit of one division had been accepted by the 
State Council and who indicated his personal support 
in this matter. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister has 
stated that the Swedish Government granted the 
request for the transit of one division from Norway 
to Finland. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the wishes of the OKW regarding Swed- 
ish cooperation in the campaign against Soviet Russia, 
as listed in the OKW letter of June 17 (volume 
XII, document No. 038), have in large measure been 
granted. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden 

Directs that the Government's thanks and satis- 
faction be conveyed to the Swedish Foreign Minister 
for Sweden's understanding attitude toward Ger- 
many's wishes in connection with the war in the East. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister assured 
the Minister of Finland that Sweden would supply 
arms and ammunition to Finland. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports on the agreement made with the Swedish 
Air Force for its cooperation with the Luftwaffe as 
regards: forced landings; courier flights; withholding 
of fire against German or Finnish aircraft; possible 
intermediate landings in the transfers of Luftwaffe 
units; and weather reports. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports on the agreement negotiated with the Swed- 
ish Government for cooperation of the Swedish Navy 
with the German Navy. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Forwards the list of war materials and equipment 
requested by the Swedish Government. 



16 



17 



28 



30 



41 



42 



Page 



11 



12 



20 



21 



30 



33 



44 



45 



43 



59 



48 



68 



lviii 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Sweden — Continued 



Date 

1941 
July 6 



July 7 



July 10 



July 10 



July 12 



July 15 



July 25 



Aug. 1 



Subject 



Doc. No. Page 



The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Discusses a possible request to Sweden to accede 
to the Tripartite Pact. Points out that the concessions 
already made to Germany have strained the coalition 
government and that only a minority government 
could support Sweden's accession. Suggests that 
Sweden's relationship to Germany could best be de- 
fined by a special treaty. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden 

Acknowledges the argument in the Legation's tele- 
gram of July 5 (document No. 77), but reserves a final 
instruction regarding Swedish accession to the Tri- 
partite Pact. Points out that a bilateral pact with 
Sweden is out of the question. 

The Head of Division W VI of the Economic Policy 

Department to the High Command of the Wekrmacht 

and other Offices and Ministries 

Forwards an Official Minute of July 9 which records 

the agreed conditions for Swedish overseas trade 

through the harbor of Goteborg. 

Memorandum by the Head of Division W V of the Eco~ 
nomic Policy Department 
Reeords a telephone message from Major Radtke 
(of the OKW, Wi Rti) that he will go to Stockholm. 
Lists the general answers he will bring in regard to 
Sweden's wishes for war materials, as forwarded in 
the Legation's telegram of July 2 (document No. 59). 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Refers to his telegram of July 2 (document No. 59) 
and complains that instead of the negotiator with full 
powers which he had requested, Major Radtke appeared 
with a negative answer and not even the power to grant 
the few concessions considered in Berlin. Reports 
having called off the negotiations of today, and having 
decided to handle aerial questions separately. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden 

Directs the Legation to decline the offer of the 
Swedish Government to detail a select group of officers 
to the Wehrmacht because such officers would com- 
mand no cadres of volunteers. 

The Charge d' Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 
Reports a discussion with the Swedish State Secre- 
tary regarding the Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. 
Boheman stated that the ships were being sharply 
watched; that they would need at least 2 weeks for 
preparations to run out; but that Swedish law could 
not prevent their departure if their papers were in 
order. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Swedish Government refused per- 
mission for the overland transit of an additional German 
division to Finland and suggested that the sea route be 
used instead. 



77 



79 



91 



92 



98 



109 



151 



93 



95 



115 



118 



124 



138 



214 



172 



272 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 



LIX 



S weden— Continued 



Date 



1941 
Aug. 2 



Aug. 4 



Aug. 5 



Aug. 6 



Aug. 28 



Sept. 2 



Sept. 8 



Sept. 11 



Subject 



The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a discussion with Hagglof regarding the 
Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. As a means of 
preventing the ships from running out to England 
Hagglof proposed that the Oslo shipping firms send 
captains to bring the ships to Norway. Objection by 
the Norwegian Legation would put the matter into the 
courts which in any case would involve long delays and 
provide that the ships remain in Goteborg. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having expressed the reerets of the German 
Government over Sweden's refusal to permit the pas- 
sage of another German division across Swedish terri- 
tory, and having emphasized the need for secrecy. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports the Swedish Government's assent to anal- 
ogous application of the agreement of July 1940 which 
would permit unrestricted transport of war materials 
over Swedish railroads to Haparanda, Narvik, and 
Trondheim and the shipment of a few thousand men to 
Narvik and Trondheim. 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a communication from Soderblom that the 
Swedes had discovered a captured British officer on a 
German furlough train. 

MintUe by the Head of Division W V of the Economic 
Policy Department 
Records the discussion at Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's 
office on August 28 concerning economic negotiations 
with Sweden: the need for a clearing credit from 
Sweden; the need to maintain civilian exports to 
Sweden, to centralize Wehrmacht purchases in Sweden, 
and for relaxation in the matter of exports of war ma- 
terials to Sweden. 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports the announcement in Sweden of the official 
ban on the recruitment of Swedish volunteers for 
foreign armies. 

The Minister in Sweden to Ike Foreign Ministry 

Reports a discussion with Gunther regarding the 
Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors, Gunther stated 
that it was impossible for the Swedish police to change 
the crews without a court order; he insisted that the 
validity of the Norwegian decree of May 1940 had to 
be decided judicially before any action took place; and 
maintained that Sweden had to operate according to 
law. He promised finally to re-examine the complex of 
questions. 

The Minister in Sweden to Ike Foreign Ministry- 

Reports receiving the final answer of the Swedish 
Government regarding the Norwegian ships: the 
recommendation that the Norwegian shipowners insti- 
tute legal action in order to place their own captains and 
crews aboard the ships. The Legation recommends 
either following that course or letting the ships escape 
and be brought in by German naval vessels. 



Doc. No. 



174 



Page 



277 



176 



178 



281 



283 



181 



254 



287 



405 



270 



290 



438 



465 



300 



475 



LX 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
S wed en — Continued 



1941 

Sept. 15 



Sept. 17 



Subject 



Doc. No, 



Page 



Sept. 19 



Sept. 19 



Sept. 19 



Sept. 20 



Sept. 22 



The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports regarding conclusion of a new agreement 
with the Swedish Air Force permitting an increase 
AenuSof flights over Swedish territory by 
German courier planes. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that today's conversation revealed the 
surprising fact that the Norwegian ships have been 
ffiered to England and are at England's disposal. 
Reports having insisted that the ahipfi.be turned over 
to their rightful owners, the Norwegian shipowners, 
and without recourse to judicial proceedings and that 
pendTng such restoration no ships be allowed to escape. 

Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Sw f ed «" n , pmh „. l7 
Refers to the Legation's ^Segram of Septembei 17 
fdocument No. 329) and directs that the > Sw«hsh 
■Foreign Minister be informed that the facts indicate 
that the Swedish Government has not dealt openly 
witn Germany; that Sweden has taken an unneutral 
Ittitude Toward the legal claims of the Norwegian 
^ners for Their ships; that the licensing for oadi ng 
war materials for England throws a peculiar hght on 
the attitude of the Swedish Government. 
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the 
Legation in Sweden < « m f om hpr 17 

Refers to the Legation's telegram of September 1/ 
fdocument No. 329) and states that the Foreign Min- 
ister wfshes a memorandum on eeonomio relations 
with Sweden, with special regard to possibilities of 
putting the thumbscrews on the bwedes. 

The Leoaiion in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 
™In response 'to the Reich Foreign Minister's request 
(document No. 335) submits a m « m t ?^ d "XswS 
the Bresent status of economic relations with »weaen 
Argues that to put pressure on the Swedes .by -cutting 
nff coal and other deliveries would disrupt the Swedish- 
German trade on which Germany .is more dependent 
tharXeden. Urges that Sweden is most sensitive in 
her overseas trade, the Goteborg traffic. 

The Legation in Sweden to tht Foreign ^*»»^__ edan 
Reports a new discussion regarding the Norwegian 
ships w'tn Giinther who insisted there had been no 
changed in the position of the Swedish Government 
nrntptted aeainit the imputation of acting behind 
F^p™v' s back and denied that war materials were 
bein3pped to'Bngland. He explained his policy a, 
one If S to Germany and neutrality ^^gland 
and recounted all that ae had d one for Germany .1 he 
Legation suggests the Goteborg traffic as a possible 
point for sanctions against bweden. 

The Legation in Sweden to the ^f^f™^ 

Reports on the significance of the results oi ™ 
neKtions concluded this day by the governmental 

5SR. tt&t&ss&A 

part would cover existing and anticipated clearing 
deficits. 



319 



329 



508 



522 



334 



529 



335 



531 



336 



532 



343 



539 



347 



546 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Sweden — Continued 



LXI 



Subject 



Doe. No. Page 



1941 
Sept. 25 



Sept. 28 



Oct. 1 



Oct. 23 



Oct. 28 



Nov. 1 



Nov. 20 



Dec. 1 



The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with Hagglof who explained 
certain factors regarding the Swedish truck market. 
The British had cut off the importation of parts from 
the U.S.A. on learning that Sweden delivered 500 
trucks to Finland just as they had eut off the importa- 
tion of chocolate through Goteborg. Hflgglof also 
urged the importance of the Goteborg traffic not only 
for Sweden but also for Germany. 

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister 

Records a conversation of September 26 with the 
Swedish Charge" d' Affaires regarding German-Swedish 
relations: criticism of Germany and of Hitler in 
the Swedish press; refusal to permit Swedish volunteers 
to serve with the German colors; the pro-English 
attitude of the Swedish Government regarding Nor- 
wegian ships in Swedish ports. 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Chief of the Legal Department 
explained the current status of the litigation regarding 
the Norwegian ships: that the Rigmor was under arrest 
by order of the Court of Appeal; that the other cases 
would probably be settled in accordance with the 
precedent of the Rigmor case. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that two important problems regarding the 
supply of the German troops in Finland have been 
resolved by Sweden's agreement to sell 2,000 tents and 
to lease 300 trucks equipped with tires. 

The Chargk d' Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 
Reports a conversation with the King who expressed 
his fears of Bolshevism, his admiration for Hitler in 
the fight against Soviet Russia, and who spoke of his 
desire to maintain good relations with Germany. 

The Foreign Minister to the Reich Commissar for Oc- 
cupied Norway 
Explains German policy on Nordic congresses in 
Sweden: Norwegian participation is out of the ques- 
tion; but as regards Finland and Denmark a distinc- 
tion must be drawn between political and nonpolitical 
congresses. 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a discussion with Guntner regarding Swe- 
den's refusal to supply woolen goods to the German 
Army in Finland. Giinther explained that the raw 
materials for such goods came from overseas and that 
the British Government would cut off the Goteborg 
traffic if Sweden provided such goods to Germany. 

Memorandum by the Head of Division W IV of the 
Economic Policy Department 
Draws the attention of Ribbentrop to a memo- 
randum prepared by the Swedish Government which 
lists in detail Swedish services on behalf of Germany 
since July 1940. 



357 



565 



364 



583 



371 



594 



418 



430 



437 



674 



706 



722 



484 



803 



530 



927 



LXII 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Sweden — Continued 



Subject 



Doc, No, 



Fags 



1941 
Dec. 7 



Dec. 7 



Dec. 8 



Dec. 8 



Dee. 11 



Adolf Hitler to King Gustav V of Sweden 

Refers to the King's message (document No. 430) 
and expresses his appreciation for the King's sympathy 
with Germany's anti-Bolshevist struggle. He points 
out that Germany is fighting for all of Europe and that 
the Swedish public should realize this more fully than 
it apparently does. 

Minister Wied to State Secretary Weizsacker 

Mentions that in November Sweden rejected the 
German requests brought by Schnurre. Predicts that 
in the new situation resulting from the English declara- 
tion of war on Finland it will be necessary to make new 
demands of Sweden. Suggests that these would best 
be made through Finland or through the regular route 
of the Legation rather than by Schnurre as a special 
envoy. 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports in regard to the consequences of the English 
declaration of war on Finland which is not expected 
to change Sweden's attitude toward Finland. Suggests 
that if special demands have to be made on Sweden they 
be made through Finland. 

German-Swedish Agreement Regarding the Delivery of 
War Materials 
Secret protocol listing a number of items of arms, 
ammunition, and military equipment to be delivered by 
German firms to Sweden, providing for methods of 
payment and specifying periods for delivery. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having delivered Hitler's letter (docu- 
ment No. 554) to the King who was rather negative 
toward Germany's present wishes in regard to the 
transportation of men on leave and exchange of troops 
from northern Finland. 

(See also under "Finland.") 



554 



969 



558 



975 



561 



565 



574 



981 



988 



1001 



Switzerland 



1941 
Aug. 19 



Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Personal Staff 
Submits a report by an agent on the Swiss domestic 
situation; the report deals with effects of the war in 
the east, German-Swiss economic relations, opinions 
in Swiss military circles, and British propaganda in 
Switzerland. 




331 



Date 



1941 
Deo. 3 



Dec. 4 



Dec. 5 



Dee. 5 



Dec. 8 



Dec. 8 



Dec. 9 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Tki partite Pact 



LXin 



Subject 



The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been informed by Ciano that the 
Japanese Ambassador had handed Mussoiini a com- 
munication regarding the breakdown of the Japanese- 
American conversations, stating that a war of Japan 
against the United States and Great Britain is regarded 
"as possible and imminent." Japan requested an Italian 
declaration of war in such an event as well as a mutual 
agreement committing the two countries not to con- 
clude an armistice or separate peace with the United 
States and the British Empire. 

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Italy 

Records a discussion with Marchese d'Ajeta regard- 
ing the Japanese d-marche of December 3 (document 
No. 537). D'Ajeta remarked that Berlin was appar- 
ently examining very carefully the reply to be made to 
Japan, and mentioned that opinions in the Palazzo 
Chigi were divided on whether the outbreak of a Japa- 
nese-American conflict at this time would be advan- 
tageous to the Axis. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy 

Forwards the draft text of an agreement of the Tri- 
partite Powers providing for a joint entry into a state 
of war with America and excluding any separate peace. 
Directs Mackensen to secure the approval of the 
Italian Government so that the text may be handed 
to Oshima. 

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy 

Records a series of conversations in connection with 
carrying out Ribbentrop's instructions of December 5 
(document No. 546). Ciano and Mussolini approved 
the German draft of an agreement to be concluded 
with Japan and the proposal that a similar statement 
be handed to the Japanese Ambassador in Rome. 

Editors' Note 

Reference to the conversations of Oshima and Rib- 
bentrop on December 7. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

Forwards the draft of a German-Italian-Japanese 
agreement which had been discussed with Oshima. 
Requests that the assent of the Japanese Government 
be obtained in time for the signing to take place on 
December 10. 

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy 

Records that Ciano and Mussolini agreed to the draft 
of the German-Italian-Japanese agreement (document 
No. 562). 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the text of the draft agreement for- 
warded in the instruction of December 8 (document No. 
562) was submitted to Foreign Minister Togo who re- 
quested changes in articles 3 and 4 for the sake of the 
Privy Council. Togo also asked when Germany would 
declare war on the United States. 



Doc. No. 



537 



Page 



941 



543 



953 



546 



958 



548 



960 



562 



563 



568 



977 



982 



983 



992 



XLIV 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Latin America — Continued 



1941 
Nov. 6 



Nov. 29 



Dec. 1 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Dec. 10 



Deo. 11 



1941 
June 25 



July 4 



The Embassy in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that General Miller, Chief of the U.S. Mili- 
tary Mission, demanded cooperation of the Brazilian 
Minister of War for the establishment of U.S. bases 
in Brazil, but that the Minister of War refused and 
the American Ambassador disavowed General Miller. 

The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with Colonel Benjamin 
Vargas, the brother of the President, who conveyed 
the President's desire to remain on good terras with 
Germany and explained that concessions made to the 
United States did not mean any fundamental change 
in Brazil's foreign policy. 

Tlie Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina 

Directs Ambassador Thermann to explain that now 
that the agitation against his person has subsided, the 
German Government would be willing to consider a 
simultaneous replacement of its Ambassador in 
Buenos Aires and of the Argentine Ambassador in 
Berlin. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile, and to the Legation in Peru 
Instructs the German representative to inform the 
Foreign Minister of the state of war between the United 
States and Germany, Japan, and Italy ; to explain that 
this was entirely due to the policy of the United btates; 
and was the exclusive responsibility of President 
Koosevelt. 

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry 

Refers to the Foreign Minister's instruction of De- 
cember 10 (document No. 570) and reports his con- 
versation with the Argentine Foreign Minister who 
explained that future German- Argentine relations 
would have to take account of Argentina's adherence 
to the principles of Pan-American solidarity, assistance 
and defense. 

(See also under "Portugal," and "United States.") 



450 



520 



Page 



743 



895 



528 



912 



570 



996 



575 



1002 



Middle East 



Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Notes the suggestion from the French Government 
that in case of a French request for military aid in 
Syria, Germany issue a declaration recognizing French 
rights there. Advises against an unqualified declara- 
tion which would run counter to German policy toward 
the Arabs. 

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with French State Secretary 
Benoist-MSchin dealing with Turkish wishes with 
regard to occupation of Syria, German-French rela- 
tions, and German intentions with regard to the occu- 
pied countries. 



19 



22 



71 



82 



Data 



1941 
July 9 



July 12 



July 20 



July 30 



Aug. 1 



Aug, 5 



Aug. 6 



Aug. 19 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Middle East — Continued 



XLV 



Subject 



The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that Iran is taking military measures to 
defend herself against any English attack and that 
she would appeal to Germany for help if sueh an attack 
should be made. 

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy 
in Italy and to the Embassy in, Paris 
Explains that Minister Cosmelli has been informed 
that the English have proposed to General Dentz a sus- 
pension of hostilities, and that the German Govern- 
ment, while warning the French of English insincerity, 
left the decision to them. 

The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secre- 
tariat 
Directs all Foreign Ministry personnel concerned 
with Arab propaganda to support henceforth Arab 
wishes for unlimited political freedom; the collapse of 
French resistance in Syria has eliminated the hitherto 
existing reasons for German reserve in this matter. 

Memorandum by Minister Rahn 

Report on the German mission in Syria from May 9 
to Jufy 11, 1941 : I Mission (p. 237) ; II Journey (p. 238) ; 
III First Meeting with High Commissioner General 
Dentz (p. 239); IV Damascus (p. 242); V First Arms 
Transports (p. 243); VI Additional Arms Transports 
(p. 244); VII War Preparations in Syria (p. 245); VIII 
Representatives of the Wehrmacht in Syria (p. 248) ; 
IX The "Arab Movement" (p. 250) ; X German Inter- 
vention in Syria (p. 251) ; XI The English Attack (p. 253) ; 
XII Economic Matters (p. 256) ; XIII Supplies (p. 258) ; 
XIV "Desert War" (p. 260) ; XV The Armistice (p. 264) 
XVI Conclusion (p. 265). 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the British Minister presented a note 
to the Iranian Foreign Ministry recommending the 
removal of Germans from the country. 

Memorandum by Minister Grobba 

Reviews Gaylani's proposal for German-Iraq coop- 
eration. Recommends that Germany aim for his rein- 
statement as Iraq Minister President. Proposes that 
Germany negotiate agreements with Iraq which would 
become effective when German occupation of Iraq is 
imminent. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Refers to Grobba's memorandum of August 5 (docu- 
ment No, ISO) and explains that some degree of Italian 
participation will be necessary. Recommends careful 
internal preparation prior to discussions with Gaylani. 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with t he Iranian Minister Presi- 
dent regarding the British demand for the removal of 
Germans from Iraq. Agrees with the Minister Presi- 
dent that an organized, official departure of German 
residents would have a devastating effect on Iranian 
morale. 



Doc. No. 



84 



101 



Page 



103 



128 



132 



1SS 



165 



237 



171 



180 



272 



285 



1S3 



215 



288 



335 



XLVI 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Middle East — Continued 



Date 

1941 
Aug. 21 



Aug. 23 



Aug. 25 



Aug. 25 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Aug. 25 

Aug. 28 
Sept. 1 

Sept. 4 



Sept. 7 



The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been told by the secretary of the 
Grand Mufti of Italian attempts to induce the Grand 
Mufti and Gaylani to conclude political and economic 
agreements with Italy at this time. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran 

Instructs Ettel to convey to the Shah a message 
expressing hope that he will continue to resist 
encroachment on Iran's sovereignty for a short while 
longer and explaining that Germany meanwhile was 
advancing farther into the Ukraine and that Russia s 
power to resist was plainly ebbing. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy 
Department 
Record of interministerial conference of August IA. 
Agreement was reached on the basic principles for the 
economic provisions of a German-Iraq draft treaty to 
be discussed with Gaylani on his forthcoming visit to 
Germany. 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having conveyed Hitler's message to the 
Shah (see document No. 230) who stated that the Soviet 
Ambassador and British Ambassador had presented a 
note explaining that their troops were entering Iran 
because of failure of her Government to expel the Reich 
Germans. The Shah asks that Turkey be approached 
to bring about a cessation of hostilities. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Notes foreign reports of an Anglo-Russian invasion 
of Iran. Proposes a seven-point program for immedi- 
ate action. 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Shah has ordered the Iranian troops 
to make no further use of arms. 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with the Foreign Minister and 
Minister President regarding the fate of the German 
colony in Iran and that he warned against expulsion of 
the Reich Germans without assurances of safe conduct 
to Turkey. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Personal Staff 
Records having discussed with Hitler the situation 
of- the German colony in Iran. Hitler approved the 
proposal by the Foreign Minister that the German 
Legation not be withdrawn until the fate of the Ger- 
mans in Iran had been decided. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran 

Advises Ettel that internment of the members of the 
German colony in Iran by the British is to be preferred 
over their surrender to the Bolshevists. Informs Ettel 
of a communication for the British Government by 
way of Switzerland threatening reprisals against Eng- 
lish residents of the Channel Islands in case of refusal to 
grant safe conduct to the German colony in Iran. 



221 



230 



344 



358 



233 



361 



240 



379 



243 



252 



263 



280 



388 



402 



419 



452 



287 



461 



ANALTTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Middle Bast — Continued 



xlvh 



Date 

1941 
Sept. 9 



Sept. 12 



Sept. 12 



Sept. 13 



Sept. 14 



Subject 



Sept. 15 



Oct. 13 



Oct. 28 



Nov. 5 



The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Iranian Foreign Minister made 
public an exchange of notes indicating that the Allies 
were demanding the surrender of the German colony 
to the British or Russians. 

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister 

States with respect to a Soviet demand for the sur- 
render of a number of Germans in Iran that reprisals 
will be taken against Soviet citizens in areas under 
German control. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Personal Staff 
Records Hitler's wish that 10 Englishmen be de- 
ported from the Channel Islands to the Pripet Marshes 
for every German deported from Iran. 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports on his negotiations with Iranian Foreign 
Ministry officials requesting an extension of the time 
limit for the deportation of the German colony. States 
that he informed the men of the colony that their de- 
parture could be no longer delayed lest the safe con- 
duct promised for the women and children be jeop- 
ardized. 

The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Reiterates that for every German from Iran interned 
by the British, 10 British subjects from the Channel 
Islands are to be interned in the Pripet Marshes. 
Directs that such measures be prepared for execution 
at a moment's notice but that the effective date will 
be given later. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records that Ribbentrop rejected a proposal by 
Bohle that Stalin's son and high-ranking Russian 
officers who had been taken prisoner be used as bar- 
gaining points in negotiations with the Soviet Union 
regarding the Germans in Iran. 

The Chargl d' Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been told by Anfuso in strictest 
secrecy that the Grand Mufti had arrived in Italy a 
short whale ago. 

The Charg6 a" Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been told by Anfuso that the Grand 
Mufti had made a favorable impression on Mussolini 
and had told him that his aim was political independ- 
ence for Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. 

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that Anfuso handed Bismarck the text of 
a declaration agreed upon by Mussolini, Ciano, and 
the Grand Mufti which was to be issued by the Grand 
Mufti after German consent had been obtained. 



Doc. No. 



295 



305 



306 



311 



Page 



471 



482 



482 



494 



317 



506 



322 



399 



428 



449 



512 



641 



704 



742 



XLvm 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Middle East — Continued 



Date 



1941 
Nov. 6 



Nov. 13 



Nov. 15 



Nov. 19 



Nov. 23 



Nov. 28 



Nov. 30 



Subject 



Nov. 28 



Doc. No. 



Memorandum by Minister Orobba 

Records the arrival of the Grand Mufti in Berlin 
and the discussions held with him and Alberto Mellini 
of the Italian Foreign Ministry with regard to the text 
of the proposed declaration transmitted in Mackensen's 
telegram of November 5 (document No, 449). 

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister 

Submits to Hitler a summary of developments in 
the Arab, Indian, and Pan-Turanian questions together 
with proposals for German activities in these matters. 
Recommends that the Grand Mufti be received by 
Hitler. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Personal Staff 
Records Hitler s comments on Ribbentrop's memo- 
randum of November 13 (document No. 468). Notes 
that Hitler will receive the Grand Mufti but regards 
the Pan-Arab question as pertaining to the Italian 
sphere of influence and that he considers it contrary 
to German interests to promote a Pan-Turanian feel- 
ing. 

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy 
in Italy 
Asks Mackensen to ascertain the views of the Italian 
Government concerning the idea under consideration 
in Berlin that a council of Arab leaders with head- 
quarters in Rome should be set up. 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 

States that the projected German-Italian declaration 
on the independence of the Arab states in the Near 
East would adversely affect German-French collabora- 
tion and weaken the will to resist in French North 
and West Africa. Urges that the French be informed 
beforehand of the declaration and that its issuance be 
postponed until a later date. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and 
the Grand Mufti. The Foreign Minister promised 
support for the Arab cause but expressed doubt, in 
spite of the Grand Mufti's insistence, whether an Axis 
declaration in favor of Arab independence should be 
issued right away. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Record of the conversation between Hitler and the 
Grand Mufti on November 28. Hitler promised to 
announce the hour of Arab liberation once the German 
armies stood south of the Caucasus but suggested that 
the declaration requested by the Mufti be put off for 
a few months. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records that following the Grand Mufti's reception 
by Hitler the decision was made to postpone the dec- 
laration on Arab Freedom; also a suggestion was to 
be made to the Italians that a communique" be issued 
concerning the Grand Mufti's reception by Mussolini 
which would be followed by a similar communique" on 
his reception by Hitler. 



452 



468 



475 



Page 



746 



774 



786 



483 



494 



803 



815 



514 



876 



515 



881 



516 



885 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Middle East — Continued 



XLES 



Date 



1941 
Dec. -2 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records the visit of the former Iraq Minister Presi- 
dent Gaylani who expressed the wish to be recognized 
immediately as Iraq Minister President and to con- 
clude with Germany a comprehensive treaty proceed- 
ing for various forms of cooperation. 

(See also under "Egypt," "India," and "Turkey.") 



1941 
June 30 



July 3 



July 5 



Oct. 



Oct. 13 



Oct. 20 



Netherlands 



The Foreign Minister to the Representative of the Foreign 
Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied 
Netherlands 
Instructs Bene to inquire if the Dutch have expressed 

any desire to organize volunteer units to fight against 

the Soviet Union. 

Reichsteiter Bormann to Reich Minister Lammers 

Informs Lammers that, as a result of the radio speech 
of Queen Wilhelmina in support of Russia, Hitler had 
approved the confiscation of the property of the Nether- 
lands Royal House. 

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the 
Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to 
the Foreign Ministry 
Reports on the political situation and the attitude of 
the population following the outbreak of the war against 
the Soviet Union, and discusses the measures under- 
taken and planned by the Reich Commissar. 

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the 

Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the 

Foreign Ministry 

Reports Seyss-Inquart's account of his meeting with 

Hitler on September 26. Hitler expressed satisfaction 

over the current German policies and requested that 

Mussert and his NSB should become the only political 

party in the occupied Netherlands. 

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Depart- 
ment 
Records a conversation with the Swedish Minister 
who requested permission to visit the Mauthausen 
concentration camp where 400 Dutch Jews had died 
since February 1941. 

The Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to 
the Chief of the Reich Chancellery 
Request a decision about the transfer of Dutch 
hostages from concentration camps in Germany to 
camps in the Netherlands to prevent an investigation 
by the Swedish Legation. 



Page 



536 



940 



45 



75 



51 



80 



89 



373 



598 



400 



412 



642 



666 



682-905—64- 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

PORTUGAL 



Date 

1941 
July 2 



July 13 



July 20 



July 22 



July 31 



Aug. 21 



Sept. 2 



Sept. 21 



Sept. 30 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Page 



The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with Salazar on the possi- 
bility of sending Portuguese volunteers to the eastern 
front Salazar did not consider this feasible but indi- 
cated his intention publicly to express his sympathy 
with Germany in the fight against Bolshevism. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal 

Directs the Minister to call the attention of the 
Portuguese Government to statements by American 
politicians urging American occupation of the Azores 
and to report the Portuguese evaluation of this matter. 

The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Keports that President Roosevelt has for the present 
postponed plans for the occupation of the Cape Verde 
Islands, Azores, and Dakar and provides details about 
the President's policy and attitude. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records a conversation with the Portuguese Minister 

about the United States' attitude toward the Azores; 

Portuguese-Spanish relations; and economic conditions 

in Spain. 

The Charge d' Affaires in the Untied States to ike Foreign 
Ministry , , 

Reports having learned of American plans lor tne 

occupation of the Azores. 

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports on the tungsten situation in Portugal and 
the activities of German firms in acquiring interests in 
tungsten mines. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records a conversation with the Portuguese Minister 
regarding attempts by the United States to interest 
Brazil in the occupation of the Azores; Portuguese- 
Brazilian relations; and the general attitude of Spam 
and Portugal to Latin America. 

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having been assured that no official com- 
munication has been transmitted to the Portuguese 
Government by Brazil regarding the Aaores, but that 
the United States would inform Brazil prior to any 
American action in the Azores. 

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M 

Records statements by State Secretary Santos Costa 
as reported by the Air Attache: Portugal intended to 
maintain strict neutrality; she would call on Germany 
for help in case of an English or American landing, 
but would call on England in case of a German inva- 
sion. 



60 



103 



133 



141 



168 



224 



271 



346 



370 



69 



130 



189 



202 



267 



349 



439 



545 



594 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Pobtugal — Continued 



LI 



Date 


Subject 


Doc. No. 


Pag8 


1941 
Nov. 22 


The Head of Division W II in the Economic Policy 
Department to the Legation in Portugal 
Informs the Legation of discussions with representa- 
tives of the Ministry of Economics and of the OKW 
leading to a plan for a guaranteed monthly supply of 
tungsten from Portugal in return for certain manu- 
factured products from Germany. 

(See also under "Spain.") 


489 


808 



Romania 



1941 
July 1 



July 2 



July 27 



July 30 



Aug. 6 



Aug. 10 



Aug. 14 



Aug. 14 



General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 

Discusses the joint military operations against the 
Soviet Union. 

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that General Antonescu wants a common 
German-Rumanian frontier and that he opposes the 
employment of Rumanians and Hungarian troops side 
by Bide. 

Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu 

Expresses praise for the performance of the Ruma- 
nian troops and satisfaction over the course of the 
operations in Russia; urges Antonescu to advance with 
bis forces into the area southwest of the Bug river 
and places under his command the LIV Army Corps. 

General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 

Expresses thanks for Hitler's appreciation of the 
Rumanian military achievement in the war against 
Soviet Russia and promises to carry out the military 
tasks requested by Hitler in his letter of July 27 (docu- 
ment No. 159). 

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that a roundup of 60,000 Jews for road- 
building in Bessarabia severely damaged the Ruma- 
nian economy. Mihai Antonescu was advised to 
proceed slowly with elimination of the Jews. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Record of Hitler's remarks on August 7 on bestowing 
the Knight's Cross on General Antonescu. Antoneseu's 
reply. 

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Rumanian Government has reports 
of the intention of Hungary to occupy the Banat on 
August 16. Rumania refers to an intention of Hitler 
to settle that question only after the war. 

Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu 

Expresses his views on the future conduct of opera- 
tions. Suggests that Rumanian forces occupy the area 
between the Dneister and the Dnieper and that Ru- 
manian mobile units participate in operations east of 
the Dnieper. 



57 



58 



159 



167 



182 



188 



200 



204 



66 



68 



225 



266 



287 



296 



312 



316 



Ul 



Sate 

1941 
Aug. 16 



Aug. 17 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Rumania — Continued 



Aug. 21 



Sept. 18 



Sept. 30 



Oct. 17 



Oct. 21 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Oct. 27 



Nov. S 



Page 



The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a request by General Antonescu that Ger- 
man military authorities be prevented from moving 
Jews back from the Ukraine into Bessarabia. 

General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 

In reply to Hitler's letter of August 14 (document No. 
204) states that Rumanian forces will occupy the area 
between the Dniester and the Dnieper but that Ku- 
mania can assume responsibility for the administration 
and economic exploitation of the area between the 
Dniester and the Bug only. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania 

In response to telegram No. 2588 (document No. 
200), directs Killinger to remain entirely noncommital 
regarding the Banat. 

The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania 

Informs the Legation of the order by the UK W for- 
bidding any intervention by the German military for 
moving Jews from Rumanian territory to the occupied 
territory or vice versa. 

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports strong complaints by Mihai Antonescu of 
the economic and military sacrifices made by Rumania 
and his urging of radical change in Germany's economic 
policy. 

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a discussion regarding Rumania's economic 
difficulties with Marshal Antonescu who complained 
especially about purchases by the German troops 
contrary to existing agreements. 

Ambassador Rilter to the Legation in Rumania 

In response to telegram No. 3346 (document No. 
406), explains that the whole problem of German 
expenditures in Rumania is under review; that some 
Rumanian complaints appear to be unfounded; that 
a long-term financial plan will be sought which will 
protect Rumanian interests. 

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a discussion with Mihai Antonescu regard- 
ing the relationship of the Rumanian Government 
and the Legion; increased tension between Marshal 
Antonescu and the Legion; unwillingness of Mihai 
Antonescu to continue the role of conciliation. 

The State Secretary to the Einbassy in Italy 

Mentions the mutual Hungarian and Rumanian 
accusations. Directs Mackensen to inquire if these 
come to the Italian Government also and if it has any 
idea of how to deal with them. 



207 



210 



318 



324 



218 



332 



369 



406 



414 



342 



528 



592 



651 



426 



457 



700 



759 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Rumania — Continued 



Lin 



Date 



Subject 



Do«. No. 



Pago 



1941 
Nov. 13 



Nov. 30 



[Nov. 28] 



Deo. 



Dec. 5 



The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 466 773 

Reports that the Rumanian Government would leave 
it up to Germany to deport the Rumanian Jews to the 
Ghettos in the east. 

Unsigned Memorandum 505 844 

Record of a conversation between Goring and Mihai 
Antonescu, apparently held on November 26, regarding 
German-Rumanian economic relations. Goring urged 
the greatest possible increase of Rumanian petroleum 
production even at the risk of exhausting the oil wells. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 513 870 
Secretariat 
Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and 
Mihai Antonescu on November 28. Ribbentrop dis- 
cussed the course of the war, urged Rumania to 
increase her deliveries of oil and food to Germany, and 
asked that the peace be kept between Rumania and 
Hungary. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 519 891 
Secretariat 
Record of the conversation between Hitler and 
Mihai Antonescu on November 28; Antonescu promised 
increased Rumanian deliveries of petroleum and grain 
to Germany; Hitler promised a reduction of German 
troops and support for Rumania's currency. 

Marshal Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 549 963 

Suggests several ways for increasing the export of 
Rumanian oil to Germany and Italy. Asks that a 
German expert be sent to examine the situation on the 
spot. 

(See also under "Hungary" and "U.S.S.R.") 



Slovakia 



1941 



Nov. 1 



Nov. 26 



Editors' Note 

Reference to conversations of President Tiso and 
Minister President Tuka with Hitler on October 20. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia 

Directs that Tuka be advised against an official visit 
to Rumania in view of recent Rumanian efforts toward 
establishing closer ties between Rumania, Slovakia, 
and Croatia which aroused concern in Hungary. 

M emorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department 
Record of the reception on November 25 of the 
Slovak Minister President Tuka by the Foreign Min- 
ister in Berlin, They discussed Slovakia's attitude 
toward Germany, the war against Soviet Russia, 
Slovak-Hungarian relations, the activities of the former 
Minister Durcansky, and Tuka's relations with Presi- 
dent Tiso. 



669 



723 



823 



LIV 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Spain 



1941 
June 25 



June 28 



July 4 



July 18 



Subject 



Dm. No. 



Pags 



July 27 



Aug. 22 



Aug. 22 



Aug. 23 



Sept. 2 



The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign^ ^"^ 

Renorts that Serrano Sufier was pleased that L.er 
manned to the expedition of Spanish volunteers 
aeainst Russia, but that as regards a declaration of 
w against Russia, he feared an economic blockade by 
England and possibly by America. 

The Ambassador in Spain to the F °/ ei W™™ StT l tTaT1 o 
ReDorts that a series of recent moves by berrano 
Sufter such as winning over Franco for sending volun- 
teers agafnst Russia, indicate clearly the intention of 
preparing Spain's entrance into the war. 
The Chargt d' Affaires in Spain to the ^reign Ministry 
Reports that 40 times the number needed .volun- 
teered for the Blue Division which is soon to be moved 
£ GermLy The division is to emprise 641 officers, 
2,272 noncommissioned officers, and 15,780 men. 

Memorandum^ an Official of Politic -al Div^on^ M 
' Records that the English have closely observed the 

sunrjlving of a German submarine by a German tender 
n P the y Slnary Islands; although the Spaniards rjrouW 

probably not be deterred by the English Potest, the 

German Naval Attache has discontinued these supply 

operations for the next months. 

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a long conversation with Serrano toaon 
the Spanish attitude toward the Allies and his fears 
of English or American landings in the Azores, North 
Africa, or Portugal. 

The Ambassador in Spain to the F 'oreign Mv^V 

Reports a conversation with the Spanish foreign 
MKfwho was distressed that the : new ^Spanish 
Ambassador, Count Mayalde, had not yet been 
received by Hitler. 
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

Adds to his earlier telegram (document No l 226) 
that Serrano Sufier was hurt that his confidant, 
Mayalde, h a d not been received after 4 weeks whereas 
the former Ambassador, Espinosa had twice been re- 
ceived in farewell visits at Hitler's headquarters. 
An Official of the Embassy in Spain to the Foreign 

Reports the signing of the agreement concerning 
employment of Spanish workers in Germany. 

The Ambassador in Spain ^^J 0Tei f>. M iT^ arA , ns 
Transmits a report of the MiUtary Attache regarding 
a discussion with General Asensio Chief of Sta ff who 
advocated an operation aga nst Gibraltar by Spain 
alone. Comments that this idea is probably inspired 
by Minister of War, Varela, who is Anglophile. Urges 
that a new approach to Spain for military, cooperation 
would probably be successful and asks for instructor. 



12 



34 



70 



122 



16 



38 



81 



168 



157 



226 



229 



231 



273 



222 



353 



357 



360 



441 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Spain — Continued 



LV 



Date 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Page 



1941 
Sept. 3 



Sept. 6 



Sept. 11 
Sept. 13 



Oct. 4 



Oct. 6 



Oct. 10 



Oct. 10 



Oct. 10 



Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy 275 444 
Department 
Records a conversation with Carceller who argued 
that a more moderate tone of the Spanish press toward 
Britain and the United States would result in increased 
imports of raw materials from overseas. He urged 
that this would not mean an abandonment of Spain's 
pro-German policy. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy 285 459 
Department 
Refers to his earlier memorandum of September 3 
(document No. 275) and records a conversation between 
Carceller and Brandau, of the Protocol Division, ac- 
cording to which the Spanish Minister of Commerce had 
emphasized that it was up to Germany to decide if she 
wanted Spain to participate in her European policy 
as an equal partner. 

Minister Eisenlohr to the Embassy in Spain 302 478 

Directs Stohrer to make preparations and get per- 
mission to increase the loading capacity of the railroad 
station at Irun, 

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the 314 498 
Foreign Ministry 
States the view of the OKW, which was approved by 
Hitler, that political and military relations with Spain 
are to be expanded, yet military action on the Iberian 
Peninsula is considered undesirable until conclusion of 
the Russian campaign. A reserved attitude is recom- 
mended in economic discussions. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 380 612 

Records a visit by the Spanish Ambassador who 
stated that his Government was for some time without 
news of the Blue Division and who requested permis- 
sion to make a personal visit to the Division. 

State Secretary Weizsacher to Ambassador Stohrer _ 383 617 

Explains the situation in regard to Mayalde. With 
both Hitler and Ribbentrop away from Berlin it is 
exceptional if Chiefs of Mission are able to see either of 
them. 

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Spain _ _ 391 628 

Expresses resentment over Spanish compliance with 
a British protest over two German ships supplying 
German submarines in Las Palmas. Asks Stohrer to 
arrange with Spanish authorities to have this operation 
continued as had been agreed upon with the Spanish 
Government in 1939. 

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry _ 392 630 

Reports on the internal political crisis and especially 
the opposition to Serrano Suner and to his pro-German 
foreign policy. 

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 394 633 

Reports the gist of the conversation between Franco, 
Serrano Suner, and Weddell as told to him by the 
Foreign Minister. Weddell suggested far-reaching 
economic concessions in return for a friendlier policy 
on the part of Spain regarding Britain and America. 



LVI 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Sp ai n — Continued 



Data 

1941 
Oct. 14 



Nov. 6 



Nov. 13 



Nov. 15 



Nov. 30 



Subject 



Doc. No, 



Dec. 9 



The Ambassador in Spain to Ike Foreign Mtmstry 

Refers to the instruction of October 9 (document No. 
391) and explains the action of the Spanish Minister of 
the Navy in regard to the two German supply ships 
at Las Palmas, 

Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Spain 
Records that recruitment of Spanish workers tor 

Germany has come to a standstill; that not a single 

worker has left for Germany. 

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy 
in Spain . . 

Directs that no discussions about joint military 

action or the entry of Spain into the war be undertaken 

with members of the Spanish Government. 

The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

Transmits a report according to which Franco stated 
in a letter to Don Juan that he considered the restora- 
tion of the monarchy in Spain the coronation of the 
revolution. 
Memorandum, by an Official of the Foreign Ministers 

Be cords the conversation of Hitler, Ciano, Sutler, 
Ribbentrop, and Stohrer on November 29 in which 
Hitler discussed American and Turkish attitudes 
toward the war, and Serrano Sufler talked about the 
problems of Spanish policy. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Protocol Department 

Records a conversation between Hitler and General 
Moscardo on December 7 about Spanish-Portuguese 
relations, and Spanish economic difficulties. Hitler 
expressed his regrets that he was unable to do any- 
thing regarding the capture of Gibraltar at that time. 

(See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact" and "Por- 
tugal.") 



Spanish Morocco 



1941 
Aug. 23 



Nov. 7 



Nov. 25 



An Official of Political Division II to the Consulate at 
Tetu&n „ _ , „. 

Directs that in view of the needs of Germany s allies 
there should be no discussion in Morocco of Germany s 
policy regarding the Arabs. 

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with the Spanish Foreign 
Minister and Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco 
regarding German propaganda in Spanish Moroceo. 
Asks for more personnel and funds to counteract ex- 
tensive American and British activities. 
Memorandum by the Director of the Information Depart- 

Records a meeting of November 14 in the German 
Embassy, Madrid, in which details of future propa- 
ganda activities for Spanish Morocco were discussed. 



403 



453 



467 



471 



523 



Page 



555 



647 



748 



774 



782 



904 



971 



232 


361 


455 


756 


499 


822 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Sweden 



lvh 



Date 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Pago 



1941 
June 24 



June 24 



June 25 



June 25 



June 27 



June 27 



June 29 



June 29 



June 29 



July 2 



The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that although no definite reply has been 
received, the Swedish Government will most likely 
agree to the German military requests, particularly 
for the transit of one division from Norway over 
Sweden to Finland. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that Finland's emphasis on her neutrality 
respecting the German-Russian war is having a re- 
tarding effect on conversations with Sweden on political 
and military questions. 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with the King who expressed 
his satisfaction that the principal German request for 
the transit of one division had been accepted by the 
State Council and who indicated his personal support 
in this matter. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister has 
stated that the Swedish Government granted the 
request for the transit of one division from Norway 
to Finland. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

. Reports that the wishes of the OKW regarding Swed- 
ish cooperation in the campaign against Soviet Russia, 
as listed in the OKW letter of June 17 (volume 
XII, document No. 638), have in large measure been 
granted. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden 

Directs that the Government's thanks and satis- 
faction be conveyed to the Swedish Foreign Minister 
for Sweden's understanding attitude toward Ger- 
many's wishes in connection with the war in the East. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister assured 
the Minister of Finland that Sweden would supply 
arms and ammunition to Finland. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports on the agreement made with the Swedish 
Air Force for its cooperation with the Luftwaffe as 
regards: forced landings; courier flights; withholding 
of fire against German or Finnish aircraft; possible 
intermediate landings in the transfers of Luftwaffe 
units; and weather reports. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports on the agreement negotiated with the Swed- 
ish Government for cooperation of the Swedish Navy 
with the German Navy. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Forwards the list of war materials and equipment 
requested by the Swedish Government. 



16 



17 



28 



30 



41 



42 



11 



12 



20 



21 



30 



33 



44 



45 



43 



59 



48 



68 



Lviir 



Date 

1941 

July 6 



July 7 



July 10 



July 10 



July 12 



July 15 



July 25 



Aug. 1 



ANALYTICAL. LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Swede n — Continued 



Subject 



Doc. No. Page 



The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Discusses a possible request to Sweden to accede 
to the Tripartite Pact. Points out that the concessions 
already made to Germany have strained the coalition 
government and that only a minority government 
could support Sweden's accession. Suggests that 
Sweden's relationship to Germany could best be de- 
fined by a special treaty. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden 

Acknowledges the argument in the Legation s tele- 
gram of July 5 (document No. 77), but reserves a final 
instruction regarding Swedish accession to the iri- 
partite Pact. Points out that a bilateral pact with 
Sweden is out of the question. 

The Head of Division W VI of the Economic Policy 
Department to the High Command of the WenrmacM 
and other Offices and Ministries 
Forwards an Official Minute of July 9 which records 

the agreed conditions for Swedish overseas trade 

through the harbor of Goteborg. 

Memorandum by the Head of Division W V of the Eco- 
nomic Policy Department 
Records a telephone message from Major Kadtite 
(of the OKW, Wi Rii) that he will go to Stockholm. 
Lists the general answers he will bring in regard to 
Sweden's wishes for war materials, as forwarded in 
the Legation's telegram of July 2 (document No. 59). 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Refers to his telegram of July 2 (document No. 59) 
and complains that instead of the negotiator with full 
powers which he had requested, Major Radtke appeared 
with a negative answer and not even the power to grant 
the few concessions considered in Berlin. Reports 
having called off the negotiations of today, and having 
decided to handle aerial questions separately. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden 

Directs the Legation to decline the offer of the 
Swedish Government to detail a select group of officers 
to the Wehrmacht because such officers would com- 
mand no cadres of volunteers. 

The Charge 1 d' Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 
Reports a discussion with the Swedish State becre- 
tarv regarding the Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. 
Boheman stated that the ships were being sharply 
watched; that they would need at least 2 weeks for 
preparations to run out; but that Swedish law could 
not prevent their departure if their papers were in 
order. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Swedish Government refused per- 
mission for the overland transit of an additional German 
division to Finland and suggested that the sea route be 
used instead. 



77 



79 



91 



92 



93 



95 



115 



118 



98 



124 



109 



151 



138 



214 



172 



272 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
S wede n — Continued 



LIX 



1941 

Aug, 2 



Aug. 4 



Aug. 5 



Aug. 6 



Aug. 28 



Sept. 2 



Sept. 8 



Sept. 11 



Subject 



The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a discussion with Hagglof regarding the 
Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. As a means of 
preventing the ships from running out to England 
Hagglof proposed that the Oslo shipping firms send 
eaptams to bring the ships to Norway. Objection by 
the Norwegian Legation would put the matter into the 
courts which in any case would involve long delays and 
provide that the ships remain in Goteborg. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having expressed the reerets of the German 
Government over Sweden's refusal to permit the pas- 
sage of another German division across Swedish terri- 
tory, and having emphasized the need for secrecy. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports the Swedish Government's assent to anal- 
ogous application of the agreement of July 1940 which 
would permit unrestricted transport of war materials 
over Swedish railroads to Haparanda, Narvik, and 
Trondheim and the shipment of a few thousand men to 
Narvik and Trondheim, 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a communication from Sbderblom that the 
Swedes had discovered a captured British officer on a 
German furlough train. 

Minute by the Head of Division W V of the Economic 
Policy Department 
Records the discussion at Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's 
office on August 28 concerning economic negotiations 
with Sweden: the need for a clearing credit from 
Sweden; the need to maintain civilian exports to 
Sweden, to centralize Wehrmacht purchases in Sweden, 
and for relaxation in the matter of exports of war ma- 
terials to Sweden. 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports the announcement in Sweden of the official 
ban on the recruitment of Swedish volunteers for 
foreign armies. 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a discussion with Gilnther regarding the 
Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. Giinther stated 
that it was impossible for the Swedish police to change 
the crews without a court order; he insisted that the 
validity of the Norwegian decree of May 1940 had to 
be decided judicially before any action took place; and 
maintained that Sweden had to operate according to 
law. He promised finally to re-examine the complex of 
questions. 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports receiving the final answer of the Swedish 
Government regarding the Norwegian ships: the 
recommendation that the Norwegian shipowners insti- 
tute legal action in order to place their own captains and 
crews aboard the ships. The Legation recommends 
either following that course or letting the ships escape 
and be brought in by German naval vessels. 



Doe. No. 



174 



176 



178 



Page 



277 



181 



254 



281 



283 



287 



405 



270 



290 



300 



438 



465 



475 



LX 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Sweden — Continued 



Date 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



1941 
Sept. 15 



Sept. 17 



Page 



Sept. 19 



Sept. 19 



Sept. 19 



Sept. 20 



The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign M *'" is ^ rppmellt 
Reoorts regarding conclusion of a new agreement 
wifh the Swedish lir Force permitting an ' J^re^e 
in the number of flights over Swedish territory by 
German courier planes. 
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that today's conversation revealed the 
suSng fact that the Norwegian ^ips have been 
Sed to England and are at England's disposal. 
Srtehaving insisted that the ships be turned over 
to their rfghtful owners, the Norwegian shipowners 
tnd w£hout recourse to judicial P£^<?^S£ 
pending such restoration no ships be allowed to escape. 

Ambassador Bitter to the Legation in S ™ d ™. heY 17 
Refers to the Legation's telegram l of .Septemba ^ 
Mnrument No. 329) and directs that the bweaisn 
StiiSte be informed that the facte mfccate 
fh-it the Swedish Government has not dealt openly 
SuS Glrmlnv that Sweden has taken an unneutral 

war materials for England throws a peculiar light on 

the attitude of the Swedish Government. 

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the 

BiartTA LSSm'- telegram of September 17 
fdocument No 329) and states that the Foreign Min- 
ister wfshes a memorandum on economic relations 
wltn Sweden, with special regard to pos^bihUes of 
putting the thumbscrews on the Swedes. 

SgSfth.t to pot Pte»»r. on **« /«*» *y o^tms 

8SKJS? '&lA a l^«p ■^3B« 

her overseas trade, the Gbteborg traffic. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Fore f?* ^Norwegian 
Reports a new discussion regarding the «°™egiaii 

wmmm 

point for sanctions against bweden. 



319 



329 



Sept. 22 



508 



522 



334 



SFSwHMSSSs 

deficits. 



529 



335 



531 



336 



532 



343 



539 



347 



546 



Date 

1941 

Sept. 25 



Sept. 28 



Oct. 1 



Oct. 23 



Oct. 28 



Nov. 1 



Nov. 20 



Dec. 1 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Sweden — Continued 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a conversation with Hagglof who explained 
certain factors regarding the Swedish truck market. 
The British had cut off the importation of parts from 
the U.S.A. on learning that Sweden delivered 500 
trucks to Finland just as they had cut off the importa- 
tion of chocolate through Goteborg. Hagglof also 
urged the importance of the Goteborg traffic not only 
for Sweden but also for Germany. 

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister 

Records a conversation of September 26 with the 
Swedish Charge d' Affaires regarding German-Swedish 
relations: criticism of Germany and of Hitler in 
the Swedish press; refusal to permit Swedish volunteers 
to serve with the German colors; the pro-English 
attitude of the Swedish Government regarding Nor- 
wegian ships in Swedish ports. 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that the Chief of the Legal Department 
explained the current status of the litigation regarding 
the Norwegian ships: that the Rigmor was under arrest 
by order of the Court of Appeal; that the other cases 
would probably be settled in accordance with the 
precedent of the Rigmor case. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that two important problems regarding the 
supply of the German troops in Finland have been 
resolved by Sweden's agreement to sell 2,000 tents and 
to lease 300 trucks equipped with tires. 

The Charge" a" Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 
Reports a conversation with the King who expressed 
his fears of Bolshevism, his admiration for Hitler in 
the fight against Soviet Russia, and who spoke of his 
desire to maintain good relations with Germany. 

The Foreign Minister to the Reich Commissar for Oc- 
cupied Norway 
Explains German policy on Nordic congresses in 
Sweden: Norwegian participation is out of the ques- 
tion; but as regards Finland and Denmark a distinc- 
tion must be drawn between political and nonpolitical 
congresses. 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a discussion with Giinther regarding Swe- 
den's refusal to supply woolen goods to the German 
Army in Finland. Giinther explained that the raw 
materials for such goods came from overseas and that 
the British Government would cut off the Goteborg 
traffic if Sweden provided such goods to Germany. 

Memorandum by the Head of Division W IV of the 
Economic Policy Department 
Draws the attention of Ribbentrop to a memo- 
randum prepared by the Swedish Government which 
lists in detail Swedish services on behalf of Germany 
since July 1940. 



LXI 



Page 



357 



565 



364 



583 



371 



594 



418 



430 



437 



674 



706 



722 



484 



803 



530 



927 



LXII 



Data 



1941 
Deo. 7 



Dec. 7 



Dec. 8 



Dec. 8 



Dec. 11 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Sweden — Continued 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Adolf Hitler to King Oustav V of Sweden 

Refers to the King's message (document No. 430) 
and expresses his appreciation for the King's sympathy 
with Germany's anti-Bolshevist struggle. He points 
out that Germany is fighting for ail of Europe and that 
the Swedish public should realize this more fully than 
it apparently does. 

Minister Wied to State Secretary Weizsacker 

Mentions that in November Sweden rejected the 
German requests brought by Sehnurre. Predicts that 
in the new situation resulting from the English declara- 
tion of war on Finland it will be necessary to make new 
demands of Sweden. Suggests that these would best 
be made through Finland or through the regular route 
of the Legation rather than by Sehnurre as a special 
envoy. 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports in regard to the consequences of the English 
declaration of war on Finland which is not expected 
to change Sweden's attitude toward Finland. Suggests 
that if special demands have to be made on Sweden they 
be made through Finland. 

German-Swedish Agreement Regarding the Delivery of 
War Materials 
Secret protocol listing a number of items of arms, 
ammunition, and military equipment to be delivered by 
German firms to Sweden, providing for methods of 
payment and specifying periods for delivery. 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports having delivered Hitler's letter (docu- 
ment No. 554) to the King who was rather negative 
toward Germany's present wishes in regard to the 
transportation of men on leave and exchange of troops 
from northern Finland. 

(See also under "Finland.") 



Page 



554 



969 



558 



975 



561 



565 



574 



981 



9SS 



1001 



Switzerland 



1941 
Aug. 19 



Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Personal Staff 
Submits a report by an agent on the Swiss domestic 
situation; the report deals with effects of the war m 
the east, German-Swiss economic relations, opinions 
in Swiss military circles, and British propaganda in 
Switzerland. 




331 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Tripartite Pact 



LXIII 



Date 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Page 



1941 
Deo. 3 



Dec. 4 



Dec. 5 



Dec. 5 



Dec. 8 



Dec. 8 



Dec. 9 



The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 537 941 

Reports having been informed by Ciano that the 
Japanese Ambassador had handed Mussolini a com- 
munication regarding the breakdown of the Japanese- 
American conversations, stating that a war of Japan 
against the United States and Great Britain is regarded 
"as possible and imminent." Japan requested an Italian 
declaration of war in such an event as well as a mutual 
agreement committing the two countries not to con- 
clude an armistice or separate peace with the United 
States and the British Empire. 

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Italy 543 953 

Records a discussion with Marchese d'Ajeta regard- 
ing the Japanese d-marche of December 3 (document 
No. 537), D'Ajeta remarked that Berlin was appar- 
ently examining very carefully the reply to be made to 
Japan, and mentioned that opinions in the Palazzo 
Chigi were divided on whether the outbreak of a Japa- 
nese-American conflict at this time would be advan- 
tageous to the Axis. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy 546 958 

Forwards the draft text of an agreement of the Tri- 
partite Powers providing for a joint entry into a state 
of war with America and excluding any separate peace. 
Directs Mackensen to secure the approval of the 
Italian Government so that the text may be handed 
to Oshima. 

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy 548 960 

Records a series of conversations in connection with 
carrying out Ribbentrop's instructions of December 5 
(document No, 546). Ciano and Mussolini approved 
the German draft of an agreement to be concluded 
with Japan and the proposal that a similar statement 
be handed to the Japanese Ambassador in Rome, 

Editors' Note 977 

Reference to the conversations of Oshima and Rib- 
bentrop on December 7. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 562 982 

Forwards the draft of a German-Italian-Japanese 
agreement which had been discussed with Oshima. 
Requests that the assent of the Japanese Government 
be obtained in time for the signing to take place on 
December 10. 

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy 563 983 

Records that Ciano and Mussolini agreed to the draft 
of the German-Italian-Japanese agreement (document 
No. 562). 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 568 992 

Reports that the text of the draft agreement for- 
warded in the instruction of December 8 (document No. 
562) was submitted to Foreign Minister Togo who re- 
quested changes in articles 3 and 4 for the sake of the 
Privy Council. Togo also asked when Germany would 
declare war on the United States. 



LXIV 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Tripartite Pact — Continued 



Date 

1941 
Dec. 10 



Dec. 11 



Dec. 11 



Subject 



The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

Agrees to the Japanese proposals for changes in the 
draft agreement as reported in Tokyo telegram of 
December 9 (document No. 568) and directs Ott to urge 
that full powers to sign be issued to Oshima without 
delay. 

The Foreign Minister to the Legations in _ Hungary, 
Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovakia 
Directs the Minister to inform the Government to 
which he is accredited of the view of Germany and 
Italy that article 3 of the Tripartite Pact now applies 
and that the Government should therefore declare war 
on the United States. Croatia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia 
are asked also to declare war on Great Britain. 

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy 

Records a series of telephone calls with Berlin and 
conversations with Mussolini and officials of the Italian 
Foreign Ministry so that the diplomatic steps and 
public statements by Germany and Italy would be 
synchronized in the matter of declaring war on the 
United States. 

(See also under "Japan" and "Sweden,") 



Doc. No, 



Page 



571 



576 



998 



1003 



578 



1005 



Turkey 



1941 
June 23 



June 30 



July 9 



July 12 



July 18 



The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry _ 

Reports that Saracoglu is willing to cooperate with 
Germany with regard to the passage of Soviet ships 
through the Straits. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy 
Department 
Records a conversation with the Turkish Counselor 
of Embassy who offered his Ambassador's cooperation 
in the preparation of a new German-Turkish trade 
agreement. 

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 

Requests instructions regarding a suggestion by 
Saracoglu that Germany should consent to Turkish 
occupation of Northern Syria. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey 

Replies to the telegram of July 9 (document No. 
86) and states that in view of the loyal attitude of the 
French it is not possible for Germany to support a 
Turkish occupation of Northern Syria. 

Editors' Note 

Reference to conversation between Ribbentfop and 
Turkish Foreign Ministry official M. C. Acikalin on 
July 12. 

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 

Explains the sympathy of the Turks for Germany 
in the struggle against Bolshevism and their hope that 
a prompt defeat of Russia will permit a German com- 
promise peace with the West. Indicates Turkey s 
antipathy toward Arab liberation movements. Sug- 
gests psychological exploitation of the situation to bring 
Turkey to Germany's side. 



51 



86 



97 



125 



69 



106 



123 



129 



174 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Tueket — Continued 



LXV 



1941 
July 24 



July 28 



Aug. 5 



Aug. 11 



Aug. 11 



Subject 



Doc. No, 



Aug. 22 



Aug. 24 



Aug. 25 



Aug. 28 



The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey 

Refers to American and British press reports of a 
peace offensive by von Papen. Points out the simi- 
larity of such reports with some of the ideas of Papen s 
dispatch of July 14 (document No. 125). Directs the 
Ambassador to refrain from any talk regarding Turkey 
as a mediator except on authorization from the Foreign 
Ministry. 

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 

Replies to Ribbentrop's telegram of July 24, (docu- 
ment No. 145); denies having discussed peace offers by 
Germany with foreign diplomats; and defends his 
policy of influencing Turkey by diplomatic means. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Records a conversation with the Turkish Ambassador 
who brought up the question of the nationalities of 
Turkic ethnic origin in Soviet Russia and suggested 
the possibility of a Caucasian buffer state. 

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister 

Suggests letting the Turks have the text of Molotov s 
proposal of November 1940 regarding Soviet bases on 
the Straits. 

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Papen 

Replies to Papen's report of July 28 (document No. 
161) and denies any lack of confidence in Papen. 
States that he had mainly wished to point out the 
danger of giving the impression that Germany was 
making peace offers through Turkey and outlines the 
goals of German diplomacy with regard to Turkey. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey 

States that Germany expects Turkey to intern 
Russian military personnel escaping to Turkish terri- 
tory and to obstruct and delay the passage of Russian 
merchant vessels through the Dardanelles. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department 
Records an account by Minister Kroll of the Em- 
bassy in Turkey of his visit in the Special Train where 
he had conversations with Ribbentrop, Ritter, and 
Jodl regarding the problem of Turkey. Kroll outlined 
a program toward Turkey which was approved by 
those present. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey 

Informs Papen of his conversation with the Turkish 
Ambassador at Headquarters on August 19 in which 
they discussed Roosevelt's policy, the Anglo-Russian 
guarantee to Turkey, and Russia's aims as revealed 
in Molotov's statement of November 1940, the text 
of which was shown to Gerede. Ribbentrop asked 
about Turkey's attitude toward the border peoples in 
the Caucasus and eastward. 

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Turkey 

Transmits the Foreign Minister's instruction that 
every effort be made to bring about a change in Tur- 
key's position toward the passage of Russian merchant 
vessels through Turkish waters. 



145 



Page 



207 



161 



179 



193 



194 



22S 



284 



304 



305 



227 



236 



354 



368 



238 



373 



253 



403 



683-905—84- 



LXVI 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Tuhkby — -Continued 



Date 



Subject 



1941 
Aug. 29 



Sept. 9 

Sept. 10 
Sept. 24 



Sept. 26 



Sept. 26 



Sept. 28 



Sept. 29 



The Stale Secretary to the Foreign Minister 

Explains with regard to the forthcoming German- 
Turkish economic negotiations that Turkey will agree 
to deliver chromium and copper only in return for war 
materials and asks that ClodiuB be authorized to ar- 
range for such German deliveries. 

The Embassy in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that in negotiations for a new trade and 
clearing agreement the Turks do not want to make 
deliveries in advance and are resolved to obtain at 
least a part of the war materials immediately. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Reeords a conversation with Nuri Pasha, a leader 
of the Pan-Turanian movement in Turkey, who offered 
to advise Germany in matters relating to the Caucasus. 

The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department 
to the Foreign Ministry 
Reports a conversation with Menemencioglu who 
said that the English Ambassador insisted on the main- 
tenance of Turkey's agreement which required the de- 
livery to England of the total annual production of 
chromium ore, limited to 250,000 tons. States that 
he rejected the suggestion of a treaty excluding de- 
liveries of chrome ore and war materials. 

The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department 
to the Foreign Ministry 
Reports regarding the economic negotiations that 
Menemencioglu insisted that it was impossible for 
Turkey to make deliveries of chrome ore prior to 
January 8, 1943. Explains that the alternatives are: 
to break off negotiations, or to conclude a treaty with 
the promise of future chrome ore deliveries. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records the results of three discussions with the 
Turkish champion of the Pan-Turanian movement, Nuri 
Pasha, who advocated the creation of certain inde- 
pendent states, based on the Turkic ethnic element, 
which would be carved out of the Soviet Union. 
Recommends that, in accordance with Nuri Pasha's 
suggestion, the Mohammedan elements be separated 
out from the other Russian prisoners. 

Memorandum by Minister Eisenlohr 

Comments on Clodius' report of September 26 
(document No. 358) and argues in favor of acceptance 
of the Turkish suggestion for future deliveries of 
chromium ore. Requests permission to take steps to 
secure the consent of the Chief of OKW to that pro- 
gram. 

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports a discussion with Menemencioglu and 
Clodius on the economic and political situation; how 
Menemencioglu felt about Turkey s interest in the defeat of 
Bolshevism but that Turkey had to maintain her 
agreement with England regarding chromium. Urges 
a decision on the Turkish proposal for a comprehensive 
agreement with chromium deliveries beginning in 1943. 



Doc. No. 



258 



294 



298 



352 



413 



470 



473 



55& 



358 



566 



361 



571 



366 



587 



367 



589 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Turkey — Continued 



Lxvn 



Date 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Page 



1941 
Oct. 2 



Oct. 9 



Oct. 10 



Oct. 13 



Oct. 28 



Nov. 12 



Nov, 12 



Nov. 18 



Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Turkey 374 602 

Lists three groups of armament deliveries which can 
be stipulated in the economic negotiations. Explains 
that the third group consisting of howitzers and 
cannons can be promised, item by item, in return for 
chromium after January 8, 1943. Points out the need 
for chromium deliveries from Turkey even after the 
proposed terminal date of the treaty, March 31, 1943. 

German-Turkish Exchanges of Letters 390 626 

Regarding Turkish exports of raw materials in ex- 
change for German war material and manufactured 
goods. It is stipulated that before March 31, 1943, 
a German- Turkish agreement is to be concluded pro- 
viding for the delivery of 180,000 tons of chromium 
from January IS, 1943, to December 1944, 

The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department 

to the Foreign Ministry 393 632 

Reports, on the basis of discussions of Turkish 
foreign policy with Saracoglu and Menemencioglu, 
that Turkey desires the total defeat of Russia in the 
east and a compromise peace between Germany and 
England in the west. 

Minister Kroll to Ministerial Director Wiehl 402 645 

Comments on the German-Turkish Commercial 
Agreement (document No. 390) and explains that he 
was surprised at Turkey's negative attitude in the 
matter of chromuim which was in contrast with Mene- 
mencioglu's initial promises. Criticizes Clodius for 
failing to make use of Kroll's experience in the negotia- 
tions with the Turks. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 431 707 

Records the action taken in the Pan-Turanian 
question: Hentig has been called to the Foreign Minis- 
try to deal with the matter; the OKW has been asked 
to separate the Turkic and Mohammedan prisoners 
of war; Papen has been asked to report on the attitude 
of the Turkish Government. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey 462 769 

Requests Papen's opinion whether Turkey should 
accede to the Anti-Comintern Pact. 

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 464 771 

Replies to Ribbentrop's instruction of November 
12 (document No. 462) and explains that Turkey's 
accession at this time to the Anti-Comintern Pact 
would be interpreted as an option in favor of the Axis 
which Turkey is not yet prepared to make. 

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 482 801 

Reports having been informed by Saracoglu and 
Menemencioglu that Turkey would receive materials 
directly from the United States under the Lend- Lease 
Law. Suggests an appropriate propagandistie treat- 
ment of the matter. 

(See also under "Middle East. 1 ') 



LXVIU 



Date 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



1941 
June 23 



June 26 



July 3 



July 6 



July 12 



July 15 



July 16 



July 16 



July 17 



July 21 



July 24 



July 30 



Paga 



Wolodymyr Stachiw to the FHhrer and Chancellor 

On behalf of Stepan Bandera requests Hitler s support 
in the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State. 

Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Foreign Ministry _ 

Refers to Hitler's decree entrusting him with the 
"central handling of the questions of the eastern 
European area" and requests that all material con- 
cerning this area be submitted to him. 

The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania 

Directs that Russian emigres who volunteer for the 
fight against the Soviet Union are not to be accepted. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris 

Directs that Grand Duke Vladimir be told not to 
disseminate his proclamation to the Russian people and 
to refrain from all political activity lest he be interned. 

Circular by Ambassador Ritler 

Sets forth the essentials of the guidelines drawn up 
in consultation with the OKW and SS for the employ- 
ment of foreign volunteers in the struggle against the 
Soviet Union. 

State Secretary Weizsacker to Reichsleiter Rosenberg _ 

Communicates the Foreign Minister's standpoint 
regarding the functions of the Foreign Ministry repre- 
sentatives in the eastern European areas under German 
occupation. 

Unsigned Memorandum 

Record of Hitler's conference with Rosenberg, 
Lammers, Keitel, Goring, and Bormann regarding 
policies, administration and personnel in the occupied 
areas of the Soviet Union. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Submits a letter from Wolodymyr Stachiw addressed 
to the Foreign Minister and stating that a Ukrainian 
government was established in Lw6w on June 30. 

Fukrer's Decree of July 17 4 . 

Provides for the civil administration under Keicns- 
leiter Rosenberg of the occupied eastern territories 
which are to be divided into Reich Commissariats 
and subdivided into general regions and districts. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Department for Ger- 
man Internal Affairs 
Refers to Bruns's memorandum of July 10 (.docu- 
ment No. 115) and explains that no reply should be 
given to the letter of Wolodymyr Stachiw. Encloses 
a memorandum describing the action of the Bandera 
group of Ukrainian nationalists in Lwow on June M. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Records a discussion with the Rumanian Minister 
who expressed the wish that the future Ukrainian 
state be not too large. 

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M 

Records a decision bv the Department of National 
Defense excluding establishment of a Ukrainian na- 
tional militia within the framework of the Wenrmacht. 



26 



76 



96 



111 



114 



115 



119 



138 



28 



79 



92 



122 



140 



149 



156 



163 



198 



147 



166 



209 



265 



Date 

1941 
Aug. 1 



Aug. 6 



Aug. 14 



Aug. 24 



Aug. 26 



Aug. 26 



Sept. 4 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS L303C 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — Continued 



Oct. 1 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Oct. 2 



Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal De- 
partment 
Encloses a Swedish note indicating the willingness 
of the Soviet Government to apply The Hague Rules 
of Land Warfare on condition of reciprocity. Explains 
the standpoint of the OKW on the matter and the 
considerations of foreign policy which are involved. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Department for Ger- 
man Internal Affairs 
Records expressions of discontent on the part of 
Ukrainian individuals and organizations as a result of 
the transfer of eastern Galicia to the administration 
of Governor General Frank. 

Stepan Bandera to Reich Minister Rosenberg 

States on behalf of the Organization of Ukrainian 
Nationalists that he will aceept Germany's conditions 
for cooperation by the OUN, but not the demand for 
dissolution of the Ukrainian Government proclaimed 
in Lw6w on June 30. 

Memorandum by Counselor of Embassy Hilger 

Records proposing to the Foreign Minister a com- 
promise solution for the propaganda against Soviet 
Russia. Although the Russia Committee favored 
assurances of abolition of the kolkhoz system it rec- 
ommended the compromise in view of the opposition 
from other ministries. 

Circular of the Foreign Minister 

Issues guidelines for conversations emphasizing 
Germany's victory over the Soviet Union which will 
soon permit Germany to turn her entire strength 
against England while Roosevelt will be unable to wage 
a war on two fronts. 

Circular of the Foreign Ministry 

Explains that Germany is not interested in the 
services of £migrls from eastern Europe who may 
offer to aid in the establishment of a new order in 
Russia. 

The Slate Secretary to the Permanent Deputy of the 
Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories 
Refers to earlier correspondence of the two ministries 
(see document No. Ill) regarding the representatives 
of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissars 
and forwards a memorandum regarding their appoint- 
ment and their functions. 

Memorandum by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery 

Records a conference on September 29 in which 
Rosenberg reported to Hitler about the political situa- 
tion in the occupied eastern territories. Hitler favored 
a gradual return of the kolkhozes to private property ; 
envisaged a 25-year German protectorate oyer the 
Ukraine; and opposed a return of Russian Emigres. 

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the 

Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to 

the Foreign Ministry 

Forwards an account of a visit of Seyss-Inquart with 

Hitler on September 26 in the course of which Hitler 

expressed his views regarding the exploitation of Soviet 

Russia's economic resources for the benefit of Germany. 



173 



184 



203 



237 



244 



247 



277 



372 



377 



Page 



274 



289 



315 



370 



389 



395 



449 



596 



606 



LXK ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

Union op Soviet Socialist Republics — Continued 



Date 



1041 
Oct. 8 



Nov. 30 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Deo. 1 



Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal 
Department 
Records receiving from the Swedish Legation a pro 
memoria of the views of the Soviet Government which 
denied any departure from The Hague Rules of Land 
Warfare in its treatment of German prisoners of war 
and demanded of Germany merely the reciprocal appli- 
cation of those rules. 

Memorandum by the Director of the News Service and 
Press Department 
Records that Hitler ordered the greatest possible 
propaganda use of the "Testament of Peter the Great 
in spite of the objection that German scholars had 
characterized it as a forgery even at the time of the 
last war. 

Circular of the Foreign Ministry 

Refers to the circular of August 26 (document No. 247) 
and reiterates that emigres from former Russian terri- 
tory are not to be used in the newly occupied areas. 
Forwards a memorandum to be used in replying to 
emigres. 

(See also under "Baltic States," "Directives for the 
Conduct of the War" "Finland," "Hungary, 
"Rumania," "Spain," "Turkey," and "Vatican. ) 



Pago 



389 



624 



525 



908 



527 



910 



United States 



1941 
July 7 



July 7 



July 9 



July 12 



July 13 



The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry 
Submits an appraisal by the Military Attache of 
American strategic thinking following the outbreak of 
the German-Russian war. 

The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Reports on the arrests of a number of Germans for 
espionage and sharply criticizes the employment of such 
people by German counterintelligence agencies. 

The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 

Comments upon the landing of American forces in 
Iceland and upon the effect of President Roosevelt s 
foreign policy on public opinion. States that Roose- 
velt's policy aims at strengthening Britain and her 
allies and at prolonging the war until America can 
intervene decisively. 

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry 
Submits an appraisal of American rearmament by 
the Military Attach^; he warns against underestimating 
American efficiency and states that the American 
Officers' Corps in general meets high requirements. 

The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 
J^zTiistTy 
Submits an appraisal of American foreign policy 
after the occupation of Iceland, explaining that the 
President does not want a formal declaration of war on 
Germany which would commit him to a total war effort 
but that he is determined to wage undeclared war. 



80 



81 



83 



96 



98 



101 



99 



104 



125 



130 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
United States — Continued 



LXXI 



Bate 



Subject 



Doc. No, 



Fagfl 



1941 
July 14 



JulyJlS 



JulyI22 



July 24 



July 25 



Julyl25 



July 30 



Aug. 7 



Aug, 10 



Memorandum, by Dr. Karl Megerle 

Proposes a program to Ribbentrop for propaganda 
themes emphasizing the defense of Europe against 
Anglo-American aggression and the concept of a 
European Monroe Doctrine. 

The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Comments on Roosevelt's explanation of the neces- 
sity for occupying Iceland for the defense of the United 
States and the Western Hemisphere and on the views 
of the noninterventionist opposition. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United 
States 
Directs the Chargi d' Affaires to circulate the idea 
in the United States that America's entry into the 
war would be most disadvantageous to the American 
Jews. 

The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Sec- 
retariat 
Expresses the wish that mendacious reports about 
Roosevelt and Churchill be circulated as a counter- 
move against British and American falsifications. 

The Charge" d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Refers to Ribbentrop's instruction of July 22 (docu- 
ment No. 139) and reports having discussed its ideas 
with leaders of the opposition. States that some in- 
telligent Jews fear that they may be the scapegoats in 
case of America's entry into the war. 

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry 
Submits an evaluation of the military situation 
indicating that the American fleet ia dispersed, leaving 
Japan free in the Western Pacific. The United States 
must therefore seek an accommodation with Japan. 
Entry into the war against Germany is unlikely. 

The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Reports on a "particularly effective" propaganda 
action organized and financed by the Embassy; post- 
cards containing attacks on Roosevelt and his Cabinet 
have been sent out in great numbers under the letter- 
heads of members of the Congress. 

The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Reports that in spite of propaganda efforts by 
"warmongers" Roosevelt will maintain the course of 
"nonbelligerent means," the median course between 
war and isolation. 

The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Reports that American foreign policy is faced with a 
dilemma resulting from various foreign and domestic 
pressures; considers it likely that an Anglo-American 
peace program will be formulated to anticipate any 
possible German peace offer after victory in Russia. 



108 



121 



139 



144 



150 



137 



167 



201 



206 



213 



153 



163 



216 



234 



185 



192 



291 



302 



LXXII 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
United States — Continued 



Date 



1941 
Aug. 12 



Subject 



Doe. No. 



The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 
Ministry . 

Reports that American policy aims at appeasement 
of Japan because America cannot risk a two-front war 
in view of her needs of strategic materials from over- 
seas Reports also that isolationist leaders have 
approached the German Embassy asking that it exert 
its influence on Japan lest an incident in the Pacific 
precipitate war. 

Aus 17 Memorandum by the Foreign Minister t, „„„„„>,♦ 

AUg - Submits to Hitler an appraisal of * h ° *?^™" 

Churchill meeting; states that the eight Wilson 
points of the Atlantic Charter will not impress anybody 
and expresses the opinion that there will be no active 
American intervention in the war once Germany has 
attained her goals in the east. 
Aug. 27 The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 

frT7 1M-S £?"U * 

States that a Japanese attack on Manila would bring 
about an American declaration of war on Japan which 
would not be in Germany's interest. 

Sept. 1 Memorandum, by Minister Eisenlohr roMT M na 

P Refers to the Washington report of July 5 regard ing 

espionage (document No. 81) and records that a delay 
*n P the investigation ensued because the OKW objected 
to the Embassy's harsh criticism of the Abwehr activi- 
ties. Of those 17 who were arrested, four were from the 
Abwehr and one from the SD. 

Sept. 6 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United 

Transmits the text of the German press announce- 
ment regarding the encounter of the AmencM deateosw 
Greer with a German submarine, and instructs Thorn- 
sen to make it clear to "leading isolationist members 
of Congress" that the incident provides a unique op- 
portunity to expose Roosevelt's war-mongenng policy. 

Sept. 9 The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 

Refers^ the Foreign Minister's instruction regard- 
ing [the Greer incident (document No. 282) and report* 
that Germany's handling of the matter has >d effect, 
and that contact has been made with eertain Senators 
and Congressmen who expect to press for a Congres- 
sional investigation. 
Sept. 11 The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 

Reports' that Senator Nye introduced a resolution in 
the Senate calling for an investigation of the Greer 
incident. 
Sept. 12 The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 

Comments on President Roosevelt's speech of 
September 11 and states that it will affl™vate the 
situation in the Atlantic, the more so as the United 
States Atlantic fleet, in interpreting the new orders 
will not merely wait for Axis naval units to appear 
but will hunt them down. 



196 



Page 



309 



209 



321 



249 



266 



399 



433 



282 



454 



292 



467 



299 



304 



474 



480 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 



LXXIII 



United States — Continued 



Date 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Page 



1941 
Sept. 15 



Sept. 19 



Sept. 22 



Sept. 28 



Oct. 6 



Oct. 7 



Oct. 10 



Oct. 17 



Oct. 27 



Nov. 1 



The Charge d'Affaires in the United Stales to the For- 321 511 

eign Ministry 
Reports that Secretary of the Navy Knox stated 
in a speech that the American Navy after September 
16 would protect ships of all flags carrying lend-lease 
war material between the American Continent and 
Iceland. 

The ChargS d'Affaires in the United Stales to the Foreign 337 533 

Ministry 
Reports the receipt of an American note demanding 
$2,967,092 in reparation for the sinking of the Robin 
Moor by a German submarine in May 1941. 

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister 348 548 

Submits a draft instruction for Washington in reply 
to Thomsen's telegram of September 19 regarding the 
American note on the Robin Moor (document No. 337) , 
Thomsen is rebuked for having acknowledged receipt 
of the note. 

Minute by the Director of the Political Department 365 586 

States that reprisals against Jews and Freemasons 
in Germany, as suggested in a memorandum forwarded 
by Bohle, would not improve the situation of German 
citizens in North and South America. 

Minute by the Stale Secretary 384 617 

Asks the Press Department for information on the 
way in which the use of uranium for blasting has 
recently been dealt with in the foreign press, especially 
the American press. 

The Chargi d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 387 621 
Ministry 
Reports his view that President Roosevelt will pro- 
ceed with caution in his endeavor to achieve repeal of 
the Neutrality Act. 

Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff 396 638 

Comments upon President Roosevelt's message to 
Congress of October 9 urging repeal of article 6 of the 
Neutrality Act which prohibits the arming of merchant 
vessels. 

The Charge" d'Affaires in the United Stales to the Foreign 407 652 

Ministry 
Comments on the likely reaction of the American 
Government and of the opposition as well to the tor- 
pedoing of the United States destroyer Kearney near 
Iceland. 

Minute by Ambassador Dieckhoff 427 702 

Records that on request from the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat he submitted a memorandum on the situa- 
tion in the United States Senate with regard to the 
pending bill providing for changes in the Neutrality 
Act. 

Circular of the Foreign, Minister 439 724 

Directs each Mission to notify the given Govern- 
ment by note verbale that the Reich Government 
absolutely denies the assertions made in a speech by 
President Roosevelt regarding a map showing German 
plans for the control of Latin America and regarding 
plans for the abolition of all existing religions. 



lxxiv 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
United States — Continued 



Bate 

1941 

Nov. 2 



Nov. 13 



Nov. 14 



Nov. 15 



Nov. 27 



Dec. 4 



Dec. 4 



Dec. 7 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Fago 



Circular of the Foreign Minister 

Refers to a second statement prepared in Berlin in 
addition to that issued in Multex No. 887 (document 
No. 439) and directs each Mission to make appropriate 
use of the statement in refuting Roosevelt's charge in 
his speech of October 27 regarding Germany as the 
aggressor. 

The Charge d' Affaires in the United Stales to the Foreign 
Ministry 
States that as a result of Roosevelt's continued drive 
against the opposition leading members of the America 
First Committee may be intimidated into resigning. 

Editors' Note 

Reference to a conference on November 13 at Hitler s 
headquarters where new directives were approved for 
the conduct of German surface forces on encountering 
American forces. 

Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff 

Comments on the changes in the Neutrality Act 
voted by the House of Representatives and emphasizes 
the small size of the vote in favor of the changes. 

The Embassy in Ike United Stales to the Foreign Min- 
istry 
The Military Attache" expresses the opinion that the 
arrival of the Japanese negotiator Kurusu poses for 
the United States the question of how to extricate 
itself from the dilemma between its "megalomania 
and the actual power situation in the Far East. 

The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Reports that the American note handed to the 
Japanese negotiators amounts to an ultimatum but 
that it is impossible to say whether the Americans 
intend to make good this threat. 

The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Suggests certain considerations which argue against 
an American-Japanese war in spite of alarmist articles 
to the contrary in the American press. 

The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 

Ivt 1S¥L % S t T 1/ 

Comments on the publication in the Chicago Tribune 
and Washington Times Herald of a secret report of the 
American High Command which confirms that 
American combat power will not be ready before July 
1943, and which indicates that Germany and her allies 
can be conquered only by an American expeditionary 
force which would require enormous sums of money. 

The Charge a" Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 
Ministry .. 

Reports that the Japanese attack on Hawaii and the 
Philippines came as a complete surprise to the American 
Government and people and caused all American war 
plans based on the expectation of gaining time for one 
or two years to be abandoned. 



441 



726. 



465 



470 



473 



772 



779- 



781 



784- 



506 



539 



541 



848- 



948 



950 



553 



968 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
United States — Continued 



LXXV 



Date 



Subject 



Page 



1941 
Dec. 8 



Dec, 8 



Deo. 10 



Dec. 11 



The Chargt d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Reports that Roosevelt will have the support of the 
whole nation in the war against Japan and will be able 
to obtain full war powers from Congress. Considers it 
uncertain whether the President will also ask that a 
state of war with Germany and Italy be declared. 

The Chargi d' Affaires in the Untied Slates to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Reports that Congress declared war on Japan fol- 
lowing Roosevelt's short speech which did not mention 
Germany or Italy; that all segments of American 
political life are united; and that American losses in the 
Pacific pose most difficult problems for the conduct of 
American military operations. 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States 
Directs the Charge' d' Affaires to deliver to the Amer- 
ican Government on December 11a note which declares 
a state of war to exist between Germany and the United 
States. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Records the delivery by the Foreign Minister to the 
American Charge 1 d' Affaires of the German declaration 
of war. 



(See also under "Finland, 1 
"Latin America.") 



"Iceland," "Japan," and 



559 



978 



560 



980 



572 



577 



999 



1004 



1941 
July 19 



July 23 



July 24 



Aug. 25 



Vatican 



Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Formulates certain guidelines in regard to the treat- 
ment of German church matters abroad. 

An Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs 
to the Foreign Minister 
Notes the impending announcement of the appoint- 
ment of Rosenberg as Reich Minister and advises 
that the Dienststelte Rosenberg claims the right to 
regulate church questions. Indicates some impend- 
ing problems. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 
Urges that the right of State control in the appoint- 
ment to offices in the Catholic Church be extended 
within the territory of the old Reich and expanded in 
the new areas under German sovereignty. Proposes 
a note to the Vatican explaining the Government's 
position. 

The Stale Secretary to the Embassy to the Holy See 

Explains the view of the Reich Government regarding 
appointments to high Church offices in the so-called new 
Reich area and regarding other appointments within 
the Old Reich. Forwards the text of a note verbale 
setting forth the position of the Reich Government 
regarding such appointments and directs that it be 
delivered to the Cardinal Secretary of State. 



129 



143 



183 



205 



148 



210 



241 



381 



LXXVI 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Vatican — Continued 



Date 

1941 
Aug. 28 



Aug. 30 



Sept. 2 



Sept. 12 



Sept. 12 



Subject 



Sept. 13 



Sept. 17 



Sept. 19 



Sept. 29 



Dec. 4 



Dec. 5 



Note Verbale From the Apostolic Nunciature 

Refers to the note verbale of May 19 of the For- 
eign Ministry (Volume XII, document No. 567) and 
explains the right of the Church to church property. 
Protests that the confiscations of church properties in 
the occupied eastern territories are contrary to inter- 
national law. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Records a visit of the Nuncio during which he was 
told that the legal theory of the latest note verbale 
of the Nunciature was not accepted. 

The Apostolic Nuncio to the Foreign Minister 

Complains about the closing of churches in the 
Warthegau and asks that the Foreign Minister inter- 
cede in the matter with the competent authorities. 

Memorandum by ike State Secretary 

Records a conversation with the Nuncio who in- 
quired about the confiscation of monasteries in Ger- 
many and about a directive that was said to restrict 
further confiscations. 

Counselor of Embassy Menshausen to State Secretary 
Weizsacker 
Discusses the attitude of the Holy See toward the 
war against Russia: The Pope would have expressed 
his sympathies with Germany to a much greater ex- 
tent had it not been for the reported anti-Christian 
tendencies in Germany. 

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Transmits a report by Attolico, the Italian Ambas- 
sador to the Holy See, concerning the conversation of 
Myron C. Taylor with the Pope. 

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 

Transmits a further report of Attolico regarding his 
conversation with the Pope in connection with Myron 
Taylor's visit to the Vatican. 

An Official of the Reich Ministry for Ecclesiastical 
A fairs to the Stale Secretary 
Transmits a copy of Hitler's order of August 6 
concerning the conduct of the Wehrmacht in religious 
questions in the eastern areas and a copy of Hitler's 
directive of July 30 concerning the suspension of the 
confiscations of church and monastic property. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Records the receipt from the Apostolic Nuncio of a 
note verbale protesting against a decree of the Reichs- 
statthalter of the Warthegau which ignores the exist- 
ing hierarchy of the Church in that area and sets up new 
religious communities. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry 

Explains why Orthodox priests had been allowed to 
enter the formerly Russian areas and Catholic priests 
had been denied such permission. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Records a conversation with the Nuncio who com- 
plained once more about conditions in the Warthegau. 



Doe. No. Page 



255 



260 



272 



307 



309 



408 



315 



330 



340 



368 



542 



547 



415 



440 



483 



489 



499 



523 



535 



590 



952 



959 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Yugoslavia 



LXXVII 



1941 
June 30 



July 10 



July 17 



July 24 



July 25 



Aug. 7 



Aug. 10 



Aug. 12 



Aug. 15 



Aug. 20 



Subject 



The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Croatia 

Directs that Pavelic" be told that Hitler accepts 
his offer of a contingent of Croatian volunteers in the 
struggle against Soviet Russia. 

The Charge 1 d' Affaires in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry 
Reports that General Glaise von Horstenau ex- 
pressed to Pavelie - Germany's concern over the excesses 
against the Serbs in Croatia committed by the Ustaie. 

The Director of the Department for German Internal 
Affairs to the Legation in Croatia 
States that the resettlement of Slovenes and Serbs 
in the territory of the former Yugoslav state is to be 
arranged by an exchange of notes between the Ger- 
man and Croatian Governments rather than by a 
formal treaty. 

Editors' Note 

Refers to the visit of Marshal Kvaternik to Hitler's 
headquarters on July 22. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Department for Ger- 
man Internal Affairs 
Requests the Foreign Minister to determine whether 
or not Hitler decided that the Volksdeutsche in south- 
eastern Europe were to be resettled in Germany. 

An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the 
Foreign Ministry 
States that a report from Belgrade regarding in- 
creased communist activity was passed on to Ribben- 
trop and Hitler. Ribbentrop ordered Veesenmayer to 
Belgrade. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Department for Ger- 
man Internal Affairs . 
Records information from Himmler of Hitler's de- 
cision postponing the resettlement of Volksdeutsche 
from southeastern Europe until after the war. Kofievje 
in Italian-occupied territory is not affected. 

The Charge d' Affaires in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry 
Reports that the insurrectionary movement in 
Bosnia, now on the wane, is partly to be attributed to 
the ruthless methods of the Ustaae. 

The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the 
Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Minis- 
try 
Reports deterioration of the situation with regard 
to the insurrectionary movement in Serbia. 

The Deputy Director of the Legal Department to the 
Legations in Croatia and Hungary 
Forwards Red Cross reports of executions of Serbs 
on Croatian and Hungarian territory. Suggests that 
measures be taken to counteract propagandists 
exploitation of such incidents. 

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister 

Records the Italian demand of Croatia that she hand 
over to the Italian military all executive authority in 
the Adriatic littoral. 



Page 



46 



90 



116 



52 



113 



157 



149 



152 



187 



191 



195 



205 



217 



203 



212 



215 



295 



301 



308 



317 



341 



L3DCVIII 



Date 

1941 
Aug. 21 



Aug. 21 



Aug. 27 



Aug. 29 



Aug. 30 



Sept. 2 



Sept. 8 



Sept. 10 



Sept. 12 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Yugoslavia — Continued 



Subject 



Doc. No. 



Paga 



The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Croatia 

Directs that in regard to the Italian demand on 
Croatia (see document No. 217) the Croatian Govern- 
ment be advised to reach a friendly agreement with 
Italy. The alliance with Italy is of paramount interest 
to Germany in the Mediterranean. 

The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry 

Reports that Mussolini has accepted a Croatian 
proposal regarding the dispute over administration of 
the Croatian littoral. 

The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the 

Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign 

Ministry 

Reports on the spread of insurrection in Serbia and 

the disintegration of the provisionally appointed 

government; installation of a new Serbian government 

willing to fight Communism is being attempted. 

The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the 
Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign 
IvfiTustviJ 
Reports the attempt to have the Communist insur- 
rection crushed by the Serbs themselves. General 
Milan Nedie, a former Yugoslav War Minister, has 
been charged with forming a government. 

The Director of the Department for German Internal 
Affairs to the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Min- 
istry With the Military Commander in Serbia 
Inquires about the number of Serbs thus far de- 
ported from Croatia. 

The Foreign Minister to the Plenipotentiary of the 

Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander 

in Serbia 

States that he has no objections to the formation of 

the Nedid government but that he should have been 

informed beforehand. The Nedie" government must 

be prevented from turning against Germany. 

The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry 
With the Military Commander in Serbia to the 
Foreign Ministry 
Proposes that 8,000 male Jews be moved from berbia 
and put on an island in the Danube delta. 

The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry 
With the Military Commander in Serbia to the 
Foreign Ministry 
Requests instructions so that the question of a quick 

and Draconian settlement of the Jewish question in 

Serbia can be taken up with the Military Commander, 

Serbia. 

The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the 

Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign 

Ministry 

Reports that the Nedie government is unable to put 

down the insurrectionary movement and that Germany 

will have to crush it solely with her own forces. 



219 



220 



250 



342 



344 



400 



257 



411 



261 



267 



416 



434 



288 



297 



463 



472 



303 



479 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 



Lxxrx 



Yugoslavia — Continued 



Date 



Subject 



Doe. NO. 



PagB 



1941 
Sept. 13 



Sept. 14 



Sept. 15 



Sept. 19 



Sept. 22 



Sept. 26 



Sept. 28 



Oct. 2 



Oct. 17 



Oct. 25 



Memorandum by an Official of the Department for 
German Internal Affairs 
Opposes the deportation of Serbian Jews to Poland or 
Russia and considers it possible to keep them in camps 
in Serbia if the necessary harshness and determina- 
tion are applied. 

Ambassador Ritter to the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign 
Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia 
Gives notice of the decision of the OKW to transfer 
one division from France to Serbia. 

Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Bulgaria 

Directs that the agreement in principle of the 
Bulgarian Government be requested for cooperation in 
blocking off outside aid to the insurgents in Serbia. 

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy 

Forwards text of Hitler's Directive of September 16 
(document No. 326) and requests that the Italian 
Government be informed of Field Marshal List's im- 
pending journey to Zagreb for discussing joint German- 
Croatian action against the Communist uprisings in 
Serbia. 

The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry 

Forwards the minutes of a conference concerning prob- 
lems of resettlement from and to the areas of former 
Yugoslavia. Requests instructions in view of the 
Croatian reluctance to accept more Slovenes. 

SS-Obergruppenfiihrer Heydrich to Foreign Minister 
Rihbentrop 
Asks that influence be brought to bear on Croatia to 
accept the Slovenes who are to be removed from Ger- 
many in order to make room for the Volksdeutsche 
from Kocevje. 

The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the 
Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign 
Minister 
Requests the Foreign Minister's support in bringing 

about the removal of 8,000 Jews from Serbia as the 

prerequisite for eliminating Freemasonry and a hostile 

intelligentsia. 

Memorandum by the Director of the Department for Ger- 
man Internal Affairs 
Comments on Behzler's telegram No. 701 (document 
No. 363) and opposes the removal of Serbian Jews to 
the Rumanian Danube delta. Requests authorization 
to discuss the matter with Heydrich. 

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy 

Requests comments on an enclosed letter of Sep- 
tember 24 from the OKW which urges that the Foreign 
Ministry not get involved in cases where death sen- 
tences are passed against nationals of occupied coun- 
tries. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Department for Ger- 
man Internal Affairs 
Record by Counselor Rademacher of his trip to Bel- 
grade to study the problem of the disposition to be 
made of the Serbian Jews. 



313 



318 



320 



339 



497 



507 



509 



535 



350 



360 



363 



552 



570 



582 



376 



408 



425 



605 



653 



697 



liXXX 



Date 



1941 
Oct. 29 



Nov. 22 



Nov. 28 



Nov. 30 



Dec. 3 



Dec. 8 



ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Yugoslavia — Continued 



Subject 



The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the 
Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign 
Ministry 
Reports that the wholesale execution of Serbs as 
reprisals for killings of members of the Wehrmacht have 
effects which are contrary to Germany's political objec- 
tive. 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

Explains that while Benzler's appointment as Plen- 
ipotentiary authorizes him to deal with the deportation 
of Jews from Serbia, the handling of this problem by the 
military authorities within Serbia is outside the sphere 
of his responsibility. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 

Personal Staff 

Record of a conversation between Hitler and 

Croatian Foreign Minister Lorkovid on November 27; 

Hitler expressed satisfaction at developments in Croatia. 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat 
Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and 
Croatian Foreign Minister Lorkovic' on November 28. 
Ribbentrop advised Croatia to conduct a wise policy 
with respect to Italy because Italy and Germany were 
allies. 

The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry 

With the Military Commander in Serbia to the 

Foreign Ministry 

Reviews the situation in Serbia after the insurrection 

had largely been suppressed. Recommends that future 

police action be chiefly entrusted to such Serbs as 

General Nedid whose actions have earned a degree of 

German trust. 

Minute by an Official of the Department for German 
Internal Affairs 
Records having told Benzler that compliance with 
his request for an early removal of the Serbian Jews 
to the east was impossible because deportation of the 
Jews from Germany had priority. 

(See also under "Directives for the Conduct of the 
War" and "Italy.") 



Doe. No. Pags 



432 



491 



511 



517 



538 



566 



708 



812 



865 



8S6 



944 



990 



No. 1 

177/85202-03 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

mosttjkgent Tokyo, June 23, 1941—12:35 a.m. 

No. 1012 of June 22 Received June 22—10 : 15 p. m. 

With reference to your telegram Multex No. 401 of June 21. 1 

For the Foreign Minister. 

Today at 7:00 p. m,, Japanese time, after receiving the telegram 
mentioned above, I called on Foreign Minister Matsuoka. I explained 
to him in detail the memorandum of the German Government and 
moreover handed to him the proclamation of the Fiihrer. 2 

The Foreign Minister accepted my explanation with understand- 
ing and told me that Ambassador Oshima had been informed by 
the Reich Foreign Minister, after i : 00 a. m., German time, corre- 
sponding to 11 : 00 a. m., Japanese time, that war with the Soviet 
Union had begun. He thereupon asked me for information whether 
there had been a formal declaration of war. I answered in the 
negative and referred him to the text of the memorandum, where 
mention is made of the removal of a threat made against the German 
Reich. Matsuoka described my explanation as valuable, but requested 
me to ask Berlin for information on this point. Precise wording 
of the question is without decisive significance for the attitude of the 
Japanese Government. However, he requested precise information 
on the German point of view. 

Matsuoka remarked further : 

1. A meeting of the leadership committee of the Cabinet, consist- 
ing of the Prime Minister, 3 Foreign Minister, the Army Chief 
[Wehrmachtschef] 4 and the Finance Minister 5 will take place to- 
morrow afternoon. He would report on the situation and hoped to 
be able to inform the German Government expeditiously of the opinion 
of the Japanese Government. 

1 Vol. m of this series, document No. 663. 

See vol. xu of this series, Editors' Note, p. 1073. 

JTumimaro Konoye. 
* Gen. Ha jlme Sugiyama, Chief of the Array General Staff. 

Isao Kawada. 

1 

682-805 — 64— -^6 



2 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

2. The Japanese Government would adopt no measures without 
detailed consultation with the Government of the Reich. 

3. For himself he could once again assert that the United States 
would not be in a position to deliver military supplies to the Soviet 
Union by the Pacific route. The Japanese Cabinet would certainly 
be of the same opinion. 

4. He had requested all departments to refrain from giving their 
own views on the situation to the press through spokesmen; the 
Bureau of Information had recommended to the Japanese press that 
it observe restraint. Matsuoka then asked me for information 
whether Germany reckoned on a quick collapse of the Stalin regime. 
He had always seen a threat to it only in foreign war. When I 
answered that the German considerations were not known by me in 
detail, he asked me to inquire in Berlin. 

Matsuoka further stated that he had gained the impression from 
the report of Ambassador Oshima, that the Fiihrer and the Foreign 
Minister did not expect active Japanese participation against the 
Soviet Union on the basis of the Tripartite Pact. He personally 
was of the same opinion as before, that in the long run Japan could 
not remain neutral in this conflict. In the event of the entry of the 
United States of America into the war, as a result of the Russo- 
German war, he personally considered that the alliance would be- 
come operative for Japan under the Tripartite Pact. 

Toward the end of the interview Matsuoka received another tele- 
gram from Oshima wherein the Reich Foreign Minister called 
attention to an alleged Russian withdrawal of troops from the Far 
East. Matsuoka stated spontaneously that he would immediately 
propose appropriate countermeasures. Matsuoka was thoroughly 
positive and cordial throughout the whole interview. He denied 
emphatically that the existence of the Cabinet was in danger, and 
he repeatedly expressed his confidence that the German operations 
would meet with quick success. "With regard to the current economic 
negotiations, he advocated that they should be carried on steadily.* 

Request telegraphic instructions to the question raised by Matsuoka.' 

Ott 



" See document No. 216. 

'In telegram No. 886, dispatched June 26 (177/85205), Ribbentrop replied to 
this request for Instructions as follows : "Please tell Mr. Matsuoka in reply to his 
question whether Germany Is counting on an early collapse of the Stalin regime 
that we expect the Stalin regime to collapse in the not-too-distant future." 



JUNE 1941 d 

No. 2 

265/173013 

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

most urgent Ankara, June 23, 1941 — 9 : 55 p. m. 

secret Received June 24 — 6 : 00 a. m. 

No. 790 of June 23 

With reference to telegram No. 726 of June 22. 1 

Today I discussed with Saracoglu the question of Russian shipping. 
Passage of Russian naval vessels is completely out of the question. 
The Bosporus and the Dardanelles are closed by net defenses and 
sown with mines. Passage of Soviet merchant vessels appears to 
the Foreign Minister not very likely at this time because in the 
initial phase of the war Russia undoubtedly would not want to divest 
herself of her merchant tonnage for the benefit of England. In any 
event, he is apparently willing to cooperate with us in this matter 
also, and he promised that he would promptly inform me of any 
Russian demarche in that regard. 

Pafen 



'This telegram (1099/318819-21) contained instructions by Bitter that Papen 
take up with Saracoglu the question of the passage of Soviet ships through the 
Straits. According to this instruction Turkey could refuse to let Soviet war- 
ships pass through the Straits under the Montreux Convention of 1936 although 
there would be freedom of passage for merchant vessels under this Convention, 
"We are very anxious, however," he stated, "to have Turkey cooperate with us 
to prevent the passage of Soviet merchant vessels, too. The reason is, first 
of all, that we do not want the considerable Soviet merchant tonnage of about 
400,000 tons in the Black Sea to get away, and, secondly, that we want to 
prevent any cooperation between the Soviet Union and England in the field 
of merchant shipping in the Mediterranean. In view of the well-known English 
shortage of shipping space in the Mediterranean the Soviet Union could perhaps 
render England substantial aid," 

The instruction then suggested that the Turks might lay minefields to pro- 
tect themselves against the passage of warships through the Straits in accordance 
with the Montreux Convention, a measure which would at the same time hamper 
and delay the passage of merchant vessels which could not be denied passage. 

No. 3 

616/249802-04 

Memorandum by tlie Read of Political Division VI x 

secret Berlin, June 23, 1941. 

Pol. VI 3369 g. 

At 1 :00 p. m. today former Lithuanian Minister Skirpa called on 

me and informed me that at 11 :30 a. m. today the Kaunas radio — 

which accordingly must be in the hands of the Lithuanian activists — 

had proclaimed a general uprising against the Red Russian occupa- 

1 Marginal note at the head of the document : "Fiihrer portfolio" (Fiihrer 
Mappe). 



4 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

tion and called on the Lithuanian people to fight for their freedom 
and political independence. At the same time the radio had announced 
the composition of a new activist Lithuanian government with Skirpa 
as Minister President at the head and General Rastikis, who is like- 
wise living here in Germany as an emigre, as Minister of National 
Defense. 

While M. Skirpa was still with me the Gestapo (Herr Grafe) also 
informed me that this announcement by the Kaunas radio had been 
picked up. 

M. Skirpa tried to describe to me the advantages for Germany if 
we would immediately recognize this new Lithuanian activist gov- 
ernment and thereby the right to existence of little countries, too; 
this would perforce make a particularly favorable impression on 
world opinion. 

I asked M. Skirpa how it happened that the new government had 
been proclaimed under him— and thus doubtless at his instigation— 
without his having informed the Foreign Ministry in advance about 
such an intention in a straightforward manner. During his private 
visits with me I had pointed out to him every time very emphatically 
that we could not tolerate political activity from him, who was en- 
joying our hospitality here. M. Skirpa replied in some embarrass- 
ment that after all he had submitted a memorandum here on June 19 * 
and he had tried yesterday to reach the Ministry by telephone but 
had not been able to get anyone ! When I objected that I could have 
been reached very easily by telephone at home all day he admitted 
that he had not made this attempt. He then asserted that he was of 
course ready to bear the responsibility for everything. 

When I asked whether he had dealt in this matter with a German 
authority, and if so with which one, he replied as follows : 

For some time he kept in connection with the High Command of 
the Wehrmacht Abwehr (Lt. Col. Graebe), who, like the Abwehr 
office in Konigsberg, was accurately informed of his activity. With the 
consent of the High Command of the Wehrmacht he had kept close 
contact with the activists in Lithuania with the aid of agents, and 
prepared everything for an uprising against the Soviet forces in the 
country for the occasion which had now arrived. 

Skirpa then evidently promoted also the plan of forming a Lithua- 
nian government under him. I cannot judge to what extent the Ab- 
wehr Department itself (Lt. Col. Graebe) knew about this plan. It 
is significant, however, that there was a communication from Hen- 
Graf e stating that he had repeatedly warned the military authorities 

' See vol. xii of this series, document No. 650 and footnote 2. 



JUNE 1941 5 

against getting involved with the all too active and somewhat fanatical 
Skirpa in matters of a political nature. 

M. Skirpa gave me a copy of the Kaunas radio announcement, 3 here 
enclosed, as well as the statement of the commitment of the agents 
employed by him,* 

Gkundheer 

•Not printed (616/249805-08). 
* Not printed (616/249807). 



No. 4 

323/193896-97 

Memorandum hy the Head of Political Division VI 

Berlin, June 23, 1941. 

Pol. VI 3382 g. 

This afternoon the former Latvian Minister, M. Kreewinsch, called 

on me. I told him immediately at the start of the conversation that 

I could receive him only as a private person. 

M. Kreewinsch stated the following : 

He had never recognized the new situation created by the actions of 
the Soviet Union in Latvia. As indicated by the note of the Reich 
Government of day before yesterday, 1 the Russian actions in Latvia 
had occurred also without the consent and knowledge of the German 
Government. He assumed that in Riga the same thing would soon 
occur that had happened in Kaunas, namely the proclamation of a 
Latvian government. 2 He was making the request that he again be 
recognized as the Latvian Minister in Berlin, that his former officials 
be able to operate once more as officials of the Legation, and that he be 
given back the two buildings of the former Latvian Legation at 
Burggrafenstrasse 13 and Einemstrasse 5. This was particularly 
important because numerous Latvian refugees, some of whom had now 
been released from German internment camps, still had no living 
quarters in Berlin. 

I replied to M. Kreewinsch that I could only take cognizance of his 
statements privately, and that moreover I could not give him any 
hope that his wishes would be granted. 

From what followed it became evident that particularly the former 
Latvian Military Attache, Colonel Plensners, who is in Konigsberg 
at the moment, has kept close contact with the High Command of the 
Wehrmacht Abwehr. Moreover about 200 Latvian refugees have been 
called up by the High Command of the Wehrmacht as interpreters, 
etc., and some of them have already been dispatched to East Prussia. 
The connection with Latvia was probably organized through these 

'For text see Monatshefte fur Aimcartige Politik, July 1941 (Essen, 1941), 
pp. 551-563 ; cf . vol. xii of this series, Editors' Note, p. 1073. 
' See document No. 3. 



6 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

agents by M. Plensners in cooperation with the High Command of 
the Wehrmacht Abwehr. 

After consultation with Under State Secretary Woermann, Pol. 
I M took up contact with the Abwehr in Konigsberg in order to make 
sure that in connection with the welcome military activity of the agents 
of the High Command of the Wehrmacht Abwehr there will not be 
any political accomplished facts brought about in the Baltic region 
that could be inconvenient to us. 

Incidentally M. Kreewinsch seems to have been much less active 
than the Lithuanian Minister Skirpa. 3 On the other hand Colonel 
Plensners probably played a more active role in these matters. 

Geundheer 



3 See documents Nos. 3 and 6. 

No. 5 

1531/374226 

Wolodymyr StacMw to the Fuhrer and Chancellor 1 

Berlin- Wilmersdoiuf, June 23, 1941. 

Rk. 9380A. 
Your Excellency, highly honored German Reich Chancellor: 
The leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists — OUN, 
Stepan Bandera, has honored me with the mission to submit to Your 
Excellency, as the leader of the German nation now fighting vic- 
toriously for the new order of Europe, a memorandum by the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists for the solution of the 
Ukrainian question.* 



1 Marginal note : "Staehiw, who brought this, states that the Foreign Ministry, 
the OKW, the Reichsftihrer SS, and Reichsleiter Rosenberg will Teceive copies 
of this letter and the enclosures. M[eerwald?], June 23." 

"The memorandum has not been found. A Reich Chancellery minute of 
June 26 (1531/374227), presumably by Iiammers, describes this memorandum of 
the Ukrainian organization in the following terms : 

"The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) has submitted along 
with the letter of June 23, 1941, addressed to the Fiihrer, a memorandum on 
the Ukrainian question. The memorandum advocates the restoration of an 
independent Ukrainian national state in the sense of the peace treaty of Brest- 
Litovsk. Considering the urge of the Ukrainians for independence, peaceful 
conditions, politically speaking, could be brought about in Eastern Europe in 
the long run, only if the Ukrainian state were politically independent. Likewise 
the Ukraine would in the long run become an organic component and a valuable 
supplement to the European economy only if the Ukrainian state were econom- 
ically independent. Finally, the best guarantee of a German-Ukrainian alliance 
and the best protection against Russian pressure on Europe would be an inde- 
pendent Ukrainian armed force. A solution of the Ukrainian question corre- 
sponding to the solution of the Slovakian and Croatian questions did not appear 
advisable. Appended to the memorandum are programmatic, political and mili- 
tary decisions of the second congress of the OUN, which took place at the 
beginning of 1941." 



JUNE 1941 7 

The OUN, which leads the Ukrainian masses in their revolutionary 
struggle to establish the Ukrainian state, is deeply convinced that the 
present passage at arms against Moscow will destroy the subversive 
Jewish-Bolshevist influence in Europe and permanently break Rus- 
sian imperialism. 

The reestablishment of the independent Ukrainian national state in 
the sense of the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk will consolidate the 
new ethnic order in Eastern Europe and contribute to the peaceful 
and beneficial development of this area. 

Confident that Your Excellency, as the champion of the ethnic 
principle, will support our ethnic struggle, I remain, 

Yours, etc. Wolodtmtb Stachiw 

Department Head in 
the Political Office of the OUN 

No. 6 

616/249799-800 

v 

Eazys Skirpa to the Fiihrer and Chancellor 1 

Berlin, June 23, 1941. 

Yotm Excellency: In this historic hour in which the Lithuanian 
people are regaining their freedom I take the liberty as Minister of 
the former constitutional Lithuanian Government in the German 
Reich to express to you and the victorious German Army my most 
profound thanks for saving Lithuania from the Bolshevist occupation. 

At the same time I have the great honor very humbly to lay before 
you the following: 

After Lithuania was last year incorporated into the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics through the act of force of the Moscow Govern- 
ment, the Lithuanian activist movement was formed in the face of the 
Bolshevist terror from the most active and energetic elements in the 
country under my leadership, with the objective of shaking off the 
Bolshevist rule and fighting to regain the political independence of 
Lithuania. 

After attainment of this objective the Lithuanian activist movement 
is striving to gain the new internal organization of the Lithuanian 
state on an ethnic basis and its incorporation into the community of 
destiny and solidarity of the new Europe, A more detailed presenta- 
tion of Lithuania's attitude and wishes is set down in a memorandum 
which I submitted to Minister von Grundherr in the Foreign Ministry 
on June 19, 1941.* It stresses the fundamental realization, proved by 
past experience, that a close political, economic, and cultural coopera- 
tion of Lithuania with the German Reich is in the vital interest of the 
Lithuanian people. 

a This letter was accompanied by a cover note of June 23 (616/249801) in 
which Skirpa asked Ribbentrop to transmit the letter to Hitler. 
' See vol. xii of this series, document No. C50 and footnote 2, 



8 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Now the Lithuanian activist movement has eliminated the Soviet 
regime through the revolution on June 22, 1941, made possible by the 
heroic advance of the German troops. It has proclaimed the restora- 
tion of Lithuania's national independence, and formed a national 
government which I have been called upon to head. 

Hoping for your kind benevolence I am willing, from a feeling of 
patriotic responsibility, and I feel duty-bound as leader of the Lith- 
uanian activist movement, to comply with the summons of my father- 
land and to place myself at its service. 

I therefore consider it my first task at tlie moment — assuming the 
consent of the German Reich Government — to go to my homeland at 
once in order to proclaim before all the world, on the occasion of taking 
over the business of the government, on behalf of the entire Lithuanian 
people their thanks to you and the German people for making it pos- 
sible to restore the Lithuanian state, and to proclaim Lithuania's alli- 
ance with the German people. 

I should be exceedingly grateful to you if you would do me the 
honor [of permitting me] to demonstrate in a personal discussion my 
full devotion to you and the German Eeich. 

Kazys Skdupa 



F19/404-05 ; 
F20/051-44 



No. 7 



Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler ' 



Rome, June 23, 1941/XIX. 
Fuhree : On the occasion of our talk on the Brenner on June 2 I 
gave you my views regarding Russia and told you that the Russian 
question now called for a radical solution : either a military alliance 
or war. You explained to me that the former solution was out of the 
question because Stalin could never forget the failure of his policy in 
the Danube-Balkan area, and because the agreement with Belgrade, 
which he concluded in the eleventh hour, 3 had revealed his true 
intentions. Consequently there remained only the second solution and 
with respect to it there was only one problem, that of timing. From 
what you have said in your proclamation to the German people * I am 



x The letter here printed is translated from the German text. 

The Italian original with Mussolini's signature is filmed on ^20/043-309. This 
Italian test is the same as that which is printed in Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e 
document} {Rome-Milan, 1946), pp. 104-108 except for two differences in para- 
graphing. The sentence on p. 107 which is enclosed within brackets does not 
appear on the original received in Berlin. 

Weizsacker's memorandum, St.S. 417 of June 25 (B12/B001010), records that 
AJfieri handed him the letter that day in a sealed envelope. 

1 See vol. xn of this series, document No. 584. 

* See vol, xir of this series, document No. 265. 

' For text see Monatsliefte fur Au&wtirtige Politih, July-Bee, 1941, pp. £15-551. 



JUNE 1941 y 

convinced that any further postponement of the solution by the use of 
arms, for which there is now no alternative, would have imperiled our 
cause. Here, too, the knot had to be cut. 

I fully appreciate that your decision must have been preceded by 
long reflection, because the war against Russia is primarily a struggle 
against the breadth of space. But all those who would point to his- 
torical precedents should be reminded that today the motors of tanks 
and airplanes, and the extraordinary maneuvering skill of both your 
generals and your soldiers, have overcome space. 
. The solution of the Russian problem results, I believe, in the 
following advantages : 

a. It deprives Great Britain of her last hope on the European 
Continent j 

&. It relieves us of any concern for the immediate future ; 

e. It brings us back to our political doctrine, which for tactical 
considerations we temporarily abandoned ; 

d. All anti-Bolshevist tendencies throughout the world, including 
the Anglo-Saxon countries, will again turn toward the Axis; 

e. The new Russia, diminished in territory and liberated from Bol- 
shevism, may be returned to the practice of sincere economic collabora- 
tion with the rest of Europe, and make raw materials which we need 
available to us, especially if the Anglo-Saxons should impose upon 
us a war of unforeseeable duration. 

Everything I have said will show you, Fiihrer, what enthusiastic 
approval your decision to take Russia by the throat has met with in 
Italy and especially among the old guard of the party, which would 
have accepted only with a heavy heart any other solution of the prob- 
lem. In a war of this nature Italy cannot remain on the sideline. 
I therefore thank you, Fiihrer, for having accepted the participation 
of Italian ground and air forces, in numbers and for a sector yet to 
be determined by the General Staff. At the same time every effort 
will be made to consolidate our position in North Africa, both in the 
west, to watch Weygand, and in the east, in order to forestall any 
British attempt at a counter thrust — an attempt, moreover, which is 
unlikely after the latest severe defeat of the English Army. Concur- 
rently we shall do everything in our power — notwithstanding the 
enormous transport difficulties — in order to prepare the 10 to 12 divi- 
sions necessary for an offensive against Egypt. This attack cannot 
be undertaken until late autumn after Tobruk has been captured. 

As regards the various states, Fiihrer, Turkey is an extremely 
important card in our game. If Turkey should permit the passage 
of our troops so that they could attack Egypt from the east as well, 
Egypt's fate would be sealed and the backbone of the British Empire 
broken. The resulting consequences for the British East, as far as 



* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 660 and Editors' Note, p. 924. 



10 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

India, would be incalculable. In this estimate of Turkey's signifi- 
cance it gave me deep satisfaction to take note of the recent conclu- 
sion of the German-Turkish accord, 8 and I have formally proposed 
to the Turkish Government the conclusion of an analogous or even 
stronger accord, if acceptable to Ankara. 

France-Spain. You know, Fuhrer, my views on France and the 
French, views which are based on an accurate knowledge of that 
nation and its psychology. Without indulging in any illusions, it 
will be useful to pay with appropriate concessions for any advantages 
that Darlan's policy can offer us, especially in the fundamental ques- 
tion of our transports to North Africa. 7 If we. were to play our 
French card for all it is worth we would lose Spain ; conversely, if 
we played the Spanish card, that is, yielded to the demands of Spain, 
the situation in North Africa would immediately be endangered. 
France is playing with the idea of regaining North Africa, but 
France also knows that her doing this would entail the complete 
occupation of the mother country, and consequently she will be care- 
ful. I believe, Fuhrer, that the best policy toward France or Spain is 
the one we have pursued up till now, namely, to prevent both the one 
and the other from creating difficult and perhaps irremediable situa- 
tions for us. 

Or eat Britain-United States. Mr. Roosevelt cannot do us more 
damage than he has done already, even if he formally declares war 
on us. The declaration of war would therefore have the purpose of 
giving a lift to morale in England, which is at present very de- 
pressed. However, the effect of such a stimulant would be of short 
duration. 

Before closing this letter, Fiihrer, I should like to say the following 
to you: 

a. With respect to the unfolding of the operations, I wish to ask 
you, Fuhrer, to keep me informed to the extent that appears desirable 
to you, just as you did in the recent campaign in the Balkans. I know 
that our General Staffs are collaborating in the most comradely 
solidarity and harmony. 

i. I should like to thank you for the recently concluded economic 
agreement, 8 which was signed by Clodius and Giannini. This agree- 
ment enables me to overcome a number of difficulties and to intensify 
our armament production. 

c. The harvest of 1941 is richer than that of last year. I shall not 
announce the figures to the nation, so as not to arouse any false hopes 
and cause a relaxation of consumer discipline. 

d. The "morale" 9 of the Italian people is excellent, as you, Fuhrer, 
probably have heard from other sources as well. Above all, the Italian 

* See vol, xri of this series, document No. 648. 

* See vol, xn of this series, document No. 633. 

* See vol. xrr of this series, document No. 652. 

* "Stimmung" in the Italian original. 



JUNE 1941 11 

people are consciously determined to march with the German people 
to the end and to bear all sacrifices necessary to achieve victory. 

I am certain that the campaign against Bolshevist Russia will cul- 
minate in a dazzling victory, and that this victory will be the prologue 
to the total victory over the Anglo-Saxon world. 

In this conviction, which is for me a certainty, I ask you, Fiihrer, 
to accept my always sincere and comradely salutations. 

Mussolini 



No. 8 

205/142T35-SG 

The Legation in Sweden to tJie Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

No. 723 of June 24 Stockholm, June 24, 1941—12 : 30 a. m. 

Received June 24 — 2 : 25 a. m. 
With reference to our telegram No. 705 of June 22. 1 
No definite decision by the Swedish Government has as yet been 
received on the list of military wishes presented by me. The Swedish 
Government is aware that compliance with the German military 
wishes marks the abandonment of its former policy of neutrality and 
for that reason, and in order to preserve unity in Sweden's domestio 
politics, it is anxious not to bypass the Foreign Relations Committee 
and the Parliament. The questions will be considered in the Foreign 
Relations Committee today, and a secret session of the Riksdag is 
set for Wednesday morning. 2 As to the Swedish Government's deci- 
sion toward the over-all German program, particularly the German 
demand for transit of the German Oslo division, 3 there seems to be 
hardly any ground for doubt according to what Giinther has told me 
in further talks. I hope to have the definite decision as early as to- 
morrow afternoon or evening, so that the Swedish Riksdag would 
only have to give retroactive sanction to the Government's decision. 4 



1 Vol. xn of this series, document No. 668. 
"June 25. 

* The German 163d Infantry Division. 

* The clock time of the dispatch of this telegram indicates that it was drafted 
on June 23. 

A memorandum by Kiamara dated Juno 25, Pol. I M 1858 g. Its (205/142739) 
records that the Military Attache 1 in Stockholm on June 23 reported directly 
to the Attach^ Department, OKW, that final Swedish approval of Germany's 
wishes in regard to transportation was expected the next day, June 24 ; that 
the attitude of the King and of the Government was positive. 

In telegram No. 725 of June 23, sent 1 : 10 a. m. June 24 (205/142737) Sehnurre 
and Wied further reported that the Swedish Government had agreed in principle 
to the laying of mine fields by the Swedish Navy in cooperation with the 
German Navy, and that the attitude of Sweden toward the other wishes ex- 
pressed by the German Naval War Staff in its communication of June 18 was 
positive. -j 



12 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Minister President Hansson, whose attitude has decisive importance, 
has already declared himself in favor of acceptance, as I was informed 
confidentially. The Minister President and the Foreign Minister are 
making it their business to win over for acceptance several members 
of the Cabinet and of the Foreign Relations Committee, who are 
still in the opposition, in order to make Sweden's decision a unanimous 
one. 

Thus, subject to Sweden's political decision, which is still out- 
standing, I have tentatively informed the Swedish Government that 
departure of the Oslo division will start as early as Wednesday 
evening. The transport experts on both sides started tonight with 
the preparatory technical planning. 

The positive impression gotten from the attitude of the Swedish 
Government and the Swedish authorities, reported in the preceding 
telegram, 5 has been substantiated in my subsequent discussions. 6 Eur- 
thermore, the effort to reorient the Swedish press in our favor has 

apparently been successful. 

Schnubre 

WlED 



" No. 705 of June 22. See footnote 1. 

•In a memorandum of June 25 (205/142740) Ritter recorded a telephone 
message from Schnnrre in Stockholm according to which the Swedish Govern- 
ment had that afternoon given its consent to the transit of one German 
division which started to move out from Norway. 

See also documents Nos. 16 and 17. 



No. 9 

205/142738 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most TJRGENT Stockholm, June 24, 1941 — 1 : 45 p. m. 

No. 728 of June 24 Received June 24 — 3 : 45 p. m. 

For Ambassador Ritter. 

In reply to your telephone message of this morning 1 and with ref- 
erence to our telegram No. 709 of June 22. 2 

The fact that Finland at every opportunity is emphasizing her neu- 
trality and even, with respect to the Swedish Government is not mak- 
ing it clear enough that she will of her own free will join the German 
campaign against Russia is having a retarding effect on our conver- 
sations with regard to political and military questions. The Finnish 
Minister here, 3 it is true, at my urging finally secured by telephone the 



1 No record of this telephone message has been found. 

* In this telegram (260/170036) Schnurre and Wled reported that the Finnish 
Minister in Stockholm had received no Instructions from Helsingfors. 

* Dr. Jarl de Vasastjerna. 



JUNE 1941 13 

agreement of his Government to the most urgent measures, but up to 
this moment he has not received telegraphic instructions along the 
lines proposed by us. As a result his manner of expression in dealing 
with the Swedish Foreign Minister is even now not emphatic enough, 
which, in view of the meetings of the Riksdag committees which are 
now taking place, and in view of tomorrow's meeting of the Eiksdag, 
is very regrettable. It would work in support of us if the Finnish 
Minister at Stockholm were immediately instructed to inform the 
Swedish Government confidentially that the entry of Finland into the 
war against Soviet Russia on our side was imminent. The defensive 
character of any Finnish move, which was emphasized yesterday and 
today in the Swedish press, need not be affected by such a step. 4 

ScHNUBBE 
WlED 

* See document No. 15. 

In telegram No. 513 of June 26 (260/170054) Blueher reported from Helsinki 
that the situation of the Swedish negotiators in Stockholm was quite changed as 
a result of the outbreak of the Finnish-Russian war, and that new instructions 
had been sent to them the previous night to put pressure on the Swedes for 
compliance with Finland's requests. 



No. 10 

93/103746-48 

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

No. 695 of June 24 Budapest, June 24, 1941—3 : 45 p. m. 

Received June 24 — 5 : 35 p. m. 
The Minister President 1 summoned me in order to clarify the ques- 
tion of the participation of Hungarian troops in the advance against 
the Soviet Army. He gave a historical account of how the Hungarian 
Government in recent weeks had time and again tried to find out our 
position in this regard in order at this opportunity also to make known 
the Hungarian position. At the Foreign Ministry, however, the 
Hungarian Minister had been told even until recently that there was 
no Russian problem. I, too, in my demarche of June 16 had stated 
only that the German Government considered it necessary for Hun- 
gary, too, to undertake steps for securing her borders with respect to 
the Soviet Union. 2 On June 19 General Haider had told the Chief 
of the Hungarian General Staff 3 in Budapest that it would perhaps 
have been better if Hungarian troops had been reinforced to a greater 

1 Laszld de Bardossy. 

1 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 631 and footnote 1. 

* Gen. Henrlk Werth. 



14 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

degree along the Russian border; he advised, however, that now noth- 
ing more be done so as not to alarm the Russians.* Nor was there any 
mention in the Ftihrer's letter which I gave the Regent on June 22 B 
that Germany considered an active Hungarian participation in the 
action against the Soviet Union to be desirable. 

Yesterday the German General with the High Command of the 
Hungarian Armed Forces e had informed the Chief of the Hun- 
garian General Staff that the participation of Hungarian troops in 
the advance into the Soviet Union was desired. He, the Minister 
President, considered this to be primarily a political question, and 
therefore asked for clarification whether there was actually a Ger- 
man wish to this effect and if so to what extent Hungarian partici- 
pation was desired. 

The position of the Hungarian Government was determined by 
the following political and economic factors: The Hungarian Gov- 
ernment had submitted in advance to the recent Vienna Award r in 
the hope of thereby bringing the Transylvanian question to a resting 
point. It had indeed done everything to achieve this, and had shown 
self-control and patience in the face of the continuing Rumanian 
provocations. It had likewise not replied to the Rumanian press 
campaign. It was impossible, however, to overlook the strong Irre- 
dentist movement in Rumania. The situation was so tense that the 
portions of Transylvania awarded to Hungary had to expect later 
to become the object of Rumanian aggression. The Hungarian 
Government knew that the Reich Government would not approve 
such a Rumanian action, but nevertheless it had to reckon with such 
independent actions, which possibly might not originate with the 
leadership of the Rumanian state. The new line of the frontier was 
not only unfavorable economically but was also difficult to defend mili-" 
tarily, particularly the connection with the Szekler region, so that 
initial successes of the Rumanian Army, which was well equipped 
with German war material, were not impossible; but they would be 
absolutely intolerable for any Hungarian Government, especially since 
the Szekler region had a purely Hungarian population. Further- 
more the Hungarian Government believed that it was fulfilling an 
obligation toward the Axis Powers by providing for the use of mili- 
tary defense measures in order to prevent such a situation from arising 
as would be contrary to the interests and prestige of the Axis Powers. 

The Hungarian Government also could not disperse its military 
forces too much for the reason that the Slovak Government still cher- 



*Cf. C. A. Macartney, A History of Hungary, 19&9-1945 (New York, 1957), 
vol. ii, pp. 20-21. 
° Vol. xii of this series, document No. 661. 
"Gen. Kurt Himer. 
* See vol. x of this series, document No. 413. 



JUNE 1941 15. 

ished revisionist ambitions. Thus the Slovak Minister President* 
had officially informed the Hungarian Minister, who had suggested 
to him the convening of a commission for the final settlement of the 
Hungarian-Slovak border, that the Slovak Government intended to 
make revisionist claims on Hungary at a final settlement of the fron- 
tiers in Southeast Europe. He [the Hungarian Minister President] 
had let him be answered that the Slovak Government should not in- 
dulge in any sort of empty hopes and illusions in this regard. 

Furthermore the Hungarian Government had to take into account 
the impending start of the harvest in view of the very serious food 
situation, as well as the fact that it had made the Hungarian railroad 
network available to the needs of the Wehrmacht to the greatest pos- 
sible extent— and this willingly. He also wanted to point out that 
Germany had not expected the Rumanians either to proceed actively 
against the Yugoslav Army. The Bulgarians, too, had only later 
moved in to occupy without fighting the areas awarded to them. 

All of these considerations changed nothing in the fact that the 
Hungarian Government felt united with the Axis Powers in loyalty 
and full solidarity. He therefore wished to emphasize that the 
Hungarian Government would be willing to review the question of 
participation by parts of the Hungarian Army in the advance against 
the Soviet armies, and to submit this to the Regent, in case this were 
desired by Germany and he were informed of this wish through me. 

The Minister President concluded his remarks by again requesting 
that he be informed through diplomatic channels whether and in 
what strength a participation by the Hungarian Army was desired. 

Erdmannsdokit 

"Vojtech Tuka. 

No. 11 

93/103750 

The Minister in Hungary to tlie Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

No. 698 of June 24 Botapest, June 24, 1940—10 : 45 p. m. 

Received June 25—12 : 25 a. m. 

With reference to my telegram No. 695 of June 24. 1 

General Himer told me that the Minister President's assertion 

mentioned in the telegram cited above, that he had informed the 

Chief of the Hungarian General Staff that participation by Hungarian 

troops in the advance into the Soviet Union was desired, was not in 

1 Document No. 10. 



1Q DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

this form in accordance with the facts. Rather, he had left with the 
Chief of the Operations Group of the Hungarian General Staff 2 a 
note on June 22 with the following text : 

"Every Hungarian assistance will he accepted at any time. We do 
not wish to demand anything, but everything that is offered volun- 
tarily will be gratefully accepted. There is no question of our not 
wanting participation by Hungary." 

He had spoken in the same sense yesterday with the Chief of the 
Hungarian General Staff; 3 it was possible that the gentlemen had 
passed on his statements in a stronger form to the Minister Presi- 
dent in order to exert pressure on him, as the department chiefs in the 
General Staff were urging participation by Hungary in the campaign 

against the Soviet Union. 

Erdmannsdokff 



* Col. H. Lfiszlo. 

3 See, further, document No. 54. 



No. 12 

136/75001 



The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

No. 2179 of June 24 Madrid, June 25, 1941. 

Received June 25 — 4:30 a. m. 

With reference to your telegram No. 1422 of June 24. 1 

The Foreign Minister was very pleased that we had agreed to the 
expedition of Spanish volunteers against Russia. He promised at 
once to bring up the matter at today's meeting of the Council of 
Ministers and afterwards to arrange everything with the Chief of the 
Falange Militia, General Moscardo, for the immediate issuance of a 
call for enlistments. I would then receive further communications 
to enable the military agencies of both Governments to discuss the 
necessary arrangements. 

Because of jealousies between the Falange and the Army, volun- 
teers would be accepted not only from the Falange but also from the 
Legion associated with the Army. The Minister assured me that the 
response would surely be extraordinarily large. 

When I remarked that for the reasons stated in the telegraphic in- 
structions, a public declaration that Spain was in a state of war with 
the Soviet Union would be appropriate and desirable, the Minister 
replied that he would have to discuss this question with the Generalis- 

1 Vol. xn of thin series, document No. 671, footnote 2, 



JTJNE 1941 17 

simo. Personally he was inclined to believe that England and pos- 
sibly America would react to such an announcement if not by a 
declaration of war on Spain, then undoubtedly by the imposition of a 
blockade, which would entail cutting off of all supplies now in transit 
as well as seizure of the Spanish ships now held in the United States 
under the order blocking Spanish assets (cf. my telegram No. 2178 
of June 24 ") . Complications for Spain would also be detrimental to 
Germany during the Russian campaign. It was not impossible that 
the sending of Spanish volunteers alone might have similar con- 
sequences, but, if so, the course of events could no longer be 
changed. 3 

Stohrer 



'Not found. 

* In telegram No, 2218 of June 26 (136/75010) Stohrer reported that a decision 
had not yet been taken regarding a Spanish declaration of war on Russia ; that 
it would in great measure depend on the reaction to the expedition of Spanish 
volunteers. The British Government had already reacted by prohibiting all 
imports of gasoline into Spain. 



No. 13 

191/138736 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most urgent Tokyo, June 25, 1941 — 8 : 15 a. m., summer time. 

secret Eeceived June 25 — 5 : 10 p. m. 

No. 1033 of June 25 

The Foreign Minister 1 just called on me and informed me that Wang 
Ching-wei had asked the Japanese Government to obtain recognition 
of the Nanking Government by the Governments of Germany and 
. Italy. Matsuoka had passed on this request to the Japanese Ambas- 
sadors in Berlin and Rome with the instruction to advocate recognition 
with the German and Italian Governments and to ask that recognition 
be accorded by July 1. The Foreign Minister also stated that on the 
same day the Japanese Government (clear text evidently missing) 
the grant of a loan of 300,000,000 yen to Wang Ching-wei. I suggest 
on the basis of our experience in Manchukuo that we link recognition 
of the Wang Ching-wei Government with prior settlement of our 
economic position in China. 2 

The same text is being sent to Peiping," 

Ott 



1 Yosulce Matsuoka, 

8 See vol. r of this series, documents Nos. 571 . 575, and 606. 

" See document No. 27. 

682-905—64 7 



18 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 14 

177/8B22S-29 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

most urgent Tokyo, June 25, 1941 — 8 : 15 a. m. summer time. 

secret Received June 25 — 5 : 50 p. m. 

No. 1034 of June 25 

Foreign Minister Matsuoka called on me today and informed me 
as follows: 

As he had already telegraphed Ambassador Oshima, Russian Am- 
bassador Smetanin called at the Japanese Foreign Ministry yesterday 
on instructions from his Government and asked whether Japan, in 
accordance with the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Agreement of April 
13, 1941 , x would remain neutral in the present conflict. He, Matsuoka, 
had first called the Russian Ambassador's attention to_ the statement 
he made in Tokyo after his return from his European trip. According 
to that, the Neutrality Pact would be without effect in the event that 
Japan should have to fulfill her obligations under the Tripartite 
Pact. 2 He had also made it clear to Stalin and Molotov that the 
Tripartite Pact was still the basis of Japanese policy. Smetanin 
had then asked whether Japan considered the Tripartite Pact appli- 
cable to the present conflict. He had not given Smetanin any clear 
reply to that, but had stated that the Neutrality Pact was limited 
in force and scope 3 by the Tripartite alliance. The Japanese Cabinet 
would soon decide on the position to be taken and also enter into con- 
sultations with Japan's allies. 

He had intentionally left Smetanin completely in the dark. He 
believed he had thereby done what was best to prevent troop with- 
drawals from the Far East.* 

Matsuoka stated further that a strong current against [in favor off] 
Japan's entry into the war against the Soviet Union is making itself 
felt in the Cabinet, in branches of the armed forces, and among the 
people. It was also being advocated by Minister of the Interior 
Hiranuma. He was well aware that part of this group wants a 
conflict -with Russia in order to prevent Japan from striking in the 
south. Although he realized this clearly, he intended to advocate 
the policy of war against Russia before the Cabinet, being convinced 
that the need for a Japanese operation in the south would become 



1 For text see Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, selected and edited by Jane 
Degras (London, 1953) , vol. in, pp. 486-487. 

'According to the New York Times of Apr. 23, 1941 (p. 7, col. 1), Matsuoka 
Upon his return made various statements, reported by the Japanese press and 
radio, saying that the Tripartite Pact remained the immutable basis of Japanese 
foreign policy. 

* The italicized words are in English in the original. 

* According to a memorandum by Kramarz of June 28 (177/85213) the Military 
Attach^ in Tokyo had briefed Matsuoka on June 23 about military developments. 
On that occasion Matsuoka remarked that "Japan would make difficult the trans- 
fer of further Russian forces from the Far East to Europe and could not tolerate 
assistance by America through Vladivostok." 



JUNE 1941 19 

increasingly strong once Japan had entered the war. He hoped that 
the Cabinet would now decide to propose to the Emperor that Japan 
enter the war at the appropriate time. As soon as such a decision 
had been taken he would get in touch with Germany and Italy. 
In his opinion Japan's entry into the war would have to come at a 
time when the outcome of the war was still uncertain, for a participa- 
tion that involved no risk would be morally objectionable and 
intolerable. 

In his opinion the United States would not at the present time 
move any closer toward participation in the war. A strong stand 
by Japan appeared to him to be the means of confirming America 
in that attitude. 

Ott 



No. 15 

260/170047-48 

The Minister in Finland to ths Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

most urgent Helsinki, June 25, 1941—6 : 10 p. m. 

top secret Received June 25 — 9 : 20 p. m. 

No. 503 of June 25 

1)1 had a talk with the Foreign Minister 1 as soon as the air raid 
alarm was over. 2 

2) The Bussian air attacks have completely changed the situation 
since this morning. The declaration prepared for today's session of 
the Parliament is no longer relevant. 3 

3) I explained to the Foreign Minister that air attacks were Rus- 
sia's answer to the Finnish protests. 4 Now war had been started by 
the Russian side through a plain act of aggression. A de facto state 
of war now existed between Finland and Russia. Finland now had 
to act accordingly. 

4) The Foreign Minister did not deny this. He stressed that the 
Russian attack was especially brutal, considering that only yesterday 
Moloftov] (1 group missing) had sent for the Finnish Charge 
d'Affaires s and had told him the following : Finland should not begin 

1 Professor Rolf Witting. 

' The American Minister reported on June 25 that he had been informed at 
4 : 35 p. m. that up to 3 : 00 p. m. that day "some 16 Soviet aircraft had been 
shot down in various parts of the country and one seaplane captured by a 
coast guard vessel after a forced landing. Bombing had been widespread in 
nearly all parts of the country with civilian casualties considerable, Soviet 
forces having been used in some places including groups of as many as 50 
planes." Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 19%1, vol. i ("Washington, 
Government Printing Office, 1958) , p. 42. 

* See vol. in of this series, document No. 675 ; The Memoirs of Marshal Man- 
nerheim, translated by Brie Lewenhaupt (London, 1953), p. 413. 

* See vol. in of this series, document No. 675. 
6 P. J. Hynninen. 



20 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

any "war with Russia. Otherwise 200 million Russians would become 
the enemies of Finland and that would lead to the extinction of 
Finland. 

5) The Foreign Minister, together with the other Cabinet Minis- 
ters, will now draft a new governmental declaration. 8 

6) I suggested to the Foreign Minister to present Finland in all 
foreign countries as the victim of an unprovoked Russian aggression. 

7) I asked the Foreign Minister that, on the basis of the Russian 
attack, he instruct his two negotiators in Stockholm not to mince 
words and to take a strong line. 7 The Foreign Minister agreed. 

Bluchek 



°In telegram No. 508 of June 25 (260/170049) Bliicher reported that in a 
secret session of the Parliament that evening the Minister President issued 
the new governmental declaration which "culminated in the confirmation of 
the fact that 'now it is war' and concluded with the hope that Finland by 
her participation could make a significant contribution for Europe and for 
the world." ,„„„ , 

In telegram No. 509, dated June 25 but sent shortly after midnight (260/- 
170050) Bliicher reported that in a second secret session Parliament gave the 
Government a unanimous vote of confidence which signified its adherence to 
the concept of war with Russia. 

In telegram No. 510 of June 26 (260/170055), as a result of the discussion 
in the morning newspapers Bliicher forwarded the exact words of M. Rangell : 
"Finland on Wednesday morning [June 25] was subjected to an attack on the 
part of the Soviet Union which initiated operations of war against Finland. 
On the basis of this Finland has began to defend herself with all the military 
means available to her." 

7 See documents Nos. 9 and 41. 



No. 16 

205/142742 

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most urgent Stockholm, June 25, 1941 — 7 : 20 p. ra. 

top secret Received June 25 — 9 : SO p. m. 

No. 736 of June 25 

For the Foreign Minister. 

The King of Sweden summoned me this afternoon in order to 
inform me that Germany's principal request, for transit of one 
division, had just been accepted in the State Council. 1 The King's 
words conveyed the joyful emotion he felt. He had lived through 
anxious days and had gone far in giving lus personal support to 
the matter. He added confidentially that in so doing he had found 
it necessary to go even so far as to mention his abdication. The 
King then expressed the hope that Germany would make no demands 
on Sweden going beyond these limits. If the issue had been for 

1 See vol. s.n of this series, document No. 668 and footnote 1. 



JUNE 1941 



21 



instance the occupation of Gotland, as he was afraid for a time, 
he would have been compelled to refuse such a demand. 

Form and substance of this statement by the Head of the Swedish 
State indicated to me once more how much affection the King felt 
for Germany and, on the other hand, the distinct limitations of his 
personal influence on decisions. 

Wied 



No. 17 

205/142743-44 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most urgent Stockholm, June 25, 1941 — 10 : 10 p. m. 

No. 737 of June 25 Received June 25—11 : 15 p. m. 

The Swedish Foreign Minister has just asked me to see him in 
order to tell me that the Swedish Government has granted our request 
for the transit of a division from Norway through Sweden to Fin- 
land. 1 The Foreign Minister emphasized the significance for the 
domestic policy as well as for the foreign policy of this decision 
for Sweden and expressed his joy that in spite of the great difficul- 
ties it had been possible to bring about a unified decision of the 
King, the Cabinet, and the Riksdag. Regarding the other wishes 
in the military field which I had brought up he could at the same 
time inform me of Swedish agreement in principle subject to fur- 
ther discussion regarding the individual points. 2 The Swedish Gov- 
ernment intends to inform the Swedish public of the decision of 
the Government by means of an official communique. He intends 
to inform the Soviet Minister, Mme. Kollontay, this afternoon. 3 

The decision of the Swedish Government encountered extraordinary 
internal political difficulties. The negative views within the Cabinet 
itself and in the parties of the Riksdag almost led yesterday evening 
to a Cabinet crisis. The joint intervention of the King, of Min- 
ister President Hansson, and of Foreign Minister von Giinther finally 
succeeded in bringing about the unity in reaching the decision. The 
differences of view had their origin in this that the Government 
on the one hand wishes to maintain the earlier policy of keeping 
out of the war of the Great Powers and on the other hand it would 
like to do what is possible in the way of rendering aid in the struggle 
against Bolshevism within the framework of this policy. 



1 See documents Nos. 8 and 16. 

s See vol. xn of this series, document No. 638, and document No. 28 in this 
volume. 
3 See document No. 42 and footnote 5. 



22 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

After this final decision the first train leaves Oslo this afternoon, 
with the Division Commander.* 

ScHNTJRHB 
WlED 



4 In telegram No. 764 of June 27 (205/142754-55) the Legation reported that 
the first train, bearing the divisional staff, regimental staffs, and the recon- 
naissance staff of the 163d Division, had crossed the Norwegian-Swedish border 
early in the morning of June 26. At the noon pause at Krylbo the train was 
greeted by Wied, Schnurre, and Major General von Uthmann. 



No. 18 

616/249808 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat 

Berlin, June 25, 1941. 
With respect to memorandum D IX 9 g. from Senior Counselor 
Grosskopf l concerning the attempt of former Lithuanian Minister 
Skirpa in Berlin to establish contact -with the Eeich Government, 
the Foreign Minister has decided that no contact whatever is to be 
established with Skirpa. 8 

Submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Depart- 
ment for German Internal Affairs (Senior Counselor Grosskopf). 

Lohmann 



'This memorandum of June 24 (616/249814) forwarded to Ribbentrop the 
memorandum printed as document No. 3. 

'Unsigned marginal note: "Was made known in the meeting of the Russia 
Committee on July 3, 1941." 



No. 19 

587/243586-88 

Memorandum by the Director of ths Political Department 

U. St.S. Pol. 584 Berlin, June 25, 1941. 

According to an unnumbered telegram of June 21 from Paris, 1 
the French Government has requested information on whether, in the 
event of a French call for help through German military action in 
Syria, the German reply "might be combined with a declaration 
cleared for publication that, in contrast to England, Germany does 
not call in question French rights in Syria". 

In view of our Arab policy any declaration would be undesirable 
that would create the impression that the Arabs in Syria should remain 
under French rule for an unlimited period. 

The French mandate over Syria was based, as is well known, on 
the principle that Syria and Lebanon were to obtain independence at 

"Not printed (70/50488). 



JUNE 1941 23 

a certain time. French policy has really taken this circumstance 
continuously into account, to a certain extent. Thus General Dentz 
stated in a broadcast on April 2 : * 

"The independence of Syria remains the goal to which the Syrians 
aspire. France has never ceased to be in favor of it, but this goal 
can be attained only in a definitive world situation that settles the 
status of Syria; 

"Public opinion desires a Government that has more extensive 
• powers ; 

"It is necessary to put an economic and social program to work." 

General Dentz stated further that he had taken the following 
decisions : 

1. . . . (There follow specific provisions.) 3 

If a German declaration regarding French rights in Syria should 
become unavoidable in the circumstances, it would be necessary to 
include in it somehow a statement that Syria's later independence is 
itself one of the aims of French policy. 

The declaration which the French Government would publish at 
a proper time should therefore be worded approximately as follows : 

"The French Government has been authorized to declare that the 
German Reich, as well as France, recognizes the right of the Syrian 
population to independence, but that like France it is convinced that 
that goal cannot be realized at this moment and that Germany, there- 
fore, in contrast to England, does not call in question the French rights 
in Syria." 

Herewith sent to Ambassador Abetz in accordance with our 
conversation.* 

I did not submit this specially to the Foreign Minister, but would 
be grateful to you for mentioning these points in your conference 
with him. a 

I am attaching a memorandum on various French declarations 
concerning Syria 6 but would like to have it back. 

WOERMANN 



' The following citations from this broadcast are in French in the original. 

* Thus in the original. 

' No record found. 

"According to a memorandum of June 20 by Sehwarzmann (38o/211099) 
Abetz had requested by telephone that he be permitted to make an oral report 
to the Foreign Minister about matters concerning France "especially on Syria, 
the question of occupation costs and the implementation of the Paris Protocols." 

"Marginal note: "Pol. VII 573/41 g. — End. 1: Temps of January 1, 1941 
(Radio address of General Dentz). Encl. 2: France de Bordeaux of April 3, 
1941 (Radio address of General Dentz to Syrian population)." 

Pol. VII 573/41 g. was an unsigned memorandum submitted to Woermann on 
June 12 (587/243579-82) which dealt with French-Syrian relations and recent 
French statements on that subject. The two enclosures to that memorandum 
which are cited above have not been found. 



24 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 20 

386/211130 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

Paris, June 26, 1941. 
No. 1910 Received June 27—1 : 00 a. m. 

For Ambassador Abetz, 

Admiral Darlan told me today that he would like to sever relations 
with the Russian Government and get rid of the Russian Ambassador. 1 
But he could [undertake] such a measure only with a suitable pretext 
and he asked for our support. 3 

Darlan is especially anxious not to wait until the country is almost 
conquered to break off relations with Russia, in order not to incur the 
suspicion that he was profiting by a military defeat. 3 

Schleier 



1 Alexander Ef removich Bogomolov. 

1 In telegram No. 1925 of June 28 (386/211147-48) Schleier reported that he 
had secretly supplied Darlan with Information of materials discovered in the 
Soviet Russian Embassy and consular department. This information was to be 
used by Darlan in the ministerial council but without revealing its origin. 

A memorandum attached to telegram No. 1925 (386/211149) indicates that it 
was to be withdrawn. 

s In telegram No. 1939 of June 28 (386/211159) Schleier reported that a council 
of ministers held on that day had decided In principle to break off relations with 
the Soviet Union and that this should take effect within 48 hours. 



No. 21 

93/103751 

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 
most urgent BunAPEST, June 26, 1941 — 5 : 35 p. m. 

No. 710 of June 26 Received June 26 — 6 :10 p.m. 

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 695 1 and 698 2 of June 24. 
The Minister President asked me whether a reply by the Reich Gov- 
ernment had arrived to the question which he had asked me regarding 
a possible participation of Hungarian troops in the German advance 
against the Soviet Union. I replied negatively. 

Bardossy asked me to report that he would be grateful for an im- 
mediate reply because the Hungarian Government attached the great- 
est importance to being guided by our wishes in this question. 3 

Ehdmannsdorff 



1 Document No. 10. 

' Document No. 11. 

' No reply has been found in the flies of the German Foreign Ministry. The 
Haider Diary has the following entry for June 25, 1941 : ". . . Hungary's par- 
ticipation would be desirable. Hungary, however, wants to be asked officially. 
For political reasons the Fiihrer does not want this." 



JUNE 1941 25 

No. 22 

93/103758 

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most urgent Budapest, June 26, 1941 — 6 : 50 p. m. 

No. 713 of June 26 Received June 26—10 :40 p. m. l 

The Minister President has just summoned me and informed me that 
this afternoon Russian airplanes had bombed an express train running 
on the line from Korosmezo to Budapest and the town of Kosice, and 
there had been some killed and some -wounded. 

The Hungarian Government therefore considered itself to be in a 
state of war with Soviet Russia. 3 The Hungarian Air Force would 
react appropriately to the attack this very day. Hungary intended 
to publish a communique" regarding the state of war with Russia only 
after the Hungarian air attack had been carried out. He therefore 
urgently requested that the German press not publish reports on the 
affair before the Hungarian communique had been issued. 

The Minister President stated further that his statements trans- 
mitted in telegram No. 695 of June 24 8 had become pointless owing 
to the new situation. 

Erdman nsdokff 



1 Marginal note : "Received by telephone." 

* For the background of this Hungarian decision, ef. Nikolaus von Horthy, Ein 
Leben Jiir Ungarn (Bonn, 1953), pp. 235-237; Antal Ullein-Reviczky, Guerre 
AUemande, Paix Busse (Neuchatel, 1947), pp. 106-109; C. A. Macartney, A His- 
tory of Hungary, 1929-1945, vol. n, pp. 25-32. 

3 Document No. 10. 



No. 23 

4661/E211348-50 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

No. 1909 of June 26 Paris, June 26, 1941. 

Received June 26—10:40 p. m. 

Foreign Ministry through Dr. Schwarzmann for Ambassador 
Abetz. 

When Admiral Darlan visited me today, he gave me a letter signed 
by Marshal Petain personally, and addressed to the Fiihrer. 



26 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

The text, in translation, follows i 1 

Marshal Petain, Chief of State . 

Vichy, June 25, 1941. 

TRANSLATION 

Herr Reich Chancellor, I have just learned that the high German 
military authorities have apparently decided to place the Gardes 
Temtoriaux (the detachments of the Home Guard), which during 
hostilities had occasion to proceed against German parachutists he- 
hind the French lines, on a par with the snipers. Some of my com- 
patriots come under this general ruling and are in danger of incurring 
the death penalty. Two of them, the MM. Pellerin and Andrieux, 
have already been sentenced on these grounds and shot. 

I have the honor to draw the attention of Your Excellency to the 
fact that the Gardes TerHtoriaux, in contrast to the snipers, carried 
out express orders of French official agencies. 

Inasmuch as the French Government confirmed these orders and 
set up the formations of the Gardes Territoriaum by legal decrees of 
June 18, 1940, 2 it was of the opinion that such an organization was 
absolutely admissible with reference to articles 1 and 2 of the Regula- 
tions annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of October 18, 1907. 3 

If this legal opinion were contestable, and I believe it is not, even 
if mistakes on the part of certain local authorities could be determined, 
it is nonetheless inhuman to turn against those who carried out the 
orders and whose patriotic duty it was to obey without contradiction. 

If, on the other hand, some of them can be reproached for some- 
times having lost their heads and committed unfortunate acts, they 
could be called to account for this reason and sentenced only for this 
reason. 

I therefore consider it my duty as Chief of the French State, to 
appeal to Your Excellency in the last resort in order that you may 
decide that in no event should the Gardes Territoriaztx be placed on 
a par with snipers. 

At a time when I am trying to obtain from the French people the 
faithful execution of the directives which I give them, I should con- 
sider it very important to obtain from your Excellency a pardon for 
those men who, in carrying out their operations, only rendered obedi- 
ence to the government of their country and their superiors. 

Please accept, dear Herr Reich Chancellor, the assurances of my 
highest esteem. Ph. Petain. 

Close of the text. 

Darlan declared himself, with reference to the proposal discussed 
previously,* in agreement with the surrender of former Ministers 



1 A copy of the French original has been filmed on 4661/E211352-53. 

' The decree for the establishment of the Gardes Territoriauw bears the date 
May 17, 1940. For the text see Journal Ofliciel de la Ripuhlique Francaise: Lois 
et D&erets, mai 1940, p. 3692. 

* For test see The American. Journal of International Law, supp., vol. 2, 1908, 
pp. 1-215. 

4 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 135. For Ribbentrop's reply to 
Darlan's proposal see document No. 74. 



JUNE 1941 27 

Reynaud and Mandel, -who were responsible for this order of the 
French Government. He would surrender them at any time if such 
a demand were made by the German Government for criminal prose- 
cution by German authorities in exchange for the holding of separate 
trials of members of the Gardes Territoriaux, 

SOHLEEER 



No. 24 

386/211122-23 

Memorandum, by Ambassador Ritter 

Berlin, June 26, 1941. 

Subject: The Present State of Negotiations Concerning the Reduction 
of French Occupation Costs. 1 

I have been informed only belatedly of Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's 
memorandum — Dir. Ha Pol No. 158— of June 24. s 

From the military point of view, I have to differ on two points with 
the conception of Wiehl. 

The first point is that I advocate granting to the French the reduc- 
tion of occupation costs to 10 million reichsmarks right now, effective 
at the time when the French will have fulfilled the German demands 
in regard to Dakar and Bizerte. 3 I share the point of view of the 
OKW and of the three armed services that Bizerte is more important 
for the supply of the Africa Corps and Dakar for the employment of 
German naval and air forces than the highest possible monetary 
contributions. 

The second point is that I advocate the renunciation of the transfer 
of securities, foreign exchange, and gold at the present time. 4 This 
demand has not been fully justified from the beginning. Such a 
demand could perhaps have been justified toward a France that was to 
be treated only as a vanquished foe. But France is now to be treated 
as an incipient ally. Such demands should not be maintained toward 
a prospective ally. In this connection I point out that the French 



1 For previous developments see vol. xn of this series, document No. 475, 
footnote 3. 

"In this memorandum (378/209741^13) Wiehl outlined the German position, 
French objections, and his own recommendations. For further details, especially 
on the French view, see La D4tegation francaise auprda de la Commission alle- 
mande d' Armistice (Paris, 1957), vol. iv, pp. 590-596. 

3 See vol. xn of this series, document No. 559. 

* In telegram No. 569 of June 30 from Olymp (386/211169) Abetz reported that 
Hitler had agreed "to a revision of the occupation costs to the figure of a daily 
sum of 10 million marks under the condition that 3 million marks of the 60 
billion deposited with the Bank of France would be transferred daily in gold, 
foreign exchange, and securities." 



28 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Government is about to employ very strong French naval units off 

Syria, that is, against the English fleet. 8 

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary 

for the prospective presentation by Ambassador Abetz and Minister 

Hemmen. 

Eitter 



° See document No. 31 and footnote 3. 

No. 25 

93/103754 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

St.S. 425 Berlin, June 26, 1941. 

The Hungarian Minister 1 gave me today the appended memo- 
randum concerning efforts in the Banat to bring this area into the 
Reich in some form or other. 2 The Minister remarked in this regard 
that he and his Government had no doubts for a single moment con- 
cerning the future fate of the Banat as a part of Hungary. 3 They 
would be grateful, however, if the data contained in the memorandum 

were investigated. 

Wbizsacker 



1 Dome Sztfijay. . , „ „ *. .... 

a Not printed (93/103755-56). The memorandum dealt with alleged activities 
in this matter by the leaders of the German minority in the Banat. 

3 For the background of German-Hungarian discussions regarding the former 
Yugoslav Banat see vol. xn of this series, documents Nos. 340, 353, 366, 371, and 
564. 



No. 26 

2800/548214-16 

Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Foreign Ministry l 

Institute for Continental European Research 

Abt. II No. 074 Berlin, June 26, 1941. 

DIX18g.Rs. 

On the basis of the special assignment given me by the decree of 
the Fiihrer of April 20, 1941, in regard to the central handling of the 
questions of the eastern European area? I request the following : 

* This letter was also sent to a number of other Ministries and departments 
eonrerned which are listed on the first two pages of this document. The copy sent 
to the Foreign Ministry was for the attention of Senior Counselor Grosskopf of 
the Department for German Internal Affairs. 

"For text see Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International 
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, 1948), vol. xxvi, document No. S65-PS (U.S. 
Exhibit 143) , pp. 383-384. 



JUNE 1941 29 

1. All publications planned in matters of the eastern area, 3 also all 
directives and orders -which concern the political or propaganda ac- 
tivities -with respect to the eastern area, as well as all orders and 
decisions which concern the political organization of this area, are to 
be submitted to me for my opinion. 

2. Special caution is in order in the employment of members of the 
nations of the Soviet Union in the eastern territories. In case an 
office intends to utilize such persons in the eastern areas for purposes 
touching on policy, my consent must be procured in advance. 

A. Rosenberg 



8 Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting : "?". 

The following notes in Ribbentrop's handwriting are appended to the docu- 
ment printed on a separate page (2800/548217) : 
"P[iihrer], 'Eastern European area'." 
"Area outside German troops is responsibility of Foreign Ministry." 



No. 27 

191/188752-53 

The Charge d'Aff aires in China to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

most urgent Peiping, June 27, 1941 — 8 : 50 a. m. 

No. 299 of June 26 Received June 27—10 : 50 a. m. 

"With reference to telegram No. 1033 of June 25 of the Embassy 
Tokyo 1 and my telegram No. 262 of June 13. 2 

1. All the reasons which have heretofore argued against the recogni- 
tion of the Wang Ching-wei Government still exist unaltered. I refer 
to my earlier reports. 

2. Negotiations on the occasion of Wang Ching-wei's recent Tokyo 
visit 3 are considered in political circles here mainly as representing an 
internal Chinese- Japanese conflict about an extension of the powers to 
be accorded to Nanking, and this is correctly termed by the press a 
"domestic quarrel." There are as yet no concrete results of the 
negotiations. Evidently, however, neither party has made any impor- 
tant concessions and the total absence of practical results can now 
only be compensated by increasing the prestige of Wang Ching-wei 
at the expense of third countries. This is here considered a helpless 
attempt at getting out of the big muddle into which they have gotten 



1 Document No. 13. 

"This telegram (191/138734) reported a conversation with a "leading member 
of the North China government" about Wang Ching-wei's negotiations with 
Japan concerning recognition by the Axis Powers. Altenburg quoted the in- 
formant as saying that the Chinese people would be able to understand a 
recognition of the Nanking regime by Germany only "in the event that Chiang 
Kai-shek would have put himself unconditionally into the hands of the Americans 
and English, which so far was by no means certain ..." 

8 June 16-25. 



30 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

themselves by their own lack of discipline. A final success can hardly 
be counted on. 

3. I wish to warn urgently against fulfilling the ultimatum-like 
Japanese wishes in favor of Wang Ching-wei. In view of the advance 
of Soviet-Russian influence in western China, bitterly resented for a 
long time, and of the continued tense relationship with their own 
Communist party, the military success in the German-Russian war 
(evidently one group missing) change at one stroke the relationship 
of Chungking to Germany as well as the Chungking inclination 
toward a compromise in the direction of a direct Chinese-Japanese 
total solution of the China conflict. I therefore suggest that before 
conclusion of the German conflict with Russia no decisive steps be 
taken in the matter of recognition. 

Altenbtjrg 



No. 28 

208/142757-58 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

No. 769 of June 27 Stockholm, June 27, 1941—9 : 02 p. m. 

Received June 27—11 : 05 p. m. 

With reference to my telephone conversation with Ambassador 
Ritter of this afternoon. 1 

The following is the report on the status of the specific questions 
raised in the OKW letter of June 17 : z 

II, 1 : Transit of the Engelbrecht Division is now in progress. The 
volume of traffic totals 100 trains. The question of using the railroad 
lines leading to Trondheim and Narvik has been deferred since 
the German interests are for the present assured by last year's trans- 
port agreement. Once this transport route is utilized to maximum 
capacity, there is nothing to bar a suitable interpretation of last year's 
transport agreement. 3 

II, 2 : The movement of supplies to Finland on every technically 
practical scale has been approved by the Swedish Government. Tech- 
nical discussions are now in progress. In addition to the route used 
at present via Denmark, southern Sweden, to Haparanda and Tornio, 
preparations are now being hastened to organize a route to Finland 
over Swedish railroads to the Swedish ports of Gavle and Sundsvall 
on the Gulf of Bothnia. From Gavle or Sundsvall by ship across the 
Gulf of Bothnia to the corresponding Finnish ports. The new route 



1 No record of this telephone conversation has been found. 
' Vol. sii of this series, document No. 638. 
* Vol. x of this series, document No. 132. 



JUNE 1941 



31 



is contingent on the early closure of the Aland passage by mines, 
which the Naval Operations Staff has put off for the present for rea- 
sons unknown to us here. I would appreciate it if the second route 
mentioned above were taken into account for transport planning and 
developed as quickly as possible. 

II, 3 : No objections on the Swedish side. The case is of no practical 
importance at this time. 

II, 4: Sweden has agreed. The question of the Norwegian ships 
has not been raised by me for the time being. I have asked the Fin- 
nish Minister, Ramsay, to see what he can do about Finnish charter- 
ing of the Norwegian ships. The question is not urgent because the 
vessels are only motor ships. 4 

II, 5 : The transport questions will be handled on a continuing basis 
by the transport experts already or still to be assigned to the Military 
and Naval Attaches. 

II, 6: Sweden has agreed to all wishes expressed so far. Ober- 
postrat Harder has been designated by me as the expert of the Mili- 
tary Attache for signal communications. 

II, 7 and IV, 5 : Sweden has agreed to assign airfields suitable for 
forced landings and will disclose instructions insuring flight safety. 
Details will be furnished to the Air Attache tomorrow morning. 8 
Compliance with the German wishes regarding aircraft and crews in- 
volved in forced landings. Discussion concerning flight of individual 
aircraft across Swedish territory is still going on at present. Sweden 
requests timely advance notice for flights across Swedish territory. 

' A memorandum of Feb. 9 by Ruter, zu Ha. Pol. II b 374 (205/142869-73) lists 
and describes the Norwegian ships lying in Swedish harbors as follows : 

"name ofthip 
SS Gudvang 
" Charente 
" Rapid II 
" Solgry 
" Skytteren 

(whale reducer) 
" Vesta 
" Carma 
" Bygdoy 
MS Fjeldberg 
MT Rigrnor 

" Buccaneer 

" Storsten 

" hind 
MS Karin 

" Lionel 

" Dido 

" ReaHII 

" B. P. Newton 

All ships lie without cargo (except for the BygdOy, Vesta, and Carma)." 
See, further, document No. lfil. 
5 See document No. 42. 



jrosj 


deadweight 


spied 




ton-nave 


tonnage 


initnot-t 


harbor 


1,470 


2,550 


9. 5-10 


Goteborg 


1,282 


1,815 


9-10 


a 


714 


1,000 


9 


Stromstad 


559 


750 


8.5 


Trelleborg 


12, 358 


15, 650 


12 


Goteborg 


1,310 


unknown 


10 


tt 


1,234 


it 


unknown 


a 


1,252 


1,800 


8 


Halmstad 


332 


380 


9 


Malmo 


6,305 


9,610 


11 


Goteborg 


6,222 


9,525 


unknown 


a 


5,343 


8,000 


10.5 


a 


461 


600 


9 


tt 


30 


unknown 


unknown 


tt 


5,653 


8,825 


10.25 


Gullmarsjord 


5,263 


unknown 


13.75 


it 


6,069 


unknown 


unknown 


Goteborg 


10, 324 


unknown 


13.75 


Malmo 



32 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

The question of a permanent regular courier service from Rovaniemi 
to Norway still requires clarification with. Army Headquarters in 
Rovaniemi. 

Ill : Regarding the status of Swedish assistance to Finland and of 
the German-Swedish negotiations on nonmilitary supplies, I refer to 
detailed telegraphic reports Nos. 734 6 and 740 T of June 25. With 
Sweden herself being short in most of the supplies requested, the 
negotiations must be expected to be difficult. The questions are being 
pursued by me in consultation with the Finnish negotiators. 8 

IV, 1-5 : Sweden has agreed. A separate report will follow tomor- 
row on the special questions contained in OKM's supplementary letter 
of June 18.* The German wishes have been complied with on all 
substantial points. Military administrative questions are not imme- 
diately pertinent at this time since there are no German troops on 
Swedish territory except the Engelbrecht Division in transit, for 
which quite satisfactory special arrangements have been made. The 
Swedish Government has today, in a separate memorandum, served 
notice of its counterrequests in the domain of civilian and military 
supplies, which will be separately reported. 10 

SCHNUBRE 
WlED 

' Not found. 

' Not printed (205/142748-49). 

* See document No. 41. 

' See document No, 43. 

10 See document No. 59. 



No. 29 

260/170058 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

urgent Helsinki, June 27, 1941 — 10 : 40 p. m. 

top secret Received June 28 — 1 : 30 a. m. 

No. 524 of June 27 

1. The Foreign Minister told me that Finland had entered a new 
phase of her policy. If a break with England or America should 
result from it, the Finnish Government would prefer that the other 
side should initiate the break. 1 



1 On June 28 the Finnish Minister In the United States, Hjalmar J. Frocop£, 
handed Sumner Welles a statement containing the following declaration: 

"The Government of Finland desires to maintain unaltered its relations with 
Great Britain. The Government of Finland Is a co-belligerent with Germany 
solely against RussEa." Cf. Foreign Relations of the United. States, 19&1, vol. I, 
p. 44. 



JUNE 1941 33 

2. In regard to England I followed the guidance of conversation 
of telegram No. 511. 2 

3. The Foreign Minister does not yet see' his way clear, but has 
by way of precaution instructed Gripenberg 3 to proceed to Dublin in 
the event of a break with England. 

4. The British Legation here has evacuated the women and chil- 
dren, and has reduced the staff. The Foreign Minister has grounds 
for believing that the British Minister i has been authorized to de- 
cide for himself whether or not he would stay. 

Blucher 



a In this telegram of June 19 (260/170023) Ribbentrop agreed with Bliicher's 
point of view and instructed him to work for a break of relations between 
Finland and Great Britain, 

1 Finnish Minister in Great Britain. 

* George Gordon Medlicott Vereker. 



No. 30 

205/142751 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden 

No. 896 of June 27 Berlin, June 26, 1941 1 

Sent June 27. 

For Minister Schnurre. 

Please call on the Swedish Foreign Minister and inform him that 
you have been instructed by me to convey to the Swedish Government 
the thanks of the Eeich Government together with its satisfaction 
over the understanding attitude Sweden has shown toward Germany's 
wishes 2 occasioned by the conflict with Russia. Also, that it was my 
conviction that this attitude conforms to the essential interests of the 
Swedish people. 

Ribbentrop 



'This telegram also bears the number 558 and the notation, "received June 
26, 10 : 40 p. m." It was presumably sent to Berlin from Bibbentrop's temporary 
headquarters. 

2 See documents Nos. 8, 16, and 17. 



No. 31 

Fl/0582-85 

The Foreign Minister to the Chief of the High Command of the 

Wehrmaoht 

top secret Berlin, June 27, 1941. 

Dear Herr Field Marshal: I have noted the contents of your 

letter of June 15, 1941 (WFSt/Div. L IV/K No. 00113741 Top 

682-905 — 64 -8 



34 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Secret) 1 on the implementation of France's military obligations as 
laid down in the "Paris Protocols", 2 and reply as follows: 

The premise from which we proceed in our attitude toward the 
French Government is that we can only secure to ourselves our mili- 
tary interests in this sphere by negotiating with France, and this 
premise underlies a policy which, as you well know, I have advocated 
from the beginning and which has since been consistently followed. 
For it is obvious that any coercive action against France would have 
led to the defection of the French colonies and their joining forces 
with de Gaulle. 

On the other hand it is important to handle matters in such a way 
that no open war between France and England should break out at 
a time when this did not suit us. If open warfare should break out 
between these two countries now that we are committed in Russia it 
could lead to an English attempt to take possession of French bases 
on the west coast of Africa without our being able to help France 
effectively in warding off such attempts at these not easily accessible 
points. 

In the meantime the Fiihrer's decision about having the French 
fleet put out to sea with troop transports for Syria s has in this con- 
nection produced a new situation; this decision is no doubt based on 
considerations of a military nature in the Mediterranean region which 
could, however, advance the likelihood of a general state of war arising 
between France and England and of an English attack against specific 
French bases. Since, as you emphasize, it is becoming increasingly 
urgent to utilize Dakar as a base for our navy while it would be 
impossible for us to seize this base by force once the English had 
gained a firm footing there, it seems to me to be of primary importance 
that we deploy, as soon as practicable from the military standpoint, 
units of the German Air Force there which would be capable, in 
concert with local French forces, to repulse any English attack. In 
this connection it should be borne in mind that under the Paris 
agreements the obligations of the French with respect to Dakar 
do not become effective until July 15 at the earliest. I would appreciate 
learning if it would be possible to send German squadrons to Dakar 
by this date. 

As far as the use of the port of Bizerte is concerned I am of 
course fully aware of its importance for supplying the German Africa 
Corps as well as of the urgency of this question. In this regard 
the arrangements entered into by Ambassador Abetz with the French 

1 See vol. mi of this series, document No. 633. 

' See vol, in of this series, document No. 559. 

"In memorandum Fol. I M 19.72 of June 26 (70/50516-17) Grote recorded 
Hitler's decision to permit the transport of four French battalions from France 
to Syria under the protection of the French naval task force "Strassbourg." 



JUNE 1941 35 

Government in the supplementary Protocol of May 28, 1941, 4 are 
so worded that the obligations which France assumes on this score 
are not contingent upon any political or economic concessions to 
France. We can therefore demand of the French Government — and 
the latter is in principle agreeable to this — that it meet these obliga- 
tions at once. As a result of the events in Syria there is, however, a 
greater danger than there was last May of an English attack as a 
reaction to our use of Bizerte for our supply line. The French 
Government is understandably anxious- to be able, in such event, 
to show its people some tangible German counterconcessions. I will 
therefore propose to the Fiihrer to make some political and financial 
concessions to the French at this time." 

Heil Hitler I 
Yours, etc. 6 

* See vol. in of this series, document No. 559. 
" For Keitel's reply see document No. 61. 

* The file copy of this letter is not signed. 

No. 32 

191/138737-39 

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan 

Telegram 
secret Berlin, June 27, 1941. 

No. 907 

With reference to your telegram No. 1033 of June 25. 1 

For the Ambassador personally. 

For the time being for your confidential information. 

The Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Oshima, after the 
Fiihrer had consented, and in agreement with the Italian Government, 
that we had decided to recognize the Wang Ching-wei Government 
on July 1. 

I have discussed with Ambassador Oshima the details of recogni- 
tion in the following way : 2 

1. I told Oshima that on July 1 we would send Wang Ching-wei 
a telegram recognizing his government. 3 It would also state that 
we were establishing diplomatic relations. We would get in contact 
with Wang regarding the special questions arising from the 
recognition. 

2. I have arranged with Oshima that we would instruct our Mis- 
sions with the Governments of the Tripartite Pact in Rumania, Bul- 
garia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia in the course of this day to 

1 Document No. 13. 

' Weizs&cker's memorandum of June 27 (191/138745-47) is a record of this con- 
versation and of some of the steps subsequently taken in this matter. 
3 See document No. 38 and footnote 2. 



36 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

support the impending Japanese step regarding the recognition of 
Wang Ching-wei, in accord with the Italian Mission.* 

3. Oshima asked that nothing be done for the time being in the 
way of approaching the Spanish Government. 5 He was expecting 
further instructions in this regard from Tokyo. 

4. Regarding our economic wishes I said the following in the course 
of the conversation : 

Following recognition of the Wang Chang-wei government we 
intended to instruct the Wohlthat delegation e to negotiate and con- 
clude within the framework of its negotiations in Tokyo a special 
agreement with the Wang Ching-wei government regarding German- 
Chinese trade. In this we proceeded from the assumption, in accord- 
ance with the Fuschl conversation of February 23, 1941, 7 that Ger- 
many in her trade with China would enjoy a preferential treatment 
over third countries. 

Oshima received this remark willingly and with understanding. 
He said he intended to inform Tokyo accordingly on his own initia- 
tive, too, and obtain confirmation of the reception given my 
observation. 

5. Oshima asked whether our relations with Wang Ching-wei should 
be considered as having been established de jure with our telegram 
of recognition of the first of next month. I confirmed this and added 
that we would then appoint very soon a Charge d'Affaires to Wang 
and would later presumably also send an Ambassador. 

Weizsacker 



'An unnumbered draft of this instruction elated June 29 (191/138771) is in 
the files. According to the reply telegrams, Nos. 1932 of June 30 from Bucharest 
(191/138791), 670 of June 30 from Sofia (191/138790), 730 of June 30 from 
Budapest (191/138787), 675 of July 1 from Bratislava (191/138805) and 631 of 
July 1 from Zagreb (191/138795) the instruction had been carried out and 
letters of recognition had been or were being sent to Wang Ching-wei. 

6 An unnumbered draft instruction of June 29 (191/138769-70) informing 
Stohrer of the forthcoming recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime and asking 
him to support the Japanese demand for recognition by Spain is also in the files. 

Stohrer's telegram No, 2274 of June 30 (191/138788), apparently the reply to 
this instruction, indicated that Spain would recognize the government of Wang 
Ching-wei the following day. 

•For the Wohlthat mission see vol. xi of this series, documents Nos. 341 and 
424, and vol. sn of this series, document No. 429. 

* Between Ribbentrop and Oshima ; see vol. xn of this series, document No. 78. 

No. 33 

177/85220-21 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

secret Tokyo, June 28, 1941 — 11 : 45 a. m. 

No. 1069 of June 28 Keceived June 28—10 : 10 p, m. 

With reference to my telegram No. 1034 of June 25. 1 

Within the last few days the leadership committee of the Cabinet 

has repeatedly met in the presence of the Chief of Staff, the entire 

1 Document No. 14. 



JUNE 1941 



37 



Cabinet, and advisory committees without reaching a clear-cut 
decision as to Japan's future attitude regarding the German-Russian 
war. As far as could be found out, only preparatory measures for 
the various possible actions on the part of Japan have been ordered 
thus far. As the Wehrmacht memorandum * confirms, preparatory 
measures have indeed begun with zest. In the circumstances the prep- 
arations for intervention against Russia will take at least 6 weeks, 
unless Russia is weakened materially and morally in a decisive manner 
in the Far East beforehand. According to reliable, confidential in- 
formation, Prime Minister Konoye and the majority of Cabinet Minis- 
ters, to be sure, seem to adhere to the view that nothing must be 
undertaken that would injure Japan's military position in China. 
Hence, the Cabinet seems thus far merely to have resolved on tighten- 
ing their grip on French Indochina for which purpose three divisions 
are allegedly being prepared. 

In public and behind the scenes discussions concerning the attitude 
to be taken are in full swing. Noted nationalists, who always work 
closely together with the Embassy, have held various confidential 
discussions— cf. DNB No. 244 of 26 June— in which caution toward 
the Soviet Union and vigorous action in the south was advocated. 

The danger exists that the southern expansion desired by this group 
will at first be limited to French Indochina, while their efforts (clear 
text evidently missing) could hinder Japan's activity in the north. 
In these circumstances, the question arises whether the general direc- 
tive, given to me in Berlin, 3 to see to it in the first place that Japan 
takes action in the south while neglecting the Soviet Union, is still 
valid if a successful move to the south beyond Indochina cannot be 
counted on at present. According to confidential reports coming to 
me from the Japanese Foreign Office, Ambassador Oshima is said 
urgently to have advised the Japanese Government to attack Russia 
soon. 

I request telegraphic instructions.* 

Ott 



! Not found. . 

' Ott was in Berlin during Matsuoka's visit in March and April 1941 as is indi- 
cated in vol. xir, documents Nos. 218 and 222 but no record has been found of 
such a directive given to him at that time. See, however, vol. xir, document No. 
100. 

* Not found. See, however, document No. 53. 



38 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 34 

136/75022-24 

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

top secret Madrid, June 28, 1941—2 : 35 p. m., special summer time. 

No. 2251 of June 28 Received June 28—6 : 10 p. m. 

The moves of Serrano Suner in the last few days show even more 
clearly than hitherto that he is with clear aim preparing Spain's en- 
trance into the war. 

The sending of Spanish volunteers against Russia, which must bring 
Spain into sharper opposition to our foes, is to be attributed to his 
initiative. Only a few hours after the outbreak of the war with Rus- 
sia he won Franco over for this plan which was immediately explained 
to us in order to bind the easily influenced Chief of State. 1 The re- 
ported jealousy and protest by the Army which vetoed the dispatch 
of Falange formation had a more serious background in so far as the 
military attempted to oppose the whole project because it would bring 
Spain to the brink of war. 

The incident at Algeciras, which according to the representations of 
the Foreign Minister involved a heavy encroachment of English flak, 
and which was made the subject of a very energetic note of protest to 
the British Embassy (telegram No. 2220 of June 26 2 ), takes on a 
different light in the description by the responsible General Munoz 
Grandes (telegram No. 2242 of June 27 e ) and far less significance. 
The same thing is evident in the affair of the gasoline blockade by 
England, which the Foreign Minister caused to be published and 
commented upon in aggressive form (Arriba article, telegram No. 
2218 of June 26 4 and No. 2236 of June 27 ") . Again the account of 
the facts of the case given by the relevant office presents a different 
picture (telegram No. 2241 of June 27) . B 

In both cases it is clear that Serrano Sufier consciously exaggerated 
matters in order to sharpen antagonism toward England and to stir 
up public opinion against England. 

"In telegram No. 2206 of June 25 (136/75003) Stohrer reported that some 40 
to 50 trained pilots of the Spanish Air Force were to be sent as volunteers in 
addition to the infantry. 

In telegram No, 2217 of June 26 (136/75009) Stohrer reported that Serrano 
Suffer had informed him of the various points regarding the volunteers which 
had been decided by the Spanish Government. 

*In this telegram (136/75011) Stohrer reported having heard that an English 
plane from Gibraltar had flown over Spanish territory near Algeciras evoking 
Spanish flak and that thereupon the English flak positions had fired upon the 
Spanish guns. 

' Not printed (136/75018) . 

•Not printed (139/75010). 

1 Not found. 



JUNE 1941 



39 



The sharp oral and written arguments with the English and with 
the American Ambassador (telegram No. 2184 of June 24 a and No. 
2213 of June 26 7 and No. 2129 of June 19 s ) tend in the same direction. 

The dilatory answers of the Foreign Minister to the Italian Foreign 
Minister in regard to adherence to the Tripartite Pact and his initial 
negative view toward the question of an official declaration of war 
against Russia should not deceive us regarding the intention of the 
Foreign Minister within a short time to make Spain's entry into the 
war unavoidable. Serrano Suner wishes war, but he wants it at a 
moment most favorable for Spain, that is to say after making sure 
of a series of important imports which are already on the way and 
after appropriate preparation of public opinion. In the pursuit of 
his aim he has to reckon with strong opponents— above all, with the 
military who have an influence with Franco. That this party is itself 
more and more convinced of the necessity of entrance into the war I 
have reported at various times; but they seek to postpone for the 
longest time possible the entry into the war because of lack of economic 
and military preparation. For this reason they would oppose any 
step taken now which might be decisive, of which they might hear 
from Franco (the Tripartite Pact, declaration of war on Russia) 
and in view of Franco's indecisiveness they would probably win out 
as they did this past winter. For these reasons Serrano Suner makes 
his preparations for war in areas where an interference is not easily 
possible and where at the most Franco's assent is necessary, which 
will be possible for the more significant of the two brothers-in-law to 
achieve after the restoration of harmony between them. 

How nervously the military party observes the operations of the 
Foreign Minister within his sphere are clear from the fact that the 
lively exchange with England in Arriba because of the gasoline block- 
ade stirred up strong discontent with certain of the military so that 
the especially anxious Minister of Air, Vigon, suggested to me that 
I exercise a moderating influence because otherwise Spain would be 
involved in the war within a very short time. 

Serrano Suner apparently operates in accordance with the words 
which he once uttered according to which a provocation on the part 
of the English was necessary for bringing about Spanish unity and 
that if necessary such a provocation had itself to be provoked. 9 

Stohrbr 



" Not found. 

'Not printed (136/750O8). 

8 Not printed (136/74983). 

'This telegraphic report crossed the instruction from Berlin of June 28 
(136/75029) which is cited In vol. xn of this series, document No. 574, footnote 
15. The instruction warned Stohrer to make no moves on his own part regard- 
ing Spanish entry into the war because the repeated suggestions of Suner's de- 
sire to enter the war were not to be taken seriously. 



40 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 35 

177/85214-15 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 
Telegram 

MOST URGENT 

No. 560 of June 28 Special Train, June 28, 1941—8 : 10 p. m. 

from the Special Train Received Berlin, June 28—8 : 30 p. m. 

No. 916 of June 28 

from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 28—9:30 p. m. 

No. 267/R RAM 

Secret for the Chief of Mission. 

I have arranged agreement with Ambassador Oshima that he -will 
influence his Government, in the direction of a speedy military action 
against Soviet Russia, and I ask you now to utilise on your part all 
the possibilities that present themselves to influence the government 
at your post and the other influential circles in such a direction. In 
this connection I ask you to make use of the following points : 

1) War between Germany and Soviet Russia will not only bring 
with it the solution of more or less limited individual problems, but 
will bring as a consequence a solution of the Russian question in its 
entirety through a final battle. 

2) The destruction of Russian power by our military action, which 
is to he expected within a comparatively short time, will also make 
Germany's victory over England an irrevocable fact. If Germany 
is in possession of the Russian oil wells and grain fields, a sufficient 
supply for the whole of Europe will thereby be ensured so that the 
English blockade will on the whole be of absolutely no avail. The 
direct land connection with East Asia will likewise be established on 
this occasion. 

3) In this way all the preconditions are given which will render 
possible the new organization of the European sphere as intended by 
the Axis Powers. 

4) The present situation also presents a unique chance for Japan. 
As Germany does this with respect to Europe, so can Japan now 
through a military action against Soviet Russia create the prerequi- 
sites for the new order in East Asia planned by her. After the re- 
moval of the Soviet power in the Far East also, the solution of the 
Chinese question will be achieved in the way desired by Japan without 
encountering any more difficulties. 

5) From the standpoint of Japanese interests, the idea of a drive 
toward the south in the direction of Singapore, to be sure, is and re- 
mains also of great importance. As Japan is not yet prepared for this 
and as a possibility for such a drive has not yet been presented in the 



JUNE 1941 41 

present phase of the war, it is in the urgent interest of Japan not to 
leave unused this chance now offered to her for solving the Russian 
question in the Far East too. By doing this she would also free her 
rear for a drive toward the south. 

6) In view of the speedy course of events to be expected, Japan 
should come to a decision in favor of a military action against Soviet 
Russia without hesitation. A Japanese action against a Soviet Russia 
already beaten to the ground would be quite prejudicial to the moral 
and political position of Japan. 

7) It can be expected that the swift defeat of Soviet Russia, es- 
pecially if Japan participates in it from the East, will be the best 
means for convincing the United States of the absolute senselessness 
of entering the war oh the side of England, who will then be com- 
pletely isolated and confronted by the mightiest combination in the 
world. 

Ribbenthop 



No. 36 

177/85216 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

Telegram 
top secret Special train, June 28, 1941 — 8 : 45 p. m. 

No. 623 from the Special Train Received Berlin, June 28 — 9 : 10 p. m. 
No. 917 from the Foreign Ministry Sent June 28—10 : 20 p. m. 

For the Ambassador personally. 

Although there have been some hard battles, military operations are 
developing so favorably and rapidly that Russian resistance as a whole 
may perhaps be expected to collapse much sooner than we had thought 
up to now. The advice given in my previous telegram of June 28 1 
that the Japanese Government should decide as soon as possible in 
favor of intervening actively against the Soviet Union assumes special 
importance in this connection. In the last few days I have kept 
Ambassador Oshima continuously informed about the favorable devel- 
opment of the military situation and have just spoken to him again on 
the telephone, with particular emphasis on the foregoing. I hope that 
Mr. Matsuoka's recently expressed conviction, that in the event of a 
German conflict with Russia Japan of necessity will have to attack 
Russia on Germany's side, 5 will now very soon become a reality. 

RlBBENTKOF 



1 Document No. 35. 

* See vol. xii of this series, documents Nos. 512 and 596. 



42 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 37 

5146/B30351T 

The State Secretary to the Embassy to the Holy See 
Telegram 

Multex No. 424 of June 27 x Berlin, June 28, 1941—12 : 25 p. m. 

Received June 28—2 : 00 p. m. 
Please do not establish any contact — or as the case may be cease any 
contact— with the former diplomatic and consular missions of the 
former Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Every dis- 
cussion of the question of the future political organization of the 
Baltic area is undesirable at the present time. 
Please confirm receipt. 2 

Weizsacker 



1 The Multex number indicates that this instruction was a circular sent also to 
various other Missions; however, no other copies of this telegram or lists of 
addresses have been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry. 

'Not found. 



No. 38 

191/138758-59 

The State Secretary to the Embassy in China 

Telegram 
secret Berlin, June 28, 1941. 

No. 281 
Drafting Officer : Minister Boltze. 

With reference to your telegram No. 299 of June 26. 1 

For the Charge d' Affaires personally. 

The Reich Government has decided to recognize the Wang Ching- 
wei government on July 1. It has been arranged with the Italian 
Government that on July 1 the Reich Foreign Minister and the Italian 
Foreign Minister will send Wang Ching-wei telegrams recognizing 
his government and informing him that we will soon establish diplo- 
matic relations with him. 

The text of the Reich Foreign Minister's telegram will be forwarded 
to you as soon as the wording is definitively settled. 2 Please see to it 
that Consul General Gipperich hands Wang Ching-wei the Reich For- 
eign Minister's telegram on July l. a 

1 Document No. 27. „«.„_ „„,. 

1 Sent in Weizsacker's telegram No. 282 of June 29 (191/138767-68). 

* In telegram No. 314 of July 2 from Peiplng (191/138811) Altenburg reported 
that Gipperich, the Consul General at Nanking, had carried out these instructions 
in the afternoon of July 1. 



JUNE 1941 43 

The matter must be kept completely secret until July 1. Please 
inform Gipperich also accordingly. Furthermore, please inform the 
Mission in Chungking confidentially from your post (Peiping) only 
on June 30. 

Further directives for the guidance of your conversation will 
follow. 4 

Weizsacker 



* See footnote 2. 

No. 39 

616/249809 

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI 

Berlin, June 28, 1941. 
zu Pol. VI 3405 g. 1 
Submitted through U.St.S. Pol. to Pol. I M with the request that 
the following communication be forwarded to the OKW: 

"The Foreign Ministry welcomes the cooperation of activist ele- 
ments and groups of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian popu- 
lations with the German troops in the struggle against Soviet Russia. 
"Strictly confidential and only for your information and attention: 
"The Foreign Ministry requests, however, that political promises 
of any kind to these elements and groups, and in general all con- 
versations of a political kind with those mentioned, be avoided in 
all circumstances." 

Grundherr 



1 Pol. VI 3405 g. : Not found. 

No. 40 

105/113623 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

St.S. 441 Berlin, June 28, 1941. 

The Hungarian Minister once more stressed to me today that he 
personally had not been misled by the Foreign Ministry in regard 
to the developments leading to the German-Russian conflict. On 
the other hand, a certain confusion in the military field had arisen 
because of the fact that Colonel General Haider had asked the 
Hungarian military on June 18 during his short sojourn in Budapest 
not to sound an alarm in order not to arouse the attention of the 
Russians, nor to take an offensive position. 1 General Himer had 
spoken somewhat differently. 

1 See document No. 10. 



44 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

For the rest we agreed that these things all belong to the past, 
now that the state of war between Hungary and Russia has been 
provoked and brought about by the Russian attack. 

I told the Minister that for my part I would only try to find out 
also whether any kind of steps through diplomatic channels were 
still necessary with regard to Hungary's military action. 

So far as I knew this was not the case. 

Weizsacker 



No. 41 

205/142761 

The Legation in Sioeden to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

No. 784 of June 29 Stockholm, June 29, 1941—3 : 00 a. m. 

Received June 29 — 6 : 00 a, m. 

With reference to your telegrams No. 734 of June 25 * and No. 769 
of June 27 2 and with reference to the telegram from Helsinki of 
June 27 in your file. 3 

The Swedish Foreign Minister informed the Finnish Minister 
yesterday that the Swedish Government is prepared in principle to 
supply arms and ammunition to Finland and to discuss Finland's 
various supply requests. 4 Concrete Swedish-Finnish negotiations 
will accordingly be initiated today, the prospects of which are viewed 
by the Finnish negotiators much more favorably than they were in 
the past. 6 

Repeated to Helsinki. 

SCIINURRB 
WlED 



1 Not found. 

a Document No. 28. 

3 Not identified. 

1 In telegram No. 897 of July 10 (319/192472) the Legation reported that in 
response to Finland's request for 1,000 trucks, Sweden would offer only 500 
and these without tires. According to the Finns the British Government had 
threatened Sweden with cutting; off her overseas imports, the Goteborg traffic, 
if Sweden were to export rubber or tires to Finland. The British control 
over the imports from overseas was so strict that Sweden saw no possibility 
of an evasion (elne Ausnahme zu konstruieren). 

In a further report on the Swedish-Finnish economic negotiations (No. 961 
of July 16: 319/192450-51), Schnurre emphasized that the Swedes feared, in 
case they delivered rubber to Finland, that Sweden's overseas trade would be 
completely cut off. 

See document No. 357. 

"In telegram No. 1883 of Nov. 5 (205/143080) Dankwort reported that the 
negotiations had been concluded in Helsinki. The Swedes declined to make 
the loan which the Finns wished as the Swedish delegation had no such 
authorization. The Swedes further were dubious that Finland would be able 
to make the stipulated counterdeliveries. 



JUNE 1941 45 

No. 42 

205/142762-65 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

most urgent Stockholm, June 29, 1941 — 3 : 30 a. m. 

No. 785 of June 29 Received June 29—6 : 00 a. m. 

For the Air Ministry, Attache Group. 1 

Following earlier general clarification of the German wishes by 
Minister Schnurre with the Swedish Government, 2 the following ar- 
rangements have been agreed with the Swedish Air Force. 

1. Forced landings. 

A. For forced landings by German aircraft, the following airfields 
have been designated, to be used preferably whenever possible : Tors- 
landa, Bulltofta, Varberg, Ljungbyhed, Skavsta near Nykoping, 
Roma and Farosund on Gotland, civilian airfield Visby, 2 km north 
of the city, Norrtalje, Frosb'n near Ostersund, Eomehed northwest of 
Sater, Vannas, Kalaxheden, 5 km south of Lulea, Kalix. No field 
available on Oland. 

B. Size of the fields. Skavsta, runways 1000 & 1000; Roma and 
Farosund approximately 1000 & 1000, in Farosund in one direction 
only 850; Vannas 900 & 600; Kalaxheden 1200 & 1200; Kalix 900 
&900. 

G. The designated fields can be directly approached by aircraft in 
distress. Red distress flares must be fired if possible. The Swedish 
authorities will afford every aid and assistance, including fueling and 
repairs, to aircraft making forced landings on these fields or else- 
where. Attention is called to use of international emergency 
frequencies. 

D. No internment. No general agreement has been concluded on 
this point; disposition will be from case to case in our favor. 

E. Maps on which the airfields are marked will be forwarded at the 
earliest opportunity to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, Fifth Air 
Force, Headquarters Army in Norway, and to Major General Lorenz. 

2. Courier routes and courier aircraft. 

A. For the time being, the following routes have been agreed on 
with the Swedish Air Force: Oslo-Hamar-Skelleftea-Kemi-Rova- 
niemi, and Trondheim-Skelleftea-Kemi-Rovaniemi, Courier planes 
must fly a pennant — color immaterial — on each air foil and are then 
considered civilian aircraft regardless of type. They will not be fired 
at, not even by way of warning. No restrictions as to cruising altitude. 



1 Typed marginal note at the end of the document : "Forwarded by the tele- 
graph office by means of closed circuit coded teletype to the Reich Ministry 
of Air, June 29." 

1 See document No. 28. 



46 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Maximum altitude desired by the Swedish side. The prescribed course 
must be followed. The fortress areas of Hemsjo and Boden, as well 
as other restricted areas, must not be flown over. As far as possible, a 
regular flight schedule must be established and will be communicated 
to the Swedish Air Force by this office. The schedule arranged at the 
present calls for one plane over each route and in each direction, or 
two planes on one route in each direction, daily. The flight schedule 
will be established by this office in consultation with Fifth Air Force 
and Headquarters of the Army in Norway. The Luftwaffe Operations 
Staff will be informed. 8 

B. An alternate courier route, Oslo-Pori, has been discussed to al- 
low for contingencies. This office can make definite arrangements if 
need arises for this route. 

0. Courier flights and special flights operated outside the flight 
schedule must be announced in advance — if possible 2 hours before 
starting time — to this office, which will arrange for notification of the 
Swedish Air Defense Command. Such flights must also follow the 
designated routes. 

3. Firing on aircraft. 

A. Aircraft in distress will not be fired at. Fire international red 
flare. 

B. Scheduled courier planes or previously announced courier or 
special purpose planes will not be fired at. 

6. Beginning June 29, other aircraft will receive warning shots 
and, if they fail to change course, fire for effect; this is the same pro- 
cedure followed in the past pursuant to Annex 3ZL, Dispatch 8/41 
Stockholm-Berlin. 4 The Swedish Air Defense Command considers 
this provision essential for effective action against Eussian aircraft 
flying over Swedish territory or attacking German rail transports to 
Finland. Sweden anticipates the possibility of Russian air attacks, 5 
particularly since the German side has demanded that German anti- 
aircraft machine guns be emplaced on top of transport trains. 



*In telegram No. 863 of July 6 (205/142797-98) the Legation reported the 
definitive agreement on two routes for couriers and transport purposes: Ro- 
vaniemi-Pori-Bromma-Oslo and return ; Germany-Bromma-Finland and return. 
Furthermore arrangements were made for fueling of the planes at Bromrna; 
the flying into Swedish air space on other routes was to be restricted to a min- 
imum ; every flight was to be proceeded by a 2-hour warning with the office of 
the Air Attache, Stockholm ; and each plane was to signal the field at Bromma 
before flying over Swedish territory but the indication of courier planes by 
means of pennants was no longer an absolute requirement. 

* Not found. 

' In telegram No. 751 of June 26 (205/142753) Wied reported having learned 
from a private Swedish source that Mme. Kollontay had said that the conse- 
quences of the Swedish concession to transport German troops would be that 
Russian planes would try to attack not only the German troops on Swedish trains 
but Swedish territory as well. 



JUNE 1941 47 

D. The Swedish Air Defense Command will not fire at German 
and Finnish aircraft, but would prefer not to issue a general order to 
this effect. Since the arrangement arrived at, despite the good will 
in evidence, is not entirely satisfactory and fails to rule out the possi- 
bility of aircraft being fired at by mistake, Minister Schnurre will ask 
of the Swedish Government an explicit order that German aircraft be 
not fired at by antiaircraft artillery and fighters. 6 For the time being 
I recommend that all aircraft flying across Swedish territory be 
equipped with red distress flares for use in case they are fired at. 

E. In the conference this evening with the Chief of the General 
Staff of the Armed Forces T and the Chief of the Air Force Staff, 8 1 
repeatedly and emphatically called attention to the incalculable conse- 
quences that in my opinion would ensue from the loss of German air- 
craft from gunfire from Swedish flak or fighters. On the Swedish side 
it was pointed out that no untoward incident had occurred since the 
coming into effect of the agreement under Annex 3 ( Section 3 O) . B It 
was further stated by the Swedish side that such incidents are believed 
impossible even now. 

4. The Swedish Air Defense Command has proposed to Finland 
the sending to Turku, the Aland Islands, and to Aulu of liaison officers 
in order to report as promptly as possible to the Swedish Air Defense 
on German or Finnish planes coming from the east. 

5. Attention is called to Swedish restricted areas indicated in the 
maps that will follow. 

6. Intermediate landings. 

In the event that contrary to past instructions the military situation 
should require transfer of a unit, e.g., fighters, to Finland, it will be 
necessary to notify this office of the number of aircraft, of the type, 
of the course, as well as of any intermediate landing places envisaged, 
in order to enable Minister Schnurre or the Legation to obtain the con- 
sent of the Swedish Government. 10 

7. Weather reports. 

A. Weather reports are now being broadcast only in a form suffi- 
cient for the needs of agriculture. Russia receives no weather reports. 
If there is interest on the German side for detailed Swedish weather 
reports, I would request instructions to this effect, together with a list 
of the desired stations and specification of the channels and codes by 

" In unnumbered telegram of July 1 (205/142790) Schnurre reported that his 
request had been granted : the Swedish Government gave assurances that in no 
case would German or Finnish planes be fired upon but at the most warning 
shots would be fired. 

* Gen. O. G. ThOrnell. 

* Col. B. G. Nordenskibld. 
" Not identified. 

10 A new arrangement regarding German transit flights over Swedish territory 
was concluded on Sept. 12, 1941. See document No. 319. 



48 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

which transmission is to be effected. The closed circuit coded tele- 
type of this Legation seems to be the best method of transmission; 
reciprocal exchange of weather information might be a matter for 
consideration. 

B. Bequest study of question and decision whether weather reports 
from this office are actually still necessary. 11 

Air Attache 18 
Wied 



11 No reply to this request has been found in the flies of the Foreign Ministry. 

12 Col. J. P. Petersen. 



No. 43 

205/142767-70 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry u 
Telegram 

most urgent Stookholm, June 29, 1941 — 2:56 p. m. 

No. 791 of June 29 Received June 29 — 4:45 p. m. 

For OKM. 
Subject : Wishes of the Navy respecting Sweden. 

After Minister Schnurre created the political prerequisite, the nego- 
tiations on the wishes of the German Navy 2 have been brought 
to a close. For these negotiations the Swedish Government had des- 
ignated the Staff of the Commander in Chief of the Swedish Armed 
Forces. As has already been reported, 3 the positive attitude of the 
Swedish Government and Navy, also in military matters, found ex- 
pression during the conferences, which were characterized by full 
understanding for the situation by the Swedish side. 

It is obvious that the Swedish public is daily becoming more aware 
of the importance of the decisive decision by the Eiksdag and that 
these ideas are popular not only in the armed forces but also in other 
circles of the population. There must also be no doubt, however, 
that this change of Swedish public opinion is being facilitated by the 
Scandinavian idea and in good part can be attributed to the announce- 
ment of Finland's entry into the war against Russia. 4 

Swedish desire to cooperate as a matter of fact with Germany in 
the military field found expression in the instruction issued with the 

1 Typed marginal note at the end of the document : "Forwarded by the Tele- 
graph Office to OKM by closed circuit coded teletype. June 29." 

* The letter of the OKM of J une 18 to the Foreign Ministry which formulated 
the specific requests of the German Navy has not been found in the files of the 
German Foreign Ministry. 

See vol. xn of this series, document No. 668, footnote 1. 
' See document No. 8. footnote 4. 

* See document No. 15. 



JUNE 1941 49 

aid of the Government to the effect that with the elimination of the 
Defense Ministry which is under parliamentary control [parlamen- 
tarischen Verteidigungs ministeriums] which is competent for the 
armed forces Attaches accredited to Sweden, all military questions 
for the duration of the hostilities in the east are to be settled directly 
through the armed forces Attaches with the Staff of the Commander 
in Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces and the three branches of 
the service. 

In particular the following is to be reported concerning the Ger- 
man naval wishes, on the basis of the letter B.No.l.Skl. ( JC) 001103/- 
41 Op.Chefs. of June 18, 1941, from the High Command of the 
Navy to the Foreign Ministry: 8 1. Swedish mine field, a.) Block- 
ing of passage west of the Aland Islands; the Swedish Navy is will- 
ing at any time to close the passage with an effective mine field as 
soon as a time is given for this by the German side. The wish was 
expressed that this mining be undertaken as soon as possible. Kef- 
erence is made to telegraphic report No. 723 of June 23 from Minister 
Schnurre to the Foreign Ministry 8 as well as telegram No. 1420 g. 
of June 24 from the Naval Attache 7 to the OKM. 8 b.) Mine field 
connected on the west with the German mine field at Oland. The 
Swedish mine field was laid on June 28 in accordance with the 
wishes of the German Naval War Staff. The announcement of warn- 
ing to shipping was issued on June 29. The High Command of the 
Navy received the text of the announcement by telephone from the 
Naval Attache, No. 1454 of June 28, 1941. The gap in the Swedish 
Oland field is being guarded. Details regarding emphasis [zoning] s 
and pilot service are contained in the announcement of warning to 
shipping. 

According to a decision of the Crown Council on June 28, 1941, 
passage through the gap in the mine field has been closed to warships 
of all nations, so that the German request for refusal of passage to 
warships of the U.S.S.R. has therewith been complied with. The 
Crown Council decision amending the Constitution will probably be 
published on June 30, 1941. For German warships see below under 
"Treatment of German naval forces". 

2. Protection of territorial waters. The maintenance of shipping 
traffic in Swedish territorial waters under the protection of Swedish 
warships was recognized as the main task of the Swedish Navy as a 
matter of c ourse. The Swedish Navy, whose floating forces have so 

* See footnote 2. 

6 Document No. 8. 

*l.t. Comdr. P. von Wahlert. 

and T footaote a f 6 to the ° KM iaS n0t be6Q f ° nnd ' See ' h0wever ' lament No. 8 
err^for G 'SnuS» ^^ " Betonune " whIch a PPa«*tly is a typographical 

682-905 — 64 9 



50 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

far mainly been employed in the patrol service to protect the Swedish 
territorial waters, has announced the first regular convoy service 
for June 30, for the time being in the region of the Gulf of Bothnia, 
At the proper time the German ships still detained or only sailing 
in the inter-island waters can join these convoys depending on the 
safety from enemy action to be decided upon by the Naval War Staff. 
The German request to prevent the possibility that enemy subma- 
rines utilize the Swedish inter-island waters as a base or refuge is 
taken care of by the stipulation in the Swedish Constitution according 
to which both the inner and the outer territorial waters are blocked 
to submarines of other nations. Exceptions can be brought about 
only through diplomatic channels (Swedish constitutional compila- 
tion of 1938, No. 187, par. 2) . German naval forces see below. 

For other non-German and non-Finnish surface naval forces the 
inner territorial waters are blocked in the same way as for submarines. 
For the outer territorial waters there will be, in accordance with the 
neutrality policy of Sweden as stressed in her foreign relations, no 
publication of a blockade, which would be contrary to the stipulations 
of international law. Assurance was given, however, that if Russian 
naval forces should cross the borderline of the territorial waters they 
would be forced away and prevented from remaining there. The 
Naval Attache is of the opinion that owing to the particularly out- 
spoken dislike of Russia in the Swedish Navy this measure will be 
carried out emphatically and the German request will thus also be 
complied with. . 

3. Treatment of German naval forces. The wish expressed in the 
letter of the Naval War Staff, that German naval forces not be in- 
terned when they exceed the period of stay in Swedish territorial 
waters permitted by international law, will be complied with. As- 
sistance too was promised in case of need. The Swedish side desires 
that German naval forces entering Swedish territorial waters (even 
if the time period is not exceeded) be unmistakably recognizable as 
German warships with the aid of special agreements to be arranged 
between the two navies. A special telegram on this subject with the 
Swedish proposal will follow." Questions arising in connection with 
entrance into Swedish territorial waters and in connection with ex- 
ceeding the period of stay are not to be settled through diplomatic or 
political channels, but on the spot in each case by the commanders or 
commandants on the two sides. The wish was likewise expressed that 
all matters belonging to this area be handled between the two navies. 
This report has been checked with Minister Schnurre. 

Naval Attache 81 g. Kdos 
Wied 



10 Not found. 



JUNE 1941 51 

No. 44 

329/105547 — 48 

Unsigned Memorandum 

Special Train, June 29, 1941. 

Instructions of the Foreign Minister for the newly appointed Minister 
Dr. von Hentig to Kabul, Afghanistan. 1 

1. Ascertainment of the English strength and positions 

a. in Afghanistan itself, 

b. in India. 

2. Consolidation of the German position 

a. with respect to the Afghan Government, 

b. with respect to the English Government, 

c. with respect to the Russian Government, 

by coordinating, among other things, all instruction and Abwehr 
officers on the spot, doctors and teachers in our schools, engineers of 
the Todt Organization, and organizations of the nationalist circles in 
Afghanistan in order to employ them within the country or, if neces- 
sary, against the government. Coordination of the local intelligence 
services of all agencies operating abroad. 

3. Contact with the frontier tribes and their nationalist leaders. 
Establishment of communications with India in order to obtain news 
and exert influence politically and by means of propaganda. 

4. Observation of the military measures taken by the English in 
Baluchistan and along the Iranian border. 

5. Observation of and support for the national independence move- 
ments in Iran and Afghanistan, particularly in so far as these are 
connected and cooperate with one another. 

1 Hentig actually did not assume this post The reason may have been opposi- 
tion to his appointment on the part of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP. 
See vol. vm of this series, document No. 470, footnote 7. 

No. 45 

173/84437 

The Foreign Minister to the Representative of the Foreign Ministry 
With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands 

Telegram 

No. 563 of June 30 Special Train, June 30, 1941—12 : 15 a. m. 

from the Special Train Received Berlin, June 30 — 12 : 45 a. m. 
No. 229 of June 30 from the Foreign Ministry Sent June 30. 

RAM 271/R 

From almost all the countries of Europe the wish to participate 
in the fight against the Soviet Union by providing volunteer contin- 



52 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

gents has been communicated to us. This wish will be granted by 

Germany. 

After consultation with Reich Commissar Seyss-Inquart please 
send me a telegraphic report on whether the desire to provide such 
volunteer contingents has also been expressed by the Dutch, particu- 
larly by Dutch organizations such as, for example, the Mussert 
movement. I ask you, however, not to undertake anything yourself 
with the Dutch in this matter for the time being. 1 

RlBBENTROP 



'In his reply telegram No. 206 of June 30 (173/^438), Bene .reported that 
from the 8,000 men who had lately come from the NSB (Mussert) and NSNAP 
(Cppard) movements, 4,000 were in the SS division Wiklng and an equal 
number of members of the NSKK were in other units at the eastern front 
He also reported that some Netherlander had expressed a desire to organize 
a Netherlands Legion. 

No. 46 

118/66852-03 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Croatia 

Telegram 
No. 624 from Special On the Train, June 29, 1941. 

Train Heinrich R Received Berlin, June 30—12 : 15 a. m. 

No. 549 from the Foreign Ministry Sent June 30. 

Biiro RAM 272/R 
For the Minister. 

1. In a letter to the Fuhrer * the Poglavnik has requested that 
Croatia be also permitted to participate in the struggle against Soviet 
Russia by supplying a contingent of volunteers. 

Please tell the Poglavnik that the Fuhrer gladly accepts the offer 
and will also inform him of this in a personal letter of reply. 2 The 
execution of the plan would then have to be settled through the usual 
official channels. 

2. As regards the invitation to Field Marshal Kvaternik, 3 please 
tell him that I would be particularly happy to see him soon, but that 
I could not receive him as yet at Headquarters, in view of the war 
situation at the moment; and as soon as this was possible I would 
have a communication sent him through you concerning the time 
of the visit. 

RlBBENTROP 



•Senf on UI S l?^5/KU). In this letter Hitler Informed Pavelic 
that Croatian volunteers would be organized within each of the three branches 

° f tSSft 512 of June 23 (116/66919) Kintelen informed the Legation 
in Zagreb that on the occasion of Croatia's accession to the Tripartite Pact 
in vlnice on June 15, Ribbentrop had invited Kvatemik to a visit in Germany. 



JUNE 1941 53 

No. 47 

191/138777 

Circular of the State Secretary 1 

Telegram 

most tjbgent Berlin, June 30, 1941. 

MultexNo.434 

"With the recognition of Wang Ching-wei we do not intend to break 

off automatically our relations with the Chungking Government, but 

want to wait for the time being to see how Chiang Kai-shek reacts to 

such a recognition. Please inform the government at your post 

accordingly. 

Confirm receipt. 

Weizsackek 



1 Sent to the Embassies in Italy and Spain, and to the Legations in Hungary, 
Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovakia. 

No. 48 

191/138784-85 

The State Secretary to the Field Office in Chungking 

Telegram 
host urgent Berlin, June 30, 1941. 

TOP SECRET Pol. Vni 951. 

No. 47 

For the Chief of the Office personally. 

I. The Chinese Ambassador 1 called on me on June 28 and told me 
it was believed in Chungking that the Japanese Government was 
trying to put through recognition of Wang Ching-wei in Berlin and 
Home. The Ambassador recalled that he had always had instructions 
in case the question of recognition of Wang Ching-wei should come up 
here to point to the statement by his Foreign Minister on November 30, 
1940.* The Foreign Minister had stated at that time that the Chinese 
Government would consider recognition to be a very unfriendly 
act and would be forced to break off relations. The Ambassador 
pointed to the efforts made by him and his Government to main- 
tain the German-Chinese relations so far as possible in consid- 
eration of the time after the war, when the natural, 100-year-old, 
excellent relationship between Germany and China would have to be 
restored automatically. The Ambassador described with emotion the 
material and ideal values which were at stake on both sides. He 



1 Chen CMeh. 

* For test of this statement of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui, see 
Foreign Relations of the United, States, Japan, 19S1-1941, vol II, pp. 122-123. 



54 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

spoke of the patient Chinese character that clung closely to friendships 
but also remembered for a long time if its feelings were injured. 

I replied to Mr. Chen that the Japanese Government had repeatedly 
brought up the question of recognition of Wang Ching-wei with us, 
but that at the moment I was not in a position to say more on the 
subject. If in case of recognition the Chinese Government should 
resort to the measures mentioned in the statement by the Chinese 
Foreign Minister, it would have to make the decision itself. Inci- 
dentally, the 100-year German-Chinese friendship had experienced 
a breach in 1917 quite without our doing. Referring to the tremendous 
German successes I finally stressed that those who intended to commit 
themselves definitely to the Anglo-Saxon cause were at any rate badly 
advised. 

Mr. Chen received my statements with understanding; indeed, 
the whole discussion was calm, although the conversation affected him 
very much. 3 

II. Please do not of your own accord notify the Government at your 
post of the recognition of Wang Ching-wei which will take place 
tomorrow. However, if you should be approached regarding the 
recognition, please conduct the conversation by making use of the 
foregoing ideas.* 

III. The same text is being sent to Tokyo and Peking. 

Weizsacker 



a The foregoing portion of this instruction la a somewhat abbreviated version 
of Weizsftcker's memorandum of June 28 (191/138760-62) recording his con- 
versation with the Chinese Ambassador. , 

•In telegram No. 51 of July 1 (191/138806) Weizsacker Instructed the Mission 
in Chungking "to observe the greatest possible reserve toward Chungking 
government circles" and for the time being "not to ask for talks with leading 
people in the Government." 

No. 49 

1000/305670-71 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran 

Telegram * 
No [351] Berlin, June [30,] 1941. 

[Pol VII 3532 g.] 

With reference to your telegram No. 331 of May 4. a 
It had been intended to send a special deputy to Tehran to carry 
on the discussions with the Egyptian Ambassador there. 3 In con- 



"The file copy of this telegram is a draft; the date, telegram number, and 
file number have been supplied from the reply telegram, document No. 66. 

2 Vol. xn of this series, document No. 448. 

■According to Woermann's memorandum, TJ.St.S.Pol. 589 of June 26 (1000/- 
305068-69) , the original Intention had been to send Hentlg to Tehran ostensibly 
for the purpose of economic negotiations with the Iranian Government but 
actually in order to continue there the discussions with the Egyptian Ambassador, 
Zoulflkar Pasha. 



JUNE 1841 55 

sideration of the situation that has developed in Iraq in the meantime 
we do not consider the time to be appropriate for more detailed dis- 
cussions. I therefore request you to carry on the discussions with the 
Egyptian Ambassador yourself and to ask him in the first place how 
the King had received the Fiihrer's message * and whether there were 
any further details concerning a continuation of the discussions, in 
particular whether there were any specific wishes for cooperation. 

Furthermore please point out in the talks that the group of Ali 
Maher, Azzam, and Azis Al Masri has evidently been recognized and 
treated there by the English as opponents, 5 and ask in what man- 
ner the aspirations represented by them can be carried on. Also 
please ask for information about the fate of the two. 

Report by wire. 9 

RlBBENTROP 



* Vol, xii of this series, document No. 427. 

"These references probably are to All Maher, Egyptian Minister President, 
August 1939-June 1940, and to Abdur-Rahman Azzam, and Aziz Ali al-Misri, 
who had served under Ali Maher as Minister of Social Affairs and Chief of 
Staff, respectively. AI-Misrl tried to leave Egypt at the time of the fighting in 
Iraq In May 1941 and waa courtmartialed and interned. 

* Document No. 66. 



No. 50 

F19/396-403 

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini 1 

Fuhrer's Headquarters, June 30, 1941. 
Duoe : First of all, please let me thank you cordially for your last 
letter. 8 I am overjoyed that our views in the great questions affecting 
the destinies of our people coincide so completely. I believe that the 
past week — from a political point of view — has given striking con- 
firmation to our opinions. What I myself at the first moment did not 
even dare to hope for has happened. Large parts of Europe have 
been roused from a truly lethargic disinterestedness. Many countries 
now find themselves obliged in this, our battle against Bolshevism, 
to take an attitude that will be the beginning of a better understand- 
ing of our common policy which, in the last analysis, is a truly 
European one. 

'In telegram No. 1481 of July 2 (100/65276) Mackensen reported that the 
letter, which came by special plane, had been delivered to Mussolini at 11 : 15 
a. m. 

In telegram No. 1483 of the same date (B12/B001033-34) Mackensen re- 
ported that Mussolini read the letter aloud in his presence, expressing his gen- 
eral satisfaction. He made the remark that he could send three more divisions 
to the eastern front if they were desired, and he promised a reply at once. See 
document No. 62. 

1 Of June 23, document No. 7. 



56 



DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 



The struggle which has now been raging for a week, Duce, already 
makes it possible for me to give you a general picture in a few strokes 
and to tell you of our experiences. 

The most important realization that I and my generals have gained 
is, despite all our suspicions, the positively alarming one, Duce, that 
if this battle had not come now, but only a few months, not to speak 
of a year later, we would— however horrible the thought may be- 
have lost the war! 

The Russian Army was about to complete a troop concentration 
with resources far in excess of what we knew or had even considered 
possible. For 8 days now one armored brigade after another has been 
attacked, beaten or annihilated— and despite this there seems to be 
almost no decrease either in their numbers or in the ferocity of their 
attack. Only since June 27 have we had the feeling that things are 
easing up, that the foe is slowly tiring, and that in spots there are 
signs of disintegration. Like the English with their Mark II infantry 
tank the Russians came here with a surprise of which we unfortunately 
had no idea at all. A monster tank, weighing some 52 tons, with 
the best of armor, 75 mm. thick, a 7.6 cm. gun, and three machine 
guns. Without our new 5 cm. antitank gun, the 8.8 antiaircraft gun, 
as well as the new armor-piercing grenades of our field artillery, 
even we would be powerless against this tank which is surely the 
strongest at present in existence. 

The Russians had stationed two huge offensive armies in the large 
pocket of Bialystok as well as in that of Lwow. Numerous motorized 
and armored units were assigned to the infantry divisions, almost all 
of which, however, had their own armored units. We executed a 
flank attack on these two armies after breaking through extremely 
deep fortifications, which in some places are hardly inferior to those of 
the West Wall. The battles that have been taking place here for the 
past 8 days are among the most difficult that German troops have 
thus far had to experience. The Russians fight with a truly stupid 
fanaticism. On the first day there were hardly any prisoners at all. 
It was a struggle to the death in which numerous Russian officers and 
especially commissars in the end escaped threatened capture by suicide. 
Pillbox crews whose position was hopeless chose to blow themselves 
up rather than surrender. The Russian counterattacks did not take 
place in accordance with any general plan, but rather with the primi- 
tive brutality of an animal that sees itself trapped and then in wild 
rage beats against the walls of its cage. These soldiers, who are very 
stolid to begin with, have, in addition, been insanely incited. Their 
commissars tell them that if they are captured, they will be tortured 
and then killed anyway. They therefore fight to the last ditch, and if 
the worst comes, prefer their own death to the torments they have been 



JUNE 1941 



57 



made to believe in. Only in the last few days of battle has this morale 
begun to waver and the number of prisoners and deserters is now, to be 
sure, increasing by the hour. 

Almost all Russian counterattacks are made with tanks only. After 
being attacked by 100 to 200 tanks, which individual divisions have 
often shot up in one day, the latter are again attacked by new tanks 
the next morning. I believe, Duce, that Europe was threatened with 
a danger here, of the gravity of which no one, unfortunately, had any 
proper conception. 

The Russian Air Force is bad. Fanatically as the Russian fights 
as a land soldier, he has always been inept as a seaman, and apparently 
now also as a flier. As far as the Russian Air Force is concerned, the 
German fliers have wrought terrific havoc even in the first 7 days. 
Here the superiority is now not only unmistakable but absolute. Rus- 
sian planes still try only occasionally to reach the front. In general, 
every such flight is also the last. 

The Russian infantry are thrown into the battle in tremendous 
numbers, regardless of the sacrifice involved. Machine guns, mortars, 
infantry guns, and hand grenades cause terrible losses. Despite this 
the attacks are repeated again and again at very short intervals. 

Russian leadership is, on the whole, bad. One exception to this, at 
least in the first few days, was the Russian Southern Army. The 
leadership of the individual divisions or regiments is not in accordance 
with any military standards. The training of the so-called officers is 
in no way comparable to the requirements in European nations. 
Nevertheless it is impossible to tell whether in the course of years an 
improvement might not perhaps have taken place in this respect also. 
But in view of the brutality of this type of warfare, the value of the 
individual is not so important from the very outset as the danger of 
the instrument in itself. This danger lies in the tremendous number 
of units, the enormous development of the tank arm, the stolid fanati- 
cism of the individual soldier, as well as the complete indifference with 
which the leaders themselves sacrifice men and materials. 

When I now report quite briefly on the outcome of the struggles, 
Duce, naturally only the external gains are to be seen at the moment, 
while the internal state of the now battered Russian units still remains 
concealed from us for the present. After an 8-day campaign we have 
the following situation : 

North of the Pripet Marshes— these divide the zone of operations 
for the time being into the northern half, the Baltic States, and White 
Russia, and the southern half, Galicia and Bessarabia — the enemy's 
armies massed near the border are already completely beaten. In the 
pockets formed along the front of the Central Army Group two armies 
are enclosed by the rapid advance of armored wedges between Bialy- 



58 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

stok and Minsk, "while other mobile forces are already pushing to the 
east over the Berezina. 

In front of the Northern Army Group the enemy, after having 
suffered heavy losses between the border and the Drina, is trying to 
save the remnants of his northern armies through a retreat to the 
northeast. Daugavpils and Eiga are in the hands of the German 
armored forces. 

In southern Finland Field Marshal Mannerheim, to whom I am also 
sending a German division via Sweden, 3 is deployed on both sides of 
Lake Ladoga, ready to attack starting July 2. In central and north- 
ern Finland German-Finnish forces have the mission to attack east- 
ward and block off Murmansk, which is of importance as a launching 
point for possible English or American assistance. 

South of the Pripet Marshes the armored group of the Southern 
Army Group is advancing hi the general direction of Zhitomir, while 
the enemy on both sides of Lwow is trying to escape the threat^ of 
encirclement by withdrawing to the east. It may well be the intention 
of the Soviet Eussians to reach their old line of fortifications and 
there to put up resistance. I therefore plan— in order to facilitate 
the frontal drive from the west— to have the Eleventh Army, which 
is concentrated in Eumania, together with the attached Rumanian 
forces, attack the line of Eed fortifications from the rear, over the 
Pruth, early in July. 

On the Carpathian front, Hungary is preparing to advance with 
a mobile corps against Kolomyya and Stanislawow. Advance units 
have already crossed the border. 

The enemy's air force units have already sustained such losses that 
our supremacy in the air is complete. TJie Luftwaffe can therefore 
be withdrawn in increasing measure from fighting the enemy's air 
force and utilized for direct support of the Army. 

The Eed Navy has so far remained passive both in the Baltic and 
in the Black Sea. 

I accept with thanks your generous offer, Duce, to dispatch an 
Italian corps and Italian fighter pilots to the eastern war theater. 
The fact that our allied armies are marching side by side precisely 
against the Bolshevist world enemy seems to me a symbol of the war 
of liberation that you and I have waged. 

As I understand the arrangements between our two transport de- 
partments, the transports are to be carried out via the Brenner- 
Innsbruck-Salzburg-Linz-Vienna-Bratislava-Budapest line and are 
to discharge in eastern Hungary. Notification of the beginning of the 
transport movement should be made at least 3 days in advance because 
of the preparations necessary in Germany. The place of commit- 



1 See document No. 16. 



JUNE 1941 



59 



ment— probably within the framework of the German Eleventh 
Army — must be decided in accordance with the development of the 
situation. I shall take the liberty, Duce, of communicating to you 
more detailed suggestions on this point at the proper time. 

The following seems to me to be of special significance : The trans- 
portation routes out of Kumania are very much congested at present 
because of the Rumanian and Hungarian troop concentrations. I 
have notified both countries that the deliveries of Rumanian oil, which 
are of vital importance to the Axis Powers, must nevertheless continue 
to be made according to schedule. Our transport chiefs have already 
taken this point of view into account in their joint handling of the 
Italian troop transports. 

During the eastern campaign too, the war against England will be 
waged with adequate commitment of forces. The German Navy is 
hardly being used against Soviet Russia in the Baltic Sea, which we 
have sealed off. Above all, however, the siege of England is to be 
intensified by an appropriate commitment of the Luftwaffe even 
during the eastern operations. 

And now, Duce, permit me to express one more thought in con- 
clusion. I have considered whether it would not perhaps be psy- 
chologically right if, in the course of this struggle, the two of us 
could meet sometime, somewhere at the front. The most suitable place 
would, of course, be my own quarters or one of the places provided for 
it, for the conditions exist there for the apparatus from which it is 
very hard for me to absent myself — for any length of time, at any 
rate. In matters of transportation and communication I am, unfor- 
tunately, a slave of technology. But I believe that — if it could be done 
sometime — quite apart from the personal exchange of ideas, the psy- 
chological effects for both our peoples would also be only beneficial. 

I believe furthermore that this would also be properly appreciated 
by the rest of the world. 

I close this long letter by greeting you most cordially, Duce, as an 
old comrade.* 

" No typed signature appears on this version of the letter which is the film of 
a carbon copy of the original. 

No, 51 

265/173046 

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department 

Berlin, June 30, 1941. 
Ha. Pol. VII 2419. 

At a luncheon on June 28, to which the Turkish Counselor of Em- 
bassy Alkend had invited me, I was told by him that he had instruc- 
tions from Ambassador Gerede to ask me whether the Turkish 



60 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY 

Embassy could be of any help to us in the preparations for the planned 
German-Turkish trade agreement. 1 I replied to M. Alkend that our 
preparations for that agreement were only being started now and that 
for that reason it seemed to me premature to consider the substantive 
aspects of that obliging offer of cooperation. 

Alkend requested that I inform the Foreign Minister regarding the 
offer of cooperation of his Ambassador and let them know through 
him (Alkend) what our position was. 

In that connection, M. Alkend told me of the deep impression which 
Ambassador Gerede had received at a recent interview with the 
Fiihrer, when he presented to the Fiihrer in accordance with his in- 
structions a personal letter from the Turkish State President. 2 On 
that occasion the Fiihrer had very strongly stressed the fact, without 
any reference to political considerations, that close economic coopera- 
tion between Germany and Turkey was both necessary and possible. 
At the same time he had expressed the readiness of the Reich Govern- 
ment to conclude at the earliest possible date a new trade agreement 
with Turkey covering the widest possible range. 

In view of this attitude on the Fiihrer's part, the Turkish Ambas- 
sador Gerede in turn was anxious to do everything possible to pave 
the way for a genuinely satisfactory solution concerning German- 
Turkish economic cooperation. He was prepared to adopt as his 
own the German wishes regarding the development to be given to the 
German-Turkish trade. He would appreciate it if he could receive a 
German formula to this effect. 

I assured M. Alkend that I would present the Ambassador's pro- 
posal and would come back to the inquiry. 

Ripken 

'According to a WeizsScker memorandum of June 30 (2153/469462-64) the 
provisional economic agreements with Turkey were due to expire soon. For 
this reason as well as for political reasons the opening of new economic nego- 
tiations around July 20 was advisable. See further, document No. 294. 

1 See vol. xir of thts series, Editors' Note, p. 1052. 

No. 52 

260/170063-64 

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister 

Teletype Message 

Berlin, July 1, 1941. 
Sent July 1—1 : 40 p. m. 1 
The Finnish Minister just transmitted to me a letter in a sealed en- 
velope personally addressed to the Fiihrer from the Finnish President. 
The letter will be transmitted by the Minister's Secretariat in the 
quickest possible manner. 

1 The date and time of the dispatch are supplied from a marginal note. 



JULY 1041 61 

The Minister delivered to me at the same time a copy of the letter's 
content which reads as follows : 

"Your Excellency: While I thank you for the cordial letter ad- 
dressed to me, 2 in which you recall tne memory of the friendship, 
sealed in blood, between Finland and Germany, I should like to give 
the assurance at the same time that the common fate with Germany 
is felt more strongly here than ever before at a time when our soldiers 
stand side by side as comrades in arms to ward off the threatening 
danger from Finland's traditional enemy. 

"Your message that, come what may, Germany would never desert 
Finland, finally guarantees a successful conclusion of Finland's long 
fight for independence. I am sincerely gladdened by the fact that the 
heroes of the mighty German Army are, in this battle, the brothers- in- 
arms of the Finnish warrior. At the same time I express the firm hope 
that this final battle against Bolshevism will guarantee the prosperity 
and the peace of the new Europe. Yours, etc. Risto Ryti." 

Weizsacker 

a Hitler's letter to Ryti has not been found. In telegram No. 400 of June 23 
(260/170040) Blticher reported, "Copy of FUbrer's letter to President Ryti has 
been delivered immediately. M. Eyti acknowledged contents with satisfaction." 
See also John H. Wuorinen, editor, Finland and World War II, 1939-1944 (New 
York, 1948), pp. 111-112. 

No. 53 

82/00234-37 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

Telegram 

most tjkgbnt Etjropa, July 1, 1941 — 5 : 35 p. m. 

FBIORITT 

No. 634 from the Special Train Received Berlin July 1—6 : 40 p. m. 
No. 942 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 1. 

Secret for officer in charge. 

I request that you deliver to the Foreign Minister at your post, as 
soon as you possibly can, the following telegram, which I have ad- 
dressed to him personally. The telegram should be written at your 
end on white sheets, without any letterhead, over my signature. The 
text of the telegram is as follows : 

"To His Excellency the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Matsuoka, 
Tokyo. 

Personal. 

"When Your Excellency was in Berlin we envisaged that we would 
get in touch with each other personally if occasions of special im- 
portance to the welfare of our two countries should arise. Such a 
moment has now come, and I have the honor to inform Your Excel- 
lency of the following : 

(1) As a result of the heavy blows dealt by the Wehrmacht it has 
been possible in the first week of the German-Eussian campaign to 
break the back of the Russian Army, A considerable part of the best 



62 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

combat divisions of the enemy has partly been destroyed, partly cap- 
tured, and partly so battered that the remnants will hardly operate 
effectively any more during this war. The enemy air force is almost 
completely smashed, so that on the main battle front German air 
supremacy has been complete since yesterday. A vast amount of ma- 
terial has been captured or destroyed ; the German army communiques 
give specific figures for this. 

In the meantime the German armies are driving farther and farther 
to the east all along the front. I have no doubt that the impending 
operations of the German army will destroy the enemy forces still 
engaged in battle in the same manner, and it is to be expected that 
Russian resistance, in the entire European area of the Soviet Union, 
will be broken — perhaps in only a few weeks. As I have already 
informed Your Excellency a few days ago through Ambassador Ott, 1 
this in turn will most probably lead before long to a final collapse of 
the Bolshevist regime. 

(2) These historically unparalleled military successes, which are 
due primarily to the bravery of the German soldiers and which have 
eliminated the great military threat to which Europe was exposed, 
create for Germany's leadership the obligation to bring about in the 
future a political situation in the East that will once and for all pre- 
vent a repetition of such occurrences. Moreover, it is our conviction 
that so long as Russia remains as the germ cell of Bolshevism, neither 
Europe nor East Asia nor the world as a whole will ever have tran- 
quillity. Germany is resolved to take the action called for by the 
realization of these facts. In this, she hopes for Japan's cooperation, 
as a definitive settlement of the Russian question can be brought about 
most quickly and effectively by Japan and Germany acting jointly. 

(3) The impending collapse of the Russian's main military power, 
and thereby presumably of the Bolshevik regime itself, offers Japan 
the unique opportunity to free herself also from the Russian threat 
and give the Japanese empire the security in the north which, is a 
necessary condition for its vitally important expansion in the south. 
It therefore seems to me that the need of the hour is for the Japanese 
Army to seize Vladivostok as soon as possible and penetrate as deeply 
toward the west as possible. The goal of these operations should be 
to have the Japanese Army in its march to the west meet the German 
troops advancing to the east halfway, even before the cold season 
sets in; then to establish a direct connection between Germany and 
Japan over Russian territory, both by way of the Trans-Siberian 
Railway and by air ; and finally to have the whole Russian question 
settled by Germany and Japan jointly in such a way as to eliminate 
for all time the Russian threat to both Germany and Japan. 

(4) Only after the Soviet Union has been defeated by Germany 
and Japan will it be possible to develop truly the actual power of the 
states joined together in the Tripartite Pact. Germany and Italy 
will thus be the absolutely dominant factor in the whole European- 
African hemisphere. They will then be in a position to intensify 
enormously their pressure on England by air raids and submarines, 
and by appropriate action to bring about the final defeat of England. 
For her part, Japan, free in the rear, will be able to employ all her 

Eower to bring about a final settlement of the problems of interest to 
er in the south. In passing, it might be mentioned that the elimina- 

1 See document No. 36. 



JULY 1941 63 

tion of the Soviet regime will of itself facilitate the settlement of 
the Chinese problems. 

As far as America is concerned, I hope that after Russia has been 
brought to her knees, the weight of the Tripartite Pact nations, 
Germany, Italy, and Japan and the powers aligned with them, which 
I hope will soon be joined by a number of other European states, will 
suffice to paralyze any tendency toward intervention in the war that 
may still arise in the United States. 

In summary I should like to say the following : 

It is my conviction that the victory of German arms in the past week 
has now given Japan the historic opportunity, which may never come 
again, to settle the Russian problem jointly with Germany and to 
free our peoples for all foreseeable time from any threat from this 
large area, whether it be of an ideologieal-political or of a military 
nature. The fact that our nations will simultaneously be able, in 
pursuance of the joint anti-Comintern policy which we have always 
followed, to strike the decisive blow for the elimination of Bolshevism, 
this archenemy of mankind, will be for the two nations and their 
leaders the classical confirmation of their common political ideas and 
their greatest claim to fame for all time. 

I believe, moreover, that the defeat of Russia will substantially 
hasten the defeat of England by the Axis Powers. This would estab- 
lish the necessary conditions for the new order in Europe and East 
Asia which our nations desire, and no one in the world, which in its 
battle against Bolshevism is already rallying with ever-increasing 
solidarity behind the Axis, will be able any longer to dispute the states 
of the Tripartite Pact the right to create a new and just world order. 
Ribbentrop." 

End of the telegram. 

Ribbentrop 



No. 54 

105/113635-37 

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I 

Berlin, July 1, 1941. 
Pol I M 2051 g. Rs. 
General Himer, German General with the Hungarian High Com- 
mand, reported to the OKW under the date of June 23 as follows : 

"On the basis of the telephone conversation with General of Artil- 
lery Jodl at 6:00 p. m. on June 22, I immediately got in touch 
with the Hungarian General -Staff. It then developed that the Hun- 
garian Chief of the General Staff i could not be reached, the Defense 
Minister 2 had gone fishing, the Regent was at a polo game on Margaret 
Island. 

"According to the Minister President's statement to the Minister 
today, the members of the Government could not be assembled because 
it was Sunday. Only General Laszlo, a who is still very much in 
need of consideration, could as always be reached and was ready to 

* Gen. Henrlk Werth. 

' Gen. Karl Bartha. 

'Chief of the Operations Group of the Hungarian General Staff. 



64 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

lend every support. General Laszlo passed on my communications 
to General Werth that very evening. I asked for a personal talk 
with General Werth, which unfortunately took place only today from 
12 ; 50 to 1 : 15 p, m., as the Chief of the General Staff went to the 
country in the morning. In this very plain and emphatic conversa- 
tion between the Chief of the General Staff and me, I once again 
personally transmitted the view of the OKW and of General Haider, 
that every support by Hungary was most welcome to Germany.* 
However, no demand would be made. I stressed in particular the 
necessity that the German transport traffic to Rumania must not 
be disturbed by any Hungarian movements that might be made. Gen- 
eral Werth said that he did not know what was in the Fiihrers 
letter to the Regent. 8 If it did not particularly mention the request 
for participation in the fight against the Soviet Union, the politicians 
would hardly go along. 

"He regretted that no hint had been given by political quarters 
as early as 4 weeks ago. Then they would now stand ready with 
an army and could have crossed the frontier with it yesterday. At 
his instigation, about 10 days ago a political inquiry had been made 
regarding Hungarian participation, but the Fiihrer did not seem to 
want to let Hungary participate. General Werth stressed again and 
again the lack of political preparation of the matter, whereupon I 
replied that now the soldiers were speaking. 

"I again pointed to my personal view, which I had set forth to him 
some time ago. I rejected the Chief of the General Staff's remark 
that the Fiihrer had said that Hungary had no claims on Russia 
and consequently had other tasks, pointing out that this most prob- 
ably involved a remark by Ambassador Oshima. Whether it was 
actually made in that form is not certain. Furthermore, General 
Werth pointed out that General Haider had asked on June 19 that 
nothing be done so that Russia would not be alarmed prematurely. 
Now, in Worth's opinion, any intervention by Hungary came too late 
in any case. In answer to this I stressed that it was still a little 
before 12: 00 o'clock, and Hungary could still participate in the cru- 
sade against Bolshevism in the otherwise solid front. 

"In the course of the conversation I had the impression that Gen- 
eral Werth is after all not equal to the greatness of the hour. The 
result of the talk was that my statements were passed on to the 
Government. After talking with the Chief of the General Staff 
and the Defense Minister, the Minister President went to see the 
Regent at Kenderes. The decision is still to be taken." 

Supplement by the Military Attache: 8 

"In oral statements to me General Himer stressed the urgency with 
which he had given expression to the views of the OKW in the 
conversation with General Werth. 

"General Werth had expressed astonishment that Rumania and 
Finland were informed at an early date concerning the planned 
operations, but not Hungary." 

Kramarz 

* Tho Haider Diary has the following entry for June 23 : "12 : 00 : Conversation 
with Himer : We accept gratefully any participation by Hungary if It does not 
impair our transport communications with Rumania." 

* Vol. sii of this series, document No. 661. 

* Col. G. Krappe, 



JULY 1841 65 

No. 55 

93/103765 

Memorandum by the State Secretary l 

St.S. 446 Berlin, July 1, 1941. 

The Hungarian Minister again complained to me today that life in 
the Banat was at present being made difficult for the inhabitants of 
Hungarian ethnic origin. Great numbers of such inhabitants of the 
Banat were applying to the Hungarian mission in Belgrade so that 
their transfer to Hungary may be facilitated. 

I replied to Minister Sztojay that as it happened I had spoken just 
yesterday with our representative in Belgrade, who was here for 
the present, concerning the repeated Hungarian complaints about 
the Banat. In this connection Herr Benzler had told me two things : 

1. The Hungarians were already engaged in a quiet deportation of 
Serbs from the Banat 2 to Old Serbia. 

2. It had been ascertained by dispatching a member of our mission 
in Belgrade to the Banat and was confirmed by the signatures of 
inhabitants of the Banat who were Volksdeutsche or of Hungarian 
ethnic origin that the latter were not doing badly in the Banat but 
very well. However, I did not yet have the pertinent report. 

Incidentally, I asked M. Sztojay why the Hungarian representative 
in Belgrade did not get in touch directly with Herr Benzler, in order 
to spare the two Governments the conversations resulting from his 
reports. Perhaps it would also be expedient if Sztojay spoke with 
Herr Benzler while the latter was here, for after all he was well 
acquainted with him. 3 



1 The file copy of this memorandum Is not signed. 

2 Apparently this ought to read "BaCka." Cf . footnote 3. 

*In a memorandum of July 3 (93/103767-70) Benzler recorded having had a 
detailed discussion with Sztojay regarding conditions in the Banat and Backa 
in accordance with Weizsacker's suggestions. The topics discussed were: (1) 
The deportation of Serbs from the BaCka ; (2) Repeated Hungarian complaints 
about alleged unfavorable treatment of the Hungarian national group in the 
Banat; (3) Interference by Hungarian officials and military in the Banat con- 
trary to existing agreements. 

Weizsacker's memorandum St.S. 462 of July 7 (93/103778) records a complaint 
by SztSjay regarding administrative measures in the Banat tending to consolidate 
Serbian administration. Weizs'aeker asked if Sztojay doubted the German 
promise regarding the Banat; if not, he would have to admit that the psychologi- 
cal moment for a declaration regarding the transfer of the Banat to Hungary 
had not arrived. 

In a memorandum of July 9, St.S. 446 (93/103795) Weizsacker recorded another 
demarche by Szt6jay in the matter of the Banat. On this occasion Sztojay 
emphasized, however, that his demarche did not imply "any doubts in the 
FUhrer's word regarding the Banat." 



682-905—64 10 



66 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 56 

93/103764 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

St.S. No. 444 Berlin, July 1, 1941. 

The Hungarian Minister, as he informed me today, had instructions 
to hand to the Fiihrer personally a letter from the Eegent of Hungary. 
When I explained to the Minister that the Fiihrer was at his head- 
quarters and that it was not quite simple to reach him, Sztojay gave 
up the idea of an audience and left the letter with me. It will be 
forwarded to the Foreign Minister by the Foreign Minister's Secre- 
tariat as quickly as possible. 

The letter is sealed. Sztojay was not informed with regard to its 
contents. 1 

The Minister had no instructions to make additional statements 
orally if the audience with the Fiihrer should come about. Obviously, 
he merely wished, if he were received, to advocate German-Hungarian 
solidarity also with respect to the later development of the war. 

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister (by telegraph). 
Weizsacker 

1 This letter has not been found in the German Foreign Ministry flies. Like- 
wise not found were Hitler's letter of July 3 to Horthy and Horthy's letter of 
reply which Sztojay handed to Weizsacfeer on July 7 (Welzsacker's memoran- 
dum St.S. 460 of July 7 : 93/103777). For a summary based on Hungarian docu- 
ments of what seem to be the same three letters, see C. A. Macartney, A History 
of Hungary, 1929-191,5, vol. n, pp. 30^31. 

No. 57 

F17/093-9S 

General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 1 

July 1, 1941. 

Excellency : Filled with admiration, I have followed the victorious 
operations of the German Wehrmaeht along the entire front from the 
Baltic Sea to Lw6w. 

The splendid victories on land and in the air make it apparent 
that a decisive victory is very near at hand and that the Soviet armies 
can be regarded as having been annihilated. 

In the course of these 7 days, the German and Kumanian Army 
Groups have succeeded in checking the Soviet armed forces on the 
Rumanian front and achieving air superiority, and at the same time 
have prepared the offensive which must lead to the final destruction 
of the Soviet military forces on the southern wing. 

1 The document printed is from a German test of the letter. The Rumanian 
original text Is filmed on F17/090-92. 



JULY 1941 67 

In order to assure unified command, the following Rumanian forces 
have been placed under the immediate command of the German 
Eleventh Army : 

Six divisions, three mountain brigades, three cavalry brigades, the 
armored divisions; furthermore, additional units of heavy artillery, 
antitank artillery, engineers, etc. 

In accordance with Your Excellency's directions i this army will 
carry out the main operations ; it is to attack in the general direction 
of Vinnitsa, in order to strike the Soviet forces in southern Galicia 
from the rear. 

The attack by the German Eleventh Army is to be secured on the 
right flank by the Fourth Rumanian Army with six divisions and 
one cavalry brigade, which is to attack in the general direction of 
Hu§i, Kishinev, and Dubossari, by shifting almost its entire strength 
to the left wing. 

An army group, advancing from Dobrudja, will cross the Danube 
in the region of Tulcea and drive north with two divisions in the 
attack. 

All measures have been taken for the protection of the oil fields. I 
may add that this area is no longer threatened, because the Soviet 
Air Force was vanquished at the very first moment on this front too. 

I have taken all necessary steps to insure that the petroleum prod- 
ucts are transported with the greatest possible speed. All the tank 
cars needed will be made available by me. 

I should not omit to inform Your Excellency that General Ritter 
von Schobert and I are on the best of terms and that all the require- 
ments of Army Group, Rundstedt in regard to the operations to be 
undertaken will be given full consideration. 

With confidence in final victory and the unshakable friendship 
which forever links Rumania and the Greater German Reich, I beg 
Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my highest consideration. 

General Antonesctt 



'This might refer to a letter of June 29 In which Hitler had set forth the 
task of the Rumanian forces in the operations of the Eleventh German Army 
and requested that the required Rumanian units he placed tinder the command 
of the Eleventh Army. 

For a summary of this letter see Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, Konig Carol 
und Marschall Antonesou (Wiesbaden, 1954), pp. 134-135. No record of Hitler's 
letter has been found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry. 



68 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 58 

222/149772 

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most urgent Bucharest, July 2, 1941—1 :10pm 

TOP 6ECRET deceived July 2-1 : 38 p.m.* 

No. 1953 of July 2 * 

For the Foreign Minister. 

The report of the advance of Hungarian troops in the direction 
south of Lw6w impels General Antanescu to make the following 
request : 

1. He again asks that a common frontier between Germany and 
Jttumama be established. 2 J 

2. He asks that we avoid employing Rumanian and Hungarian 
troops side by side, in order to avoid incidents. 

KlLLINGER 

USOp.mT n ° te: " Transmitted t0 tUe Special Train as No. 2114. July 2, 
* See vol. sii of this series, document No. 416. 

No. 59 

205/142791-92 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most urgent Stockholm, July 2, 1941—4 : 45 p m 

No. 822 of July 2 Received July 2-6 : 30 p. m. 

With reference to our telegram No. 769 of June 27, last paragraph. 1 

Today the Swedish Government gave me a list of its wishes in regard 

to deliveries of German war equipment, namely : 

1. Licences for airplane engines (1600-1700 horsepower) and 
delivery ot the machine tools necessary for starting production. De- 
tails are known to Mimsterialrat Midler of the Reich Air Ministry. 

2. Delivery of Me[sserschmitt] 110's. 

a ' ™ liv ?^ of Twin Was P en g in es from stocks in France. 

4. 1 he delivery to Sweden of tanks and the provision of German 
licences in return for which Sweden will provide spare parts for 
tanks— a, transaction with which Daimler-Benz and the OKW are 
already familiar. 

5. Armor for tanks, namely, 1,500 tons of 10-60 mm. armor for 
covering 20-ton tanks. 

6. Magaz ine equipment for tanks [Kampf-wagen-Kastengerat]. 
1 Document No. 28. 



JULY 1941 69 

7. Ten cross-country motor vehicles with equipment, specifically, 
1-ton half-tracks from Demag A.G. Also there is Swedish interest in a 
considerable number of 3-ton tractors. 

8. 21-cm. cannon along with ammunition and equipment, regarding 
which there have been negotiations for some time with Skoda. The 
prerequisite for Swedish interest is a shorter delivery period. 

9. A list of orders concluded but not yet carried out, especially for 
optical and radio equipment — familiar to Captain Flues at the OKW. 

In consideration of the great cooperation shown by the Swedish side 
in connection with all German military wishes 2 and in order to sup- 
port the German and Finnish wishes regarding supplies, I consider 
it necessary that I be provided at this time with considerable con- 
cessions in the areas of deliveries of war equipment important to 
Sweden. An accommodating attitude in this area will, moreover, con- 
siderably advance our political efforts here. Please check on the 
above-described Swedish wishes with these views in mind. 3 I should 
welcome it if Ministerialrat Miiller of the Air Ministry and a repre- 
sentative of the Office of Economics and Armaments (Colonel Becker 
or representative) would then be sent to Stockholm with the necessary 
authority so that negotiations could be begun on this subject with 
Sweden at the beginning of the coming week. Please send telegraphic 
instructions at once.* 

SCHNURRE 
WlED 



1 See documents Noa. 8, 16, 17, and 28. 

s See document No. 92. 

* See document No. 98 and footnote 4. 



No. 60 

J2D/121106-0T 

The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

No. 1405 of July 1 Lisbon, July 2, 1941—11 : 00 p. m. 

Received July 3 — 8 : 25 a.m. 
In the course of today's conversation with Salazar the talk turned 
to the establishment of a corps of Spanish volunteers to fight against 
Bolshevism 1 and to the question of carrying out a similar demonstra- 
tion in Portugal. I informed Salazar that we received daily applica- 
tions from Portuguese to be taken into the German Army, but that we 
always rejected these with our thanks for the friendship demonstrated, 
for the reason that foreigners were not accepted in the German Army. 
I also personally considered it to be the right thing for the Portuguese 



1 See documents Nos. 12 and 70. 



70 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

to express their commitment to the new Europe by standing firm on 
the Continent, in the islands, and in the colonies. Salazar explained 
that this was his opinion, too. In Spain it was somewhat different. 
Aside from the fact that Spain had a debt of gratitude to pay for the 
help in the Civil War, the nature of the Spaniard was also more ex- 
pansive and more demonstrative than that of the reserved Portuguese. 
Furthermore, the small contingent that Portugal could provide at best 
could not exercise any sort of influence on the success of the victori- 
ously advancing tremendous German Army. On the other hand, how- 
ever, he had already been considering for several days in what way he 
could give widely visible expression to Portugal's sympathy with 
Germany's fight against Bolshevism. He would perhaps organize a 
demonstration by the Portuguese Legion, which after all had been 
established at the time for the fight against Bolshevism and still today 
had to perform this in the interior of the country, and would use this 
occasion for a presentation of his political views. Portugal's deathly 
enmity toward Bolshevism was known to the world and particularly 
also to England, but he nevertheless considered it necessary during 
these days of the decisive struggle to commit himself also toward the 
outside. I replied to the Minister President that I was convinced 
that such a demonstration would find a strong response not only in 
Germany but all over the world. 2 

Huene 

" In telegram No. 1430 of July 6 (129/121109) Huene reported that while pro- 
German Portuguese officers were advocating a special Portuguese formation for 
the employment at the eastern front, the Portuguese Ministry of War favored 
a strengthening of the garrisons in Portugal and on the Atlantic islands. In 
telegram No. 1603 of July 27 {129/121120) Huene reported that the organization 
of a small Portuguese military unit for the eastern front was still being 
considered. 

In telegram No. 2407 of Oct. 31 (129/121193) Huene reported that he had again 
brought up the matter with Salazar who listened to the arguments in favor of a 
unit of Portuguese volunteers for the fight against Russia but who asked that 
Huene not request an Immediate reply. 

No. 61 

Fl/0579-81 

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the 
Foreign Minister 

Fuhrek's Headquarters, July 2, 1941. 
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 
WFSt/Abt. L (IV/K) No. 1557/41g. Kdos. 

Dear Reich Minister : In reply to your letter of June 27 x and with 
reference to the decisions of the Fiihrer on the occasion of Ambassador 
Abetz' visit, 1 I confirm the agreement of the High Command of the 

1 Document No. 31. 

* See document 24, footnote 4. 



JULY 1941 71 

Wehrmacht with the conceptions you advanced on the application of 
the Paris Protocols." 

The concluding negotiations concerning the use of the port of 
Bizerte are now, in accordance with the French views, directed at 
having transport to Bizerte at first sail from ports in southern Italy 
only, and not from Toulon. 4 A convoy guard by the French Navy 
is thus eliminated. What matters now, however, is to charter as many 
fast French merchant vessels as possible. Traffic can be expected to 
start from about the middle of this month with the inclusion of 
Italian transports. 

To my regret I have to reply in the negative to your question relat- 
ing to Dakar and whether some Luftwaffe units could be transferred 
there by the middle of this month. Before the conclusion of the war 
in the East, German aerial forces will not be available for this purpose. 
But I should also like to point out that in the Paris negotiations 
the French characterized the establishment of a German air base in 
French West Africa as a serious encumbrance for a sympathetic 
reception of German-French military collaboration in the colony. 
Besides, it was rightly pointed out by them that from this step, more 
than from the provisioning of German U-boats by a tender stationed 
in the port of Dakar, an immediate outbreak of open conflict with 
England or the United States would have to be expected. Hence 
it was laid down in the Paris Protocols that a German air base near 
Dakar was not to be established until a later date. 

Furthermore, the measures of the French armed forces for rein- 
forcing the defense potential in West Africa are, according to the 
Protocols, on a scale sufficient by themselves for prolonged defense, 
and even against considerable forces. The employment of the Luft- 
waffe in that area was not intended to add to the defense potential, 
but mainly for the offensive against enemy commerce. 

For these reasons the prior or simultaneous movement of Luftwaffe 
units to Dakar is not necessary, even if in accordance with the Fiihrer's 
decision the date for its utilization as a naval base must be postponed 
for political reasons. 

I will make it my business, however, to urge the French that they 
carry out the military reinforcements of Dakar and the West African 
region which is provided in the Paris Protocols. In this fashion it 
will be possible to let the exploitation of Dakar as a base for the Ger- 
man Navy take effect immediately if the political conditions permit 
it, and the further political concessions which in this connection are 
expected by the French can then be made to them from our side. 

Heil Hitler! 
Yours, etc. Keitei, 



' See vol. xu of this series, document No. 559. 

* See vol. in of this series, document No. 559, footnote 5. 



72 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 62 

Fl 9/393-05 

Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler x 

Rome, July 2, 1941/XIX. 
Fuhree : To begin with, I should like to thank you heartily for the 
letter 2 you sent me informing me of the progress of the initial phase 
of the operations against Russia. The bulletins issued by your High 
Command on Sunday, June 29 , 3 have strengthened my conviction, 
which I expressed in my last letter to you, that the campaign against 
Russia will culminate in a triumph of your arms. The space is no 
obstacle to maneuvering units such as yours, but rather an advantage. 
I was aware that the military organization of the Soviet Union 
had made remarkable progress in these past years, but what you tell 
me is a surprise to me also. It appears clear that this mighty military 
organization, not being able to be with us, would have been against 
us when the time came. It is therefore necessary and f oresighted to 
eliminate it, so as to deprive Great Britain of all hope of aid from the 
European Continent. The marshaling of the European nations 
against Russia with regular and volunteer troops is actually a mar- 
shaling against Great Britain, which has allied herself with the 
Kremlin. This is very important for the future development of the 
Avar and for American intervention, which in my opinion has been 
postponed. After Russia's liquidation, Great Britain's fate will soon 
be decided, particularly if we should succeed in drawing Turkey over 
to our side and attacking Egypt from two sides. 

As regards the sending of the Italian Army Corps, the three divi- 
sions are ready and can depart as soon as the timetable has been 
established by the proper authorities. 

I accept with pleasure your proposal for a meeting at your Head- 
quarters and am of the opinion that, morally as well as politically, 
such a meeting will rouse a wide response in both our countries and 
in the rest of the world. The task of beating Russia in order to extir- 
pate Bolshevism is truly epic, and to have dared to do this will be 
the imperishable glory of your armies and the Axis revolution. 

I want you, Fiihrer, in this great hour of your life and of the history 
of your people, to feel that I am with you in comradeship and faith. 

Mussolini 

1 The translation is from the original Italian. The first page of the German 
translation (F19/391-92) is only partially legible. 

* Of June 30, document No. 50. 

8 This bulletin listed the capture of 40,000 prisoners of war and 600 guns, the 
destruction or capture of 2,233 armored vehicles and the destruction of 4,107 
enemy planes. 



JULY 1941 73 

No. 63 

82/60241-43 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most urgent Tokyo, July 3, 1941—3 : 55 a. m. 

No. 1101 of July 2 Received July 3—10 : 50 a. m. 1 

For the Foreign Minister. 

With, reference to my telegram No. 1069 of June 28 2 and your 
telegrams Nos. 916 s and 917 4 of June 28. 

In accordance with instructions I tried in every way as soon as the 
above-mentioned telegrams arrived to bring influence to bear on the 
Japanese Government and other leading circles in favor of a rapid 
military action against Soviet Russia. For that purpose I have kept 
in touch with both the Foreign Minister and prominent leaders of the 
Nationalists; I have had the Wehrmacht Attaches and members of the 
Embassy working toward the same end and have also assured myself 
of the cooperation of the Italian Ambassador. 5 It became apparent 
that the Nationalist wing, which had previously been influenced in 
favor of action in the south, will not readily adopt the new line. This 
tendency intends to cling tenaciously to prosecution of the campaign 
in the south, which was almost to be expected in view of the slowness 
of the reaction but which at the moment has led to that paralysis 
of the opposing tendencies mentioned in telegram No. 1069 of June 28. 
According to reliable information Matsuoka personally has strongly 
advocated a clear-cut decision. He was unable, however, to prevail 
with all the leadership committees of the Cabinet, the full Cabinet, 
and with the Emperor in favor of an immediate decision for a 
Japanese entry into the war. 

After this morning's Cabinet meeting, presided over by the 
Emperor, 6 Matsuoka asked me and also the Italian Ambassador to 
call on him at 2:00 p. m. He first made an oral statement to us, 
addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister, which was drawn up on the 
basis of a Cabinet decision, and then gave me an English translation 
of it. The text will follow by a separate telegram, 7 A statement 
addressed to the Italian Government was likewise presented. It is 
identical in content but differs in the wording of the introductory 



1 Marginal note : "Forwarded as No. 2130 to the Special Train, July 3." 
' Document No. 33. 

* Document No. 35. 
4 Document No. 36. 

* Mario Indelli. 

"The record of the decisions of this Imperial Conference of July 2 was 
submitted to the International Military Tribunal of the Far Bast as exhibit No. 
588 (Doc. No. 1652). 

' Document No. 64. 



74 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY 

sentence. Text likewise follows by separate telegram. 8 The state- 
ment to the Italian Government, by the way, does not speak of the 
German-Soviet war but of the war of the Axis Powers against the 
Soviet Union. Matsuoka gave an oral explanation of the statement 
he had presented, saying that Japan was not at present in a position 
to enter the war against the Soviet Union without facing other com- 
plications. The meaning and purpose of the Japanese attitude would 
become clear to the German Government upon a careful and thorough 
study of the statement. 11 

I replied to Matsuoka that I would immediately forward his state- 
ment to the Eeich Foreign Minister. I had to reserve comment on 
it, but asked for a technical explanation with respect to the extent of 
the East Siberian territory in which the Japanese Government, accord- 
ing to its statement, intended to achieve the destruction of communism. 
Matsuoka replied that this territory was not precisely delimited geo- 
graphically, but in his opinion about to Irkutsk. 

Matsuoka stated further that he would ask the Russian Ambas- 
sador 10 to call on him after he had received the Ambassadors of the 
Axis Powers. He would hand him a statement, the text of which he 
gave me in an English translation. The text will follow by a sep- 
arate telegram. 11 Matsuoka emphasized the closing sentence in 
particular. 12 

For the public only a communique would be issued on today's Cab- 
inet session presided over by the Emperor. 13 This communique would 
also serve as a guide for conversations with the American " and 
English 15 Ambassadors. If they should insist on further information 
about the Cabinet decision, he would point out Japan's commitments 
under the Tripartite Pact. 

Matsuoka then expressed his appreciation for the fact that because 
of the information received from the Reich Foreign Minister before 



"In telegram No. 1108 of July 1, dispatched July 3 (82/60248) Ott forwarded 
the text of this introductory sentence of the statement handed to the Italian 
Ambassador. 

" In a memorandum of July 3 (82/60238-39) Weizsacker recorded having been 
informed by Oshima of the Japanese position following the recent Cabinet 
decision. In this connection Oshima said that he had told Tokyo that "he 
was not prepared to participate in representing a weak Japanese policy." 

10 Konstantin Smetanin. 

"Telegram No. 1104 of July 1, dispatched July 3 (82/60246-47). The text 
of this statement handed to the Soviet Ambassador is printed In Foreign Rela~ 
tions of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. n, p. 504. 

" This sentence read as follows : "I need hardly add that their Excellencies, 
Messrs. Stalin and Molotov, may rest assured that I will do my best but that 
future developments will largely decide if the Japanese Government can con- 
sistently abide by this policy." 

a For text of the Government communique and of a statement by Matsuoka 
regarding the Imperial Conference, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 
19 hh vol. rv, p. 287. 

"Joseph C. Grew. 

"Robert L. Craigie. 



JULY 1041 75 

the outbreak of the German-Soviet conflict " he had not been caught 
unawares by events in this difficult period, 

Ott 

"Presumably a reference to Matsuoka's conversations with Ribbentrop in 
March and April 1941. See vol. xn of this series, documents Nos. 218, 230, 
233, and 278. 



No. 64 

82/60244-45 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

NoJl.102 of July 2 Tokyo, July 3, 1941—3 : 55 a. m. 

Received July 3 — 8 : 25 a. m. 1 

For the Foreign Minister. 

With reference to my telegram No. 1101 of July 2. 2 

Text of declaration of Japanese Foreign Minister follows : 3 Oral 
statement. Strictly confidential. (Translation). 

Please convey the following to His Excellency Herr von Ribbentrop : 

I have duly noted your Excellency's request made through Am- 
bassador General Ott in Tokyo and Ambassador General Oshima in 
Berlin. I have taken particular care in studying the views set forth 
by your Excellency in approaching the Japanese Government with 
the request. 

In reply I take pleasure in stating that Japan is preparing for all 
possible eventualities as regards the U.S.S.R. in order to join forces 
with Germany in actively combating the communist menace. Japan 
is keenly watching developments of conditions in Eastern Siberia in 
particular, determined as she is to destroy the communist system es- 
tablished there. It is, I believe, hardly necessary to add that the aug- 
mentation of military preparations, among other things ? with an 
, eye to realizing this object, together with the aim of restraining Soviet 
Russia at the Far Eastern end in her struggle with Germany is 
steadfastly kept in the mind of the Japanese Government. 

At the same time I beg to state that the Japanese Government have 
decided to secure points d'appui in French Indochina which will 
enable Japan further to strengthen her pressure upon Great Britain 
and the United States. In this connection I would like to draw your 
Excellency's attention to the fact that Japan has been keeping constant 
vigil in the Pacific, including the southwestern ocean with a view to 
restraining these two powers and will continue the efforts and even 
intensify them, if necessary. I trust that your Excellency is in full 
agreement with me that this really constitutes a vital contribution to 
our common cause, indeed no less vital than Japan's intervention at 
this junction in the German-Soviet War. 



1 Marginal note : "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 2131, July 3." 

' Document No. 63. 

*The test of Matsuoka's statement is in English in the original. 



76 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Japan cannot and will not relax her efforts in the south which after 
all possess a very important bearing upon the whole course of the 
war out of which I am most confident that Germany and Italy will 
soon emerge victoriously. I assure your Excellency once again that 
the Japanese government will not fail to act in accordance with the 
aims and spirits of the Tripartite Pact. 

Ott 
No. 65 

82/60249-50 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

mosttjkgent Tokyo, July 3, 1941— 3 : 55 a. m. 

No. 1109 of July 2 Received July 3—6 : 30 a. m. 1 

For the Foreign Minister. 

With reference to your telegram No. 942 of July l. 2 
Immediately upon receipt of the above telegram I called on Mat- 
suoka and transmitted to him personally the message of the Reich 
Foreign Minister. Matsuoka stated that he had already received from 
Ambassador Oshima the announcement of the message even before 
today's Cabinet session, presided over by the Emperor, had begun. 3 
Even without knowing the exact text he had made use of the fact that 
a special message from the German Foreign Minister was imminent 
for backing up his point of view and for bringing about a clear-cut 
decision. He was grateful for the message with which he would to- 
morrow immediately acquaint the Army and Navy, as well as the 
Emperor. He was personally in full agreement with the ideas of the 
Reich Foreign Minister. He regretted that his opinions had not pre- 
vailed for the moment. During the Cabinet session he had warned 
Prime Minister Konoye and other Cabinet members and pointed out 
that the Japanese people would, after some time, demand government 
action against the Soviet Union. Opposing forces, who now dominate 
the scene, will in the long run be unable to carry their point. He re- 
quests that the Reich Foreign Minister be assured that he will adhere 
to the old policy. 

I drew Matsuoka's attention to the fact that the Cabinet decision 
will certainly not be understood by the people who will in the future 
heavily blame the Government for the missed opportunity. Matsuoka 
explained the wording of the Japanese statement to the Soviet Ambas- 
sador 1 with the necessity of deceiving the Russians or at least of 

* Marginal note : "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 2129 July 3 " 
Document No. 53. 

* See document No. 63 and footnote 6. 
See document No. 63 and footnote 11. 



JULY 1941 77 

keeping them in a state of uncertainty, owing to the fact that the 
armaments were still incomplete. At present Smetanin did not suspect 
that speedy preparations were being made against the Soviet Union 
as is hinted at in the Government decision transmitted to us. 5 He had 
furthermore informed Smetanin that, as far as was known to Japan, 
neither had the USA promised assistance with regard to arms nor 
had the Soviet Union asked for it. He wished to give the earnest ad- 
vice not to attempt any cooperation of this kind as Japan, at the re- 
quest of her allies, would not tolerate shipments. I told Matsuoka 
that Japan's attitude could not satisfy us. Matsuoka replied that he 
had expected this and personally regretted the Cabinet resolution; 
but he assured us again that deficiencies in preparedness would be 
eliminated as fast as possible, and that the Army was preparing for 
alWventualities. 

Ott 
* See document No. 64, 

No. 66 

65/45212S— 13X 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry * 
Telegram 

MOST OTMJENT 

top secret Tehran, July 3, 1941 — 10 : 15 p. m. 

No. 565 of July 3 Received July 4^i : 20 a. m. 

With reference to your telegram No. 351 of June 30. 2 
Shortly before the arrival of the above-mentioned telegraphic in- 
struction the Egyptian Ambassador 3 had requested a conference, 
which took place on July 2 after arrival of the telegraphic instruction. 
The Ambassador told me about a telegram of June 29 from King 
Farouk to him, in which the King stated that he had information in 
his possession according to which the British General Staff had de- 
cided upon the occupation of the Iranian oil region. This occupa- 
tion was necessary for protection against a possible German attack 
on Iraq and Iran from the territory of the Soviet Union. A period 
of two months was set for the necessary preparations. For carrying 
out the operation of occupation, for which only three weeks were al- 
lotted, the British General Staff had asked that up to 500,000 (live 
hundred thousand) men be provided. The occupation is to extend 
to the entire concession area of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in- 

1 Marginal note : "Shown to the FUhrer. Hew[el]." 
1 Document No. 49. 
'Zoulfikar Pasha. 



78 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

eluding the ports on the Persian Gulf, and also Kermanshah. Fur- 
thermore the decision of the British General Staff provided for an 
advance from Euwandiz via the Rayat Pass into the Iranian province 
of Azerbaijan for the protection of the Iraq oil areas near Kirkuk 
and Mosul. The main push is to take place in the west at Lake Urmia 
through Khoi to Dzhulfa. In the telegram the King had issued him 
the express instruction to inform His Majesty the Shah and the 
German Minister of these British intentions. The Shah had been in- 
formed on July 1. -The Shah had been very much impressed by the 
news. He had expressly requested the Ambassador not to speak to 
anyone about it. The Shah is thinking over the situation at the 
present time in order to become clear about the precautionary defense 
measures to be taken. 

The Ambassador stressed several times that it was not a matter of 
rumors but of a decision of the British General Staff that should be 
taken seriously. The Ambassador referred in particular to the fact 
that this decision was taken before the tremendous successes of the 
Wehrmacht over the Bolshevists had become known. Under the 
pressure of the situation the preparations for the Iranian operation 
would probably be shortened so far as possible. 

The Ambassador asked that the King's communication be passed 
on to the Reich Foreign Minister, and that the telegram be regarded 
as a proof of an attitude of candor and good faith toward Germany on 
the part of the King. The Ambassador then described the King's 
position, which had become still more difficult and dangerous since our 
last conversation ; the latter had been characterized quite openly by the 
English as enemy No. 1. 

The Fiihrer's message 4 had made a deep impression upon the King; 
it had been received by him with great gratitude. 

Upon inquiry the Ambassador stated that Azzam was at the present 
time detailed to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry with the rank of min- 
ister plenipotentiary, without however exercising any function. Any 
political activity was impossible for him as a result of the strictest 
possible British supervision. The Ambassador did not know the 
whereabouts of Ali Maher. The Ambassador could not give any in- 
formation about the possibility of carrying on the aspirations repre- 
sented by the two. 5 

Ettel 



* Vol. in of this series, document No. 427. 

8 In telegram No. 574 of July 7 (266/173624) Ettel reported having been told 
by the Egyptian Ambassador that the preparations for the British operation 
referred to in the document printed were being carried on "roost actively." 



JULY 1941 79 

No. 67 

•4685/B225279 

The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania 
Telegram 

secret . Berlin, July 3, 1941—10 : 30 p. m. 

Multex446of July 2 

Russian emigres who volunteer for the fight against the Soviet 
Union should be treated in a friendly way, but not be registered, since 
it is not intended to employ them. The decisive thing among others is 
the consideration that in case of capture they will probably not be 
treated according to the laws of international warfare. There will 
be a) reservation regarding the employment of individual persons be- 
cause of special suitability for special tasks in accordance with the 
decision of the military authorities. 

For your confidential information: We have no interest in the Rus- 
sian emigres being in evidence. 

Confirm receipt. 

Weizsacker 

No. 68 

1B1/138817-18 

Memorandum by the State Secretary 

St.S. No. 453 Berlin, July 3, 1941. 

As was to be expected, the Chinese Ambassador informed me this 
evening that Chiang Kai-shek is breaking off relations with the Ger- 
man Government. 

Mr. Chen did not give me a note. Rather, he only informed me 
orally, for the use of the German Government, that after Wang Ching- 
wei had been recognized by Germany his Government had decided to 
break off diplomatic relations with Germany. The Ambassador as- 
sumed that a formal notification in writing was being given to our 
representative in Chungking. 1 

The Ambassador said that all the members of his Embassy and all 
the members of the Chinese Consulates in the Reich had been in- 
structed to leave Germany. He asked that this departure need not 
take place before July 10, since there was a great deal of business to 
wind up. I told him that I agreed to having the departure take place 
some time after July 10 at a date still to be fixed. (I did not press for 
an earlier date, since our Mission in Chungking is estimated to need 

1 According to telegram No. 100 of July 2, dispatched from Chungking July 3 
(191/138823), a note to this effect addressed to Altenburg was delivered by the 
Chinese Chief of Protocol on July 2 at 7 : 30 p. m. 



80 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

at least £ to 5 days by automobile to leave the country in the direction 
of Indochina. ) The Ambassador put in a word for the approximately 
150 Chinese students and 800 to 900 other Chinese citizens staying 
behind in Germany. He believed that he might express such a recom- 
mendation as the break-off of relations with Chiang Kai-shek was not 
the same as a state of war. Regarding this I replied that our conduct 
toward the Chinese citizens would be guided, among other things, by 
the treatment of the Germans in the area controlled by Chiang Kai- 
shek, as well as by the conduct of the Chinese concerned on the terri- 
tory of the Reich, 2 

Weizsacker 

"In telegram No. 53 of July i (191/138826-28) Weizsacker informed the 
Mission in Chungking of the Chinese step and asked that preparations be made 
for terminating the Mission. 

No. 69 

1584/382515 

Reichsleiter Bormann to Reich Minister Lairvmers 

Fuhrer's Headquarters, July 3, 1941. 

Bo/Fu. 

RK 10036A. 

Subject : Confiscation of the property of the Netherlands Royal House. 

Dear Herr Lammers : The former Queen Wilhelmina of Holland 
gave a radio speech on June 27, 1941, in which she stated that her 
House feels deep sympathy for the Russian people, which would soon 
be confronted with terrible trials. Today it was Russia's turn, but 
she knew that tomorrow and the day after the mighty bulwarks of 
our civilization — Great Britain and North America — would have to 
resist the main force of the German war machines; therefore they 
would fight on the side of the Russian people. In conclusion Wil- 
helmina then praised the resolute stand and the wise and courageous 
policy of the British Empire in the face of the new conflict. 

The Fiihrer has now given the permission requested earlier by 
the Reich Commissar to confiscate the property of the Netherlands 
Royal House. 1 

Heil Hitler! 
Yours, etc. M[artin] Bormann 

'In telegram No. 224 of July 7 from the Hague (173/84441) Betz reported 
that Seyss-Inquart had received Hitler's approval for the connscation of the 
property of the Netherlands Royal House. In a letter of July 18 (1584/382517- 
18) Lammers notified Seyss-Inquart of Hitler's approval of this step, informing 
Bormann at the same time (1584/382518) that Hitler's decision had been 
communicated to the Reich Commissar. 



JULY 1941 81 

No. 70 

502/234719-20 

The Charge d'Aff aires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

No. 2329 of July 4 Madrid, July 4, 1941. 

With reference to your telegram No. 1516 of July 3.* 

The call for volunteer enlistments for the "Blue Division" to be 
sent to Russia has produced 40 times the number of volunteers needed. 
Final selection will take place in all army corps districts today. The 
volunteers will then be staged in the vicinity of Irun, on the Spanish- 
French border, whence shipment to Germany by railroad will prob- 
ablyjbegin next week. An advance party of seven Spanish officers 
is leaving for Berlin by plane tomorrow to take up first contacts 
with German military command organizations. A billeting party 
will follow soon. 

The strength of the Division including rear services and replace- 
ment units totals 641 officers, 2,272 noncommissioned officers and 
sergeants, and 15,780 men. 

The Division is made up of the following units; three infantry 
regiments, four artillery battalions, one reconnaissance battalion, one 
ccmbat engineer battalion, one antitank battalion, one signal bat- 
talion, one medical unit, and a complete division headquarters. 8 

The Military Attache is reporting all details to the Attache Group 
on a continuing basis. 3 

HeberleiN 

l Ia this telegram (95/106947-48) Weizs&cker stated that the Reich Govern- 
ment would gladly welcome volunteers from the Spanish Army, Navy, and 
Air Force, as well as from the Falange, and hoped that they would constitute 
an integrated Spanish formation under Spanish command, but which could 
be incorporated as a unit into the Wehrmacht. He asked that Russian emigres 
not be accepted. 

3 In addition there was a group of Spanish Air Force pilots who volunteered 
for service against Soviet Russia (see document No. 34, footnote 1). 

In a confidential report of July 30 (138/77031) Likns recorded that when the 
first contingent of Spanish pilots arrived at the Tempelhof airfield they were 
greeted by a band of the Luftwaffe which rendered not the Spanish national 
anthem, but that of the former Spanish Republic. 

8 In telegram No. 1889 of Aug. 20 (502/234775) Sonnleithner explained that 
reports had been received that Communists were Infiltrating into both the 
French and the Spanish volunteer formations in order to spy and then to defect 
to the Russians. Having noted that the Communist elements in the Spanish 
formation were reported to have come chiefly from Spanish Morocco, Sonnleith- 
ner directed that the report be investigated. 

In telegram No. 2892 of Aug. 21 (95/107022) Stohrer reported that the pre- 
dominant part of the Blue Division was made up of regular troops; that no 
Moors were included; and that 10 years of earlier service had been required 
for admission so that Communist infiltration seemed improbable. Stohrer 
advised against approaching the Spanish Government in regard to the rumors 
of communistic penetration. He recommended that inasmuch as the Division 
was now in Germany any further investigation be by German security agencies. 

Farther reports on the Blue Division are filmed on serial 502. 
682-905—04 11 



§2 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 71 

2361/488576-79 

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 

top beckbt Therafia, July 4,. 1941. 

No. A 2422 

Political Report 

Subject: Conversation with State Secretary Baron Benoist-Mechin, 

For the Foreign Minister. 

(1) As I have already reported by wire, the visit of State Secretary 
Benoist-Mechin brought only slight satisfaction to the wishes of the 
French Government with regard to Syria. 1 During the many discus- 
sions which the State Secretary had with Turkish leaders their 
tendency was constantly noticeable to observe strict neutrality and 
to avoid any English demands aimed at direct or indirect support of 
Soviet Russia. 

At first the State Secretary met with a cool reception, probably be- 
cause of Darlan's speech about the events of 1919-1920, which was 
very widely misunderstood here. Later, however, the State Secretary 
was assured that Turkey considered the three power pact 2 to be in 
full force also with respect to France, and that she would in no case 
yield to an English request which might prejudice French interests. 

In addition, M. Saracoglu very frankly discussed with me the ques- 
tion how it would be possible, without hurting French interests, to 
obtain satisfaction of the Turkish demands known to us (of making 
the Baghdad railway secure). He mentioned that the French, in 
case they could not hold their position in Syria, as is to be expected, 
perhaps might find it convenient to make the Turks trustees of Syria. 
In such an event Turkey would be prepared immediately to occupy 
Syria, to grant the French Army an honorable departure, and after 
conclusion of the war to return Syria to France, except for the north- 
ern part. I replied to the Minister that I could not express any 
opinion in this matter, but would convey the suggestion to the State 
Secretary. 

M. Benoist-Mechin and I agreed that discussion of such an idea 
was unacceptable as long as the possibility to defend Syria existed and 

1 In telegram No. 1860 of June 21 (386/211108) Abetz had reported having 
been Informed by the French Government that Benoist-M<§chln would fly to 
Ankara "to take personal charge of negotiations with Turkey regarding the 
passage of French troops and arms to Syria and to see that the transports of 
gasoline were speeded up." In telegrams No. 2 (265/173047) and No. 3 
(265/173045) of July 1 sent from Therapia, Papen reported about the results 
of Benoist-Meehin's negotiations. . 

1 A reference to Turkey's mutual assistance pact with Great Britain ana 
France, sighed October 19, 1939. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, 
vol. cc, p. 187. 



JULY 1941 83 

that furthermore a Syria under Turkish trusteeship would be far 
more inconvenient to Germany's conduct of the war later on than a 
Syria in British hands. Neither M. Saracoglu nor the President made 
any subsequent reference to this idea. 

The clear and precise manner in which the State Secretary ex- 
plained the basic concept of German-French collaboration to the 
Turkish statesmen has had an excellent effect. The decision of the 
French to participate with volunteer detachments in the European 
struggle against Bolshevism 3 has underscored the fact that the 
development of a new Europe was making rapid progress. 

(2) In the exhaustive conversations which I was able to have with 
Baron Benoist-Mechin he discussed in detail the evolution of German- 
French relations and the impediments which the Laval crisis * has 
created. Obviously wishing that I should convey this to you (because 
he assumes that the reports of Ambassador Abetz' might, perhaps, not 
have fully elucidated this point) he emphasized that Petain had sep- 
arated from Laval solely after it had become evident that Laval had 
promised his parliamentary friends that he would later on, that is, 
after the present difficulties had been overcome, reinstate them into 
their posts and places. Abolition of the parliamentary system was not 
a matter of principle for him and was merely aimed at a temporary 
compromise. • The Marshal, however, did not want to hear anything 
of the old methods, wishing to build up a new France. Germany 
ought therefore to have confidence in the persons on whom he was 
calling for this purpose. 

I must confess that the frankness and the views of Baron Benoist- 
Mechin as supporter of a close German-French understanding had the 
effect of convincing me. He mentioned of course that in order to 
obtain a firm backing for the development in France, Germany ought 
to carry her promises and good intentions into effect. When he told 
me about the offer of the English Government with regard to Syria 
and I asked him what further French colonies England could attack, 
he mentioned Dakar and the concentration of British-French forces 
which pointed to an attack. Yet Germany had hitherto not fully 
complied with the French wishes for the strengthening of the means 
of defense. 

The State Secretary further said that people in France were prob- 
ably better informed than we were with regard to public opinion and 
developments in the United States. If the victorious conclusion of 
the German-Eussian war were to bring on peace, it could be done only 
if Germany took into account the desires and hopes of the smaller 
countries, presently occupied, such as Holland, Belgium, and Norway, 
for administrative autonomy and independence. But above all, said 

8 See document No. 78 and footnote 2. 

' See vol. xi of this series, document No. 510 and subsequent documents. 



84 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Baron Benoist-Mechin, it was necessary to find a political solution for 
Russia, which would leave the individual parts of that empire their 
territorial and administrative sovereignty and above all their religious 
freedom. It was known that with respect to the struggle of National 
Socialism against the churches a parallel was being drawn in the 
United States between the former system and Bolshevism. Yet the 
Eussian people could not exist and even less be governed well unless 
they had a firm religious foundation. The solution of this very prob- 
lem -would indicate whether it was true that National Socialism was 
not an "export commodity." 

Counselor of Embassy Kelley, B who recently returned from leave 
in the United States, has spoken in a similar sense about the possi- 
bility of ending the war and America's position regarding this. How 
much the problem to which I have referred already occupies our 
enemies is shown by the fact that the English propaganda is spread- 
ing the rumor that the conquered parts of Russia would be put under 
Herr Eosenberg and incorporated in the German administrative 
system. 

The aim of such propaganda is all too plain : 

The offensive against Bolshevism has become an European affair, 
a "crusade". It is therefore necessary to disturb this European unity 
and to tell the participants: "You do not fight to restore a 'Christian 
order' of the Occident but for the 'Anti-Christ', National Socialism." 
This shows the greatness of the danger which appears at the cradle 
of the new Europe. 

Baron Benoist-Mechin spoke with great satisfaction of the coopera- 
tion with Ambassador Abetz, of his constant efforts to promote 
German-French collaboration, and asked me to convey his regards 
to the Foreign Minister. 

Pafen 



1 Robert Francis Keller, First Secretary, later Counselor of Embassy of the 
United States Embassy in Turkey. 



No. 72 

82/6026B-67 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 
Telegram 

No. 598 Special Train Eubopa, July 5, 1941—12 : 17 a. m. 

from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 5 — 1 : 10 a. m. 

No. 981 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 5. 

On the occasion of the discussion concerning Japan's attitude toward 
Soviet Russia, I wish to correct below for your own information 
what Matsuoka has told you at the time concerning my conference 



JULY 1941 85 

with him about the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian pact of non- 
aggression or neutrality. 

As you reported in your telegram No. 685 of May 6, 1941, ' Matsuoka 
told you at that time that after his departure from Berlin, he did 
not at first consider the possibility of concluding a Japanese-Russian 
treaty of neutrality. [He said] he had even brought this up in his 
conversation with me stating his willingness to accept only in case 
Russia was willing to conclude such a pact. By telling you this, 
Matsuoka obviously wanted to say that I ought to have reckoned 
with the conclusion of the pact after the conversations at Berlin. 

After agreement had already been reached on the conclusion of 
the pact and immediately before it was formally signed, Matsuoka 
also informed Count Schulenburg in Moscow in a similar vein. 2 At 
-'this occasion Mr. Matsuoka described his conversations with me at 
Berlin as follows : He had told me that while at Moscow he would prob- 
ably not be able to avoid discussing the long pending question of a 
Japanese-Soviet Russian neutrality or nonaggression pact. He 
would, of course, show no eagerness in the matter but would be com- 
pelled to do something in case the Russians agreed with Japan's 
wishes. I had consented to this point of view. 

Neither the presentation of the matter made to you nor that made 
to Count Schulenburg corresponds to the facts. The subject of a 
Japanese-Soviet pact of nonaggression or neutrality had been touched 
upon by Matsuoka and me in our conversation of March 28, 1941, in 
the following way, according to the memorandum drawn up immedi- 
ately after the conversation by Minister Schmidt : 3 

Following a remark on the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian long- 
term trade agreement, Matsuoka asked me directly whether during his 
return trip he should remain in Moscow for a somewhat longer period, 
in order to negotiate with the Russians on a nonaggression or neutrality 
pact. He emphasized in this connection that the Japanese people 
would not countenance a direct acceptance of Russia into the Tripartite 
Pact, which would call forth a unanimous cry of indignation all over 
Japan. I replied to Matsuoka that the adherence of Russia to the 
Pact was out of the question and recommended that he should not bring 
up the previously mentioned question ; i.e., the question of a nonaggres- 
sion or neutrality pact in Moscow, since this would not fit into the 
framework of the present situation. On Matsuoka's further remark 
that the conclusion of a fishing and trade agreement would improve the 
atmosphere between Russia and Japan, I replied that there were no 
objections to the conclusions of such purely commercial agreements. 

Thus, what I said to Matsuoka at the time unmistakably indicated 
that I did not consider the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian pact of 
nonaggression or neutrality to be appropriate. The news of the con- 
clusion of the Pact therefore came as a surprise to me. However, I 
refrained at the time from making this known to Matsuoka. 

1 Vol. xir of this series, document No. 464. 

2 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 332. 

3 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 230. 



86 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Even now there would be no sense in pointing out to Matsuoka the 
incorrectness of the account which he gave you at the time, as well as 
pointing to the fact that by concluding the Pact he confronted the 
German Government with an astonishing fait accompli. I am never- 
theless informing you of the actual course of events because during 
your future political conversations, there may arise an opportunity to 
rectify this point to Matsuoka in a suitable way, should it be deemed 
useful. In the same way, there may be an occasion in the further 
course of events to remind Matsuoka that during the same conversa- 
tion in which he discussed the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet Pact 
with you, he made the following noteworthy statement : "If war should 
break out between Germany and the Soviet Union, no Japanese Prime 
Minister or Foreign Minister would be able to keep Japan neutral. 
In such a case Japan would be impelled by natural consideration to 
join Germany in attacking Russia. No neutrality pact could change 
anything in this respect." 4 

Should you deem it advisable to draw attention to both of the points, 
when there is an occasion, please do it in a very gentle manner so that 
Matsuoka will not receive the impression that I wish to take him to 
task on these matters. 

RlBBENTROP 

* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 464, 

No. 73 

233/156556-56 

The Ambassador in Argentina to tlie Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

most urgent Buenos Aires, July 5, 1951 — i : 11 p. m. 

top secret Received July 6—1 : 40 a. m. 

No. 1068 of JulyS 

In yesterday's lengthy conversation the new Argentine Foreign 
Minister 1 also spoke about the impressions he had gained during his 
stay in Rome during the war and his trip back here via Spain, 
Portugal, and North America, and he summarized his opinion on the 
present war situation as follows : 

He was counting on the defeat of Russia in the immediate future, 
which would lend new emphasis to the already existent indisputable 
supremacy of the Wehrmacht. There could be no doubt that Ger- 
many, in possession of the Russian wheat areas (Ukraine), her 
minerals and other resources, especially petroleum, could continue the 
war for a long time, and was really unconquerable. Germany was 
therefore in a position, after the total defeat of European Russia to 

1 Dr. Enrique Ruiz-Guifiazti. 



JULY 1941 



87 



be expected in a few weeks, to end the war by a new offer of peace that 
would have a quite different basis from those of the former peace 
offers after the conquest of Poland 2 and France: 3 All of Europe was 
prepared for a new order under German leadership. The tremendous 
economic prospects which the prompt conclusion of peace would offer 
to Germany were unmistakable. 

On the other hand it should not be forgotten that the course of 
the war for almost 2 years had shown that Germany, in spite of the 
greatest efforts, could not [force] England, supported by North 
America, to her knees. England's situation would rather improve 
owing to the constantly increasing assistance of North America, so 
that she, too s could continue the war indefinitely. Only a successful 
invasion, which, it was generally believed, would cost Germany a tre- 
mendous number of casualties and still not guarantee a thorough 
success, could bring about a fundamental change in the situation. 

inasmuch as the prospect of direct negotiations between the Ger- 
many of Adolf Hitler and England under Winston Churchill prob- 
ably had to be termed hopeless for some time to come, the (group 
garbled) of a mediator appeared indispensable for bringing about 
peace, Only President Koosevelt could be considered for such ; aside 
from the military power now being developed he could also throw 
the entire economic and financial influence of North America into the 
scales, whereas the position of the Pope, in spite of his high personal 
prestige, was not strong enough for such mediation. Roosevelt's en- 
tire past policy had been directed toward the strengthening of his 
domestic position and he had been largely successful in this. He 
certainly had sufficient authority to stop all the warlike noises in the 
United States and to apply his great influence to mediation. If 
such peace negotiations did not materialize the end of the war was 
entirely out of sight. The resultant disorganization of the entire 
economic life, under which South America also suffered severely, 
and particularly the threatening destruction of England and Ger- 
many and a large part of Europe was terrible, and the responsibility 
of the leading statesmen for the continuation of the war was extremely 
grave. 

Without appropriate authorization from Berlin I did not consider 
myself empowered to further develop the conversation and therefore 
I did not ask whether the ideas that were expressed had anything to 
do with the conversations held with Roosevelt and the leading offi- 
cials in the State Department during the Minister's recent visit in 



' See vol. viii of this series, Editors' Note, p. 227. 

3 In a major speech before the Reichstag on July 19, 1940, in which he reviewed 
the achievements of the German armed forces Hitler also said, "In this hour, I 
feel it to be my duty before my own conscience to appeal once more to reason 
and common sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself 
in a position to make this appeal because I am not the vanquished, begging 
favors, but the victor speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why 
this war must go on . . ." The German text is printed in Monatshefte filr 
Ausmirtige Politik, August 1940, pp. 603-622. The official German translation 
is in German Library of Information, Facts in Review (New York, 1940), vol. n, 
No. 32, pp. 362-375. 



88 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Washington.* Eather, I limited myself to replying to the Minister 
that in the first place President Roosevelt with his odious statements 
about Germany lacked any sort of objectivity, which, after all, was 
the necessary basis for such mediation; therefore it was precisely he 
whom we consider responsible for lengthening the war because of 
the support of England. Finally the German people had not for- 
gotten the fateful role played by another American President at the 
close of the World War and would therefore be extremely distrustful 
with regard to any proposal coming from North America. The Min- 
ister thereupon stated that the situation today was after all entirely 
different, because Germany was victorious on all fronts as the ac- 
cepted ruler of Europe and therefore had opportunities to be "gen- 
erous." I have the impression that the Foreign Minister expressed 
mainly his personal opinion, though he doubtless wanted to offer the 
gcod offices of the Argentine Government for personal mediation, 
without his being authorized or commissioned to do so by the English 
or North Americans. I request instructions. 5 

Thermanst 



*Dr. Ruiz-Guiiiazti was in Washington in May for discussions about a trade 
agreement between the United States and Argentina. For the record of a 
conversation with Sumner Welles, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1941, vol, vi, pp. 399-401. No record of a conversation between Ruiz-Guinazti and 
President Roosevelt has been found and it is doubtful whether a meeting be- 
tween the two men took place. 

6 Document No. 112. 



No. 74 

386/211175-76 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris 

Telegram 

Special Traijt Westfalbn, July 5, 1941 — 7:25 p. m. 
No. 605 of July 5 

from Special Train Eeceived Berlin, July 5—8 : 30 p. m. 

No. 3556 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 5. 

KAM 291/EV 
With reference to your telegram No. 1909 of June 26. 1 
Please tell M. Darlan orally that we are prepared to consider a 
pardon for the territorial guards in our custody as requested by 
Marshal Petain in his letter to the Fiihrer, 2 although from the legal 
point of view we would certainly be justified in treating them as 
snipers. We are also prepared to renounce the extradition, offered us 
by Darlan, of Raynaud and Mandel, who were the intellectual insti- 



1 Document No. 23. 

2 The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram No. 1909. See footnote 1. 



JULY 1941 89 

gators of the activities of the territorial guards. We are, however, 
making the pardon dependent on the condition that the French Gov- 
ernment on its part impose imprisonment for life on Reynaud and 
Mandel and that it assume the strict responsibility that the two former 
Ministers never escape from detention and flee abroad. We must 
further demand that the French Government place at our disposi- 
tion all the documents in its hands that would furnish information 
about the political collaboration of Reynaud and Mandel with the 
American Government. We already have evidence that the two former 
Ministers together with Roosevelt and his followers, especially the 
former American Ambassador Bullitt, had worked toward war. We 
are moreover interested in strengthening our material by the exhibits 
in the French files, which are, no doubt, voluminous and convincing. 
France, just like Germany, has a great interest in shedding light upon 
these warmongering intrigues, because this would surely contribute 
to opposing the present warmongers in the United States effectively 
and thereby speed the conclusion of peace. In publishing the French 
material we would keep its delivery by the French Government secret 
and announce instead that we ourselves had found the material in 
France. 

As soon as the French Government fulfills the two above-mentioned 
conditions, that is the imprisonment for life of Reynaud and Mandel, 
and the delivery of its documentation concerning the warmongering 
collaboration of the two Ministers with Roosevelt and his followers, 
we would declare a general pardon of the territorial guards. The 
pardon could not, of course, extend to offenses punishable also in the 
case of regular French soldiers. Those members of the territorial 
guards who might have committed such offenses would in their prose- 
cution be treated like regular French soldiers. 

Please report by wire. 3 

RlEBENTROP 



3 See document No. 211. 

No. 75 

4S03/E23 7277-80 

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich 
Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry 

The Hague, July 5, 1941. 

Subject : The political situation in the occupied Netherlands territories. 

The war against Bolshevism naturally has also greatly excited the 

population in the Netherlands and is constantly in their minds. In 

this connection the most varied opinions and hopes are expressed with 



90 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

feelings ranging from joy to depression.- Joy because Germany -will 
supposedly experience her defeat in the east, as did Napoleon, because 
this will give England time to repair the breaches, because a Ger- 
many weakened by Russia "will no longer be able to fight England 
and the United States successfully and so on; depression because 
Germany may win in the east and then smash England. The majority 
of the Dutch are optimistic, however, regarding the fate of their 
country; they believe more than ever in the final victory of England 
and expect some sort of operation against the Germans in the west 
as long as the latter are occupied in the east. The attitude of the 
people has become noticeably more intransigent. 

The attitude of the "Nederlandsche Unie" x probably reflects this 
hope most clearly in the editorial which appeared in its newspaper 
Unie on July 3. (A translation is attached.) This article is con- 
sidered by the Reich Commissar to be an unequivocal rejection and 
a challenge to the speech given by the Reich Commissar in Amster- 
dam. 8 In any case this attitude of the Netherlands Unity party 
makes continued recognition of the N[ederlandsche] U[nie] impossi- 
ble. The Office of the Reich Commissar is considering the dissolution 
of this party. In the meantime all German agencies have been ordered 
to limit contact with the Unie functionaries to only the most necessary 
official conversations. 

Since the appearance of this article we can no longer reckon with 
the formation of a Netherlands legion for the fight against Bolshe- 
vism ; 3 the suggestion to this effect made by the National Front has no 
possibility of realization owing to the slight importance of this party. 
The NSB takes a negative attitude toward a "Netherlands legion" 
because it fears that the value of the 4,000 men of the Waffen SS 
who are already participating in active fighting in the east with the 
Standarte Westland would thereby be lessened. Moreover, an appeal 
by the NSB or the NSNAP would only achieve the opposite among 
the people of the Netherlands. Therefore, as we can no longer count 
on a Netherlands legion originating spontaneously, so to speak, it is 
intended to designate the SS-Standarte Northwest stationed at Ham- 
burg, in which 2,000 Netherlanders are already serving, as a Nether- 
land legion under the name of the "Volunteer Standarte of the 
Netherlands," and to call for recruits to this regiment through the 
Office of the Reich Commissar. At the moment a few formal ques- 



1 For the development of the political parties in the Netherlands during the 
German occupation, see vol. xi of this series, document No. 667. 

'The German translation of this article has been filmed on 4803/E237281-S4. 

In his speech at a meeting of German and Dutch National Socialists on June 
27, Seyss-Inquart reminded people of the Netherlands that their fate was de- 
cided in the east. Excerpts of this speech are printed in Dokumente der 
Deutschen Politik (Berlin, 1944), vol. ix, pt. 1, p. 257. 

a See document No. 45. 



JULY 1941 91 

tions are still being clarified with the Reichsfiihrer SS but it can be 
assumed that recruiting can be started in the next few days. 4 Propa- 
gandistically the 2,000 SS men in Hamburg can be utilized as a 
nucleus. 

Besides the 4,000 Netherlander in the Waffen SS another 4,000 
Dutch NSKK men are in action in the east. These 8,000 Dutchmen 
come almost exclusively from the ranks of the NSB and NSNAP. 
To what extent they should be counted as being in the "legion" for 
purposes of propaganda should be clarified with the Reichsfiihrer SS. 
The Reich Commissar will give his opinion with regard to this. 

The new situation makes it necessary and possible to proceed against 
the old political parties. The Reich Commissar has ordered the 
dissolution of all the old parliamentary parties and the confiscation 
or their property. 5 The main blow is directed against the anti- 
revolutionary party, which had been known for a long time as an 
organized resistance movement against National Socialism. The 
leader of this party, former Minister President Dr. Colijn, has been 
ordered not to leave the Limburg town of Valenberg. About 90 of 
his close co-workers have been interned in a camp. Dr. Colijn is 
under constant surveillance, but has a certain amount of personal 
freedom of movement. Nothing can be said as yet about the effect 
of the prohibition of the old parties. 

Along witli this, most of the clubs of all kinds are to be dissolved 
in order to eliminate the centers of resistance which they represent. 

As a further measure of the Reich Commissar, the dissolution of 
the States-General and an extensive amendment of the Netherlands 
Constitution is planned, as a result of which the reassignment of 
important administrative posts will become necessary and possible. 
Thereafter the dissolution of the trade unions is to be ordered. These 
have been under the administration of a Dutch commissar for almost 
a year. Reports will be made on the course of these actions.* 

The order for the collection of metal has met with a very negative 
reception. The general attitude of the population is best characterized 
by the current whisper propaganda: "Better to throw it into the 
canal than to give it to the Jerries." 

After the Queen's speech T the Reich Commissar ordered that all 
pictures of the members of the Royal House now living be removed 
from all public buildings. Although the people expected and under- 
stand this measure they show their annoyance at it nevertheless. 



'In telegram No. 218 of July 5 (173/84440) Bene reported that Hinimler bad 
approved the organization of the "Volunteer Standarte of the Netherlands." 

• For text of this decree of July 4, see Kaphae'l Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occu- 
pied Europe (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 
1944), pp. 459-460. 

* These reports have not been found. 
' See document No. 69. 



92 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

The English air raids, which have become more frequent in recent 
weeks, are taken without excitement. 

Owing to the general tension described above, there is a possibility 
that there will be some attacks and raids, but no major revolts are 
expected. 

Bene 



No. 76 

105/113675-76 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris 
Telegram 

MOST URGENT 

No. 607 of July 5 Special Train, July 5, 1941—8 : 00 p. m. 

from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 5—8 : 30 p. m, 

No. 3554 from the Foreign Ministry ■ Sent July 6. 

For the Ambassador personally. 

The Russian Grand Duke, Vladimir, has sent the Fiihrer from 
St. Briac a proclamation drawn up by him, addressed to all Russians, 
along with a cover letter. 1 In the proclamation all Russians are called 
upon to cooperate in the liberation of their homeland from Bolshevism. 

Please summon the Grand Duke at once and communicate the 
following to him : 

1. The Reich Government had taken cognizance of his proclama- 
tion. This proclamation was of a nature to help the Soviet Govern- 
ment and make the fight of the Wehrmacht more difficult, because 
it gave the Bolshevist rulers the opportunity of claiming in their 
propaganda that Russia was now threatened by the return of the old 
Tsarist feudalism, which would strengthen the will of the Red Army 
to resist. 

2. We wish to learn from the Grand Duke what he had so far 
done with his proclamation, in particular whether and to what offices 
he had sent it and whether he had had it published anywhere. 

3. The Reich Government had to demand of him that he refrain 
from any dissemination of the proclamation, as well as from all 
similar steps and from any political activity whatsoever, and that 
he give you a strict assurance to that effect. 

4. In case he should not comply with the foregoing demand, the 
Reich Government to its regret would be forced to intern him at once. 

Please also see that from now on the Grand Duke is watched most 
carefully by German security organs with respect to his entire activity, 
particularly his personal connections and his correspondence, and 
that the information gained in this connection is reported to you at 
once. Any dissemination or discussion of the proclamation in the 
French press or in any other manner must absolutely be prevented. 

1 Neither found. 



JULY 1941 93 

Please report at once by wire concerning the course of your con- 
versation "with the Grand Duke. 2 Furthermore, please report regu- 
larly your future information and observations concerning the Grand 
Duke. 3 

RlBBENTKOP 

3 Nothing f oud(I. 

3 Ho further reports found. 

No. 77 

205/142793-95 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

\ Telegram 

top secret Stockholm, July 6, 1941—8 : 04 a. m. 

No. 861 of July 5 Eeceived July 6^10 : 35 a. m. 

With reference to your telegram 1094 of July 4. 1 

1. The implementation of the German military wishes which in- 
volved not only the transit of the Oslo Division but also required 
important departures as regards the Navy and Air Force from the 
policy of neutrality of Sweden up to now was a severe test in domestic 
policy which the structure of the coalition Government could not 
cope with immediately. The pros and cons are still being heatedly 
discussed, and opinion in the country is divided. The Social Demo- 
cratic party, which possesses the absolute majority in the Government 
and in both houses of the Riksdag, displays a split which casts doubt 
on the work of the Cabinet in future decisions. The Cabinet will 
hardly be capable of bearing still graver tests than those thus far. 

2. The request to accede to the Tripartite Pact would represent such 
an encumbrance that it would mean the total abandonment of the 
present neutrality policy so far maintained with all means toward 
the outside and would bring about a political decision by Sweden 
in the sense of the Axis Powers against England and America. Such 
a result is difficult to attain with the present Cabinet. It is more than 
doubtful that the King would find an authoritarian minority govern- 
ment that would support such a decision, because strong personalities 
who could sweep the Swedish people along with them will be difficult 
to find. At any rate stable conditions that would be needed precisely 
for the case of a future accession by Sweden to the Tripartite Pact 
could hardly be created, since a minority government would find the 
Social Democratic party and thus the majority of the country in 
opposition. 

3. Even Foreign Minister von Giinther, who like the King would 
push the rapprochement with Germany to the limits of what could 
possibly be tolerated domestically, will not be able to justify Sweden's 

* Not found. 



94 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

accession to the Tripartite Pact to the political public opinion of 
the country. Giinther probably desires Sweden's political decision 
for Germany, but not a commitment of Sweden to distant powers like 
Italy and Japan who are alien to Swedish interests. 

4. What Foreign Minister von Giinther personally considers to be 
necessary and worth striving for, as is evident from numerous con- 
versations with him of recent date, is a treaty regulation of Sweden's 
relationship with the Reich expressing Sweden's cooperation in the 
consolidation of the new Europe, in particular in the great tasks 
arising in the east. Such a treaty would in practice mean the option 
for Germany and would fix Sweden's position at the side of Ger- 
many, but would still tend more toward the east than toward the 
west. Evidently Giinther would accept an orientation against Eng- 
land inevitably resulting from this as a necessary consequence. More- 
over such a treaty, in Giinther's opinion, (clear text evidently miss- 
ing) could be put through great domestic policy difficulties which 
in some circumstances could lead to a Cabinet change. Further- 
more, at such negotiations we could count on the present Foreign 
Minister to support our wishes, and in this he would also be able to 
rely on the authority of the King. The problem would be simpli- 
fied for Sweden, without a doubt, if Finland and Denmark would 
accede to such a treaty first or simultaneously. In all political con- 
versations with Giinther he expresses the great concern of standing 
isolated after a political accession of Finland to the Reich. 

4. [sic] A treaty of the above- sketched type, which would fix Swe- 
den's position at our side in the northern and eastern European area, 
could be of considerable importance and utility for us. Accession by 
Sweden to the Tripartite Pact could only rest upon an exceedingly 
unstable political situation. 2 

Schnukrb 

WlBD 

* See, further, document No. 79. 

No. 78 

386/211182 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

MOST URGENT P ABIS) July Q f 1941. 

No. 2030 of July 6 Received July 6—2:00 p. m. 1 

For the Foreign Minister. 

After arrival of the information of German agreement for the 
organization of French volunteer units for the struggle against Rus- 

1 Marginal note : "Forwarded as No. 2178 to the Special Train. July 6." 



JULY 1941 95 

sia, 2 I assembled at the Embassy the leaders of the Rassemblement 
National Populaire, 3 of the Doriot party, 1 of the Francistes, 5 and of 
the Ligne Frangaise. 6 These groups agreed on a common organiza- 
tion of volunteer units and on the text of a proclamation which will 
be published tomorrow in the press and on the radio. 7 

Marshal Petain as Chief of State has given his approval to the 
organization by private initiative of volunteer units for the struggle 
against Russia, and for this case he has canceled the law which pre- 
vents military service by French subjects outside the French armed 
forces. 8 

Abetz 



"Paris telegram No. 1862 of June 23 (386/211115) reported that Russian 
Emigres had asked to enroll. 

--TVeizsacker's draft telegram of July 1 (4641/E20926G) forecast German ap- 
proval of the enrollment of French volunteers in the Wehrmacht but indicated 
that Russian emigres would not be enrolled. 

Ritter's telegram No. 3555 of July 5 (386/211177-78), No. 606 from the Special 
Train, confirmed the decision to accept French volunteers ; indicated that sup- 
port for such enrollment on the part of the French Government was not wanted ; 
and suggested an upper limit of 10,000. 

'Marcel Beat. 

•Jacques Doriot, leader of the Parti Populaire Francais. 

B Marcel Bucard. 

' Constantinf. 

' Abetz' telegram No. 2031 of July 6 (386/211183-84) indicates that publica- 
tion of the proclamation was temporarily held up by an officer of General von 
Stulpnagel's staff. 

■ Abetz' telegram No. 2035 of July 7 (386/211186) indicated that there would 
be large participation ; some 50 trained pilots had enrolled. 

In telegram No. 3653 of July 14 (386/211208-209), No. 662 from the Special 
Train, Ritter instructed Abetz that so large a number of French volunteers as 
the 30,000 which had been reported, was politically undesirable ; 10,000 to 16.000 
was the upper limit 



No. 79 

205/142796 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden 

Telegram 

Special Train Westphalia, July 6, 1941 — 8 : 40 p. m. 
No. 614 of July 6 

from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 6 — 9 : 20 p. m. 

No. 1156 of July 7 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 7. 

RAM 295/R.V. 

For the Minister personally as well as for Minister Schnurre. 

I have taken cognizance of the statements in your telegram No. 861 
of July 5. 1 I reserve a final instruction concerning the further treat- 
ment of the question of Sweden's accession to the Tripartite Pact, 
but for your personal orientation at this time I wish to point out 

1 Document No. 77. 



96 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

that the possibility of a bilateral pact of Sweden with Germany men- 
tioned in your telegram is out of the question. If Sweden wishes to 
participate with Germany in the new European order, then only the 
form of the Tripartite Pact can be considered for this. Should 
Sweden in actuality finally decline accession, then we would bring 
about the accession of Denmark and Finland alone. I therefore re- 
quest that, in case Swedish quarters should bring up for discus- 
sion in conversations there the idea of a bilateral pact with Germany, 
you, for your part, not treat this as any actual possibility. However, 
as already stated, please await my further instructions 2 before taking 
any steps in regard to Sweden's accession to the Tripartite Pact. 

RlBBENTROr 



2 No record of further instructions on this point has been found. 

No. 80 

1527/373619-21 

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

urgent Washington, July 7, 1941 — 5 : 65 a. m. 

secret Received July 7 — 5 : 40 p. m. 

No. 2098 of July 6 

For Chief of OKW, Ausland; Chief of the Army General Staff; 
Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff 

Evaluation of the military situation July 6. 

The wirepullers around Roosevelt had planned to carry on the 
war according to the plan that the English along with other deluded 
people should fight and bleed for America until the time had come for 
ending the war by means of an intervention by America that no longer 
entailed any danger. The plan has long been disrupted by the 
Fuhrer's measures and the uncertainty because of Japan's attitude, 
and was upset in the last fortnight by Germany's initiative against 
Russia. It has been noted quite correctly on the part of best (clear 
text evidently missing) that a Germany which was victorious against 
Russia would have all the possibilities of victory in her hands. Soon, 
however, the primitive strategists at the helm of the English and 
American governments comforted themselves with the idea that 
Germany would be tied down with her main forces in Russia for at 
least three months and Japan would likewise hold back militarily 
for months until the decision had been reached in the Russian cam- 
paign. They pushed aside the American General Staff, which warned 
against such wishful thinking, [they said that] now was the time to 
strike Germany in the West by continuing and strengthening the air at- 
tacks in order thereby to shatter German morale; in the Middle East 



JULY 1941 97 

to replace General Wavell, who does not believe in Roosevelt's mes- 
sage of salvation and his strategy, with a more suitable soldier; 1 
and to propose to the American people through the Secretary of the 
Navy 2 that the bulk of the American fleet should "purge" the Atlantic 
Ocean of the German "threat". 3 The Russians were informed that 
the United States was not yet ready now, but from 1942 on the big 
blow would come from America. The Russians should keep to the 
tradition of the campaign of 1812 and like the United States try to 
draw out the war. 

These ideas characterize the primitive strategical thinking and, as 
always in history, the lack of clarity in military matters, typical of 
opportunist politicians. They are doing the Japanese a favor in with- 
drawing naval forces from the Pacific ; they live in a realm of fantasy, 
intoxicate themselves with slogans and do not have the slightest con- 
ception of how one is to purge the Atlantic of the German threat for 
the duration of the German-Russian war; they believe with boundless 
presumption that they can hold the Japanese exactly to the policy 
which is agreeable to the Americans, and they hardly take any account 
of German initiative. Of military importance at the moment is the 
fight now going on inside America as to whether the United States 
should enter the war in order to lengthen the war thereby and to keep 
England going. 

The events of the first two weeks of the Russian campaign have not 
by any means increased the sentiment for war, but have increased the 
nervousness about Japan's attitude. Again American war policy 
regards as its most important task the elimination of the danger 
threatening from the Pacific and shrinks from decisions as long as 
clarity in the relations with Japan, and if possible, an understanding 
with Japan has not been achieved. For this reason threats are ad- 
dressed to Japan which are 'backed only by an increasingly dispersed 
fleet which is incapable of attack. In the Sunday newspapers of July 6 
there are also tendentious reports regarding the slowing down and 
halting of the German attacks, which are clearly meant for Japan. 

The United States today has neither the fleet to carry on this struggle 
against Japan in the Pacific and at the same time support the English 
in the Atlantic with adequate forces, nor will it have in the course of 
this year an adequate army and a suitable air force. Finally, the uti- 
lization of even the few serviceable divisions is badly hampered by the 
scarcity of shipping space. 

Bottichee 
Thomsen 



1 On July 5, General Sir Claude Auchinleck replaced Sir Archibald Wavell as 
British Commander In Chief, Middle Bast. 

' Frank Knox. 

3 In address to the conference of State Governors on June 30 Secretary Knox, 
according to the New York Times of July 1, 1941 (p. 1, col. 4), stated that "the 
time to use our Navy to clear the Atlantic of the German menace is at hand." 

682-905—64 12 



98 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 81 

765/270453-55 

The Charge & Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

top secret Washington, July 7, 1941—7 : 04 p. in. 

No. 2110 of July 5 Received July 8—2 : 30 p. m. 

Pol IM 2131 gRs. 

With reference to telegram No. 2082 of July 5. 1 

[1.] Following announcement of the espionage case arrests in New 
York, the Consulate General reported as follows : Mas Albrecht Blank, 
who was taken on by the Library of Information some 3 weeks ago, is 
personally known from the time when he was employed by the Wester- 
mann & Company concern. He came to the Consulate General on 
several occasions and dropped hints that he had various secret 
contacts. 

2. The Consulate General knew that Axel Wheeler-Hill operated a 
transmitter. It immediately reported this to the Foreign Ministry 
and asked that this contact be immediatey broken off in view of Wheel- 
er's personality. At the same time, attention was called with renewed 
emphasis to the damage which such an operation was bound to cause. 
Wheeler had received training in radio communications and intelli- 
gence work in Hamburg. 

3. Karl Reuper returned from Germany after the outbreak of the 
war and immediately started telling that he had undergone training 
and would send intelligence reports to Germany by means of Wheeler's 
transmitter. 

4. The transmitter was procured by Schroder of the D.A.B. 

5. The wife of the arrested Georg Schuh, who is a German national 
herself and left for Germany a few weeks ago, is personally known ; 
she regularly sent information to an agency in Hamburg through ship 
stewards, etc. Her maiden name was von der Osten. Her nephew, 
one von der Osten, was sentenced to a long prison term as a German 
spy in Turkey some time ago. 

Most, and probably all, of the persons involved in this affair were 
totally unqualified for operations of this kind, according to everything 
the Consulate General had heard about them. To give themselves 
importance, these people kept hinting all the time among their ac- 
quaintances that they had been given such missions and were carrying 
them out. It can be assumed that the American authorities had long 



1 This telegram (765/270450) reported the arrests of a number of persona 
in New York, seven of whom admitted having been engaged in espionage 
activities on behalf of Germany; among those arrested was the operator of a 
secret radio transmitter whose activity had been known to the FBI from the 
very beginning. 



JULY 1941 99 

known all about the network, which, certainly would not have been any 
great feat, considering the naive and sometimes downright stupid be- 
havior of these people. The Consulate General repeatedly called the 
Foreign Minister's attention to this mischief. 3 The various counter- 
intelligence agencies in Germany have indiscriminately trained totally 
unqualified persons, and then sent them over here on missions, supplied 
with sympathetic ink and the like. Even immature, young fellows of 
twenty-one years were expected to set up transmitters here. 

The operations of the German agencies concerned in this field were 
marked by naivete and irresponsible carelessness, and on top of that 
lacked any kind of coordination. One almost had the impression that 
the various "counterintelligence" agencies were competing against one 
another. 

Tarn completely in agreement with the Military Attache with re- 
gard to this evaluation. I should add that such poorly organized 
operations by irresponsible and incompetent agents, which most likely 
have not benefited our conduct of the war, may cost us the last rem- 
nants of sympathy which we can still muster here in circles, whose 
political opposition is of interest to us. 3 

Thomsen 



a See vol. ix of this series, documents Nos. 289, 299, and 505 ; and vol. ii of this 
aeries, document No. 255. 

* Referring to the telegram which is printed here, Sonnlelthner informed Coun- 
selor Kramarz of Political Division IM In telegram No. 637 of July 11 from the 
Special Train (765/270457) that the Foreign Minister requested a report as to 
"who of those arrested in New York on suspicion of espionage worked with the 
Abwehr and who with the SD". In telegram No. 2349 of July 15 (765/270458) 
Counselor Grote told the Foreign Minister's Secretariat that inquiries were 
being made with the Abwehr and that a report could not be submitted before 
8 days. See, further, document No. 266. 



No. 82 

866/211187-89 

Ambassador Abets to the Foreign Minister 
Telegram 
MOST URGENT 

top secret Wiesbaden, July 8, 1941 — 8 : 20 p. m. 

No. 204 of July 8 Received July 8—10 : 20 p. m. 

For the Foreign Minister. 

I introduced the conversation with the French Government which, 
jointly with General Vogl, was started yesterday and resumed this 
morning, with the remark that : 

1. For the Iraq/Syrian sector? the French services agreed upon 
and the German services in return in the political, military, and eco- 
nomic field have been carried out. 



1 See vol. mi of this series, documents Nos. 546 and 559. 



100 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

2. For the North Africa Sector, French services agreed upon, 
namely, deliveries of trucks for the German Africa Corps, have been 
fulfilled ; transfer of guns and ammunition in progress, but transport, 
escort, and transshipment of supplies via Bizerte has not yet started, 
whereas German services promised in return in this sector in the po- 
litical, military, and economic field have been carried out or are in 
progress. 

3. For the West Africa Sector the agreement on French services 
planned was not expected by Germany by the date contemplated and 
therefore the discussions of German services in return have been 
postponed. Darlan replied that since the signing of the protocol 
on North Africa a number of events had occurred which had greatly 
increased the dangers incident to transportation via Bizerte. Eng- 
land had succeeded in bringing very considerable aerial reinforce- 
ments to Egypt through the Strait of Gibraltar and via the Gold 
Coast. By using an aircraft carrier near the Balearics 50 planes a 
day have been brought to the Eastern Mediterranean during the past 
month and by way of Central Africa a total of 200 machines. The 
Luftwaffe, on the other hand, had had to withdraw forces for the 
Russian campaign. French North Africa's own defenses had been 
greatly weakened because a major portion of the Air Force and six 
battalions had to be removed to Syria. 2 It seemed doubtful to him 
that England would wish to venture attacks on French North Africa ; 
on the other hand, it had to be expected that England would make the 
most remote French position of Dakar the target of attacks as soon 
as the support of the German military operations via Bizerte fur- 
nished her a pretext for this. The French Government was still 
determined to take this risk and made no change at all in its basic 
attitude. It could, however, defend a second Syria before public 
opinion only if moral weapons, in addition to military ones, were 
placed at its disposal. General Vogl refuted Darlan's opinion con- 
cerning the unfavorable development of the military strength in 
the Mediterranean. The German air forces there had suffered no 
reduction and could, moreover, soon be reen forced by wings from 
Russia, since the operations in the east were taking such a surprisingly 
swift and favorable turn. He believed that England, who had met 
in Syria with so fanatical an opposition on the part of the French 
troops, would not risk a thrust against French possessions a second 
time. Until now all English landing maneuvers had failed, and if 
France feared English attacks on Dakar, it should be recalled that 
in the past year such an attempt had been prevented with far smaller 
forces than were available today. The reasons of the French for 



a In telegram No. 191 of June 28 (378/209754-62) Welck reported that the 
French had received permission to transfer six infantry battalions and other 
troops and equipment to Syria. 



JULY 1941 



101 



the delay in the implementation of the movements of supplies via 
Bizerte could, therefore, not be recognized, and he had been commis- 
sioned by the OKW to press for a speedy performance of the services 
agreed upon. Darlan replied that the loss of Syria had shown that 
the most valiant resistance was doomed to failure if technical prepa- 
rations were not made in time. From the moment the transports 
started to move through Bizerte, he counted on a large-scale attack 
of the English on Dakar, by sea, air, and land; so that the problem 
of Dakar arose indirectly already in the North Africa sector of 
negotiations. Since the events in Syria, he also had to be in a posi- 
tion, more than previously, to expound the policy adopted toward 
England before his people through [suitable] propaganda. In this 
morning's conversation, Darlan asked for an early opportunity for 
a talk with the Foreign Minister in which he took it for granted 
that the peace treaty would not be prejudged. He would, however, 
like to submit the proposal for a political protocol which regulates 
relations between Germany and France for those questions that have 
arisen outside of the Armistice and those which may still arise. 3 In 
conclusion Darlan then stated that at the end of the week he would 
call a Cabinet meeting in Vichy, which Weygand was also being asked 
to attend, in order to obtain a decision as to whether supplies could 
start to move through Bizerte at once, in compliance with the German 

request. 4 

Abetz 



a See document No. 110. 

♦In a note to Abetz of July 8 (3485/E019480) and referring to this 
conversation, Darlan wrote "... in order to clear up any misunderstanding, 
I wish to make it plain that the political position of the French Government 
has not changed at all. If I insist on the necessity for a broad political con- 
versation, it is because I consider this to be indispensable for the French Gov- 
ernment so that it can proceed along the path it has traced for itself . . . 
For the outcome of the Cabinet meeting see document No. 100. 

No. 83 

1327/373635-36 

The Charge d 1 Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

urgent Washington, July 9, 1941—1 : 44 a. m. 

No. 2138 of July 8 Eeceived July 9—5 : 00 p. m. 

For the State Secretary. 

With reference to my telegram No. 2126 of July 8. 1 
The reaction to the landing of the American naval forces on Ice- 



1 Not found. 



102 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

land 2 shows how skillfully Eoosevelt exploits the power which he has 
gradually usurped. To this extent the occupation of Iceland is to be 
regarded as a touchstone of what public opinion and a generally 
quite amenable Congress will accept. As I have reported, Roosevelt's 
tactics consist in suggesting gradually to the public by word and deed 
the mood which he needs for consistently pursuing his policy. Today 
the American people are not yet ready to make blood sacrifices far 
away from America in addition to paying high taxes within the 
country. 

They are nevertheless already following Eoosevelt more or less 
fatalistically along a path that does not seem to involve any dangers 
for the time being, but whose general direction can be clearly recog- 
nized. Through an appeal to the ideals of conditional "defense" the 
American public is to be pushed into a course which will make it 
psychologically ripe for asking the President for war. Eoosevelt 
himself is much too skillful a politician to ask the people for war. 
Even though most of the material prerequisites are lacking for Ameri- 
ca's entry into the war, one must reckon nevertheless with Eoosevelt's 
unpredictableness as well as with factors that cannot be entirely 
judged from here, particularly Japan's attitude, which determines 
the freedom of action in the Atlantic. If there should be an incident 
because of Iceland, then Eoosevelt will operate with the argument 
of defense against an unprovoked attack. 

Public opinion here is at heart prepared to recognize that the Presi- 
dent's policy makes such incidents almost unavoidable; and as soon 
as the American honor is engaged and the first American blood has 
been shed under the American flag, the propaganda will have a rela- 
tively easy game. But it should not be simply assumed that the 
President would regard such an incident as an adequate reason for 

United States Forces arrived in Iceland on July 7, 1941. For the United 
States-Bntish-Icelandic negotiations preceding this move, cf. Foreign Relations 
Of the United States, 1941, vol. u, pp. 776-792. 

Counselor Etzdorf, the Foreign Ministry's representative with the High Com- 
m «?&r 0lf the Army recorded tne following in his notes of July 16 (1247/337687) : 
OKM has requested a political decision on whether with regard to naval 
warfare the occupation of Iceland is to be considered as the entry into the war 
by the U.S.A., or whether it is to be regarded as a provocation which should 
be ignored. 

"The Fiihrer stated in this connection that he is most ansious to delay the 
entry into the war by the U.S.A. for another month or two, because on the one 
hand, the entire Luftwaffe is needed for the campaign in the East, and on the 
other hand, a victorious campaign will have a tremendous effect on the situation 
as a whole— presumably also on the U.S.A. Therefore, the existing instructions 
issued to the Navy are not to be changed for the time being ; rather, one should 
continue to avoid ail incidents." 

Etzdorf 's notes apparently refer to a conference at Hitler's field headquarters 
on July 9 at which the High Command of the Navy submitted a paper on the 
effects of the entry of American troops into Iceland with proposals for possible 
countermeasures. Cf. U.S. Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence 
"Fiihrer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy 1941" (Wash- 
ington, D.C., 1947), vol. ii, pp. 3-7. 



JULY 1941 103 

asking Congress for a declaration of war. For until the rearmament 
of the United States is completed on land, sea, and in the air, his 
policy is not interested in carrying on a full war with all of its con- 
sequences, particularly in view of the undefined situation in the 
Pacific. The immediate aim of Roosevelt's policy is exclusively to 
strengthen England and her allies materially and morally and to 
prolong the war until America either can intervene decisively on the 
side of England or is so well armed that she can take over the English 
inheritance and settle accounts once and for all with her opponents, 
in particular Japan. This policy is served by the authorization law, 3 
which is misused by Roosevelt propagandistically as an expression of 
the will of the people, by the closing of the German consulates, 4 by 
the promise of aid to Russia 5 and by the occupation of Iceland. 
Further similar bombastic actions can be expected, which basically 
obligate America to very little and do not involve any immediate 
dangers. 

Thomsen 



* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 146, footnote 1. 

* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 634. 

* Presumably a reference to the statements made by Acting Secretary of State 
Sumner Welles on June 23 concerning the German attack on Russia, the last 
two paragraphs of which read as follows : 

"In the opinion of this Government, consequently, any defense against Hit- 
Ierism, any rallying of the forces opposing Hitlerism, from whatever source these 
forces may spring, will hasten the eventual downfall of the present German 
leaders, and will therefore redound to the benefit of our own defense and 
security. 

"Hitler's armies are today the chief dangers of the Americas." 

For text, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. I, pp. 767-768. 



No. 84 

65/45749-50 

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

secret Tehran, July 9, 1941 — 8 : 40 p. m. 

No. 590 of July 9 Received July 11-4 : 35 a. m. 

Owing to the increasing flow of reports about English intentions to 
attack which have reached the Shah, 1 especially from the source named 
in telegram No. 565 of July 3, 2 he has ordered extensive military 
defense measures. Troops in the provinces of Azerbaijan and Ker- 
manshah have consequently again been reinforced. The Shah has 
also given orders that Khuzistan Province, where the concessions of the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company are located, including Abadan, is to be 



1 Riza Shah Pahlevi. 
' Document No. 66. 



104 DOCUMENTS ON GEHMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

defended with all possible means. Further troop reinforcements were 
therefore dispatched to that province, too. 

Hand in hand with the military preparations went the diplomatic 
steps the Shah ordered to be taken with the British Government, 
which through the Iranian Ambassador in London s and simultane- 
ously through its Minister here * was informed, that consistent with 
her policy of neutrality, Iran would turn against "the aggressor." In 
the event of any British attack, the Iranian Government would appeal 
to Germany for aid and enter the war on Germany's side. The same 
applied in the event of a Russian attack ; just as in the opposite case of 
a German attack, the Iranian Government would request aid from 
Britain. The British Government, which was visibly impressed by 
this plain language, hastened, as the Minister President told me, to 
declare that it had no intention whatever of attacking Iran, 

The Minister President 5 is of the opinion that the English, who did 
not remain unaware of the serious military defense preparations of 
Iran, would not risk an attack on Iran in view of the clear position 
of the Iranian Government, of which they had been notified. If the 
attack should be made, nevertheless, the Iranian armed forces, despite 
their weakness in some modern weapons, would fight for every square 
meter of Iranian soil. Then the Iranian Government would approach 
the German Government with a request for help. 

I made it plain to the Minister President that any feeble, tacit 
consent to a British attack would make the worst possible impression 
in Berlin. I disposed of the question of a German attack on Iran, 
which he discussed only theoretically, to be sure, by pointing to Ger- 
many's sufficiently proved determination to avoid as far as possible an 
extension of the war. I am convinced that Iran will counter a British 
attack with resolute military resistance and that the appeal to Germany 
for help announced by the Minister President in that contingency will 
be issued. Because of the military and diplomatic steps taken by the 
Iranian Government, I believe that the danger of a British attack on 
Iran has become less acute. 

Ettel 



3 Mohammad Ali Mogbaddam. 

4 Sir Reader William Billiard. 
6 AU Mansur. 



JULY 1941 105 

No. 85 

260/170076-77 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland 

Telegram 

Special Train, Westfalen, July 9, 1941—10 : 10 p. m. 
No. 630 at the Code Room 

of the Foreign Ministry Received Berlin, July 9 — 10: 30 p. m. 
No. 849 of July 9 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 9. 

For the Minister personally. 

Recently I telegraphed you, in reply to your inquiry, that you may 
mention to the Finnish Government that it should break off diplomatic 
relations with England. 1 Since then I have heard nothing definitive 
from you in this matter. I just read that Eden has stated in the 
House of Commons that England intended to maintain diplomatic 
relations with Finland and to keep her Minister there. 2 I ask that you 
now take up this matter with the Finnish Government and say more or 
less the following : 

England, both through Mr. Churchill's utterances and through the 
exchange of military missions and, according to our information, 
through the agreements made by these missions for cooperation in all 
military fields, had openly made herself an ally of the Soviet Union in 
its war against the German Reich. 3 Inasmuch as Finland is Ger- 
many's ally in this fight against the Soviet Union, it appeared to us, 
both out of fundamental considerations and in view of the possibilities 
for espionage and the reporting of intelligence, detrimental to the 
interests of the allied Finnish- German armies, if Finland continued 
to maintain contact with England and keep the Finnish Minister in 
England. We should thus like to assume that Finland now on her 
part, is drawing the consequences from this situation and breaking 
diplomatic relations with England and recalling her Minister as soon 
as possible. 

I also refer to the telegram recently transmitted to you,* according 
to which the English themselves had apparently, as a matter of course, 
counted on the break of diplomatic relations with Finland and had 
already sent instructions to the English Minister that the intelligence 
organization was to be turned over to his American colleague. I 
assume that the Finnish Government is not closing its eyes to these 



1 See document No. 29 and footnote 2. 

' On July 2, Mr. Eden, replying to a question in the House of Commons, stated, 
"His Majesty's Government are at present maintaining diplomatic relations with 
Finland." (Parliamentary Delates, fifth series, H of O, vol. 372, col. 1325.) 

s Cf. Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950), pp. 377-395. 

4 Not found. 



106 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN" POLICY 

facts and request a telegraphic report from you in the near future on 
the settlement of the matter. 5 

Ribbemtrop 



5 In telegram No. 632 of July 16 (260/170079-80) Zechlin reported further dis- 
cussions with Witting regarding a Finnish break of diplomatic relations with 
Great Britain. It appeared that Witting advocated this course ; recognized that 
the Anglo-Russian treaty of July 13 had completely changed the situation ; but 
had been unable to make his views prevail. 

In telegram No. 645 of July 19 (260/170083-84) Bliicher reported an hour-long 
discussion with Witting in which he again urged that Finland break off relations 
with Britain. It appeared that President Ryti opposed such a move because of 
the reaction which it would have on the United States. 

See, further, Editors' Note, p. 185. 



No. 86 

265/173076 

The Ainbassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

No. 24 of July 9 Ankara, July 9, 1941. 

Eeceived July 9—10 : 52 p. m. 

For the Keich Foreign Minister. 

The Foreign Minister has advised that General Dentz is suing for 
an armistice. 1 Furthermore, a French minelayer and a tanker have 
come into the port of Alexandretta, probably to seek safety. Sara- 
coglu recalled his statement that Turkey has the greatest possible in- 
terest in northern Syria but has made no agreements with England 
in this matter. He requested consideration whether Germany might 
not give consent to Turkish occupation of northern Syria (approxi- 
mately up to the pipeline Abu Kemal-Tripoli) , of course just as a 
temporary solution until conclusion of a peace. The French Army 
in Syria could be returned to that section and repatriated to France. 
Please state your view. 2 Sharp reaction against England in Antalya 
affair s not yet exploited by our propaganda. Fifty-two dead. 

Papek 



1 Cf . document No. 101. 
* See document No. 97. 

The French auxiliary vessel St. Didier was sunk by British aircraf t In the 
Gulf of Antalya off the southern coast of Turkey on July 4. 



JULY 1941 107 

No. 87 

278/178644-46 

Memorandum, by the Director of the Political Department 

most ttrgent Beklin, July 9, 1941. 

U. St.S. Pol. 631 

The Bulgarian Minister called on me today and for his part, too, 
brought up — in a somewhat different form from the past reports — 
the Italian wishes for a change of the frontier with Bulgaria, regard- 
ing which we already have a memorandum from Minister Beckerle of 
July 8 1 and the telegram No. 703 of July 8 from the German Charge 
d'Affaires in Sofia. 2 

T$ie description of the frontier which the Italian Minister in Sofia 3 
gave the Bulgarian Government is appended as an enclosure 4 and 
drawn on the accompanying photostat of a map. 5 

Minister Draganov, as instructed, expressed doubts as to whether 
the line proposed by the Italians was in accordance with the agree- 
ment made between Germany and Italy, 6 and asked, as instructed, 
that information regarding this line be communicated to the Bul- 
garian Government. His presentation, however, differed in one point 
from the telegram from our Charge d'Affaires in Sofia. Whereas 
according to this telegram the Italian Minister in Sofia in transmit- 
ting the draft treaty stated that this frontier was in accordance 
with the one agreed upon in Vienna between Germany and Italy, 
according to Draganov's statement the Italians had admitted that 
this was not the case in several points, particularly at Mount Lju- 
boten, northwest of Skoplje. 

M. Draganov asked in addition that because we had made Italy 
accept the Vienna line of the frontier with Bulgaria we now sup- 
port Bulgaria in holding this line. Finally the Minister also men- 
tioned that the Italians had offered the Bulgarians compensation 

'This memorandum (278/178841-42) dealt with a forthcoming visit to Rome 
by the Bulgarian Minister President and the Foreign Minister for the purpose of 
negotiations on the final determination of the Albanian-Bulgarian frontier, and 
in this connection recorded an Italian suggestion made in Sofia that Bulgaria 
give up a large territory to the west and northwest of Skoplje. The memorandum 
stressed that this involved an area where there were mines which were of 
Importance to Germany. 

'This telegram (278/178843) reported that, according to the Bulgarian For- 
eign Minister, the Italian Minister in Sofia had handed in a draft treaty provid- 
ing for a frontier which greatly differed from the present line of demarcation. 
The Bulgarian Foreign Minister requested German corroboration of the Italian 
assertion that this line of the frontier was in accordance with the line which 
Germany and Italy had agreed upon at Vienna. 

' Count Massimo Magistrati. 

'Not printed (278/178847).. 

1 Not found. 

* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 398. 



108 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

at Vranje for the cession at Mount Ljuboten, not at the expense of 
Albania but of Serbia. 

As is known, this line of the frontier was carried through in 
Vienna with respect to Italy because there are chrome deposits in 
the area nortlrwest of Skoplje which according to the present Italian 
wishes, as shown in the appended map, would partly fall into Italian 
hands. Furthermore, as is known a special agreement has already 
been made between Germany and Bulgaria regarding these chrome 
deposits,' so that we are also directly interested in the question. 

A memorandum by Senior Counselor von Schmieden, who was 
present at the negotiations in Vienna, is appended. 8 

Since according to present plans the Bulgarian Ministers are to 
be in Rome on July 14, a quick decision is necessary as to whether 
and in what form we should help the Bulgarians in this matter. 

I therefore propose that we give the Bulgarian Government con- 
fidentially a map with the line agreed upon in Vienna, and tell 
the Bulgarians that they should not give in to the Italians in this 
matter. We might also consider speaking openly with the Italians 
about the matter; we could probably first wait and see, however, 
what the Bulgarians themselves accomplish in Rome. 

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State 
Secretary. 9 

WOERMANN 



7 See vol. xn of this series, document No. 393 ana footnote 3. 

* Not found. 

* See, further, document No. 94. 



No. 88 

82/60298-98 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Minister 
Telegram 

most urgent Tokyo, July 10, 1941 — 11 : 50 a. m. 

No. 1184 of July 10 Received July 12—3 : 10 a. m. 

For the Foreign Minister. 

With reference to your telegram No. 1112 of July 9. 1 
Following the Japanese Foreign Ministers communication on the 

status of the Japanese- American talks, reported in telegram No. 865 

of June 3, 2 I have regularly called the Foreign Minister's attention 



1 A marginal note identifies this telegram as Special Train telegram No. 6277. 
Neither telegram No. 1112 nor No. 6277 has been found but it is probable that 
an error Is involved and that the reference is to telegram No. 627 from the Special 
Train forwarded to Tokyo as No. 771 of July 9. See document No. 89, footnote 1. 

a In this telegram (177/85139) Ott reported having been informed by Matsuoka 
that the American reply to the Japanese position with regard to a previous 
American statement was being expected. 



JULY 1941 



109 



to the necessity of promptly informing the German Government 
about the awaited American reply. The Foreign Minister assured 
me repeatedly, most recently at the end of June, that Japan's state- 
ment of her position, on which I reported by telegram No. 731 of 
May 13, s had not yet been answered. Information received by me 
from other sources confirmed the fact that the Japanese Ambassador 
in Washington, Admiral Nomura, as was to be expected, was trying 
to keep the Japanese- American negotiations going but had not yet 
received any statement of the American Government's position. In 
my last conversations with Foreign Minister Matsuoka after the 
beginning of the German-Russian conflict, he told me in reply to 
my question about the status of Japanese- American relations that he 
was ifully occupied with internal political conflicts and by delibera- 
tions regarding Japan's attitude toward the German-Russian conflict 
and that he consequently was unable at present to devote any atten- 
tion to the American problem. I thereupon tried to keep informed 
about the status of Japanese- American relations through other chan- 
nels as well. In so doing I learned from an informed person in 
the Japanese Foreign Ministry, who, however, was not authorized 
to make any statement, that at the insistence of Admiral Nomura 
an American reply to" 1 the Japanese statement had actually been 
received. My informant told me that the American reply is an 
attempt to reinstate the original American plan of April 18. 5 In 
particular, the American Government demanded a statement from 
Japan ruling out application of the Tripartite Pact in the Pacific. 
With regard to China, the American Government did not want to 
agree to a commitment to break with Chiang Kai-shek in the event 
that he should refuse to accept the American advice that he arrive 
at an agreement with Japan. Finally, Secretary of State Hull had 
pointed out in an oral statement made to Nomura that a successful 
continuation of the discussions was possible only if that were desired 
uniformly by the entire Japanese Cabinet. However, certain state- 
ments by individual members of the .Government cast serious doubt 
regarding the existence of such a desire. 8 

I have also learned from my informant that Matsuoka felt per- 
sonally offended by Hull's approved (group missing) and will try 
to take the wind out of the sails of the pro-American clique by calling 
attention to this improper interference in Japanese internal affairs. 



* See vol. sii of this series, document No. 512, footnote 2. 

'The following portion of this telegram was sent separately by radio via 
Osaka, received in Berlin on July 12, 6 : 45 p. m„ and forwarded to the Special 
Train at 9 : 35 p. m. 

5 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 454 and footnote 1. 

*The foregoing presumably refers to the statement given to Ambassador 
Nomura by Secretary of State Hull on June 21 and to the draft proposal 
which Secretary Hull handed to Nomura on that occasion. Cf. Foreign Rela- 
tions of the United States, Japan, 1931-ldM, vol. n, pp. 485-492. 



110 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

My informant categorically denies that these negotiations might lead 
to an agreement with the United States. He doubts, however, whether 
a majority of the Japanese would decide on a clear break. It is much 
more probable that the Japanese Government in its reply to the 
American statement will revert to its own proposal of May which 
would then result in a ' 'deadlock. " 7 

I learned confidentially that this morning there was a meeting 
of the leadership committee of the Cabinet in which Matsuoka told 
for the first time of the existence of the American reply. According 
to my information the leadership committee has adjourned till 
Saturday , a when it will continue the discussions. 

In accordance with instructions I shall in the course of our next 
conversation ask Matsuoka, without indicating that I have been told 
to do so, about the state of the negotiations and remind him again 
of our request for detailed information. 

Since, as experience shows, Matsuoka feels, in American affairs, 
which are always treated here with special secrecy, greatly dependent 
on the group of Cabinet leaders, I should, for the sake of counter- 
acting the pro- American clique, appreciate it if you would inform me 
oi all details winch have come to light at your end with regard to 
the new American move. 

_ Ott 



T In English in the original. 
' July 12. 



No. 89 

82/60285-89 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 

Telegram 

>r »„» , Special Train Westfalen, July 10, 1941—2 : 51 p. m 

No. 707 from the Special Train P 

Received Berlin, July 10—4 : 00 p. m. 
No. 1018 from the Foreign Ministry gent July 10. 

For the Ambassador personally. 

Please wire immediately detailed analysis of conditions there. The 
ioiiowing items are of particular interest: 

1. IVhat are the present relations between Japan and the United 
btates? I had already asked you to inquire of the Japanese Foreign 
Minister of your own accord and without instructions,* at the next 
occasion, whether the recent Japanese-American conversations on 

m™in Slvl&^^f ^ £? SpeclaZ Train Awarded to Tokyo 



JULY 1941 111 

rapprochement 2 have come to naught, and above all, in which way 
they were terminated. Do you think it possible that the Japanese 
Ambassador in Washington, Nomura, has given any oral assurances — 
without any written agreement having been made — to the American 
Government, which could have induced Roosevelt to occupy Iceland, 3 
knowing that in the rear he has nothing to fear from Japan? Please 
wire at once all available information on the subject of Japan- 
America. Of course I request you not to show the slightest suspicion 
with respect to the Japanese Government in official conversations. 

2. How was America's occupation of Iceland received by Japanese 
public opinion in the press, and above all, in important government 
and army circles ? How is this action evaluated? Have you the im- 
pression that there could be a tendency in Japan to pursue perhaps 
a'Very shortsighted policy, which by coming to terms with America, 
would result in involving the latter in a European war for a long 
time in order to have a free hand in East Asia without openly clashing 
with America, to settle the Chinese business and to expand further in 
the South? I need not emphasize that this would be, as I said, an 
extremely shortsighted policy which would mean that Japan could 
miss the great historical opportunity that will never come again. 

With England and America, Japan will never be able to establish 
a Greater East Asia; this is only possible against those two coun- 
tries. The Japanese Government woidd be under a terrible delusion 
if it should believe itself to be able to obtain by diplomatic barter a 
gigantic, historical decision such as the establishment of its position of 
power in East Asia from the clever English and Americans. 

Out of opportunism the latter would perhaps make certain tempo- 
rary compromises but would never yield on principles, in order to 
attack Japan at a favorable opportunity, seizing from her everything 
she has won during the last years with the blood of her army. 

3. I request a detailed report regarding the reaction of the Japanese 
Government to my message to Foreign Minister Matsuoka.* I do not 
quite understand why you have not yet reported on this in detail. As 
Mr. Matsuoka told you, he intended to lay the message before the Jap- 
anese Cabinet and the Emperor. What was their reaction? Did not 
Mr. Matsuoka inform you about this during your conversation? If 
necessary please take up this question anew with the Japanese Foreign 
Minister, whereby an answer to this message must, of course, be ex- 
pected by us. 



' See vol. xn of this series, documents Noa. 454, 455, and 456. 
8 See document No. S3. 
* Document No. 53. 



112 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

4. Please thank the Japanese Foreign Minister on this occasion for 
having transmitted the telegram from the Japanese Ambassador at 
Moscow. 5 It would be good if we could receive further news from Rus- 
sia in this way at regular intervals. 

Summarizing, I would like to say this : I still have full confidence in 
Japan's policy and in the Japanese Foreign Minister, above all, because 
the present Japanese Government would actually act irresponsibly to- 
ward the future of the nation if it did not seize this unique opportunity 
to solve the Russian problem as well as to secure once and for all Ja- 
pan's expansion to the south and the settlement of the Chinese prob- 
lem. Since, as the Japanese Ambassador reports from Moscow, Russia 
actually is faced with impending collapse, which tallies, incidentally, 
with our observations in so far as we are able to appraise the situation 
during the present phase of the war, it is practically impossible for 
Japan not to solve the question of Vladivostok and of the Siberian 
area. 

It is, of course, also in our interest that Japan intends to secure for 
herself further positions in Indochina, 6 etc., just as any expansionist 
measure on the part of Japan is welcomed by us on principle. Re- 
garding the consequences which may and probably will result from the 
occupation of Iceland by American armed forces, and the attitude to 
be taken by us toward Japan in this connection, I will send you de- 
tailed instructions within the next few days. I wish to say today for 
guidance in your conversations that the fact that American armed 
forces were being sent for the military support of England into the 
area of operations officially declared by us not only clearly proves the 
aggressive intentions of Roosevelt but that the penetration of Ameri- 
can armed forces into this combat zone to support England amounts, 
as such, to an aggression against Germany and Europe. For it is im- 
possible to join one of the armies in a theater of war where two armies 
are locked in combat without wishing to join in the shooting and with- 
out actually doing so. I do not doubt for one moment that, in the case 
of an outbreak of hostilities between America and Germany, Japan 
will stand by her obligations resulting from the Tripartite Pact. In 
this connection it can be regarded as absolutely certain even today that 
America is the sole aggressor. 

For the rest, I request that you go on with your efforts to bring 
about the earliest possible participation of Japan in the war against 



5 In telegram No, 1171 of July 8 (82/60274-75) Ott had forwarded excerpts 
from a telegram from the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Yoshitstigu 
Tatekawa, which Matsuoka had given him that day. 

a In telegram No. 670 from the Special Train, forwarded to Tokyo as No. 1068 
of July 16 (216/147719) Ribbentrop informed Ott that this remark regarding 
Indochina was for his personal information, adding the following instruction : 
"Please be noncommittal In conversations about Indochina with the Japanese 
and otherwise so that the impression may not arise that we urged this occupa- 
tion on the Japanese, so to speak, at the expense of the French. 



JULY 1041 113 

Russia, in accordance with my message to Matsuoka, using all the 
means at your disposal, for the earlier this participation in the war 
materializes, the better it is. The natural goal must he, as before, to 
bring about the meeting of Germany and Japan on the Trans-Siberian 
railroad before winter sets in. With the collapse of Russia the position 
of the Tripartite Pact Powers in the world will be so gigantic that the 
question of the collapse of England, that is, the absolute annihilation 
of the British Isles, will be only a question of time. An America com- 
pletely isolated from all the rest of the world would then be faced with 
the seizure of those of the remaining positions of the British Empire 
important to the Tripartite Powers. 

I have the rock-like conviction that the new order which we desire 
will be achieved as a matter of course and will present no more insur- 
mountable difficulties if the Tripartite Powers will firmly stand to- 
gether, countering at once every action on the part of the Americans 
by employing the same weapons. For the rest, please report in future 
as often and as detailed as possible about all developments of the 
political situation at your post. 

RlBBENTROP 



No. 90 

246/162034-35 

The Charge d' Affaires in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

No. 708 of July 10 Zagreb, July 10, 1941—8 : 40 p. m. 

Received July 10 — 10 : 10 p. m. 

Subject : Persecution and resettlement of Serbs. 1 

The Serbian question has become considerably more acute in the 
last few days. The ruthless carrying out of the resettlement with 
many unfortunate by-products, and numerous other acts of terror in 
the provinces in spite of the strict decree of June 27, 1941," by the 
Poglavnik are giving even the sober-minded Croatian circles reason 
for serious concern. The various previous acts of terror and excesses 



1 This telegram was sent in reply to Foreign Ministry instruction Pol IV 2141 
of June 25 (4832/B243223-39) , which forwarded a report from the Plenipo- 
tentiary of the Foreign Ministry with the Military Commander in Serbia with 
a number of enclosures dealing with the persecution and forceful expulsion of 
Serbs in Croatia. 

2 In telegram No. 608 of June 27 (4827/E241186) Kasche reported that on 
June 26 Pavelie' had issued an "Extraordinary Decree and Order" for the pre- 
vention of arbitrary excesses. It provided for trials by courts martial with 
the death penalty against perpetrators of arbitrary acts. This decree was 
published in the Croatian press on June 27. A summary of the first four 
paragraphs of that decree is contained in a document from the flies of the 
Legation in Zagreb, initialed by Kasche on June 27 (4827/E241187-88) . 

682-905—64 13 



114 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

by the Ustase committed against the Serbian population in many 
regions of the country, which, had come to the knowledge of the 
Legation through communications from the Military Commander 
in Serbia, 3 through reports by individual Wehrmacht command posts, 
through the Sarajevo Consulate and a number of other sources, had 
already induced the Minister to point out orally and in writing as 
well both to the Marshal * and to the Foreign Minister s the dangerous 
character of these occurrences. 6 The more so, as it was necessary for 
the understanding between the Wehrmacht and the Croatian people 
to limit these occurrences. 

Taking into consideration this last point General Glaise von 
Horstenau yesterday evening, after talking witli me, felt impelled to 
bring up this matter of the Serbs first with the Marshal and then,, 
at the latter's express wish; also with the Poglavnik. General Glaise 
von Horstenau expressed to the Poglavnik in the presence of the 
Marshal his grave concern over the excesses of the Ustase, supporting 
his statements with numerous specific examples from the most recent 
period. The Poglavnik had to agree with him in general, spoke of the 
phenomena common to all revolutions and referred to the decree of 
June 27 mentioned above. The Poglavnik and the General agreed 
that in the future particularly striking cases reported by Wehrmacht 
authorities would be subjected to a close investigation. 

The German General stated in his report to the OKW, which he 
submitted at the same time, that he could not make any proposal 
that could induce the German occupation forces to interfere directly 
with the misdeeds of the Ustase, because Croatia was an independent 
state belonging to Italy's sphere of influence. Furthermore, the 
occupation forces were much too weak to take over police surveillance 
to the extent necessary. Moreover, intervention in individual cases 
would involve the Wehrmacht much more than heretofore in a share 
of the responsibility in the tremendous majority of cases where it 
could not intervene. 

The General states in his report that the whole country has been 
seized with a feeling of the gravest legal insecurity. Unfortunately, 



*A letter of June 25 from the Chief of the Administrative Staff of the 
Military Commander in Serbia to the Legation in Zagreb (4827/E241181-84) 
listed a number of terroristic acts committed against Serbs on the territory of 
the Independent State of Croatia and requested the Legation to make serious 
representations with the Crotian Government. A copy of this letter was sent 
to the Foreign Ministry by the OKW on July 15 (4827/E241159). The cover 
note stated that the OKH "considered it intolerable that incidents of that kind 
should be permitted in the Army's zone of operations." 

* Slavko Kvaternik, 
6 Mladen Lorkovic". 

* A note verbale of the German Legation in Zagreb sent to Foreign Minister 
Lorkovic" on July 7 (4827/E241180) enclosed the report from the Military 
Commander in Serbia referred to in footnote 3. Additional data on terrorist 
acts against Serbs were sent to the Croatian Foreign Minister with riotes 
verbales of July 10 and 15 (4827/E241162-79) . 



JULY 1941 115 

as one who has been acquainted with the entire former Yugoslav area 
for many years, I must concur in this opinion, because the Serbian 
question has become very much more acute as a result of the resettle- 
ment of the Serbs now under way. This resettlement which is being 
carried out harshly and the many atrocities preceding it will heap up 
tremendous amounts of incendiary material everywhere where Serbs 
live, and will create centers of unrest in the near future which will be 
difficult to control. 

Troll 



No. 91 

3197182473-77 

Tne Head of Division W VI of the Economic Policy Department to 
the High Command of the Wehrmaoht and Other Offices and 
Ministries 1 

Berlin, July 10, 1941. 
Ha. Pol. lib 2367 * I. 

Subject: New German-Swedish Agreement regarding Overseas Mari- 
time Traffic to and from Goteborg. 

With reference to my letter of February 10, Ha. Pol. lib 374/I, 3 
and of March 8, Ha. Pol. lib 750.* 

The Swedish ship traffic to and from the overseas areas by way 
of the harbor of Goteborg whicli was established by the German- 
Swedish exchange of notes of February 7 5 and of March 5 * of this 
year was brought to a standstill by the inclusion of the sea area around 
Iceland in the German zone of operations at the end of March of this 
year. 6 The difficulties arose from the establishing of the course to be 
followed through the zone of operations by the incoming and out- 
going Swedish ships. On the German side a course was prescribed 
for the ships along a loxodrome halfway between Iceland and the 
Faroes. The Swedish Government meanwhile had informed us that 
it had not succeeded in getting the consent of the British Government 
to this course: that rather the British side for control purposes had 



1 This letter was addressed also to the High Command of the Navy, to the 
Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, to the Reich Ministry of Economics, to the 
Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture, and to the Reich Ministry of 
Communications. 

3 Ha. Pol. lib 2367 : Not found. 

s This letter (319/192537-38) addressed by Leitner to the same group of re- 
cipients as are indicated by the heading and footnote 1, announced the Initial 
establishment of the Goteborg traffic by means of the exchange of notes of 
Swedish Minister Arvid Richert and Rudolf Leitner. 

4 Not found, 

•This exchange of notes, filmed on 319/192539-43, served as an enclosure to 
Lettner's letter of Feb. 10 identified in footnote 3. 
" See vol. xii of this series, document No. 210. 



116 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN" POLICY 

demanded that ships sailing from east to west or from west to east 
take a course leading through the Faroes and touching at Skopen 
Sund. 

At the wish of the Swedes, negotiations have taken place in the 
Foreign Ministry, July 4-8, with a Swedish delegation headed by Rear 
Admiral Lindstrom with the aim of getting the Goteborg traffic again 
under way. The results of the negotiations are set down, in the offi- 
cial minute, a copy of which is enclosed. 

By order: 

RtJTER 

[Enclosure] 

Berlin, July 9, 1941. 

Official Minute ok the Results of the Discussions Conducted in 
Berlin From July 4 to July 8, 1941, Regarding the Continuation 
of the Goteborg Traffic 

Copy zu Ha. Pol. lib 2367. 

I. On the German part it is agreed that the wish of the Swedish 
Government be granted that the five Swedish ships now lying in 
America, namely the Satumus, Sveadrott, Brasil, Stegeholm, and 
Peru, may make the trip to Goteborg by the course over the Faroes 
whereby the Swedish Government assumes every risk of loss in the 
zone which is prescribed in paragraph 1 of II below, under the stipu- 
lation that the five ships observe the conditions of notification, identifi- 
cation, etc. 

II. After the Swedish delegation had proposed that Sweden her- 
self bear the risk for the ship traffic near the Faroes and further that 
she give guarantees that no exchange of goods take place at the 
Faroes, the German delegation agreed with the continuation of the 
Goteborg traffic itself along a course for the ships by way of the Faroes 
under the following conditions : 

1) Within the area that is comprised within a circle with a radius 
of 60 nautical miles with its center at Skopen the traffic goes exclu- 
sively at Swedish risk. At this occasion it is emphasized on the Ger- 
man part, as it has been repeatedly before, that a guarantee for a 
safe trip by the ships through the German zone of operations cannot 
be undertaken on the German part. 

2) The Swedish Government guarantees that neither on the out- 
ward nor on the return trips of the ships will there be any goods dis- 
charged or taken aboard at or near the Faroes ; and the stipulation ap- 
plies for the crew, for passengers, and to mail, newspapers, and films. 

3) The Swedish Government pledges that for the whole voyage 
of each ship it will have aboard a Swedish officer as supercargo who 
will be responsible that the regulations which are to be issued by the 
Swedish Government are not violated, particularly by the captain 
or by the crew. 



JULY 1941 117 

4) The German consent to this reactivation of the Goteborg traffic 
represents .only an experiment until further notice which can be given 
up again in accordance with the war situation and with the experi- 

. ences gained. 

5) Under the condition that the stipulations which are enumerated 
as 1 to 4 under II are fulfilled on the Swedish part, it is declared on 
the part of the Germans that they will be ready to be considerate of 
the Swedish ships sailing on the Faroe course according to the possi- 
bilities. The voyage of the ships in the zone which is described in 
paragraph 1 of II goes, however, essentially at Swedish risk. 

III. The assurance is given on the part of the Swedes that they 
will strive so to regulate the Goteborg traffic that the trips of ships 
through the German zone of operations do not take place more than 
twicje a month in each direction and that the traffic will be simplified 
and lightened as much as possible (grouping the ships together, agree- 
ment as to times, etc.). The prescribed regulations which are to be 
observed (notifications, identifications of the ships, prescriptions for 
the voyage) will be made known to the Swedish Legation in Berlin 
(Naval Attache) once more by the High Command of the Navy. 7 

IV. The German delegation declares its agreement that the goods, 
bought on Swedish account and which in total weight of approxi- 
mately 8000 tons are still lying in England, be brought to Sweden. It 
is agreed that this can be carried out : a) either by means of a Swed- 
ish ship which goes in ballast from overseas to England and brings 
the goods from there to Goteborg and then will be left free on the 
German part for outward voyage with goods; i) or in such fashion 
that the goods will first be shipped from England to a harbor in some 
neutral country (e.g., Portugal or South America) and then reach 
Sweden in the Goteborg traffic. 

V. The Swedish wish for an extension of the list of goods which 
according to the exchange of notes of March 5, 1941, are valid for 
the Goteborg traffic e will be examined benevolently and will be con- 
sidered generously. 



'The exchange of notes of Feb. 7 (see footnote 5) had provided for a German 
Control Office (Geleitstelle) which was to operate at GSteborg. For each enter- 
ing or departing ship the Swedish maritime authorities were to submit complete 
data to the Control Office : name of the ship, list of passengers and crew in all 
cases. For outgoing ships they were to provide the destination and full details 
regarding the cargo : kind, amount, name of the exporter, name of the ultimate 
receiver. For incoming ships the Swedish authorities were to provide the port 
of departure and date, the probable date of entry, and full description of the 
cargo. Such data were to be presented at least 8 days prior to the arrival or 
departure by the ship. Each outgoing ship on reaching its port of destination 
was to report Its arrival to the nearest German Consulate and was also to report 
the discharge of its cargo. 

8 RUter's letter of July 14 addressed to OKM, to OKW, OKL, and to various 
ministries ( 319/192452-64) forwarded a memorandum with the revised list of 
items for the trade with South America, Central America, and Mexico, and for 
Japan and China. 



118 DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

VI. In view of the present stoppage of freight traffic over Petsamo 
it is agreed that closer agreements over the exportation and importa- 
tion of Swedish goods by way of Petsamo are not in order but that 
in principle the list of goods valid for the Goteborg traffic can be 
applied in approving Swedish wishes for exports as soon as the Pet- 
samo traffic is resumed. 9 

Initials of Minister Leitner 
Initials of Office Chief Stahle 



•In telegram No. 1129 of Aug. 5 (319/192430-31) Wied reported that Hagglof 
had told him that Sweden's trade in Europe was practically confined to Germany 
and Finland, and her overseas trade was confined to the GBteborg traffic which 
was controlled by Germany. 



No. 92 

819/192471 

Memorandum, ~by ike Head of Division W V of the Economic Policy 

Department 

Berlin, July 10, 1941. 

e.o.Ha.Pol.454g.Ks. 

Major Radtke, 1 by order of Colonel Becker, 2 telephoned that he 

would go to Stockholm on Friday. 3 Colonel Becker himself cannot 

go, unfortunately. 

I. As to the individual Swedish wishes * he will bring the following 
answers. 

1) License for motors: positive, within the framework of the com- 
munications already made to us by Ministerialrat Miiller. 

2) Airplanes : negative. 

3 ) Motors from captured material : positive. 

4) Delivery of tanks to Sweden in exchange for the delivery from 
Sweden to Germany of spare parts for tanks : essentially negative. 

5) Armor for tanks : negative. 

6) Magazine equipment for tanks. Inasmuch as the Swedish wish 
is not clear, no position with regard to it can be taken now. 

7) Cross-country motor vehicles and tractors: a partial compliance 
is possible. 

8) 21- cm. cannon from Skoda. A good substitute offer can be made 
to the Swedes. 

9) Lists of the still open orders for optical and radio equipment : 
positive. 

1 Major Badtke, of the OKW, Wi RU. 

* Colonel Becker, of the OKW, Wi RU. 

* i.e., July 11. 

* See document No. 59. 



JULY 1941 119 

II. A general directive whether the basic tendency in the actual 
discussions of the Swedish wishes is in large measure to be benevolent 
or scarcely so is expected from Headquarters today. 5 

Herewith respectively submitted through the Dirigent of Ha. Pol. 
to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl. 6 

VAN SCHERFENBEKG 



! A minute by Seherpenberg, e.o. Ha. Pol. 459 g. Bs. (319/192468), of July 12 
records : "According to a communication from Colonel Becker, General Thomas 
brought the directive from the Fuhrerheadquarters for Major Radtke that in the 
negotiations with the Swedes regarding war material he was to show a reserved 
attitude rather than a benevolent attitude." 

•Wiehl's memorandum of July 12, zu Ha. Pol. 459 g. Rs. (319/192469-70), 
records the point by point discussion of Schnurre's telegram of July 2 (docu- 
ment No. 59) with the War Economy and Armaments Office of OKW and with 
the Reich Air Ministry. 

No. 93 

326/195002 

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy 

in Brazil 

Telegram 

No. 967 Berlin, July 10, 1941. 

Sent July 11, 5 : 40 a. m. 
zu Ha. Pol. 4187^ II. 

With reference to your Nos. 630 * and 1108. x 

Please inform the Brazilian authorities that we shall continue to 
hold to the execution of the contract as in the past and that the Wehr- 
macht together with Krupp is investigating a new plan of produc- 
tion regarding which a further communication will be made as soon 
as possible. 3 Please inf orm Schluchtmann * of your step as soon as 
possible so that he will proceed pari passu. 

For your information and to guide your conversation : 

Krupp submitted to the Wehrmacht a proposal for the resumption 
of the manufacture interrupted by the exigencies of war ; 5 to be sure, 
it also necessarily represents a postponement of the original delivery 
plan, but signifies a considerable extension and improvement of the 
proposal in the letter of March 11, 1941. 6 Meanwhile a decision on 



1 Ha. Pol. 4187: This was telegram No. 1108 of June 19 (326/194994) In which 
Priifer reported that the Brazilian Ministry of War could no longer be put off 
regarding the delivery of the promised war materials. 

For previous developments, see vol, xn of this series, document No. 612. 

! See vol. xn, document No. 612, footnote 1. 

8 Not found. 

' The representative of Krupp in Rio de Janeiro. 

* See vol. xn, document No. 612, footnote 3. 

* See vol, xn, document No. 612, footnote 2. 



120 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Krupp's proposal is possible e»ly after oonoluoion ef- the dceioiro ep- 

WlEHL 8 



* The words scored through were crossed out on the original and new words 
added in longhand to read : "only after further progress has been made with 
current operations in the east." 

8 Typed marginal note : 

"Note: The original version of the statement to be transmitted to the Bra- 
zilians, agreed upon in yesterday's conference, seems to me to be too laconic; 
the Ambassador will have to say a little more to the Brazilians, after all. I 
have arranged the present version by telephone with Major Radtke, who was 
entirely of my opinion. 

The phrase 'in agreement with Schluchtmann' intended by H. Pamperrien 
seemed ambiguous to me ; of course the Ambassador must proceed alone, and 
merely a pari passu procedure by Schluchtmann is to be assured. Here, too, 
Major Radtke and I are of one opinion. M [oraht] ." 
"2. A[fter] dis[patch] re[submit], H. Pamperrien. 

(Let Krupp know by telephone for the purpose of informing Schluchtmann 
in Rio. Information to OKW and RWM on 4559) ." 



No. 94 

278/178852 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 

U. St.S. Pol. 643 Berlin, July 11, 1941. 

In connection "with the conversation of this morning (U. St. Pol. 
641 ) l I gave the Bulgarian Minister, in accordance with instructions, 
a map showing the Vienna boundary line between Albania and Bul- 
garia, And I added, in accordance with instructions, that the Bul- 
garian Government could use the argument with the Italians that it 
had already concluded an agreement with us regarding the exploita- 
tion of chrome and that it could not agree to a unilateral modification 
of the frontier without Germany's consent. 

The Minister expressed his thanks for this communication the im- 
portance of which he correctly understood. 

I furthermore told the Minister that on the basis of his statements 
I could not see on which side of the Vienna line the chrome mines 
were which Italy demanded to have handed over to her last night. 
Finally, anticipating every possibility, I also pointed out to him that 
there were minor differences between the German and the Italian map. 

WOERMANN 



'In this memorandum of July 11 (278/178850) Woermann recorded having 
been informed by Minister Draganov that an Italian colonel had confronted the 
Bulgarian Military Commander in Skoplje with the demand "in form of an ulti- 
matum" for the evacuation of the chrome mines north of Mount Ljuboten held 
by Bulgaria. On this occasion the Bulgarian Minister again requested informa- 
tion regarding the line of the frontier agreed upon by Italy and Germany in 
Vienna. 

According to this memorandum Woermann was subsequently authorized by 
Ribbentrop to give Minister Draganov a map of the Vienna line. 



JULY 1941 121 

No. 95 

82/60301-02 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

most urgent Tokyo, July 12, 1941 — 10 : a. m. 

No. 1208 of July 12 Keceived July 13—12 : 20 ajn. 1 

For the Foreign Minister. 

With reference to your telegram No. 771 of July 9 2 and my tele- 
gram No. 686 3 of July 10. 

In the absence of the Foreign Minister who was indisposed I saw 
Deputy Foreign Minister Ohashi today about current matters and in 
thap connection turned the conversation to American-Japanese rela- 
tions. Ohashi confirmed to me that an American reply had been 
received. His statements about its contents agree in general with 
the reports I had already received confidentially from within the 
Foreign Ministry. He also confirmed to me the oral statement by 
Secretary of State Hull, which has already been reported. He 
added, more specifically, that the American Government had refused 
to be bound by any agreements in the matter of an entry into the war 
"for self-defense." Furthermore, the American Government had 
stated with regard to a settlement of the Japanese-Chinese conflict that 
it could not agree to the continued presence of Japanese troops in 
North China and Inner Mongolia. With regard to China the Amer- 
ican Government intended to adhere to the principle of the Open Door. 
Finally, the American reply contained the offer to settle all questions 
of trade and of procurement of raw materials in the Pacific with 
Japan in a fair manner on the basis of reciprocity, 

Ohashi told me that the proposal was of course unacceptable. He 
himself believed, however, that the Japanese Government would for 
the present avoid breaking off the negotiations abruptly so as not to 
aggravate the present difficult situation. I asked Ohashi to let me have 
all the details of the American reply and keep me currently and 
promptly informed about further developments. Ohashi promised 
me that he would inform the Foreign Minister immediately. 

Ott 



1 Marginal note : "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 2315, July 13." 
* See document No. 89, footnote 1. 
3 Marginal note : "Presumably 1184". 
Telegram No. 1184 is printed as document No, 88, 



X22 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 96 

105/113710-12 

Circular by Ambassador Bitter 1 

Multex No. W JtJLY 10 ' 1ML " 

Pol. I M 5166 g. 

With reference to my instruction Pol. I M 4796 g. of July i> 
In consultation with the authorities concerned, particularly the 
OKW and the Waffen SS, guidelines have been set up for the em- 
ployment of foreign volunteers in the struggle against the Soviet 
Union and for their technical implementation. The essential points 

1 In principle only compact units under their own leadership will 

be useS^whSn general ^ill be *^ ""« iSTb?^^^ 
untpprs Formations in a state of readiness will be reporteaio me 
OKW V t™ German Diplomatic Mission, if there is one through 
tht Forlign Ministry. Transportation will ^e a-anged by he 
branches of the Wehrmacht or, in the case of untrained ™^y the 
commander of the Replacement Army m conduction with the _ Cmef 
of Wehrmacht Transportation. Immediate employment is intended 
!n SrSE ^ of volunteer formations which are tramed and equipped 
by the homelands. Formations that have to be first inspected, 
equipped, and trained in Germany will be ^^¥Kd 
Armv for the time being. Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Dutcn, ana 
FlS volunteers will" In principle be taken by the ^chs^rer |S 
nnd nlaced in the Waffen SS. In general Reich citizenship will not be 
SreTthrough enlistment. In the case of countries with legation 
SS to which entry into the Wehrmacht results, in loss of citizen- 
ship negotiations, if necessary, will be considered m order to make 
iT^b^SSt&onahip is retained. Please send a written report on 

^^SSS'SSSSS^V ^ion -ill not as a rule rece^ew 
uniforms, but will receive the important f ha ™ c ^ st ™ ^^S 
uniform steel helmet, rank and national insignia ^ ^™*£°J^ 
are trained in Germany will receive German uniforms w^h the badges 
of their nationality. Arms will be provided by Germany. Arms 
brought along will be utilized in so far as the supply of ammunition 
pSX Thl oath will be rendered to the Fuhrer as Supreme 
Commander of the Wehrmacht for the fight against Bolshevism. 

i Sent t0 the Embassies in Italy and Spain, the Embassy in Paris, the Lega- 

■Not printed L (34/2474<Ml7). This instruction forwarded to a number o ! Mis- 
slom, coMes of the minutes of an interdepartmental conference held in the 
Foreign Ministry on June 30 which dealt with foreign volunteers for the struggle 
against the Soviet Union. 



JULY 1941 123 

3. Assumption of all costs by the Reich is planned. This is con- 
fidential for the time being, since negotiations regarding this are still 
in progress with the responsible Reich authorities. In any case for- 
eign volunteers will receive soldier's pay, front allowances, reimburse- 
ment of travel and expenses for detached service as well as cash 
allowances for feeding themselves. Further details are still being 
settled. 

4. Compact volunteer formations will in principle be subject to the 
military disciplinary regulations of their country, German discipli- 
nary regulations will apply to formations lacking their own disci- 
plinary regulations or with German superiors. Large formations with 
their own military courts will retain them. Smaller units will be 
sub j ect to German military j urisd iction. 

D.VThe Waffen SS has already issued or intends to issue similar 
regulations. 

6. In countries where there are German Missions I request the 
Mission chiefs to take care that all political negotiations in the ques- 
tion of volunteers, i.e., negotiations with the government, political or- 
ganizations, and similar groups, are carried on by the Mission chief, 
whereas the handling of the technical military questions, falls to the 
Wehrmacht Attache. In France the volunteers will be handled by 
the Military Commander in accord with the Paris Embassy. 

RlTTER 



No. 97 

265/173081 

The Foreign Minister to tlie Embassy in Turkey 

Telegram 

RAM 308/R Special Train, July 12, 1941— 2: 00 p. m. 

Received Berlin, July 12—2 : 20 p. m. 
No. 902 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 12. 

With reference to your telegram No. 24 of July 9. 1 

With regard to the wish of the Turkish Government expressed to 
you through the Turkish Foreign Minister that we give our consent 
to the occupation of northern Syria by the Turks, you are requested 
to convey the following : 

The English justified their attack on Syria on the ground that the 
French had permitted German aircraft to be there. While we believe 
that the English used this merely as a pretext and would have taken 
action against Syria in any event, France nevertheless has acted very 
loyally toward us in this matter. Consequently, we also feel an obliga- 
tion of loyalty on our part not to range ourselves against French in- 
terests in the Syrian question, and it is therefore not possible for us 
to take a favorable stand regarding the Turkish request for occupation 
of northern Syria. 

RlBBENTROP 



1 Document No. 86. 



124 DOCUMENTS OK GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 98 

310/I924Q7 

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Mini§ti*y 
Telegram 

No. 926 of July 12 Stockholm, July 12, 1941—5 : 30 p. m. 

Received July 12 — 8 : 05 p. ra. 

Also for Ambassador Ritter. 

In my telegram No. 822 of July 2 1 I asked that after examination 
of the Swedish wishes for arms a negotiator with adequate full 
powers be sent here. Today Major Radtke arrived, bringing a fully 
negative answer that was not cleared with the Foreign Ministry. 
According to the statements of Radtke there are a few minor items 
in the Swedish list of wishes which were cleared in a positive sense 
in Berlin," but Radtke cannot make even these few concessions to 
the Swedes because the OKW, for certain basic considerations, does 
not wish to make any concessions at all without new massive Swedish 
counterservices. 3 

On the basis of this instruction of Radtke's I was obliged to call 
off the negotiations set for today with the Swedish officials. In addi- 
tion to this the instructions of Radtke are in contradiction to the 
directives for the Air Attache here which on individual points were 
positive and which have just been confirmed by telephone by the 
Reich Ministry of Air. 4 I shall therefore take up the aerial ques- 
tions separately on the basis of the directives which the Air Attache 
has received. 3 In this situation the question of the delivery of Ger- 
man war material to Sweden requires basic clarification, hereafter 
as hitherto, particularly because we will have to present further 
German and Finnish wishes 6 of the most varied kind to the Swedish 
Government. 7 

' Document No. 59. ScHNURRE 

* See document No. 92. 

* See document No. 92 and footnote 5. 

4 A draft telegram of July 5, Ha. Pol. 440 g. Rs. Ang. 3 (31G/192480-81), 
outlined the provisional views of the Reich Ministry of Air (pending final deci- 
sion by the Reichsmarsehall), end indicated that Colonel Becker would be 
on hand in Stockholm to be of assistance in the negotiations on aerial matters. 

5 Not found. 

* In telegram No. 1196 of July 8 (319/192478-79) Schnurre was informed that 
because of the general difficulties in transportation the situation with respect 
to rubber had become critical, and was directed to ask for the delivery to 
Germany of some 3,000 tons of raw rubber from Swedish stocks against payment. 

Schnurre replied In telegram No. 942 of July 13 (319/192466) that he had 
carefully checked the matter with Friedrich, the expert of the Reich Office for 
Rubber. On the basis of the niggardliness of the German response to Sweden's 
wishes, Schnurre did not consider it appropriate to ask the Swedes for rubber. 
Friedrich agreed with this view and planned to return to Berlin to see if it 
might not be possible to offer the Swedes buna in return for rubber and to 
offer also the process of manufacturing buna. 

'In telegram No. 1301 of July 14 (319/192465) Wiehl informed Schnurre 
that Ambassador Ritter would bring up the matter of Sweden's wishes again 
with the OKW. 

See, further, document No. 254. 



JULY 1941 125 

No. 99 

1527/373659-58 

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

urgent Washington, July 12, 1941 — 8 : 33 p.m. 

No. 2194 of July 11 Keceived July 13—10 : 00 a. m. 

For OKW, Ausland; OKH, Attache Department; KLM, Attache 
Group. 

The development of American rearmament up to the middle of this 
year has in general proceeded in such fashion as we have continu- 
ous)^ reported since the spring of 1939. In the middle of this year 
the American Army reached the planned strength and organization 
and now requires a few more months in order to receive as a whole 
the latest training and equipment. Parts of the Army are ready 
today. 

As a result of large deliveries to England, the equipping of the 
Army Air Force with material has also not yet been completed. 

The previous evaluations of the rearmament and of the American 
armament industry have proved to be accurate in all essential points, 
even where they differed from the opinions of American experts. I 
refer to my individual reports. The fact remains, which is also 
important for the political measures of the American Government, 
that the second half of 1941 will bring a sharp rise in the development 
of the Army, Air Force and armament industry. 

On July 1 the American Army, including its air force, had a strength 
of about 1,400,000 men, consisting of 4 armies, 9 army corps, 27 in- 
fantry divisions, one of them motorized, 2 cavalry divisions and 
4 armored divisions, which will be increased to 6 in the near future, 
. under one commander of armored troops. 120,000 men are employed 
in the overseas possessions including Newfoundland and Alaska. 

The Air Force is supposed to consist of 54 combat groups and 6 
transport groups, the organization of which was reported in the 
dispatch of January 23. 1 It is 167,000 men strong. 

The equipment of the Army and the Air Force will improve con- 
siderably by autumn; by spring of 1942 it will be complete. At the 
moment the equipment is still inadequate. Only 2 divisions can 
be considered as fully equipped, and a total of 5 as being ready for 
immediate use. 

The demand of the War Department that the service period of 
the men called up under the military law, 2 of the reserve offi- 

1 Not found. 

'Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, approved Sept. 16, 1940- U.S. 
Statutes at Large, 1939-1941, vol. 54, p. 885. 



126 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

cers, and of the National Guard units be extended beyond the one year 
so far stipulated, is being justified on these grounds: Between 75 
and 90 percent of the officers are reserve officers, and the new units 
cannot be set up with their modern training or kept in the high state of 
readiness which is desirable if there is an annual turnover of officers 
and men. 

At the same time the Army demands abolition of the provision ac- 
cording to which men called up under the military service law and the 
National Guard must not be used outside the Western Hemisphere. 
In order, nevertheless, to have always some forces available for over- 
seas employment, two divisions were formed solely of volunteers 
serving 3 years, with regard to whose employment there are no 
restrictions. 

Whereas the entire Army in its present organization will be pro- 
vided with modern equipment by spring of 1943, certain formations 
in the meantime are being prepared for special tasks according to 
completion of their training and equipment. They are called "task 
forces", 3 formations of all service arms, usually reinforced divisions 
that are equipped for immediate independent use for special tasks. 
Thus there are two divisions for landing operations. Two armies with 
4 army corps including army and corps troops are supposed to be 
constantly in the highest state of readiness after completion of their 
armament. 

In my reports I have regularly noted the development of American 
armament and the armament industry, also their weaknesses. I ur- 
gently warn against overestimating the weakness and underestimating 
American efficiency and the American determination to perform. 

It is easy to draw incorrect conclusions from statements and 
criticism in the American press. In cases of doubt I recommend that 
my evaluation be used as a basis. 

As I have done for years I repeat in particular my report that the 
American officers' corps of the Army and the Air Force in general 
meets high requirements and that the influence of the tradition going 
back to Washington and Steuben, and thereby to Frederick the Great, 
supports the structure of the American armed forces. They are work- 
ing intensively and are giving greatest attention to the problem of 
modern warfare. Unsuitable individuals are now being eliminated, 
good officers are being advanced with priority ; the officers of the re- 
serves and the National Guard are being trained intensively. 

BornoHEK 
Thomsen 



•In English in the original. 



JULY 1941 127 

No. 100 

386/211199 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

MOST -URGENT 

top secret Paris, July 12, 1941 — 9 : 50 p. m. 

No. 2091 of July 12 Received July 12—10 : 50 p. m. 

For Herr Schwarzmann. 

For immediate presentation to the Foreign Minister and Ambassa- 
dor Abetz. 

"This evening Fatou x and Guerard handed me the instruction 
they received after today's Cabinet meeting 3 for transmission to 
the Embassy. The text of this instruction, translated into German, 
reads p,s follows : 3 

I have the honor to inform you that after hearing the presentation 
of Admiral Darlan, under the chairmanship of Marshal Petain, the 
Cabinet decided that: 

1. It did not seem possible to proceed to carry out part II of the 
Military Protocol of May 28,* as long as the political negotiations, 
within the framework of which this protocol is placed, have not been 
concluded. 

2. The French Government will remain loyal to the policy es- 
tablished on May 11 in Berchtesgaden, 5 but it believes that at this 
moment any decision other than the one it has made would be con- 
trary to the interests of France as well as of Germany. 

3. A note verbale e will be addressed to you at once that will exactly 
define the attitude of the French Government. 

SCHLEIEIt 



'Louis Marie Pierre Fatou, Commander (promoted to Captain in November 
1941), Naval Representative of the French Delegation in the Occupied Zone. 

' See document No. 82. 

'The French text is printed in La Delegation francaise aupr&s de la Commis- 
sion atlemande d' Armistice, vol. rv, pp. 58SW590. 

* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 559. 

6 See vol. xii of this series, documents Nos. 490 and 491. 

' See document No. 113. 



128 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 101 

366/211198 

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy 
and to tlw Embassy in Paris 

Telegram 
SECRET 

To Rome No. 1735 Berlin, July 12, 1941. 

To Paris No. 3649 zu Pol. VII 3832 g. 1 

For Chief of Mission ! For your information : 

By direction of the Foreign Minister, I have informed Minister 
Cosmelli of the Italian Embassy as follows: 2 

"The French Government has recently informed us that, through 
the American Consul General in Beirut, 3 the English had sent to 
General Dentz proposals for the suspension of hostilities.* The French 
Government at the time secretly inquired as to our view. We had 
thereupon replied to the French Government that we were convinced 
of the insincerity of the English intentions and could therefore only 
warn the French against making agreements with the English. 5 We 
had at the same time added, however, that if the French considered 
themselves incapable of offering further resistance, we naturally would 
have to leave to them the final decision as to how they should pro- 
ceed. Since that time the French had not approached us in the matter 
any more. In the last few days a number of conflicting reports con- 
cerning the Anglo-French armistice negotiations had come to our 
attention." e 

End of the communication. 



1 Pol. VII 3832 %. : Not found. 

1 In telegram No. 643 of July H from the Special Train (TO/50567) Ribbentrop's 
instructions were conveyed to Woermann. 

" Cornelius Van H. Engert. 

4 In Paris telegram No. 1946 of June 29 (70/50529-30) Sehleier reported the 
fact of the British proposal and the text of a French reply. Cf. Foreign Rela- 
tions of the United States, 191,1, vol. nr, pp. 755-756. 

"No record of such a German reply has been found. 

"In telegram No. 221 of July 9, dispatched July 10 (70/50558-59) Rahn< 
reported having been informed by the French High Commissioner of Syria 
that he was forced to approach the British with a request for negotiations re- 
garding cessation of hostilities. Cf . document No. 165. 

By a message of July 11 (70/50570) Weizsacker sent to the Special Train the 
text of an instruction which he proposed be sent to Rahn. A minute of July 32 
by Weber (70/50509) records Ribbentrop's approval of the instruction which 
requested Rahn to limit himself to giving the following general advice: 

"a) If honorable terms, compatible with the dignity of France, could not he 
obtained in the armistice negotiations an unconditional surrender without as- 
sumption of political commitments of any kind would be preferable. 

"6) Any concession favoring the de Gaullists, above ail any recognition of 
the de Gaullists as a political or military factor ought to be avoided in the 
negotiations". 

According to a teletype message sent by Woermann to Gaus on the Special 
Train on July 14 (70/50576) the instruction which was dispatched on July 12, 
10:45 p. m. failed to reach Rahn because of conclusion of the armistice. 



JULY 1941 129 

I then referred to the Anglo-French exchange of notes of which, we 
had meanwhile been informed from Vichy. 7 

WOERMANN - 

* Following a proposal by General Dentz of July 8 addressed to the British 
authorities for cessation of hostilities an Anglo-French exchange of communica- 
tions took place through the good offices of the United States which resulted 
in the signing of an armistice agreement on July 14. See Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1941, vol. m, pp. 762-774. 



[Editors' Note. On July 12 the German Foreign Minister had a 
conversation witli Minister M. C. Agikalin of the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry who on instruction from Saracoglu conveyed thanks for 
Bibjaentrop's part in the achievement of the German-Turkish Treaty 
of June 18 (Volume XII of this series, document No. 648). The 
record of this conversation which was drawn up by Loesch on July 13 
(F20/320-32) is in large part illegible on the copy from the film of 
files of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. 

From those parts of the document which can be read it appears that 
most of the conversation was taken up by Ribbentrop's explanations of 
past German policy toward Britain, Turkey, and the USSR.] 



No. 102 

62/42334 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark 

Telegram 

Special Train Westfalen, July 13, 1941 — 1 : 00 a. m. 
No. 651 of July 13 

from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 13—2 : 10 a. m. 

No. 772 of July 13 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 13. 

With reference to your telegram No. 882. 1 

It is entirely in our interest that the Danish Government or the 
King of Denmark 2 should protest to the American Government 
against the occupation of Iceland by American troops. 3 Please make 
strong representations to this effect with the Government at your post.' 1 

RlBBENTROP 



1 In this telegram of July 8 (62/42328-29) Kotze reported that he had talked 
with Foreign Minister Sea venius "about the occupation of Iceland by American 
troops" and asked for instructions regarding the Foreign Ministry's attitude to 
a possible Danish protest to Washington. 
Christian X. 

s See document No. 83, footnote 2. 

4 See document No. 118. 



662-905— 64 14 



130 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 103 

1527/373669 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal 

Telegram 

Special Train Westfalen, July 13, 1941—1 : 00 a. m. 
No. 652 of July 13 

from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 13—2 : 10 a. m. 
No. 1062 of July 13 

from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 13. 

In connection -with the occupation of Iceland by American troops, 1 
American politicians are speaking openly for America also occupying 
the Azores. 2 Please call the attention of the Government there to 
this news and ask them how they evaluate the matter and what position 
they will take toward an American occupation of the Azores. 3 

KlBBENTROP 



1 Document No. 83, footnote 2. 

3 On May 6 Senator Claude Pepper proposed in a speech in the United States 
Senate that the United States seize various bases in the Atlantic, among them 
the Azores and the Cape Verde islands (for text of his speech, see U.S. Congres- 
sional Record, vol. 87, pt. 4, p. 3617) . In telegram No. 982 of May 9 (129/121081- 
82) Huene gave the text of an official declaration of the Portuguese Government 
repudiating these proposals. For the attitude of the United States Government 
concerning the Azores and the other Atlantic Islands, see Foreign Relations of 
the Vnited States, 19H, vol, n, p. 839-859. 

3 No reply to this directive has been found. For Portugal's attitude see doc- 
ument No. 141. 

No. 104 

1527/373670-71 

The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

urgent Washington, July 13, 1941—5 : 44 p. m. 

No. 2210 of July 13. Received July 14—2 : 45 a. m. 

For the State Secretary. 

From the reports by agents regarding statements by Early and 
Willkie (cf. telegram No. 2146 of July 9 1 and No. 2165 of July 10 *) 

l This telegram (1527/373638-40) relayed reports from a "reliable source" 
regarding statements made by Early, President Roosevelt's Press Secretary, 
that "Roosevelt intended to occupy suddenly the Cape Verde Islands and Dakar 
within the next two weeks." Cf. document No. 133. 

'This telegram (1527/373642-43) reported that "Wendel Willkie, the Repub- 
lican candidate for the Presidency in the 1940 election, told his friends about 
a recent conversation with President Roosevelt in the course of which the latter 
allegedly expressed his "firm resolution to bring about a state of war with 
Germany, and as early as possible at that." 



JULY 1941 131 

as well as from other data, the following appraisal of American for- 
eign policy after the occupation of Iceland may be made : 

1. The President does not want a formal declaration of war on 
Germany because it would commit him irrevocably to a total effort. 
He still believes that he will be able to attain his goals, namely, the 
protection of the Western Hemisphere and the destruction of National 
Socialism without a full war effort of his own. He has intimated to 
the English that they will have to wage total war at the front alone. 

2. This does not exclude Roosevelt's being determined to wage 
undeclared war. The frequent use of the expression "pirates" with 
respect to German air and naval forces indicates a tendency toward 
"shooting without declaration of war." 

X For this the President reserves for himself freedom of action even 
without asking Congress. The President on the basis of his powers 
is at any time in a position to take steps which place America de facto 
in a state of war, and with respect to which Congress has no other 
choice than to give its subsequent approval if he demands it. Ameri- 
can history offers many such examples. 

4. One must reckon with further operations after the fashion of 

the occupation of Iceland, possibly also in the Pacific. With respect 

to Portugal, too, the principle propounded by Hull applies that the 

inalienable right of self-defense has precedence over the respect for 

foreign territorial sovereignty. 

Thomsen 



No. 105 

82/B0316-19 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most urgent Tokyo, July 14, 1941—2 : 30 a. m. 

No. 1217 of July 13 Received July 14—11 : 20 a. m. 

For the Foreign Minister. 

With reference to your telegram No. 1018 of July 10, 1 received in 
Tokyo on July 12, 1941. 

(1 ) With regard to Japan's present relations with the United States 
I wish to refer to my telegrams of July 10 2 and 12, 3 which crossed 
with your telegrams referred to above. Japanese-American relations 
are marked by increasing tension. Measures of economic strangula- 
tion by the United States against Japan, most recently in evidence in 
the breaking off of the Japanese-Netherlands Indies economic nego- 

1 Document No. 89. 
= Document No. 88. 
1 Document No. 95. 



132 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

tiations * at the instance of the Anglo-Saxons, have greatly aggravated 
the situation. Attempts of Anglophile Japanese circles still to try for 
a compromise are doomed to fail in view of the American attitude and 
the Japanese activists' growing determination to resist. In the cir- 
cumstances I consider it improbable that there has been any secret 
oral assurance from the Japanese Government giving Roosevelt 
reinsurance and a free hand to occupy Iceland. However, the majority 
of the Japanese Cabinet and also the Japanese Foreign Minister view 
the possibility of America's entry into the war with marked concern, 
which is also expressed in point 5 of a "personal message" of July 11, 
from Matsuoka, which has presumably in the meantime been handed 
to the Foreign Minister by Ambassador Oshima. 5 As Matsuoka 
already stated in Berlin, the Japanese Government believes that the 
military conflict will be extremely long-drawn-out after an American 
entry into the war. Matsuoka is therefore most anxious to keep 
America from intervening actively, because he realizes that American 
offensive actions in the Atlantic will of necessity, as he fears, lead to 
the extension of the war to the Pacific. Japan, incidentally, is taking 
precautionary measures in the increasingly probable event of war with 
America. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Admiral Kondo, stated that 
Japan is discontinuing shipping to the East Coast of the United 
States and is also avoiding the Panama Canal as much as possible, so 
as to prevent seizure in case America enters the war. Shipping to the 
West Coast of the United States is being directed in such a way that 
an immediate withdrawal will be possible there too. 



'Announcement of the breaking off of these negotiations which had begun 
in September 1940 in Batavia was made in Tokyo on June 18, following the 
"unsatisfactory reply" to the Japanese proposals in a memorandum of June 6 
by the Netherlands delegation. Cf. Foreign. Relations of the United States, 1941, 
vol. v, pp. 179-180. 

6 The message was conveyed to Ribbentrop in a telegram of July 12 (1007/- 
307790-92) in which Matsuoka explained that he had originally assumed that 
his statements made to Ott on July 2 (see documents Nos. 63 and 64) consti- 
tuted an adequate reply to Ribbentrop's message (document No. 53). He had* 
now decided, however, to express his views to Ribbentrop directly. 

He reiterated his conviction that Japan's policy had been clearly set forth 
in his statements of July 2 to Ott and proceeded to explain to Ribbentrop the 
difficulties arising from the absence of a strong central direction in Japanese 
policy. Assuring the German Foreign Minister that "my opinion regarding 
the future treatment of the Soviet Union remains the same as I stated it to 
Tour Excellency in Berlin" Matsuoka then made the following statements in 
point 5 of his message, to which a reference is made in the document printed : 

"In our conversations in Berlin Tour Excellency as well as I clearly realized 
that our views regarding a possible participation in the war by the United 
States of America differ somewhat Every day I pray to Heaven that the 
matter may turn out as your Excellency believes that it will; in my opinion, 
however, every conceivable step must now be taken to prevent America's entry 
into the war until the conclusion of the Russian campaign. Regarding later 
developments I am of the same opinion as your Excellency. The Japanese 
Government is making incessant efforts to attain this goal. But as the Foreign 
Minister of an allied state and as Tour Excellency's good friend I would like 
to repeat that I am unable to suppress concern on this point because I believe 
that I know America to some extent. I would ask your Excellency to be so good 
as to convey this view of mine to the German Reich Chancellor. May we be 
sufficiently well armed, morally and materially, even in the most unfavorable 
case!" 



JULY 1041 133 

(2) Regarding press reaction to the occupation of Iceland I refer 
to telegraphic report No. 1175 of July 9 and No. 1177 of July 10. 8 
The occupation of Iceland is interpreted as an unequivocal step by 
the United States of America in the direction of entry into the war. 
In view of the statements made in point (1) above, I do not believe 
that the Japanese Government is striving to reach a compromise with 
America and tie the latter down in a long European war in order to 
have a free hand in East Asia. To be sure, Anglophiles and also Na- 
tionalists view the transfer of strong American naval units from the 
Pacific with relief, since they expect that the Indochina operation will 
as a result be carried out without hindrance. This operation, which 
Japan decided upon only after long consideration, demands at present 
the full attention of the Japanese leadership. I have learned confiden- 
tially that the instruction mentioned in my telegram No. 1181 of 
July 10 7 was sent on Saturday 8 to the Japanese Ambassador in Vichy, 
who will carry it out nest week with the French Government. In 
the Army and Navy as well as in other activist circles it is firmly 
believed that Japan's position of power in East Asia can be made a 
reality only in opposition to the Anglo-Saxon powers. True, in these 
■circles, too. one encounters the view that the further course of the war 
and the German successes will mean a weakening not only of the Soviet 
Union but also of the Anglo-Saxons in the Pacific to an ever- increas- 
ing degree. The main difficulty is to convince these circles again and 
again that further waiting will not be profitable for Japan. 

(3) When the personal message of the Foreign Minister 9 was 
handed to Matsuoka on the evening of July 2, the conversation had 
assumed a serious character in view of the unsatisfactory content of 
the message addressed to Germany. 10 I considered it self-evident 
that Matsuoka, in keeping with the importance attributable to the 
Foreign Minister's personal message, would carefully discuss it with 
the Emperor and the Government and reply in detail. I therefore do 
not understand how Matsuoka, as stated in the introduction to his 
"personal message" to the Foreign Minister, could be of the opinion 
that no personal reply was expected. In my next conversation with 
Matsuoka, which took place on July 8, 11 1 deliberately refrained from 
insisting on a reply, however, in order not to give the Japanese Gov- 
ernment the mistaken impression that its participation in the German- 
Russian war, and even less so its aid, were indispensable. In view of 



* Neither found. 

""This telegram (83/60283-94) announced the Impending presentation of the 
Japanese proposals in Vichy which are referred to in document No. 126. 
•i.e. July 12. 

* Document No. 53. 

* See document No. 64. 

11 The only record of a Matsuoka-Ott conversation on July 8 is telegram No. 
1171 of July 8 referred to in document No. 89, footnote 5. 



134 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

the Japanese mentality this seemed to me tactically inadvisable. In 
the conversation on July 8, moreover, Matsuoka gave the distinct im- 
pression of being unsure of himself and nervous — which, I am told, 
was due to worries about his personal position. In accordance with 
instructions I will ask the Japanese Foreign Minister in our next con- 
versation to tell me about the reaction of the Japanese Cabinet and 
the formation of the Cabinet to the personal message of the Foreign 
Minister [urn Mitteilung der Reahtion japanischen Kabinetts und 
Kabinettsbild.ung . . . ansprechen]. I was able to ascertain today 
at the War Minister's, 13 where I had been invited, that the Foreign 
Minister's message has found wide support among army leaders, al- 
though it was emphasized that a certain period of preparation is 
necessary for intervention against the Soviet Union. 

(4) With regard to the reports of the Japanese Ambassador in 
Moscow " I refer to my telegram No. 1207 of July 12." In the mean- 
time (group garbled) there are noticeable indications here that Japan 
is proceeding seriously with military mobilization measures. The 
Military Attache 16 has reported on this in telegram No. 1200 of 
July 12." Regarding Japan's attitude in the event of American ag- 
gressive action against one of the Axis Powers, I wish to refer to point 
2 of my telegram No. 893 of June 6. 18 

I am trying to exert all the influence I can with Matsuoka person- 
ally, with the Foreign Ministry, the branches of the Armed Forces, 
the Nationalists, and friendly business circles, to bring about Japan's 
entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible, making use 
especially of the arguments in the personal message of the Foreign 
Minister and your above-mentioned telegram, and I believe, as in- 
dicated by the military preparations, that Japan's participation will 
come about in the foreseeable future. 19 The greatest obstacles which 
will have to be overcome in this connection are presented by the dis- 
unity among the activist group which, without unified leadership, 
pursues different goals and adjusts only slowly to the changed 

situation. 

Ott 



a Lt. Gen. Hideki Tojo. 

"Yosbitsugu Tatekawa. 

"In this telegram (105/113721) Ott reported that the Japanese Deputy For- 
eign Minister promised to instruct the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow to report 
currently on the questions taken up in Foreign Ministry telegram No. 1029 of 
July 11— Pol. 8512. The latter telegram has not been found. 

"Colonel Kretschmer. 

"Not printed (82/60300). 

*■ Vol. hi of this series, document No. 596. ,■.„.«■„ 

" In telegram No. 1248 of July 15 (82/60335) Ott reported that the Soviet 
Ambassador had called on Matsuoka on July 12 to inquire officially whether 
Japan's pact of neutrality with the Soviet Union would apply to the present war 
between Germany and the Soviet Union. Matsuoka had replied that it could 
not apply having been concluded at a time "when German-Russian relations 
had been substantially different." 



JULY 1041 135 

No. 106 

278/178854-65 

The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most urgent Budapest, July 14, 1941 — 10 : 15 a. m. 

No. 806 of July 14 Received July 14—11 : 00 a. m. 

Del. No. 15 

For the Foreign Minister. 

With reference to your No. 1203. 1 

According to the determination of the frontier which was agreed 
upon in Vienna and regarding which I informed King Boris on 
April 27 in accordance with the instruction of the Foreign Minister, 2 
the chromium mine Jesserina falls within the Bulgarian territory. 
In order to make absolutely sure that the Jesserina mine belongs incon- 
testably to Bulgaria and to avoid later frontier disputes, we have, 
precisely on account of this mine, made the line of the frontier deviate 
from the ridge of the Sar Planina north of Tetovo and to the west 
of Mount Ljuboten in a northwestern direction and drawn the line 
across the low ridge situated approximately 15 to 20 kilometers north 
of Mount Ljuboten toward the east to the railroad line and then 
further into the valley of the Black Morava. 

A subsequent change in the line of the frontier would not only be 
in contradiction to the communication made to King Boris but would 
also represent a considerable economic disadvantage to Germany. 
The Jesserina mine is one of those mining enterprises, the exploita- 
tion of which has been left to us on the basis of the Protocol signed 
with the Bulgarian Foreign Minister on April 24. 3 Even prior to 
April 24 the Foreign Minister hinted to Count Ciano that we had 
special economic interests in the territory northwest of Skoplje. In 
the latest Berlin agreements with Italy of June 19 * we conceded to 
the Italians the delivery of 7,000 tons of chromium from the area 
of Skoplje. In the negotiations regarding this matter it was quite 
clear that the Italians knew and expected that the chromium mines 
situated around Skoplje had become Bulgarian territory and would 



1 There is in the files only what appears to he an unnumbered draft copy of 
this telegram which was sent to Clodius in Budapest by the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat on July 13 (93/103811) . It informed Clodius of the dispute between 
Italy and Bulgaria regarding the Jesserina mine and requested his view as to 
whether it was to go to Italy or Bulgaria in accordance with the Vienna deci- 
sions of April 1941. 

' See vol. xn of this series, documents Nos. 405 and 450. 

* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 393, footnote 3. 

* This refers to the Eighth Secret Protocol of June 19 which with its annexes 
is filmed on 2033/445489-525. Cf. vol. xn of this series, document No. 652. 



136 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN" POLICY 

be administered by Germany, or that at least their production would 

be managed by Germany. 6 

Oloditts 
Erdmannsdorff 



* In a memorandum of July 14 (278/178856) Woermann recorded having been 
told by the Bulgarian Minister that the Incident involving the Jesserina mine 
had been settled. 



No. 107 

617/248975-76 

The Legation in Afghanistan to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

top secret Kabul, July 14, 1941 — 6:40 p. m. 

No. 224 of July 12 Received July 14—8 : 20 p. m. 

With reference to my telegram No. 192 of June 21. 1 

Italian Counselor of Legation Anzilotti, -who has returned from 
his trip to the Fakir, 2 reports basic willingness to intensify border 
fighting. This is dependent upon financial assistance in gold pounds, 
af ghanis or rupees. Gold bars are less desirable. 

After the first assistance to the Fakir in February 1941, whereby 
we and the Italians each paid 80,000 af ghanis, the Fakir was prom- 
ised 25,000 English pounds every 2 months; of this Afnzilotti] has 
already delivered 12,000 English, pounds, of which we contributed 
7,000; our assets today are 25,000 dollars, 11,445 gold pounds, and 
about 190,000 afghanis. The Italians possess no funds here at the 
moment, since the promised equivalent of 6,000,000 lire has not yet 
arrived. 

A greater effort by the Fakir would have to be ordered at your 
end within the framework of other operations according to the time 
and extent desired. An auxiliary action, the effect of which requires 
time, was discussed by the Fakir with A. as follows: 

For maintaining and intensifying the present petty hostilities, 
instead of 25,000 English pounds every 2 months, 300,000 rupees 
every month; for extension to further areas, double the amount of 
this; for a general border uprising, triple the amount. Providing 
arms and ammunition would release free money for winning over 
additional followers, who are now in the pay of the English and 
would fight for the Fakir under the same conditions. It is important 
in this connection that financial assistance begin at the earliest possi- 



1 Not found. 

' The reference is to the Fakir of Ipi, religious leader of the Waziri tribe In 
the "independent zone" between India and Afghanistan. Cf. vol. xir of this 
series, documents Nos. 300 and 511. 



JULY 1941 137 

ble moment, because recruiting and intensifying [hostilities] "will 
require several months; therefore transfer to the Fakir now the 
remainder of the promised sum of 25,000 English pounds, equal 
to 13,000 in gold pounds and afghanis. 

Please send as soon as possible the additional sums needed ; paper 
pounds are also usable. 

A suitable dropping point which was inspected by A. is being 
re-examined for air drop : English rifles and ammunition, tank guns, 
IMG [infantry machine guns] with antiaircraft equipment, hand 
grenades. 

According to A., the Fakir welcomes temporary detailing of a radio 
operator for instruction, also two additional Europeans. The Fakir 
allegedly has no connection with the Russians; nor, supposedly, are 
there any Europeans with him. A German agent in Baluchistan 
reported that the local police are alerted ; it is questionable whether 
they are strong. 

The Kabul area is under the strictest surveillance at the moment, 
presumably as a result of A.'s trip having become known. Since 
July 9 gasoline consumption has been limited to 3 gallons per car 
per day. 

Rasmuss 

PlLGER 



No. 108 

611B/E285S36-37 

Memorandum J>y Dr. Karl Megerle 

Berlin, July 14, 1941. 

Brief for the Foreign Minister 

The occupation of Iceland by the USA, the further designs on Ire- 
land, the Spanish and Portuguese islands in the Atlantic and also 
on Dakar permit us now to make the struggle against England 
and American aggression a European issue and to develop the con- 
cept of a European Monroe Doctrine. In this way the connection 
between the anti-Bolshevist and the anti-English aspects of the pres- 
ent struggle can be established. In making use of this in propa- 
ganda it will be advisable to proceed only gradually in order to 
get the European states which are outside the sphere of the Tripartite 
Pact slowly used to this line. With respect to the Nordic sector 
(Scandinavia) the emphasis will have to be more on the attack against 
Iceland, with respect to the Latin [Lateinischen] states (Spain, 
Portugal, and France) on the danger for their outlying possessions. 
The necessary slogans and data must be furnished first of all and 



138 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

primarily by the press and public opinion of the regions directly 
concerned and then be taken up by Germany and her friends. 1 A 
further important bridge between the anti-Bolshevist and the anti- 
Anglo-Saxon sector of the struggle for the defense of Europe is 
formed by the Anglo-Soviet alliance which is now complete and 
with regard to which it is to be insinuated that Europe has already 
been promised by England to Bolshevism as its spoils of victory. 
Submitted to Minister Dr. Schmidt for his information and with 
the request that this be forwarded to the Foreign Minister. 2 

Megerle 



1 Marginal note In Ribbentrop's handwriting : "Yes". 

''Marginal note "Submitted to the Foreign Minister. I have issued to the 
German press this line as its guide line as early as the end of last week. 
Dr. Schmidt, July 14." 

The text of a directive along similar lines for the guidance of the German 
press in dealing with the United States was sent by Schmidt to the Embassy 
in Italy in telegram Multex 484 of July 12 (4865/E248873-74). 



No. 109 

205/142807 

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden 

Telegram 

RAM 315/R Special tract, July 14, 1941, 

Foreign Ministry Code Eeceived Berlin, July 15 — 3 : 00 a. m. 

Room No. 664 
No. 1303 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 15. 

With reference to your telegram No. 869. 1 For the Minister per- 
sonally as well as for Minister Schnurre. 

Please decline in a friendly way the offer of the Government there 
to detail a group of Swedish officers to the German Wehrmacht : 

The Reich Government expressed sincere thanks for this offer, of 
which it has taken cognizance with pleasure. It is of the opinion, how- 
ever, that since the Swedish officers, unlike the officers coming from, 
other countries, would not command any volunteer cadres of their 



^his telegram of July 7 (205/142799-800) reported that the question of 
volunteers had been discussed by Major General von Uthmann with the Swedish 
military and by Wied and Schnurre with the Foreign Minister. The plan was 
produced that Sweden send a group of selected officers, possibly one general, one 
colonel, and several ranging from lieutenant colonel to lieutenant, and includ- 
ing some General Staff officers and some from the Air Force. At such time as 
Germany would suggest, they would be released from the Swedish armed forces 
and allowed actively to participate in German units in the war against Hussia, 
On the part of the Swedish military it was suggested that they be committed on 
the sector of the front south of the Gulf of Finland which would insure their 
employment over a considerable time. The Swedish Government, on the other 
hand, had determined to restrict the participation of Swedish volunteers to the 
Finnish armed forces. 



JULY 1941 139 

own, they would not have any real sphere of activity and therefore 
would come into a somewhat difficult situation. 

We believed that the Swedish officers would feel this themselves and 
therefore would request that they not be sent, much as we would have 
appreciated Swedish participation per se. 2 

Ribbentrop 



' See, further, document No. 270. 

No. 110 

386/211230-31 

) The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat 

Telegram 

No. 669 of July 15 Special Train, July 15, 1941—7 : 30 p. m. 

Eeceived Berlin, July 15 — 8 : 45 p. m. 

For Ambassador Abetz personally. 

For the immediate future, please fashion your policy in France as 
follows : 

1. The question of the shipments, etc., via Bizerte is important to us. 
Please see to it, therefore, that the agreements reached with the 
French on this question 1 are kept and that the shipments can start 
as soon as possible. Please check the attempts of M. Darlan to delay 
on this question in view of the case of Syria. We are not in a position 
to make any more concessions than we have already made. 

2. Furthermore I ask that, until further notice, you treat all other 
pending questions in a dilatory manner and confine yourself to con- 
stant observation of further developments both in internal French 
matters as well as of the relations of France to England and America, 
and to reporting on them. 

3. A meeting between Darlan and me is inopportune at the present 
time. It is possible that this might be advantageous in the foreseeable 
future, but as yet it is impossible to tell. I cannot at this time accede 
to Darlan's suggestion tor the conclusion of a political protocol, 2 
regarding whose contents you have reported nothing, but I should like 
first to await the conclusion of the Russian campaign before making 
further decisions with regard to France. 

Ribbentrop 



1 In telegram No. 2057 of July 9 (386/211194) Schleier reported the conclusion 
of a protocol for implementation of the agreement regarding supplies via Tunisia, 
1 See document No. 113. 



140 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY 

No. Ill 

1200/331628-30 

State Secretary Weisscicker to Reicksteiter Rosenberg 

July 15, 1941. 
Pers.2658g. 

Dear Reichsleiter : With reference to the conversation which we 
had on July 8 1 concerning the future treatment of the questions of the 
now eastern European areas of occupation, I should like once more to 
clarify below the standpoint of the Foreign Ministry in summary, on 
the basis of the instruction issued me by the Foreign Minister. 2 In 
so doing I should like to state at the outset as a principle that the au- 
thority given to you applies to the internal administration of the oc- 
cupied eastern European areas, and that in case questions should arise 
regarding these areas, which are to be taken with the governments of 
third countries, the Foreign Ministry has exclusive responsibility for 
them. 

For the rest I should like to make the following comment on the 
questions which we discussed : 

1. The question of how the eastern European areas of occupation 
are to be politically constituted in the further course of events affects 
the entire foreign policy of the Reich to such a degree that the Foreign 
Minister can never disinterest himself from it. He must therefore 
reserve the right at any time to intervene in the questions connected 
with this in order to report on them directly to the Fuhrer. The 
Foreign Minister therefore expects that you will keep him regularly 
informed concerning the developments in these areas on account of 
their connection with the over-all formation of our foreign policy. 

2. The function of the representatives of the Foreign Ministry with 
the Reich Commissars, in addition to their activity in local questions 
involving foreign policy and the propaganda work directed to third 
countries regarding the future political shape of the individual east- 
ern European areas, consists in reporting to the Foreign Ministry on 
the internal developments in these areas, to the extent that they are 
important for the future foreign relations of the Reich with the new 
political structures. Thus, their activity in this respect is purely as 
observers. The representatives do not have the task of themselves 
exerting active influence on the internal developments. 

3. As regards the question of who is to appoint the representatives 
of the Foreign Ministry, it is quite self-evident that as representatives 
of the Foreign Ministry they cannot be appointed by another author- 
ity, but only by the Foreign Minister himself. It is just as self- 
evident that as representatives of the Foreign Ministry they can receive 



1 Weizsacker's memorandum of July 8 (1200/331623-25) records this conver- 
sation which dealt primarily with the position of the representatives of the 
Foreign Ministry with respect to the administrative authorities in the occupied 
eastern areas. 

"Telegram No. 665 of July 14, sent from the Special Train on July 15 (1200/- 
331626-27) . The document printed follows verbatim the text of this instruction. 



JULY 1941 141 

instructions only from the Foreign. Minister, and that they have to 
address their reports to him. As a special concession the Foreign Min- 
ister has agreed that the representatives of the Foreign Ministry with 
the Reich Commissars in the eastern European areas of occupation 
shall give the Reich Commissars carbon copies of each of their reports, 
which is not done by the Foreign Ministry representatives in the other 
areas of occupation. 

Finally, the Foreign Minister has instructed me to tell you the 
following: He has reported to the Ftihrer on the matter in the last few 
days. The Fiihrer has stated that the Foreign Minister, of course, 
could send a Foreign Ministry representative to each Reich Commis- 
sar, as it had done in The Hague, in Belgrade, etc. The represent- 
atives of the Foreign Ministry at these last-named places, who are 
naturally appointed by the Foreign Minister, receive their instructions 
exclusively from him and report to the Foreign Ministry without 
submitting copies of their reports to the authorities to which they are 
attached. I may therefore assume that these questions can now be 
regarded as having been definitively settled, also as regards the repre- 
sentatives of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissars in the 
eastern European areas of occupation, with the provision that the 
Foreign Minister will keep the promise he made as a concession that 
copies will be given to the Reich Commissars. 3 

Heil Hitler! 

Weizsacker 



'According to a memorandum by Weizs&cfeer of Aug. 28 (34/2483&-41) the 
Foreign Ministry did not receive a reply from Rosenberg ; Weizsftcker then dis- 
cussed the matter with Rosenberg's permanent deputy, Gauleiter Meyer, on Aug. 
15 and 28, In these discussions certain principles were formulated regarding 
the position of the Foreign Ministry and its representatives with the Ministry of 
Occupied Eastern Territories, which were to be submitted to Ribbentrop and 
Rosenberg for their approval. See, further, document No. 277. 



[Editors' Note. On July 15 Hitler received Ambassador Oshima 
at his field headquarters' in the east. Hewel's memorandum of this 
conversation of July 15 on the film of files of the Foreign Minister's 
Secretariat (F7/0137-20) is only partly legible. From the legible 
portions of this document it appears that Hitler spoke at length about 
the German campaign against the Soviet Union and then urged Japan 
to participate in the annihilation of Russia.] 



142 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 112 

233/166560 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina 

Telegram 

No. 847 Berlin, July 16, 1941—5 : 20 p. m. 

zu Pol. II 489 g. Rs. 1 Ang. II. 
For the Ambassador. 

With reference to your telegram No. 1068 of July 5. 2 
I agree with your attitude toward the opinion of the Argentine 
Foreign Minister regarding the war situation. You can point out to 
the Minister the new manifestation of Roosevelt's aggressive and 
provocative policy demonstrated in the meantime in the case of Ice- 
land. 3 With this the President admits quite openly that he wants war 
and not peace. I suggest a friendly word for the Argentine Foreign 
Minister, whose understanding attitude is known also in Berlin. 
Please, however, do not touch on the idea of the possible good offices 
of the Argentine Government. 

Kebbentrop 



1 Pol. II 489 g. Es. : Not found, 
* Document No. 73. 
' Document No. 102. 

No. 113 

F10/460-4T8 

Memorandum, for the Fiihrer 

Westfalen, July 16, 1941. 

The enclosed communication of the French Government was de- 
livered to the Embassy in Paris and forwarded to Ambassador Abetz, 1 
who is now in Berlin. He transmitted it to me yesterday by teletype. 

I have instructed the Ambassador, subject to the Fiihrer's ap- 
proval, to go back to Paris immediately and return the communica- 
tion to the French Government with the oral comment that the 
communication indicated a complete misconception of France's posi- 
tion as a nation defeated by Germany, and that he, Ambassador 
Abetz, was therefore unable to transmit the communication to his 
Government. 



1 Paris telegram No. 2101 of July 14 (386/211214-224) transmitted the text 
of the French note as printed below except for the last section, 
beginning with "The Government of the Reich and the Italian Government 
make the following declaration to the French Government . . ." 

The telegram also contains a version of the German draft armistice agree- 
ment (less article 22) in Syria of July 12 (386/211224-228), the French text of 
which is printed in La Dttler/ation francaise aupris de la Commission alletnande 
d' Armistice, vol. rv, pp. 627-30. 



JULY 1941 143 

I believe it is necessary to put an end once and for all to these naive 
French attempts at blackmail. 

R[lBBENTROP] 

[Enclosure] 
Note Vekbale* 

Vicht, July 14, 1941. 

In pursuance of the conversation of May 11, 1941, at Berchtesgaden, 3 
three protocols concerning the Levant, Tunisia, and French Africa, 
respectively, were signed by Ambassador Abetz and by General Warli- 
mor^t as the representative of the High Command of the Armed Forces 
onahe one hand, and Admiral Darlan, Vice President of the Council 
of Ministers on the other.* 

These protocols, which referred to the military assistance which 
France, should the occasion arise, could give to Germany in her war 
against England, were drawn up in the course of a series of political 
conversations, and their practical implementation was explicitly made 
contingent on, first : "the prior reinforcement of our military defenses 
in Africa"; and, second : the granting of a certain number of political 
and economic concessions capable of justifying, in the eyes of French 
public opinion, the possibility of an armed conflict with England and 
the United States, which might result from the said protocols. 

Trusting in the prompt conclusion of the political negotiations 
promised by Ambassador Abetz, and satisfied with the military rein- 
forcement of our defense resources in Tunisia granted by the OKW 
the French Government felt on May 28 that it was in a position to 
assume immediately the risk that might result from the concessions it 
had made regarding Bizerte. 

Since the signing of the protocols, however, new circumstances out- 
side French control have unfortunately changed the existing situa- 
tion, giving rise to an exchange of letters of June 17 and 19, 1941, 6 
between General VogI, President of the German Armistice Commis- 
sion and Delegate of the OKW, and Baron Benoist-Mechin, State 
Secretary with the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and 
delegate of Admiral Darlan. 

According to the text of this exchange of letters, General Vogl 
stated explicitly "that the military conversations had the character of 



' Marginal note by Ribbentrop: "[Tor] Ffiihrer]," 

The French text of this note verbale, except for the draft declaration (see 
p. 149), has been found amoni? the persona! papers of Abetz as part of his memo- 
randum of July 1, 1943 (P3/P150-165) . See La TicUgatinn frcmcaise aupris de la 
Commission allemande of d' Armistice, vol. iv, p. 564, footnote 3. 

* See vol. Tir of this series, documents Nos, 490 and 491. 

4 See vol. jh of this series, document No. 559. 

•Not found; see, however, Jean-Louis Aujol, Le Procds Benoist-M4chin (Paris, 
1948), p. 238. 



144 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN" POLICY 

preliminary explorations and that the entry into force of the two 
agreements was reserved for a later ■date." 

Acknowledging General Vogl's declaration, Baron Benoist-Mechin 
replied : 

"I thank you very much for confirming to me that these provisional 
conversations had an exploratory character and that the date for the 
entry into force of these two agreements will be determined later in 
consultation with the French Government." 

What are the new factors which have entered the picture since 
May 28 to change the general situation ? 

(1) The English attack on Syria. 

(2) The attitude of increased hostility toward France demonstrated 
by England. 

(3) The deadlock in the political conversations which formed the 
framework for the military protocols. 

In order to give a clear and absolutely unequivocal picture of the 
situation in which the French Government finds itself at the present 
moment, it appears appropriate to examine each of these three factors 
individually : 

1. The English attack on Syria. 

The English attack on Syria, which was launched on the pretense 
that the French Government had extended assistance to the German 
Air Force operating in Iraq, has had the following consequences: 

a. The French Government was compelled to transfer from Algeria 
and Tunisia certain defense forces and equipment needed for Syria, 
and thus correspondingly to weaken its military potential in North 
Africa. 

b. France has lost one of the most valuable territories of her empire, 
without having been compensated for this loss by any tangible 
advantage. 

g. French public opinion has become aware of the disastrous con- 
sequences which the French Government's policy of aid to Germany 
could have for the empire if the resulting operations lack sufficient 
military and psychological preparation. 

d. The contradiction which exists between a policy which must 
lead France to fight in widely separated parts of her empire, and the 
fact that France is at the present moment subject to an armistice 
regime designed to put her out of action, has been brought home to 
the French Government with great clarity. 

e. An armed conflict between England and France is being provoked 
without France having received an explicit declaration from the 
Reich Government that the fact of France's fighting with Germany's 

Erincipal enemy has brought about a fundamental change in the 
rerman-French statute [Statuf] . 

2. The attitude of increased hostility of England and the United 
States toward France. 



JULY 1941 145 

This hostility, brought on by the heroic opposition of our troops in 
Syria, the failure of the English de Gaullist propaganda, and the 
French Government's perseverance in the policy it had determined 
upon, has manifested itself in a series of actions and statements by 
the leading Anglo-American statesmen, namely : 

a, Mr. Winston Churchill's address before the House of Commons, 
in which he stated that England, "in the desire to conquer the enemy 
wherever he is to be found, would not limit herself to attacking only 
areas actually occupied by German forces, but would also attack all 
areas which the British Government assumed might be taken over by 
German forces." 6 The declaration seems to forecast a series of pre- 
ventive attacks which would have the purpose of counteracting actual 
or presumed German military plans. 

S.yVarious speeches by President Roosevelt (May 28, July 10, 
1941, 7 etc.), which defined the American designs on Dakar and 
the Atlantic coast of the African continent. 

c. The increased military preparations of the English in their vari- 
ous possessions on the west coast of Africa. 

It is evident from the foregoing that the execution of the military 
operations envisaged in Protocols No. 2 and 3 of May 28 would in- 
volve infinitely greater hazards today than at the time of the signing 
of the protocols in question and for the following reasons : 

(1) The withdrawals, especially in the field of aviation, effected to 
strengthen the defense of Syria have weakened our defense resources 
in North Africa. 

(2) The operations in the east now begun by the bulk of the Wehr- 
macht — though there can be no doubt as to the outcome — have never- 
theless compelled the German General Staff for the moment to strip 
the occupied French territories of aircraft and antiaircraft weapons, 
rendering these areas, the French cities and factories, infinitely more 
vulnerable to the incursions of the Royal Air Force; what is more, 
this at the very moment when these factories were starting to manu- 
facture war material for the account of the Reich. 8 

(3) The several declarations by Messrs. Churchill and Roosevelt 
make it impossible any longer to view the operations in Tunisia, 
French West Africa, and French Equatorial Africa as isolated actions. 
Rather, they must be looked upon as one operation, because the execu- 
tion of only a part of the protocols in question must, with virtual 
certainty, provoke a reaction by the Anglo-Americans in other, some- 
times very distant parts of the French Empire. 

In fact, it may be expected that the counterblow to Bizerte will be 
struck, not against this port, but against Dakar and French Equatorial 

The date and place of this speech have not been found. A similar statement 
was made by Eden on May 22, 1041. For text, see the New York Times, May 23, 
1941, p. 4, col. 3. 

1 The dates of the President's radio address and his message to Congress were 
May 27 and July 7, respectively. For the texts, see Department of State, 
Bulletin, 1941, vol. rv, p. 647 and vol. v, p. 15. 

'See vol. xii of this series, document No. 559, footnote 9. 

682-905—64 1 5 



146 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Africa. There are not two problems : Bizerte and Dakar ; there is only 
one single problem : Africa. The whole of French Africa, i.e., the 
most important part of our empire by far, is thus threatened with be- 
coming involved in an armed conflict with the English land, air, and 
naval forces. 

3. The deadlock in the political conversations which form the 
framework for the military protocols. 

The German-French negotiations have since May 28 not kept pace 
with the military events, despite certain minor concessions, the value 
of which the French Government certainly does not fail to recognize, 
and have to this date produced no results capable "of justifying in the 
eyes of French public opinion the possibility of an armed conflict with 
England and the United States." This conflict today, however, is no 
longer a mere potentiality; it has actually broken out in Syria. 

For all of these reasons, the French Government, on July 8, 1941, 
addressed itself to the Reich Government to request a new meeting 
between Admiral Darlan and the Reich Foreign Minister. 9 

Admiral Darlan intended in the course of this conversation to dis- 
cuss with Herr von Ribbentrop the new problems that had arisen since 
the conference of May 11, 1941, in order to adapt the common course 
of action of the two Governments accordingly and enable France to 
take another step forward on the path of German-French collaboration. 

It has been impossible to date to hold this meeting, and the French 
Government submits to the compelling reasons which have prompted 
the German Government to postpone it. 10 The French Government 
believes, however, that it is not in the interest of either the Reich 
or France to precipitate an operation in Africa with all the hazards 
it involves without careful military preparation and a drastic change 
in the political climate ; for these two conditions are essential for carry- 
ing such an operation to its conclusion with every chance of success. 

The views of the French Government on the nature and the purpose 
of this change of climate are presented in an appended note, 11 which 
will be delivered to Ambassador Abetz simultaneously with the pres- 
ent documents. 

Conscious of the obligations imposed by the policy which it has 
traced for itself, and by which it intends to abide without reservation 
and equivocation, but conscious also of the responsibilities it assumes 
with this policy toward both the French nation and the Reich, the 
French Government therefore has the honor to repeat its request in 
the hope that a conference of this nature, from which it anticipates the 
best results, may take place in the very near future and enable it to 
proceed immediately to the implementation of the military protocols, 



' Document No. 82 and footnote 4. 

10 See document No. 110. 

11 See the Appendix printed on p. 147. 



JULY 1941 147 

the preliminary study of which has already been completed and with 
regard to the modalities of which the French and German military 
experts have already reached agreement. 

APPENDIX 

France has made it a point of honor to carry out in an irreproach- 
able manner all of the clauses of the Armistice, with which the names 
of Mers-el-Kebir 12 and Dakar 13 will forever be associated. 

On October 24, 1940, at Montoire Marshal Petain adopted the 
policy of collaboration which Reich Chancellor Hitler had proposed 
to him. 14 

This collaboration has been strengthened progressively until it has 
brought France into conflict with her former ally. The continued 
development of this policy carries with it the risk that the hitherto 
localized and intermittent attacks by Great Britain will develop into 
a general war with the attendant destruction and suffering. 

The prospect of these new ordeals, in which the French Army, the 
French Air Force, and the French Navy will find opportunities, as 
in Syria, to demonstrate their traditional valor, will not deflect the 
French Government from the path which it has taken consciously 
and of its free will. 

This prospect, however, imposes on it new obligations and new 

responsibilities toward the French nation as well as toward Germany. 

If the French Government addresses itself today to the German 

Government, it does so in order to be in a position to assume these 

obligations and these responsibilities. 

The French Government would incur a grave responsibility with 
respect to the French nation if it were to involve its people in a 
new war without having the assurance that such a policy, inspired 
by the great French traditions, which are both European and hostile 
to British imperialism, provides the only means to restore France 
to her place in the community of the great nations. The French 
Government would incur no less a responsibility toward Germany 
if it did not in all candor indicate the moral and material conditions 
on which, in its view, depend the efficacy of its political and military 
actions. 

So that France may in honor fulfill the mission to which she has 
been called, it is first of all necessary that all the moral forces of the 
country be united. This unification can be achieved only if all citi- 
zens are unanimous in their faith that the destinies of France and 
Europe are henceforward united. The Government has the will and 

13 See vol. x of this series, document No. 93. 
11 See vol. xi of this series, document No. 92. 
" See vol. xr of this series, document No. 227. 



148 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

the certainty of achieving this accord if it is given the possibility 
of acting without, hindrance, and if Germany and Italy will give 
precise promises and hopes that will reassure French patriotism. In 
the military sphere, the reconstructed French Army, Air Force, and 
Navy must be enabled in the common interest of Europe and France 
not only to fight heroically against the British forces, as they did at 
Mers-el-Kebir and in Syria, but also as at Dakar, to triumph over 
them. 

Finally, French policy must have the value of an example on the 
international plane and so convert the still undecided countries to 
the European order, thereby depriving of their foundation any poten- 
tial coalitions likely to form about Great Britain. 

None of these results can be achieved at the present stage of the 
Franco-German relations prescribed by the Armistice of June 22, 
1940. 15 The policy of collaboration may lead France to a point where 
she would have to wage war everywhere. But she cannot do this 
under an armistice regime, the very object of which is to render her 
impotent. 

The armistice treaties currently in force actually block the exer- 
cise of French sovereignty and in an even greater measure the use 
of French military strength. 

For all these reasons they appear no longer compatible, in either 
letter or spirit, with the new tasks of which France believes she has 
proved herself worthy, through the loyalty of her leaders and the 
bravery of her soldiers. While the present situation does not imperil 
the spiritual unity of the state, and while, in particular, the Govern- 
ment, as it has shown, has remained the master of its political deci- 
sions, nevertheless, apart from this, the situation created by the Armi- 
stice prevents it from affirming this freedom with sufficient force and 
detracts from the moral and material value of its actions both at 
home and in the international field. 

In consideration of these statements, the French Government which, 
in view of the marked hostility on the part of Great Britain, deems 
itself henceforth freed from any obligation toward that country, and 
fully conscious of France's own mission in Europe and the world, 
requests the opening of negotiations with the German and Italian 
Governments. 

In the opinion of the French Government, these negotiations should 
aim at an immediate and definitive settlement of certain vital ques- 
tions, and at replacing the armistice regime by a regime founded on 
the sovereignty of the French State and a loyal collaboration by 
France with Germany and Italy. 

" Vol. ix of this series, document No. 523. 



JULY 1941 149 

The Government of the Reich and the Italian Government make the 
following declaration to the French Government : 18 

If France, as a result of the Anglo-American attack on French 
North Africa, -will participate with all the resources at her command 
in the war against England and the United States and in the Euro- 
pean war of liberation against Bolshevism on the side of the Axis 
Powers, they will give France the following assurance : 

1. France shall retain her territorial possessions in Europe in ac- 
cordance with the status of 1914. 

2. France shall retain her colonial possessions in Africa. Certain 
changes which within the framework of the final settlement of the 
entirS African colonial situation should also be necessary in the French 
colonial possessions, among others, shall be equalized by the Axis 
Powers by compensations of at least equal value. 



"This draft declaration follows the Appendix to the French note without any 
further comments or notations. The French text is filmed on F10/480. In the 
Abetz Memorandum of July 1, (see footnote 2) the Appendix to the French note 
closes with this sentence: "In the opinion of the French Government this new 
regime could be established on the following principles ;" This is followed by : a 
draft of a provisional treaty between Germany, Italy, and France ; a secret draft 
protocol ; a French declaration joining the Tripartite Pact ; a joint declaration 
by the German and Italian Governments, and by a draft of a revision of the 
Armistice conditions (P3/P160-163). 



No. 114 

Nuremberg Document 221-L 

Unsigned Memorandum 1 

top secret Fuhrer's Headqtjartees, July 16, 1941. 

Bo/Fu. 

A conference attended by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Reich Minister 
Lammers, Field Marshal Keitel, the Reichsmarschall, and me was held 
today by order of the Fiihrer at 3 : 00 p. m. in his quarters. The con- 
ference began at 3 : 00 p. m. and, including a break for coffee, lasted 
until about 8 : 00 p. m. 

By way of introduction the Fiihrer emphasized that he wished 
first of all to make some basic statements. Various measures were 
now necessary ; this was confirmed, among other events, by an assertion 
made in an impudent Vichy newspaper that the war against the Soviet 
Union was Europe's war and that therefore, it had to be conducted 
for Europe as a whole. Apparently the Vichy paper meant to say 
by these hints that it ought not to be the Germans alone who benefited 
from this war, but that all European states ought to benefit from it. 



1 The document is from the files of Martin Bormann. The text is printed in 
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 
vol. xxxviii, U.S. Exhibit 317, pp. 86-94, and in English translation in Nasi 
Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. vii, pp. 1086-1093. 



150 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

It was essential that we not proclaim our aims before the whole 
world; also this was not necessary, but the chief thing was that we 
ourselves know what we wanted. In no case should our own way be 
made more difficult by superfluous declarations. Such declarations 
were superfluous because we could do everything wherever we had the 
power, and what was beyond our power we would not be able to do 
anyway. 

What we told the world about the motives for our measures ought 
to be conditioned, therefore, by tactical reasons. We ought to proceed 
here in exactly the same way as we did in the cases of Norway, Den- 
mark, Holland, and Belgium. In these cases too we said nothing 
about our aims, and if we were clever we would continue in the same 
way. 

We shall then emphasize again that we were forced to occupy, ad- 
minister, and secure a certain area; it was in the interest of the 
inhabitants that we provide order, food, traffic, etc., hence our meas- 
ures. It should not be recognizable that thereby a final settlement is 
being initiated ! We can nevertheless take all necessary measures — 
shooting, resettling, etc. — and we shall take them. 

But we do not want to make any people into enemies prematurely 
and unnecessarily. Therefore we shall act as though we wanted to 
exercise a mandate only. It must be clear to us, however, that we 
shall never withdraw from these areas. 

Accordingly we should act : 

1. To do nothing which might obstruct the final settlement, but 
to prepare for it only in secret ; 

2. To emphasize that we are liberators. 
In particular : 

The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners and to be settled 
by Germans only. 

In the same way the former Austrian part of Galicia will become 
Keich territory. 

Our relations with Rumania are presently good, but one does not 
know what our relations will be at any future time. This we have 
to consider and we have to draw our frontiers accordingly. One 
ought not to be dependent on the good will of other people; we have 
to arrange our relations with Rumania in accordance with this 
principle. 

In principle we have now to face the task of cutting up the giant 
cake according to our needs, in order to be able: first, to dominate it; 
second, to administer it ; and third, to exploit it. 

The Russians have now given an order for partisan warfare behind 
our front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it 
enables us to exterminate everyone who opposes lis. 



JULY 1941 151 

Principles : 

Never again must it be possible to create a military power west of 
the Urals, even if we have to wage war for a hundred years in order 
to attain this goal. All successors of the Fiihrer must know : Secu- 
rity for the Reich exists only if there are no foreign military forces 
west of the Urals; it is Germany who undertakes the protection of 
this area against all possible dangers. Our iron principle must be 
and must remain : 

We must never permit anybody but the Germans to carry arms/ 

This is especially important; even when it seems easier at first to 
enHst the armed support of foreign, subjugated nations, it is wrong 
to do so. This will prove some day to be to our disadvantage ab- 
solutely and unavoidably. Only the German may carry arms, not 
the Slav, not the Czech, not the Cossack, nor the Ukrainian ! 

On no account should we apply a wavering policy such as was done 
in Alsace before 1918. What distinguishes the Englishman is his 
constant and consistent following of one line and one aim. In this 
respect we must absolutely learn from the Englishman. Therefore 
we ought never to base our actions on individual contemporary per- 
sonalities; here again the conduct of the British in India towards the 
Indian princes, etc., ought to be an example : It is always the soldier 
who has to consolidate the regime ! 

We have to create a Garden of Eden in the newly won eastern ter- 
ritories; they are vitally important to us; as compared with them 
colonies play only an entirely subordinate part. 

Even if we divide up certain areas at once, we shall always proceed 
in the role of protectors of the Right and of the population. The 
terms which are necessary at this time should be selected in accord- 
ance with this principle : We shall not speak of new Reich territory, 
but of the task which became necessary because of the war. 

In particular: 

In the Baltic territory the country up to the Diina will now have 
to be administered in agreement with Field Marshal Keitel. 

Reichsleiter Rosenberg emphasizes that in his opinion a different 
treatment of the population is desirable in every Commissariat. In 
the Ukraine we should start with attention to cultural matters ; there 
we ought to awaken the historical consciousness of the Ukrainians, 
establish a university at Kiev, and the like. 

The Reichsmarschall on the other hand states that we have to think 
first of securing our food supply; everything else can come later. 

(Incidental question: Is there still anything like an educated 
stratum in the Ukraine, or do upper class Ukrainians exist only as 
emigrants outside present day Russia ? ) 

Rosenberg continues, also in the Ukraine certain efforts toward 
independence should be encouraged. 



152 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

The Reiclismarschall asks the Fiihrer to indicate what areas had 
been promised to other states. 

The Fiihrer replies, Antonescu desired Bessarabia and Odessa with 
a strip (of land) leading west-northwest from Odessa. 2 

Upon objections made by the Reiclismarschall and Rosenberg, the 
Fiihrer replies that the new frontiers desired by Antonescu contained 
little outside the old Rumanian frontiers. 

The Fiihrer stresses furthermore that nothing definite had been 
promised to the Hungarians, Turks, and Slovaks. 

The Fiihrer then submits for consideration whether the former 
Austrian part of Galicia ought to be added immediately to the Gen- 
eral Government; upon objections being voiced the Fiihrer decides 
that this part shall not be added to the General Government but shall 
only be placed at the same time under Reich Minister Frank (Lwow) . 

The Reiclismarschall considers it right to assign East Prussia several 
parts of the Baltic region, e.g., the Forest of Bialystok. 

The Fiihrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic area must become 
Reich territory. 

Likewise the Crimea, including a considerable hinterland (the area 
north of the Crimea) must become Reich territory; the hinterland 
must be as large as possible. 

Rosenberg had misgivings about this because of the Ukrainians 
living there. 

(Incidentally : It appeared several times that Rosenberg has a soft 
spot for the Ukrainians; thus he wishes to enlarge the former Ukraine 
to a considerable extent.) 

The Fiihrer emphasizes further that the Volga colony too will have 
to become Reich territory, also the district around Baku; the latter 
will have to become a German concession (military colony). 

The Finns wanted East Carelia, 3 but the Kola Peninsula should 
come to Germany because of the large nickel mines there. 

The annexation of Finland as a federated state should be prepared 
with great caution. The area around Leningrad is wanted by the 
Finns; the Fiihrer will raze Leningrad to the ground and then hand 
it over to the Finns. 4 

There ensues a rather long discussion as to the qualifications of 
Gauleiter Lohse, 5 who has been considered by Rosenberg as Governor 
of the Baltic area. Rosenberg emphasizes again and again that he 
had approached Lohse already and it would be very embarrassing if 



For Hitler's discussions with Antonescu regarding Rumania's territorial 
aspirations to Soviet Russian territory, see vol, xir of this series, document No. 
614. Cf . document No. 159. 

* Gf. vol. xn of this series, document No. 592 and footnote 3. 

* See document No. 388 and footnote 1. 

5 Hinrich Lohse, Gauleiter of Schleswig-Holstein. 



JULY 1941 153 

Lolise were not appointed; for the western part of the Baltic country 
Kube 8 was to be appointed, but subordinated to Lohse; for the 
Ukraine Rosenberg proposes Sauckel. 7 

The Reichsmarschall, however, emphasized the most important 
criteria which for the time being must be exclusively decisive for us : 
securing of food supplies, and as far as necessary, of the economy ; 
securing^of the roads, etc. 

The Eeichsmarschall emphasizes that Koch e should either be con- 
sidered for the Baltic area because he knew it very well, or that Koch 
should receive the Ukraine because Koch was the person with the 
greatest initiative and with the best training. 

The Fiihrer asked whether Kube could not be appointed as Reich 
Commissar for the Moscow area ; Rosenberg and the Reichsmarschall 
both thought that Kube was too old for this position. 

Upon further representations Rosenberg replied he was afraid that 
Koch might soon refuse to obey his (Rosenberg's) instructions; Koch 
had, by the way, said this himself. 

As against that the Reichsmarschall pointed out that it was after all 
not possible for Rosenberg to guide every step of the appointees; 
rather these people had to work quite independently. 

For the Caucasus area Rosenberg proposed his Stabsleiter, Schicke- 
danz. He emphasized time and again that Schickedanz certainly 
would fulfill his task very well, a statement which is doubted by 
the Reichsmarschall. 

Rosenberg then stated Lutze 9 had proposed to him to appoint sev- 
eral SA leaders, namely Scheppmann for Kiev; Manthey, Dr. Ben- 
necke, and Litzmann for Estonia; and Burgomaster Dr. Drexler for 
Latvia. 

The Fiihrer has no objections to the employment of the SA leaders. 

Rosenberg then states he had received a letter from Ribbentrop 
who desired the participation of the Foreign Ministry; 10 but he 
asked the Fiihrer to state that the internal organization of the newly 
acquired areas was no concern of the Foreign Ministry. The Fiihrer 
absolutely shares this view. For the time being it will suffice for 
the Foreign Ministry to appoint a liaison officer to Reiehsleiter 
Rosenberg. 

The Fiihrer emphasizes that the Ukraine will undoubtedly be the 
most important district for the next 3 years. Therefore it would be 
best to appoint Koch there; if Sauckel were to be employed it would 
be better to use him in the Baltic area. 



' Wilhelm Kube, former Oberpriisident and Gauleiter of Brandenburg. 

' Fritz Sauckel, Gauleiter of Thuringia. 

" Erich Koch, Gauleiter of East Prussia. 

'Viktor Lutze, Chief of Staff of the SA, 

" See vol. xii of this series, document No. 649, footnote 6. 



154 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN" FOREIGN POLICY 

Rosenberg further states that he intends to appoint Schmeer, 
Selzner, and Manderbach as Commissars in the Moscow area. The 
Fiihrer desires that Holz be employed too, and that the former Gau- 
leiter Frauenfeld should be placed in. charge of administration of 
the Crimea. 

Rosenberg states he intends also to employ Captain von Petersdorff 
because of his special merits; general consternation, general rejec- 
tion. The Fiihrer and the Reichsmarschall both insist that without 
doubt von Petersdorff is insane. 

Rosenberg states furthermore that the employment of the Burgo- 
master of Stuttgart, Strolin, has been proposed to him. There were 
no objections. 

Since Kube is considered too old for the Moscow district by both 
the Reichsmarschall and Rosenberg, Kasche is to take over this 
district. 

{ Memorandum for Party Comrade Klopf er : 

Please ask Dr. Meyer " at once for the files concerning the plans 
for the future organization and the intended appointments.) 

The Reichsmarschall emphasizes he intended to assign to Gauleiter 
Terboven 12 the exploitation of the Kola Peninsula ; the Fiihrer agrees. 

The Fiihrer emphasizes that Lohse, provided he feels equal to this 
task, should take over the Baltic area; Kasche Moscow; Koch the 
Ukraine; Frauenfeld the Crimea; Terboven Kola; and Schickedanz 
the Caucasus. 

Reichsleiter Rosenberg then broached the question of providing 
for the security of the administration. 

The Fiihrer tells the Reichsmarschall and the Field Marshal that 
he had always urged that the police regiments be provided with 
armored cars ; this has proved to be most necessary for police opera- 
tions within the newly-occupied eastern territories, because a police 
regiment equipped with the appropriate number of armored cars of 
course could perform much service. Otherwise though, the Fiihrer 
pointed out the security protection was very thin. However, the 
Reichsmarschall was going to transfer all his training fields to the 
new territories, and if necessary even Junker 52's could drop bombs 
in case of riots. Naturally this giant area would have to be pacified 
as quickly as possible; the best solution was to shoot anybody who 
looked askance. 

Field Marshal Keitel emphasizes that the inhabitants themselves 
ought to be made responsible for their affairs because it was of course 
impossible to put a sentry in front of every shed or railway station. 



u Alfred Meyer, Gauleiter of Westphalia, North. 

" Josef Terboven, Reich Commissar for occupied Norway. 



JULY 1941 155 

The inhabitants had to understand that anybody who did not per- 
form, his duties properly would be shot, and that they would be held 
responsible for every offense. 

Upon a question of Reichsleiter Rosenberg the Fiihrer replied that 
newspapers, e.g., for the Ukraine too, would have to be reestablished, 
in order t<^ obtain means of influencing the inhabitants. 

After the interval the Fiihrer emphasized that we had to under- 
stand that the Europe of today was nothing but a geographical term ; 
in reality Asia extended up to our previous frontiers. 

Reichsleiter Rosenberg then described the organizational arrange- 
ment he intended to establish; he did not intend to appoint a perma- 
nent deputy of the Reich Commissar from the outset, but always the 
most efficient of the General Commissars would be called upon to 
deputize for the Reich Commissar. 

Rosenberg will set up four departments in the office of the Reich 
Commissar: first for the general administration; second for politics; 
third for economics ; fourth for engineering and architecture. 

(Incidentally : The Fiihrer emphasizes that activities on the part of 
the churches are out of the question. Papen had sent him through the 
Foreign Ministry a long memorandum 13 in which it was asserted 
now was the right moment to reestablish the churches ; but this was 
completely out of the question. ) 

The Reichsmarschall will detail to Rosenberg's organization Minis- 
terialdirektoren Schlotterer andRiecke. 

Reichsleiter Rosenberg requests appropriate premises to house his 
administration ; he requests the premises of the Trade Mission of the 
Soviet Union in Lietzenberger Street ; the Foreign Ministry, however, 
was of the opinion that these premises were extraterritorial. The 
Fiihrer replies that this was nonsense; Reich Minister Lammers was 
charged to inform the Foreign Ministry they were to hand over these 
premises to Rosenberg at once and without any negotiations. 

Rosenberg then proposes to detail a liaison officer to the Fiihrer ; his 
aide, Koeppen, was to be appointed; the Fiihrer agrees and adds that 
Koeppen should take over a role parallel to that of Hewel. 

Reich Minister Dr. Lammers then read the rough drafts which he 
had made. (See the annex! 14 ) 



"Not found. In a note of July 17 (1247/337693) Counselor Etzdorf, the 
Foreign Ministry's representative with the High Command of the Army, recorded 
the following : 

"Papen has proposed to the Fiihrer that Russia be led back to Christianity in 
order to strengthen morale. Fiihrer : Idea of the 'old Jockey' missionary activity 
was entirely out of the question. If one did it at all, one should permit all the 
Christian denominations to enter Russia 'in order that they club each other to 
death with their crucifixes'." 

" Not found. 



156 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

A longer discussion takes place concerning the authority of the 
Reichsfiihrer SS ; obviously at the same time all the participants have 
in mind the authority of the Reichsmarschall. 

The Fiihrer, the Reichsmarschall, and others reiterate that Himmler 
was to receive no other authority than he had in Germany proper ; but 
this much was absolutely necessary. 

The Fiihrer emphasizes repeatedly that this quarrel would soon 
subside in practice; he recalls the excellent cooperation between the 
Army and the Luftwaffe at the front. 

In conclusion it is decided to call the Baltic country "Ostland." 

Annexes. 15 



18 Not found. 

No. 115 

5077/H292425-427 

Memorandum ly an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat 

Beklin, July 16, 1941. 

d ix 44. 

Subject : Letter of M. Wolodymyr Stachiw of July 2, 1941. 

Respectfully submitted to Consul General Grosskopf with the 
request that further action be taken. 

If it should be considered necessary that the matter be submitted to 
the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Minister's Secretariat would be 

grateful if a position were taken. 1 

Bruns 

[Enclosure] 

Berlin- Wilmersdokf, July 2, 1941. 

Youk Excellency, Highly Honored Reich Foreign Minister : On 
behalf of the Ukrainian Government for the Western Ukraine in 
Lwow I take the liberty of communicating the following : 

On June 30, 1941, there met in Lwow, the capital of Western 
Ukraine, a Ukrainian national assembly where Jaroslav Stecjko, the 
deputy of the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, 
OUN., proclaimed the establishment of authority of the Ukrainian 
State in the Western Ukraine and read aloud the proclamation of the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. 

At the same time the proclamation of the leader of the OUN., 
Stepan Bandera, was read, according to which Jaroslav Stecjko was 
appointed chief of the Government of Western Ukraine. 



1 See document No. 138. 



JULY 1941 157 

Speeches of welcome were held by Bishop Dr. Joseph Slipyj in 
the name of the Metropolitan of the Uniate Greek Church, Andreas 
Count Scheptyckyj, and by Dr. Hrynioch in the name of the 
Ukrainian Legion and its commander Captain Eoman Schuchewytsch. 

High officers of the victorious Wehrmacht were present at this 
Ukrainian ^assembly. Captain Professor Dr. H. Koch 2 made the 
welcoming speech on behalf of the Wehrmacht. 

By radio the Ukrainian Government in Lwow appointed the under- 
signed as its Plenipotentiary Extraordinary with the Government 
of the German Reich and with the governments of the countries 
allied with and friendly to the German Reich. 

This communication is being sent to the Imperial Japanese Gov- 
ernment, the Royal Italian Government, and the Governments of the 
countries which have acceded to the Tripartite Pact. 3 

Yours, etc. Wolodymik Stachiw 

* Representative of the Abwehr. 

•An almost Identical communication dated July 3 (105/113736-37) was 
addressed to the Rumanian Minister in Berlin. Woermann's memorandum 
U.St. S.Pol. 652 of July 16 (105/113735) records that Bossy showed him the 
communication that day and in that connection asked about the future shape 
of the Soviet Union. Woermann replied that nothing could be said at the 
time on this matter and emphasized that Germany did not recognize any 
Ukrainian government in Lwow or its representative in Berlin. 



No. 116 

4828/E241315-18 

The Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs to the 

Legation in Croatia 

Telegram 

No. 650 Berlin, July 17, 1941—2 : 10 a. m. 

Received July 17 — 2 : 15 a. m. 
With reference to your telegram No. 577 of June 25. * 
The draft of a treaty between the German and Croatian Govern- 
ments concerning the resettlement of Slovenes and Serbs in the area 
of the former Yugoslav state, which Minister Kasche submitted, 2 
has been thoroughly reviewed. The review has shown that it is 
expedient not to conclude a formal agreement in consideration of 
the fact that no provisions are intended regarding the treatment of 
the property of the persons involved in the resettlement which is 
being carried out as a war measure, and also in view of the fact 

*In this telegram (4828/E241317) Kasche had reported that the Military 
Commander in Serbia had agreed to the Croatian request that 30,000 Serbs he 
resettled in Serbia in addition to those who were to he resettled in accordance 
with the decisions taken in the conference of June 4 (see vol. xn of this series, 
document No. 589) . 

1 See vol. in of this series, document No. 589, footnote 3. 



158 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

that the necessary speed in ^^^^^^^^ 
with this nrocedure. It is considered to be sufficient if an excnange 
Tf L^ betw^i the Legation and the Croatian Government m the 

^ arising which go beyond the content of the memorandum would 

steps and report regarding them. 3 Luther 

T7— ^patch of Au g . V^ t Stl A ** SoSSSS SoS^ 
reported that an exchange of notes between me £°™ truetlon , The German 

SS?^S £ Wan* r cSan^te^aie of Au, 5 are «!»- 

on 4828/E241309-14. 



No. 117 

82/60338-41 



r he Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

Tokyo, July 17, 1941-12 : 30 p. m. 

MOST URGENT x " ' . J , I , -|7_Q.5f, a m. 

No. 1250 of July 16 Reived Ju ly 17-8 • « * £ 

I have taken the opportunity, together .ith the ^Attaches ^ ; h 

armed forces, to discuss the present pohtical J^^ ™*^££ 

Withdrawalof the Russian Army, which washeld close to the borderby 
Ihe Amur railway, was difficult. One would therefore have to reckon 
from the very outeet with severe fighting which would have to bring 
aLut the annihilation of the enemy. Japan's Army did not £ave at ,t 
disposal large mechanized forces like the German Army ^and fl«rf ore 
no ranid conquest of territory could be expected The primary oo 
•e°cS was therefore the destruction of toW**Vg*o f ^ 
enemv which might form the support for a Siberian- BolslieviK gov 
"nmenlother gene-Is said the same thing. They emphasized that 



JULY 1941 159 

effective preparations to strengthen the Array had not begun till after 
June 22. Prior to that date Germany had not expressed any wish for 
Japan's participation in a possible conflict with Russia. Consequently, 
the Japanese Army had made no preparations against the Soviet 
Union in order not to alert it prematurely and act contrary to any 
plans that the Germans might have. 

Vice Admiral Kondo, Chief of Staff, who has headed the naval staff 
for 2 years, spoke enthusiastically about the success of German arms. 
Unfortunately, it was impossible for Japan to go into action immedi- 
ately, in view of the lack of preparations and the strength of the 
Russian adversary. It was hardly practicable to withdraw large 
forces from China. For the Navy it was primarily a question of com- 
mitting sufficient naval air forces against about 2,000 remaining com- 
bat and pursuit planes of the Russian Far East Army. The naval air 
force, which is the backbone of the Japanese Air Force and also takes 
a decisive part in land operations, was partly tied down in China. 
Other units had to stand by for defense against possible action by the 
Americans in East Asia. To be sure, it was not expected that there 
would be any serious American-English interference with the Indo- 
china operation. 1 However, the Navy, including the air force, had to 
be ready for action. In reply to my remark that America was not in 
a position to take action and that the American Navy, moreover, was 
not rated very highly, he said that in the last 2 years the American 
Navy had made great progress in training and that the younger offi- 
cer corps in particular *was good. It would be a mistake to under- 
estimate the American Navy. Units of it would probably operate 
over the South Pacific and attack forward Japanese positions from 
the South Sea base (Port Darwin). The Japanese Navy would im- 
mediately have supply difficulties. However, he had to concede that 
the danger would not become acute for about 6 months. I pointed out 
to the Vice Admiral Chief of Staff that if the Russian enemy were 
first disposed of, that very fact would then free the Japanese Navy 
in the rear; in the contrary case, it was to be feared that the Americans 
would obtain a foothold in Kamchatka. Admiral Kondo replied 
that the Japanese Navy was on its guard and would immediately take 
action to prevent that. Japan would not permit military support of 
Russia, and the Russian Government had indicated to Ambassador 
Tatekawa that it expected American war material only through Iran. 
Russia had only an insignificant amount of merchant tonnage in the 
Pacific and the English and Americans would hardly make any ton- 
nage available. Reminded of the possibility of procuring raw mate- 
rials, Kondo admitted that recently three Russian tankers had been 
sighted at the latitude of Sakhalin and a few Russian ships were now 

1 See document No. 126. 



160 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

lying in Manila, probably in order to take on copra and other goods 
there. Admiral Kondo pointed out in conclusion that the question of 
the timing of Japanese intervention was largely a matter to be decided 
by the Army, which would undoubtedly have to wait for the end of the 
rainy season, that is, till the middle or the end of August. He asked 
that it be borne in mind that Japan was now in the fifth year of a hard 
war. It was important that Japan not suffer any reverse but remain a 
strong factor in the event of a conflict with the United States of 
America which may become necessary. 

From circles close to the Prime Minister and the War Minister I 
hear that they are absolutely determined to persist with the China 
campaign as the center of Japanese interest. They have not yet come 
round to the conviction that a determined attack first on the Russian 
and then on the Anglo-Saxon position will also force Chiang Kai- 
shek to give in. The Army leaders want to make adequate prepara- 
tions in any case before beginning a new military operation, especially 
since the position of the Army, after years of war, is no longer the 
same as it was 5 years ago. The Army leadership also intends for the 
time being to await the result of the Saigon operation and at the same 
time to proceed consistently with further mobilization. The political 
leadership is toying with the idea of convoking the Diet at the end 
of August in order, if necessary, to put through an enabling act. The 
internal political situation in Russia is being closely watched, with 
occasional expressions of hope that independence movements will 
arise in parts of Siberia. This idea, it seems to me, is also suggested 
in Matsuoka's oral statement of July 2 to the Foreign Minister. 2 It 
is further indicated by Matsuoka's repeated questions about when 
the Stalin regime will collapse and the question about German ideas 
on the future internal organization of Russia. 

Under the impact of the great German victories overcautious con- 
siderations will in my opinion finally be pushed aside by public opinion 
and by the war sentiment of the officers' corps, which is growing as 
mobilization progresses. To be sure, there is still great anxiety about 
a long war with the United States. On being reminded of the aggres- 
sive attitude of the United States and asked what Japan's reaction 
might be, leading figures in the Armed Forces and the Foreign Min- 
istry repeatedly replied to me that this matter should be handled by 
the three-member Commission of the Tripartite Pact. 3 

Ott 



' Document No. &t. 

* See vol. xi of this aeries, documents Nos. 153 and 270, and vol. xn, document 
No. 304. 



JULY 1941 161 

No. 118 

63/42336-38 

The Charged'' Affaires in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 
MOST URGENT COPENHAGEN, July 17, 1941. 

secret Received July 17—7 : 10 p. ra. 

No. 915 of July 17 

With reference to your telegram No. 772 of July 13, 1 and with 
reference to my telegrams Nos. 882 of July 8 i and 889 of July 9. 3 

The request of the Foreign Ministry for official information has 
so far had the result that the American Charge d' Affaires * has sent 
over Roosevelt's statement to Congress, which is known to you, to- 
gether with the letter of the Icelandic Prime Minister to Roosevelt, 
and the reply to it. a The Icelandic Charge" d'Aff aires « transmitted 
a copy of a telegram from the Prime Minister from Reykjavik, in 
which it is confirmed that all parties of the Althing, with the excep- 
tion of the Communists, have approved the Jonasson-Roosevelt agree- 
ment. This circumstance, it is thought in authoritative circles in the 
Foreign Ministry, precludes a protest by the King because he, too, 
would violate the Icelandic Constitution, upon which he took an oath, 
and, apart from the practical futility of the entire step, this would 
bring him into opposition to the people and Parliament in Iceland, 
in which he would be in the wrong. 

I, on the other hand, took the very emphatic stand that in connection 
with the most recent events, one came up against the amazing and 
inexplicable fact that the same Icelanders who, less than a year ago, 
had protested most vehemently against the English occupation, 7 and 
in January 1941, used an obscure American press notice to proclaim to 
the world emphatically that they would prevent any form of Anglo- 
American traffic in arms through Iceland's harbors and intended to 
remain very strictly neutral, 8 were now, without discernible opposi- 

1 Document No. 102. 

1 See document No. 102, footnote 1. 

' In this telegram (130/70788) ETotze reported that according to the Danish 
Foreign Minister, the American Charge d'Affaires had received no instructions 
regarding the landing of American forces in Iceland. 

' Mahlon F. Perkins. 

6 For the test of President Roosevelt's message of July 7 to Congress trans- 
mitting a message received from the Prime Minister of Iceland, Hermann Jonas- 
son, and the President's reply, see Department of State, Bulletin, 1941, vol. v, p. 
15. 

' Jon Krabbe. 

7 British troops landed in Iceland on May 10, 1940. Cf. Foreign Relation* of 
the United States, 1940, vol. n, pp. 679-684. 

'Details concerning the Icelandic protest are found in a memorandum by 
Grundherr of May 19, 1941 (130/70742-52) which discusses developments in 
Iceland. 

682-905—64 — —16 



162 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

tion, voluntarily summoning into the country tens of thousands of 
American soldiers. We had thought of a statement to be issued by 
the King, because despite a voluntary aloofness since April 1940, he 
must still be regarded as the de facto head of the state. Even now 
we believed that such a statement, particularly in view of the future 
of Denmark and Iceland, could be of great importance. But what 
mattered, above all, was that this act of a new, forcible occupation of 
Iceland by foreign troops should not be accepted without any expres- 
sion of opposition from the Danes. One should not be deterred by 
formalistic objections from speaking plainly in a matter so decisive 
for Iceland's future position in the European world. 

After this discussion, M. von Scavenius called" in his aides and in my 
presence instructed them first of all to assemble material and prepare 
texts for an official statement which would take into account the con- 
stitutional objections, and which could ultimately be issued by the 
Minister President s or the King. He said he would inform me as 
soon as possible of his proposals on this matter. 10 In addition, mate- 
rial was to be prepared in order that through the pens of well-known 
journalists, like Professor Gudmund Hatt, attention might be called 
publicly in more comprehensive form, less bound by formal objections, 
to the sudden change in position of the Icelanders, its internal 
implications and the importance of the entire question for the future. 

In view of the age and the well-known general attitude of the King, 
it is improbable that after the vote of the Icelandic Parliament, he can 
be induced to take some sort of public stand, particularly since he has 
refrained from any such interference since April 1940. As far as the 
contemplated statement by the Government and the public discussion 
in the press are concerned, it will take constant pressure by us to 
induce the Danes to take more effective action. 

The Danish Minister in Eeykjavik, 11 who has likewise been asked 
for his reaction, but who is probably hampered the most by Anglo- 
American censorship, has not yet replied. 12 In the Foreign Ministry 
they still hope to get from him information through special channels 

concerning actual sentiment in Iceland. 

Kotze 



Thorvald Stauning. . tl , .. 

10 In telegram No. 989 of Aug. 4 (62/42345-49) Renthe-Fink transmitted the 
confidential draft of the statement which the Minister President was going to 
read in Parliament regarding the landing of American troops in Iceland. German 
proposals for changes in the text of the draft and Renthe-Fink's reports about 
these changes are contained in Weizsacker's instruction of Aug. 8 (130/70814-18) 
and in Copenhagen telegrams of Aug. 12 (unnumbered: 62/42359-60), Nos. 1031 
of Aug. 14 (62/42361-66), and 1038 of Aug. 16 (62/42367). 

" F. le Sage de Fontenay. . 

" Renthe-Fink transmitted the report of the Danish legation at Reykjavik 
in telegram No. 968 of July 30 (62/42340-^1) . 



JULY 1941 163 

No. 119 

34/24761-63 

Fiikrer's Decree of July 17 

Fuhker's Headquarters, July 17, 1941. 
Enclosure 1 zu WFSt/Abt. L (IV/Qu) No. 334/41 of July 18, 1941. 

Concerning the administration of the newly-occupied eastern 
territories. 

In order to restore and maintain public order and public life in the 
newly-occupied eastern territories I order as follows : 

Paragraph 1 

As soon and in so far as the military operations in the newly- 
occupied eastern territories are terminated, the administration of these 
territories will be transferred from the military authorities to the au- 
thorities of civil administration. I shall in each case designate by 
special decree the territories which are accordingly to be transferred 
to the civil administration, and the date at which this is to be done. 1 

Paragraph 2 

The civil administration in the newly occupied eastern territories, 
in so far as these territories are not incorporated in the administration 
of the adjoining areas of the Reich or of the General Government, 
shall be placed under the "Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern 
Territories." 

Paragraph 3 

The military sovereign rights and powers shall be exercised in the 
newly-occupied eastern territories by the Wehrmacht commanders 
in accordance with my decree of June 25, 1941. 2 

The powers of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan in the 
newly-occupied eastern territories are separately defined by my decree 
of June 29, 1941, s and those of the Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of 

1 A Fiihrer decree of July 17 (34/24765) assigned the civil administration of 
the region of Bialystok to the Oberprasldent of the province of East Prussia 
a ad that of former Polish Galicia to the Governor General. The territories of 
the former states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia together with the area in- 
habited by the White Ruthenians was designated the Reich Commissariat, "Ost- 
land," whose precise boundaries were to be stated later. 

A decree of July 18 (34/24764) separated the western part of this area from 
the zone of operations and ordered the civil administration to take over effective 
July 25. 

A directive of July 22 (5083/E292814-14/3) placed the regions of Vilna, Bialy- 
stok, and Lw6w under civil administration effective Aug. 1. 

'Not printed (5078/E292510-11). 

■Not printed (5078/E292512) . 



164 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

the German Police by my decree of July 17, 1941, 4 and are not affected 
by the following provisions. 

Paragraph 4 

I appoint Reiehsleiter Alfred Rosenberg Reich Minister for the Oc- 
cupied Eastern Territories. He shall have his headquarters in Berlin. 

Paragraph 5 

The parts of the newly occupied eastern areas placed under the 
Eeich Minister for the Occupied Eastern territories shall be divided 
into Reich Commissariats, these into General Regions \General- 
hesirke] and these again into Districts [Kreisgebiete]. Several dis- 
tricts can be combined into a Main Region. The Reich Minister for 
the Occupied Eastern Territories shall issue the more specific 
regulations concerning this. 

Paragraph 6 

At the head of each Reich Commissariat there shall be a Reich Com- 
missar; at the head of each General Region a General Commissar; 
and at the head of every district a District Commissar. In case of the 
formation of a Main Region a Main Commissar shall head it. 

The Reich Commissars and the General Commissars shall be ap- 
pointed by me, the heads of the main departments in the offices of the 
Reich Commissars as well as the Main Commissars and District Com- 
missars shall be appointed by the Reich Minister for the Occupied 
Eastern Territories. 

Paragraph 7 

The Reich Commissars shall be subordinate to the Reich Minister for 
the Occupied Eastern Territories and shall receive their instructions 
from him exclusively, in so far as paragraph 3 does not apply. 

Paragraph 8 

It shall he the responsibility of the Reich Minister for the Occupied 
Eastern Territories to legislate for the newly-occupied eastern terri- 
tories placed under him. He may delegate to the Reich Commissars 
the power to legislate. 

Paragraph 9 

The Reich Commissars shall be responsible for the entire adminis- 
tration of their areas with respect to civil affairs. 
As long as military operations are in progress the security of the 



*Not printed (34/24766). This decree gave Himmler responsibility for the 
policing of the occupied eastern areas and also authorized him to Issue directives 
in this field to the Belch Commissars. 



JULY 1941 165 

operation of the railroads and the mails is the responsibility of the 
competent supreme authorities of the Eeich in accordance with the 
instructions of the Chief of the OKW. A different arrangement may 
be considered for the time after the conclusion of the military 
operations. 

Paragraph 10 

In order that the measures taken by the Eeich Minister for the Oc- 
cupied Eastern Territories or the Reich Commissars in their areas may 
be harmonized with the larger viewpoints of the interests of the Eeich, 
the Eeich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories shall keep 
close contact with the supreme Eeich authorities. In case of differ- 
ences of opinion which cannot be resolved by direct negotiations, my 
decision shall be obtained through the Eeich Minister and Chief of the 
Eeich Chancellery. 

Paragraph 11 

The regulations necessary for carrying out and supplementing this 
decree shall be issued by the Eeich Minister for the Occupied Eastern 
Territories in agreement with the Eeich Minister and Chief of the 
Eeich Chancellery and the Chief of the OKW. 

The Fuhrer 

Adolf Hitler 

The Chief of the OKW 

Keitel 

The Reich Minister and 

Chief of the Eeich Chancellery 

Dr. Lammers 

No. 120 

195/139184-87 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Departinent 

U. St.S. Pol. 661 Berlin, July 17, 1941. 

M. Bose called on me today after his return. 1 

I first informed him regarding the tasks assigned to State Secretary 
Keppler. After his visit with me M. Bose called on Herr Keppler. 

Bose first spoke in detail concerning the repercussions of the Ger- 
man-Eussian war on public opinion in India. The Soviet Union had 
been popular in India, especially among the intelligentsia, from which 



1 Following Ills visit to Germany the Indian nationalist leader, Subhas Chandra 
Bose, had gone to Rome on May 29 (see vol. xn of this series, document No. 561 
and footnotes 3 and 4). In a memorandum of July 10 (195/139182-83) Woer- 
mann recorded having received a letter from Bose who announced that he was 
coming to Germany and would arrive in Berlin by July 14 at the latest. In this 
letter of July 5, which is attached to Woermann's memorandum, Bose remarked 
that his talk with Oiano was not encouraging and that prospects for the realiza- 
tion of his plans looked gloomy as a result of the outbreak of the war in the east. 



166 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAJST FOREIGN POLICY 

the leader group came, because in India they believed that the Soviet 
Union was an anti-imperialist power and thus the natural ally of 
India against England. The German-Russian pact of 1939 had been 
a climax for India. It had made it possible for the basically anti- 
National Socialist intelligentsia now to regard Germany and Italy as 
those powers which, in friendship with the Soviet Union, would put 
an end to the British rule in India, although the British propaganda 
had succeeded in preserving hostile feelings against the Axis Powers 
in large parts of India. In the German-Russian war the feelings of 
the Indian people were very decidedly on the Russian side, because the 
Indian people were sure that Germany was the aggressor and thus 
also an imperialist power dangerous to India. Even after a complete 
German victory over Russia it would be difficult to change public opin- 
ion in India in this regard. 

At the same time Bose expects — and there are already reports from 
London confirming this — that England will now carry out reforms in 
India that will make it appear inviting to that portion of public 
opinion which is always inclined to compromises to continue to bet on 
the English, while at the same time the danger of a German attack on 
India is pictured ; not in the sense of a liberation of the Indian people 
but of a replacement of British rule by German rule. 

Bose expects that India will become even more than before a center 
for the development of British military power and considers it very 
probable that England will advance not through Afghanistan but 
through Iran in order to seize first the oil fields and then to join hands 
with the Soviet Union in the Caucasus region. 

Bose's statements indicated that, away from Berlin, he is strongly 
influenced by the Soviet thesis even in the question of the origin of 
the German- Russian conflict, so that it will be one of the first tasks 
to set him right on this point. 

I told Bose that we adhered unchanged to the intention of a procla- 
mation in favor of a free India ; 2 naturally a favorable moment had to 
be chosen for this. 

At this point M. Bose became very excited and asked that the Foreign 
Minister be told that this proclamation should be issued as quickly as 
possible. Every day that passed gave England the lead with the 
projected measures of reform in India, whereas on the other hand he 
did not see any reason for holding back the proclamation. However, 
he could understand that the moment had to be chosen by judging the 
situation as a whole. 

I did not deal in detail in our short conversation with the other cur- 
rent questions, in particular with that of preparations here for the 
establishment of a free India 3 center. It was obvious, however, that 



' See vol. xir of this series, document No. 553. 
' In English in the original. 



JULY 1941 167 

for Bose these questions are of lesser interest as long as lis does not 
have the certainty that the declaration regarding a free India will be 
issued. 

I refer also to the report of July 13 * from the German Embassy in 
Rome and the memorandum of the Italian Foreign Minister contained 
therein regarding Bose's conversations in Rome. The idea discussed 
there in point 4, of keeping Bose in reserve in a neutral country for a 
later suitable moment, appears to me to be inapt. 

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister. Proposals for the 
further treatment of the questions concerned are being prepared by 
State Secretary Keppler and me. 

Woermann 



4 Report No. 61 g. (41/28496; 2849S^501). 

No. 121 

1527/373694-85 

The Charge d? Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

urgent Washington, July 18, 1941 — 9 : 03 p. m. 

secret Received July 19 — 8 : 20 a. m. 

No. 2301 of July 18 

1, The opposition is incessantly demanding of Roosevelt and Knox 
an authentic interpretation of their orders to the American fleets which 
was announced in Roosevelt's message to Congress * on the occasion of 
Iceland. Assertions by the opposition that the American fleets had 
received orders from Roosevelt to shoot at German war vessels have 
become so annoying to the President that he felt compelled in his press 
conference today again to deal with this matter in a detailed fashion. 
The English text of his statement to the press conference in the United 
Press version follows en clair as No. 2302.* According to this Roosevelt 
said the following : The occupation of Iceland was simply necessary 
for the defense of both the United States and the Western Hemisphere 
as a whole in order to forestall seizure by an unfriendly power. For 
the protection and maintenance of the American garrisons employed 
for this it is imperative that the lines of communication with Iceland 
be kept open. 

The President interpreted this statement in the sense that because of 
basic military considerations he had to refuse to state what means 
the fleets would use in order to keep the lines of communication with 
Iceland open. 

1 See document No. 118, footnote 5. 
•Not found. 



168 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

These evasive tactics of parliamentary maneuvers [Parlamentsver- 
handhmg] indicate that on the one hand he is trying to calm the oppo- 
sition which is troublesome for him, but that on the other hand he does 
not want to disappoint the English but rather to encourage them, as 
they might fear that the opposition had forced him to withdraw a 
possible order to shoot. 

2. In this connection the leading Senator of the noninterventionist 
opposition informed me that Roosevelt always expresses himself un- 
clearly also for the purpose of being able to exploit to his best advan- 
tage any possible incident with the German naval forces. The leader 
of the opposition was deeply concerned about the gravity of the situa- 
tion developing from these dishonest statements by the President. He 
urgently let it be suggested to me that everything be done to ensure 
that the German Government saw through these intrigues by Roose- 
velt aimed at provoking an incident with every possible means. Time 
and again he stressed that the calm dignity of the Reich Government, 
which did not allow itself to be provoked by any American impudence, 
had so far been successful in that the opposition had had the time to 
rally and to organize. The Fuhrer's restraint, as he well knew, put 
Roosevelt in a white heat. If an incident could be avoided until the end 
of this year the opposition, in the opinion of its leaders, would be so 
strong that no one would be able to induce this country any longer to 
take an active part in the war ; by that time, namely, the majority of 
the American people would be sufficiently convinced of the selfishness 
of Britian's policy and conduct of the war as well as of the lack of 
scruples of the American interventionists and. would likewise have 
gained clarity regarding the steps toward American military 
intervention. 

Thomsen 



No. 122 

496/233480 

Memorandum oy an Official of Political Division IM 

Berlin, July 18, 1941. 
zuPol.IM2247g.Rs. 1 
With reference to telegram No. 2443 of July 17 from Madrid. 2 
On the basis of strictly confidential arrangements between the Ger- 
man Navy and the Spanish Naval Command, German submarines 

1 Pol. I M 2247 not identified. It may be Madrid telegram No. 2443 of July 17. 
See footnote 2. 

■ In this telegram (95/106953) an official of tee German Embassy reported that 
it was clear from the British note of protest to the Spanish Government that the 
British were aware of the submarine supply action by the German Naval Attache 1 
in the Canary Islands. 



JULY 1941 169 

have for some time been supplied by German tenders based on Canary 
Islands ports. 3 

According to a communication received from the Naval Operations 
Staff in reference to the above telegram from Madrid, it appears that 
the English have closely observed such a supply operation of a Ger- 
man submarine. The detailed and correct information relating 
thereto in the British note of protest leaves no doubt in that respect. 

The Naval Operations Staff has the impression that the Spaniards 
will not let themselves be affected by the English protest and are 
prepared to continue their collaboration. The German Naval Attache 
in Madrid,* however, has on his own taken care to have these supply 
operations discontinued for the next months. 6 

Herewith submitted to Ambassador Hitter. 

von Geote 



* See vol. xi of this series, documents Nos. 268 and 450. 

* Cmdr. C. Meyer-Dohner. 

6 For further developments see documents Nos. 391 and 403. 



No. 123 

1007/307749-57 

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat 

Konigsbeeg, July 18, 1941. 

Brief for the Foreign Minister 

By telegram No. 1247 of July 15, 1 the German Embassy in Tokyo 
reported the counterproposals which the Japanese Government made 
regarding the text of the proposed Japanese- American agreement. 2 
Using the text communicated by telegram No. 731 of May 13 from 
Tokyo a as a basis, the wording as amended by the changes now pro- 
posed is as follows : * 

"Actuated by a desire to restore their traditional friendship, the 
Governments of Japan and the United States will embark upon the 
negotiation of a general agreement with a view to establishing, by a 
joint effort, a just peace in the Pacific and thus arresting the tragic 
confusion that now threatens civilization. 



'Not printed (82/60328-32). 

1 What is involved here are Japanese counterproposals to the American draft 
proposal of June 21. See document No. 88 and footnote 6, which in turn was 
a reply to the Japanese proposal of May 12 (see vol. in of this series, document 
No. 512, footnote 2) . 

8 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 512, footnote 2. 

4 The texts of the American and Japanese drafts cited in the original of the 
document printed are actually translations into German of English texts cited 
in telegrams Nos. 1247 and. 731 (see footnotes 1 and 3). This has been taken 
into account in producing the translation printed here. These English texts 
transmitted in the telegrams referred to above are likewise cited in an unsigned 
memorandum of July 17 from the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (82/60354-60) 
comparing the pertinent American and Japanese drafts. 



170 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

"I. The concepts of Japan and the United States respecting inter- 
national relations and character of nations. 

"The Governments of Japan and the United States jointly acknowl- 
edge each other as equally sovereign States and contiguous Pacific 
powers. . . 

"Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies 
as directed towards the foundation of a lasting peace and the inaugu- 
ration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation between 
their peoples. 

"Both Governments declare that it is their traditional and present 
concept and conviction that nations and races compose as members 
of a family one household ; each equally enjoying rights and admitting 
responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful 
processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical 
welfare which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are 
bound not to destroy for others. There should, of course, be neither 
oppression nor exploitation of the backward peoples. 

"Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective 
traditional concepts on the character of nations and underlying moral 
principles of social order and national life will continue to be pre- 
served and that they will not be deformed by foreign ideas or ideologi es 
contrary to those moral principles and concepts. 

"II. The attitudes of both Governments towards the European war. 

"It being the common aim of both Governments to establish world 
peace, they will join forces with a view to preventing the extension 
of the European war and restoring peace speedily when the proper 
time arrives" 

(Note: The American reply had proposed leaving out the 
words "and restoring peace speedily," since there is not at present 
any prospect of peace. Japan, on the other hand, proposed sub- 
stituting for those words "and restoring peace speedily when the 
proper time arrives.") 

"The Japanese Government -maintains that the purpose of the 
Tripartite Pact was and is defensive and that this purpose indubitably 
is thus to contribute to the non-extension of the present war. If, 
however, the European war should experience an extension, the 
Japanese Government wUl fulfill the obligations of that Treaty and 
they will decide their attitude solely by considerations of the defense 
of their welfare and security." 

(Note: The original text read: 

"The Government of Japan believes that the purpose of the 
Tripartite Pact was and is defensive and designed to prevent the 
participation of nations in the European war [not] present [ly J 
involved in it. . . 

"The Government of Japan declares that there is no question 
that the obligation of military assistance under the Tripartite 
Pact comes into force in the case stipulated in article 3 of the 

said Pact." ■ » 

The American reply had proposed that the two foregoing 
paragraphs be omitted entirely. The Japanese Government 



JULY 1Q41 171 

thereupon made the above counterproposal which is underscored 
with dots.) ° 

"Being pledged to the hate of war the attitude of the United States 
towards the European war is and will continue to be determined solely 
and exclusively by considerations of the protective defence of its own 
national welfare and security. The Government of the United States 
declares that it does not and will not resort to any aggressive measure 
aimed to assist any one nation against another." 

(Note: The American Government proposed as paragraph 4 
the following text : 

"The Government of the United States maintains that its atti- 
tude toward the European hostilities will be determined solely 
by considerations of its national security and defense." 

The Japanese Government, however, demands in its counter- 
proposal mat the old text of the former paragraph 4 be restored 
as given above.) 

"III. China. 

"The Japanese Government declares to the Government of the 
United States that the fundamental condition for the solution of the 
China affair is not contrary to the principles mentioned in the Konoye 
declaration and the arrangements already put into effect in pursuance 
of that declaration. The Government of the United States will rec- 
ommend to the Chiang Kai-shek regime to enter into negotiations 
with the Japanese Government for the purpose of cessation of hostili- 
ties and restoration of peaceful relations." 

(Note : The American Government had proposed a longer text 
for paragraph III, according to which Japan would from the 
outset tie her hands with respect to any negotiations with Chiang 
Kai-shek. Orally the American Government declared with re- 
gard to this that it was against the stationing of Japanese troops 
in China, and it demanded finally that the Japanese peace terms 
had to be acceptable to Chiang Kai-shek. Instead of that, the 
Japanese Government proposed the above text which is under- 
scored.) 

"IV. Commerce between both nations. 

"When an understanding is reached between the two Governments, 
Japan and the United States shall assure each other to supply mu- 
tually such commodities as are respectively available or required by 
them. Both Governments will take steps necessary for the resumption 
of normal trade relations as once existed under the treaty of naviga- 
tion and commerce between the two countries. 

"V. The Economic Activity of both nations in the Southwestern 
Pacific Area. 

"On the basis of the pledges hereby given the activity of Japan 
and of the United States in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be 
carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle 
of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the 
Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree 

5 The passages which in this English translation are italicized are underscored 
with dots in the German original of the document. 



172 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

to cooperate independently each without the other in the production 
and procurement of the natural resources in these areas (such as, for 
example, mineral oil, rubber, tin and nickel) which each of the two 
countries needs." 

(Note: Instead of paragraph V the American reply proposes 
a text by which Japan and the United States undertake to co- 
operate m the entire Pacific area in questions of trade and raw 
materials and not to practice any discrimination. Thereby 
America seeks to restore the Open Door in China. The Japanese 
counterproposal would, adopt the above-quoted test whicli is 
underscored for paragraph V.) 

"VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilisation in 
the Pacific. 

"A. Both Governments declare that the policy underlying this 
understanding is peace in the Pacific area, and further that it is their 
fundamental purpose through cooperative efforts to contribute to the 
maintenance and preservation of peace in the Pacific area, and that 
neither of them has territorial designs in the area mentioned. 

"B. The Governments of Japan and the United States jointly guar- 
antee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that 
the latter observes permanent neutrality and accords to the Japanese 
subjects a treatment equal to the Commonwealth citizens. 

u O. The Government of the United States wUl make endeavors that 
amicable consideration shall be accorded to Japanese emigration to 
the United States. Japanese immigrants shall be placed on a basis of 
equality with other nations, free from discrimination." 

(Note: With reference to paragraph VI the American reply 
stipulates that a guarantee of the independence and neutralization 
of the Philippines is not to be given immediately but only when 
it is desired by the United States. The Japanese counterproposal 
has the present text under paragraph VI, the passages underscored 
being new. The American reply would delete clause C 
completely.) 

Telegram No. 1247 of July 15 from Tokyo, on the basis of whieh the 
above text is composed as it now appears in accordance with the Jap- 
anese proposals, also states the following : 

"Foreign Minister Matsuoka, whom I have been trying to see since 
the end of last week, is indisposed for the time being and informed 
me through his office that his doctor had ordered for him complete 
rest. In response to an extremely urgent request from the Russian 
Ambassador, however, he had gotten up on Saturday e to receive him 
briefly. The doctor had thereupon strictly forbidden him to engage 
in any activity if he wished to be able to work again in the next few 
weeks. In his absence the head of the European Department * in- 
formed me of the contents of the American reply to the Japanese 
communication of last May. At the same time he said that the Japa- 
nese Government had drawn up a counterproposal, which would be 

* i.e., July 12. 
'Ryuki Sakamoto. 



JULY 1941 173 

transmitted to the American Government in the next few days by 
Ambassador Nomura. 8 Unfortunately, he was not in a position to 
furnish the exact text of the American proposal, but he would reveal 
the substance of it. A few unmentioned details concerned only the 
Chinese question. The American reply and the Japanese counterpro- 
posal are both largely based on the text transmitted by telegram No. 
731 of May 13, 1941. The head of the European Department also 
informed me that Ambassador Nomura had received instructions to 
tell the American Government that the oral statements by Secretary 
of State Hull about certain members of the Japanese Government 
were considered inappropriate. 9 One did not wish to assume that the 
American Government intended thereby to intervene in internal Jap- 
anese affairs. The Head of the European Department emphasizes as 
his personal opinion that the Japanese counterproposal merely tossed 
the ball back ; on account of the great divergence of views an agreement 
was out of the question. On the China question the positions of the 
two Governments were diametrically opposed to each other," 

(Weber) 

s Cf. the Konoye memoirs, printed In Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before 
the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 
2nd sess., pt. 20, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 173, pp. 3994-4003. 

'This presumably refers to a portion of the oral statement handed to Am- 
bassador Nomura by Secretary of State Hull on June 21 (see document No. 88 
and footnote 6) where Hull spoke of some influential Japanese leaders who 
were committed to the support of Germany and who made public statements 
emphasizing Japan's commitments under the Tripartite Pact. "So long as such 
leaders maintain this attitude in their official positions and apparently seek to 
influence public opinion In Japan in the direction indicated, is it not illusory 
to expect that adoption of a proposal such as the one under consideration offers 
a basis for achieving substantial results along the desired lines?" See Foreign 
Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. n, p. 485. 



No. 124 

82/60304 

Memorandum by Ambassador Stahmer 

By Teletype 
to Special Train Westfalen 

Berlin, July 18, 1941. 

Brief for the Foreign Minister for Presentation to the Fuhrer 

Subject: Situation in Japan after the resignation of the Cabinet. 

For Weber. 

The resignation of the Cabinet * is attributable to inner conflicts over 
the attitude of the Japanese Government with respect to foreign 

1 The resignation of the Konoye Cabinet had been first reported by Ott in 
telegram No. 1258 of July 16 (82/60345). In telegram No. 1271 of July (82/- 
60348-49) Ott stated that the "Cabinet crisis had come as a surprise even for 
those who were initiated" and then gave a detailed discussion of the background 
of the crisis based on information "from generally well informed sources." The 
resignation of the Konoye Cabinet was also the subject of a brief memorandum 
for the Foreign Minister drawn up by Woermann on July 17 (82/60352-53). 



174 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

policy. The Minister of War 2 and the Minister of the Navy 3 pressed 
for an energetic implementation of foreign policy and acceleration of 
the military preparations against Russia and in Indochina, which -were 
opposed by the Foreign Minister, who apparently still wanted to ad- 
here to his policy of delay. There are now two possibilities: (1) A 
new cabinet will be formed with a Foreign Minister who will vigor- 
ously push developments in Japan in accordance with the Tripartite 
Pact. (2) A cabinet will 'be formed which will continue trying to steer 
a middle course. I consider the first possibility very likely, because 
according to reports just received Prince Konoye has been asked to 
form the new government and the former Minister of War and the 
Minister of the Navy will remain in office. At the time of the con- 
clusion of the Tripartite Pact these two Ministers worked very vig- 
orously to help bring the Pact into being, and it may definitely be 
assumed that they will press for a speeding up of military preparations 
and a clear and unequivocal stand by the Japanese Government. The 
Minister of the Navy in particular is reputed to be a strong personality. 
General Araki, likewise a very dynamic officer, who has already in 
the past taken an unequivocal stand in favor of the Tripartite Pact, 
seems to have the best prospects of becoming the future Foreign Min- 
ister. The candidacy of Toyoda, the former Minister of Commerce, 
which has been mentioned in the American press, is considered ex- 
tremely unlikely in the Japanese Embassy here. 

Stahmer 



* Gen. HIdekl Tojo. 

1 Adm. Koshiro Oikawa. 



VI 1/0362; 
F2/038O-7T 



No. 125 



The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 

No. A2335 Ankaea, July 14, 1941. 

[Sent July 18.] * 

Received July 20. 2 
Political Report 

Subject : The development of Turkish foreign policy. 

For the Foreign Minister. 

My many reports will have shown with what unqualified satisfac- 
tion Turkey has welcomed the outbreak of the German-Soviet War. 

'The dispatch date is supplied from another copy (2361/488584-88). 

1 Marginal notes : 

"To Special Train Westfalen by closed circuit secret teletype." 

"[For] F[tthrer]." 

"Shown to the Fiihrer. Hew [el], July 21." 



JULY 1941 175 

The Turkish press, in conformity with the Government's neutrality 
declaration, 3 to be sure, has been instructed to restrain its enthusiasm. 
Its reports are therefore strictly factual. The country, however, is 
following the decisive developments with tremendous attention. While 
the restrained reporting of the German Supreme Army Command 
has not had the effect of shaking the firm confidence in a German vic- 
tory, it has nevertheless brought certain anxieties to the surface, which 
clearly reflect Turkey's attitude. Secretary General Numan Men- 
emencioglu mentioned that although, according to the reports of his 
Ambassador in Moscow,* the Russians were beaten on the Stalin Line, 
they would upon the advice of their English friends attempt to build 
up a new solid front east of Moscow. There is talk of 120 divisions 
which the Russians could activate and arm. 

This very idea is a nightmare for the Turks, If carried into reality 
it would mean that the Russian campaign which, as was hoped here, 
would bring an end to the war could not be terminated. On the con- 
trary parts of the German Army would in that ease remain tied down 
in Russia and the Reich would be exposed to the grinding effect of 
a war on two fronts of long duration. 

In my conversations with M. Saracoglu and M. Numan I have re- 
peatedly pointed out that Turkey's self-evident interest in the elimina- 
tion of the Bolshevik system was naturally bound to bring the country 
over to the side of the German Reich. As soon as the campaign 
against the Soviets was victoriously concluded, the Reich would be in 
a position to get down to the reorganization of Europe which had 
been discussed for such a long time. Then the moment would have 
arrived when Turkey would have to make the decision whether she 
belonged to Europe or whether she wanted to remain an appendix 
to the British- American-Russian front. I further pointed out that 
Churchill's and Roosevelt's decision to fight side by side with Bol- 
shevism until Germany was destroyed had made it plain to anyone 
who had not yet grasped this fact that England, who never through- 
out her history had shown the slightest interest in European solidarity, 
must henceforth be reckoned among the foremost of Europe's declared 
enemies. 

I have reason to assume that this train of thought meets with full 
approval here, for the official Ulus writes in its editorial of July 11 : 
"If Germany should lose this war, all mankind from the Pacific to the 
Atlantic would be shaken to its roots. If Germany wins, the Russian 
world would be divided up and scattered, and the edifice of the Com- 
munist International would be forever overthrown. Those on the 
European Continent who but recently were at each others' throats 

•According to Papen's telegram No. 788 of June 23 (105/113586) this declara- 
tion was made in an Anatolian News Agency report of June 23. 
* Ali Haydar Aktay. 



176 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

have united to ward off domination by the Kremlin. Europe has 
been unified in the mystique of a crusade." Also, the clumsy attack 
of Litvinov's in his radio address 6 has been rejected by the entire 
press in the manner it deserved. 

There is no mistaking the wish of the Turkish Government that the 
Reich, after defeating Bolshevism, will succeed in ending the war on 
the basis of a compromise that would afford Germany the possibility 
of satisfying her needs for Lebensraum and raw materials in the east 
and would put her in a position to offer France, Holland, Belgium, 
and Norway a peace that would be acceptable to all of these countries. 

It is the unspoken wish of the Turkish Government to offer its good 
offices in such a situation. The further the war progresses and the 
closer it comes to the areas of Turkish interest in the Caucasus, the 
greater will be the inducement for the Turks to talk with us about the 
future situation in that region. As Ali Fuad 8 intimated to me today, 
Turkey would be pleased if in the Caucasus a federation of the local 
tribes, which are in greater or less degree related to the Turks, could 
be established while east of the Caspian Sea formation of an inde- 
pendent Turanian state would be regarded as the best solution. These 
buffer states would relieve Turkey for a long time of the Russian 
pressure and at the same time greatly strengthen her economic 
situation. 

The English are of course not unaware of these ideas. For that 
reason it is not likely, as is feared in military quarters, that the 
English might try to move major forces from the Mosul area through 
Iran so as to make common cause with the Russians in the Caucasus. 
It goes without saying that the English are busying themselves with 
organizing a strong defensive front in northern Iraq, in order to be 
able to exert political and military pressure on Turkey from there 
and from Syria. 

The close interconnection of English interests with Bolshevism is 
most severely condemned here although the greatest reserve is observed 
publicly. As I have previously reported, 7 it has been learned from 
Moscow that at the beginning of the campaign Stalin was still hope- 
ful that he might reach an understanding with the Fiihrer on the 
basis that if the Russian Army were beaten in the west, he would 
be granted continued existence in the eastern part of Russia. It 
lias become known that he refused to receive the English delega- 
tion 3 and that he harbors as much as ever the strongest distrust 

s Presumably a reference to an English language broadcast by Litvinov of 
July 8 in which he called on Britain and the USSR to strike at Hitler 
"untiringly." 

8 Gen. Ali Fuad Erden, head of the Turkish Military Academy. 

7 Not found. 

8 Probably a reference to the British Military Mission in Moscow which 
arrived in Moscow on June 27 following arrangements made regarding the 
exchange of British and Soviet military missions. Of. Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1941, vol. i, pp. 175-177. 



JULY 1941 177 

of England's war aims. It is said that he agreed to sign the agree- 
ment s that he would conclude no separate peace, only after the Eng- 
lish, with American help, had given him a guarantee of continued 
existence in all circumstances. Incidentally it is generally believed 
here that Churchill's fall in the foreseeable future is more probable 
than the fall of Stalin. It is reported that the English opposition 
is getting nervous because of America's constant approach toward the 
British Empire's sphere of influence. It is this distrust of Ameri- 
can intentions which prompted Churchill not to withdraw the British 
troops from Iceland although the Americans advised him to do that 
and to throw the surplus of his numerous divisions, unemployed in 
England, into the struggle against Germany. Another peril for 
Churchill is said to be the charge of fraternization with Bolshevism. 
It is predicted that he will some day be overthrown for these reasons. 

As regards the position of Turkey toward the problems on her 
southern front, the desire is to continue to maintain a correct atti- 
tude toward England, as in the past. Because of the unfortunate 
outcome of the Syrian campaign, England will now be in a position 
to exert even greater influence in economic and transit matters than 
ever before. Added to this is Turkey's fundamental antipathy toward 
all so-called Arab liberation movements. Although recognition is 
given to the principle of independence of the near eastern Arab 
states, it has not been forgotten that the Arabs, who yesterday went 
with the British and today are going with us, would tomorrow ally 
themselves with the devil himself in order to march against Turkey, 

The current complicated position of Turkey with respect to the 
problems on her southern border can be resolved only through a 
policy in accord with us. 

In view of this situation it might not be uninteresting, once mat- 
ters in Eussia have developed to a certain point and agreement is 
reached on the future organization of Europe, to let Turkey take 
the initiative. Because after the English ally has brusquely rejected 
every possibility for peace, she would be fully justified in burying 
the alliance for good and making an unequivocal decision in favor 
of Europe. 

I believe that skillful exploitation of the situation by us could 
accomplish a great deal toward extricating Turkey from the present 
dilemma of alliance versus friendship. This should not be by politi- 
cal, let alone military, pressure upon her, but on the contrary by 
slowly bringing psychological influence to bear and by emphasiz- 
ing the "European" mission which is devolving upon that country 

*A reference to the British-Soviet Agreement for Joint Action and Mutual 
Assistance signed in Moscow on July 12. For text, see League of Nations 
Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 277. 

682-905—64 17 



178 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

and its peace-minded leader out of the course of historical events. 
Carrying out this mission affords Turkey a unique opportunity for 
occupying once more a top-rank position in world politics. 

Papen 



No. 126 

216/147722-23 

The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Embassy in Japan 
and to the Embassy in Paris 

Telegram 

No. 678 of July 19 RAM (Konigsberq), July 19, 1941. 

from Konigsberg Eeceived Berlin, July 19 — 1 : 05 a. m. 

No. 1094 to Tokyo from the Foreign Ministry 
No. 8712 to Paris from the Foreign Ministry 

Sent July 19. 

On July 17 Ambassador Oshima handed to the Foreign Minister the 
following memorandum with an appendix concerning the Japanese 
demands on France regarding Indochina : 1 

"The Japanese Government has started negotiations with the 
French Government with a firm resolve to secure, among other things, 
naval and air bases in Indochina. A Japanese proposal made in this 
connection is attached. The realization of this plan is the first step for 
our advance to the South. It will undoubtedly play an important part 
as a diversion of the English- American forces. In this sense the Japa- 
nese Government believes that in pursuing this aim it is giving 
valuable assistance to Germany and Italy, loyal to the spirit of the 
Tripartite Pact. It therefore believes that it may assume that the 
German Government will not only refuse any entreaty of the French 
Government to arrange for a refusal or mitigation of the Japanese 
proposal but that it will also assist the Japanese Government by 
endeavoring to convince the French Government of the advisability of 
compliance. 

End of the memorandum. 

Appendix follows: 

"confidential 

1. France and Japan undertake to cooperate militarily for the 
common defense of French Indochina. 

2. For this purpose the French Government will authorize Japan to 
adopt the following measures : 

1 See vol. ■xa of this series, document No. 611. Ambassador Ott had reported in 
telegram No. 1246 of July 15 (216/147716-17) that the Japanese Deputy Foreign 
Minister had told him "strictly confidentially" that the Japanese Ambassador In 
Vichy had received instructions to seek French agreement to the stationing of 
Japanese troops and the establishment of a few Japanese naval and air bases In 
Indochina. 



JULY 1941 179 

(a) Dispatch of the necessary number of Japanese troops, 
naval units, and air forces to South Indochina ; 

(&) Use of the following eight localities as air bases : Siemreap, 
Pnompenh, Tourane, Nhatrang, Bienhoa, Saigon, Scotrang and 
Kompongtrach. 

Use of Saigon and the Bay of Camranh as naval bases; the 
Japanese forces will bring the necessary installations. 

(c) These forces will have all freedom regarding billeting, 
maneuvers and movements. They will be granted special facilities 
for the fulfillment of their task. This also includes the abolition 
of the restrictions provided in the Nishihara-Martin agreement. 2 

(d) The French Government will supply the Japanese forces 
with the necessary amount of foreign exchange; the Japanese 
Government is willing to pay for these in accordance with methods 
which are to be determined jointly. 

3. The French Government will agree to a general plan of entry of 
these forces. The manner of such entry will be the topic of consulta- 
tion between the local Japanese and Indochinese authorities. In order 
to eliminate the possibility of a conflict the French authorities will 
adopt appropriate measures such as the removal of Indochinese forces 
from the vicinity of points of debarkation of the Japanese forces." 
End of Appendix. 

The Foreign Minister requests that you observe restraint in the 

matter. 

Rintelen 

'A military accord signed by the Japanese and French local eommanders in 
Indochina on Sept. 22, 1940. Under its terms the French granted Japan the use 
of three airfields in Tonkin, 'the right to station 6000 Japanese troops there, the 
passage of up to 25,000 Japanese troops through Tonkin to Yunnan, and per- 
mission to evacuate a division of the Canton army through Tonkin. Cf. Foreign. 
Relations of the United States, 19^0, vol. rv, p. 142 and footnote 92. 



No. 127 

82/60374-75 

The Foreign Minister to the Emhassy in Japan 
Telegram 

most urgent Konigseerg, July 19, 1941—10 : 45 a. m. 

No. 680 of July 19 from 

the Special Train Received Berlin, July 19—12 ; 00 noon. 

No. 1098 of July 19 from 

the Foreign Ministry Sent July 19 [1 : 20 p. m.] 1 

RAM 318 [Pol. VIII 4117 g.] 

For the Ambassador personally. 

An examination of the text of the Japanese counterproposals to the 
American Government, transmitted in your telegram No. 1247 of July 

1 The information in brackets Is supplied from another copy (1680/395735-36). 



180 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

lo, 2 shows that these counterproposals have been noticeably toned 
down, particularly in those passages which refer to the Tripartite 
Pact, and that this toning down is attributable to the American Gov- 
ernment's wish that these passages be omitted entirely. In view of 
thi« to us undesirable, development in this matter I request that you 
call 'on the Deputy Foreign Minister 3 or the Head of the European De- 
partment i and, without indicating that you have received any instruc- 
tions from here, state approximately the following as your personal 

view. , 

You had carefully examined the text furnished to you by the Head 
of the European Department and, of course, had forwarded it to 
Berlin. As yet you had no instructions from Berlin but believed that 
on your own initiative you ought to bring up one point immediately. 
For it appears that the passages of special importance to the other 
powers of the Tripartite Pact which were contained m the first Japa- 
nese counterproposal obviously met with the disapproval of the Wash- 
ington Government and led to the demand of the Americans that these 

passages be deleted. 

To be sure, the second Japanese counterproposal retained the sense 
of these passages but in such a substantially weakened form that you 
could not but express the fear that this method of partial compliance 
with American wishes would only strengthen the Washington Gov- 
ernment's hope that it would be able in the end to put through formu- 
lations which would make the Tripartite Pact more or less ineffectual. 
It was therefore your opinion that yielding with regard to those very 
passages relating to the Tripartite Pact was extremely risky and in- 
consistent with the sense and spirit of that Pact. 

Actually, the situation was rather this : that the Americans would be 
more careful the more categorically Japan's determination to stand 
by the Tripartite Pact were stated, whereas every concession in. this 
regard would encourage Washington to take further steps toward 
America's entry into the European war and thus by its aggressive ac- 
tion bring about the very situation that the Japanese Government 
wished to avoid. 

In view of this situation you urgently requested that the presentation 
of the new Japanese counterproposals through Ambassador Nomura 
be postponed for the time being, so that the above-mentioned point 
might be re-examined and you yourself be provided with an oppor- 
tunity, if need be, to inform the Japanese Government of the views of 
the Reich Government regarding the present state of the Japanese- 
American negotiations, which you expected to receive. 

* See document No. 123 and footnote 1. 
1 Chulchi Ohashi. 
' Ryuki Sakamoto. 



JULY 1941 



181 



If it should become apparent from your conversation that Nomura 
has already submitted the counterproposals, there is nothing that can 
be done about it ; in the contrary case, please use your influence to have 
the presentation of these proposals postponed. Please report by wire. 5 

RlBBENTROP 



1 Document No. 1S7. 



8589/E602970-73 



No. 128 



Fuhrer's Directive 

CHEFSACHE FtJHRER's HEADQUARTERS, July 19, 1941. 

TOP SECRET MILITARY 

The Fiihrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht 
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op. No. 441230/41 g.K. Chefs. 
By officer only 

Directive No. 33 : Continuation of the War in the East 

(1) The second round of battles in the east has ended on the whole 
front with the breakthrough of the Stalin Line and sweeping ad- 
vances of the armored units. With Army Group Center the elimina- 
tion of the strong enemy combat forces remaining between the motor- 
ized units will still require considerable time. 

The northern wing of Army Group South is hampered in its action 
and freedom of movement by the Fortress of Kiev and the Fifth 
Soviet Army in its rear. 

(2) The aim of the next operations must be to prevent further 
strong parts of the enemy from withdrawing into the vast Russian 
expanse, and to destroy them. 

Preparations to that effect are to be set afoot along the following 
lines : 

(a) Southeastern Front: 

The principal objective is the destruction of the enemy's Sixth and 
Twelfth Armies, while still west of the Dnieper, by a concentric 
attack. The Rumanian main forces will have to cover this operation 
in the south. 

The enemy's Fifth Army can also most quickly be destroyed by 
joint action between forces of the Army Group Center's southern 
wing and Army Group South's northern wing. 

Some infantry divisions of Army Group Center will have to be 
turned toward the south. Additional forces, motorized units partic- 
ularly, will have to be committed in a southeasterly direction after 
fulfilling their present missions, securing their supplies, and screening 
in the direction of Moscow. This will be in order to cut off those 
enemy forces which transfer to the far side of the Dnieper from 
escape into the depths of the Russian space, and to destroy them. 



182 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

(&) Center of the Eastern Front; _ 

Army Group Center, after eliminating the numerous encircled 
enemy pockets and after making its supplies secure, will continue its 
advance upon Moscow with infantry units, with the mission of cutting 
the Moscow-Leningrad communications with the motorized units that 
are not being employed southeastward in the rear of the Dnieper 
Line, and thereby covering the right flank of the thrust of the Army 
Group North toward Leningrad. 

(c) Northeastern Front: 

The advance in the direction of Leningrad must not be resumed 
until the Eighteenth Army has closed up with the 4th Armored Group 
and the deep flank is dependably shielded toward the east by the 
Sixteenth Army. Army Group North must also endeavor to block 
the withdrawal to Leningrad of the Soviet forces still fighting in 
Estonia. 

The early seizure of the Baltic islands, as possible bases of the 
Soviet fleet, is desired. 

(d) Finnish Front : 

It remains the mission of the Finnish main forces, reinforced by 
the bulk of the 163rd Division, to attack the enemy confronting them 
with the main effort east of Lake Ladoga and later, by concerted ef- 
fort with the Army Group North, to destroy them, 

The targets of the attack under command of XXXVI Corps and 
the Mountain Corps remain unchanged with the understanding, that 
for the time being stronger support cannot be expected from air units 
and therefore, if necessary, one will have to put up with a temporary 
postponement of the operations. 

(3) For the Luftwaffe, upon the release of any units from the cen- 
ter of the front, it is especially important to support the attack along 
the southeastern front as the main effort [schwerpwnktmassig] by the 
commitment of air and antiaircraft forces, and if necessary, by the 
prompt bringing up of reinforcements or by a suitable regrouping. 

The attack on Moscow -with forces of the Second Air Force, rein- 
forced by fighter formations from the west, is to be carried out as 
soon as possible as "retaliation for the Soviet attacks on Bucharest 
and Helsinki." 

(4) The mission of the Navy remains to maintain the maritime 
traffic, especially for the sending of supplies for the land operations, 
as far as enemy situation in the sea and in the air permits. Further- 
more, while we progressively threaten the enemy bases, our actions 
must as much as possible be directed at preventing enemy forces from 
escaping to Swedish ports of internment. 

After the fleet units in the Baltic are set free once more, the motor 
torpedo boats and minesweepers — at first in the strength of one flotilla 
of each — are to be transferred to the Mediterranean. 

Several submarines are to be dispatched to the Arctic Ocean for 
the support of the German operations in Finland, which are hampered 
by the bringing up by sea of enemy reinforcements. 



JULY 1941 183 

(5) In the west and north all three Wehrmacht branches must be 
on the alert to repel possible British attacks on the Channel Islands 
and the Norwegian coast. The rapid transfer of combat aircraft from 
the western theater into all parts of Norway must be ready and 

prepared. 

Adolf Hitler 

No. 129 

512/235521-23 

Memorandv/m, by the State Secretary 

St.S. No. 493 Beklw, July 19, 1941. 

ZUDVIII837I. 1 

For the Foreign Minister. 

I should like to make the following comments in regard to the 
enclosure : 

Concerning the treatment of German church matters in so far as they 
take place abroad or have an effect abroad, general guidelines should, 
in my opinion, be set up according to which one can proceed without 
having to obtain the decision of the Foreign Minister or the State 
Secretary in each separate case. 

Foreign policy interests must be observed in two respects : 

a. cultural ethnic German interests, which are connected with 
church-type institutions more often abroad than at home, and in dif- 
ferent ways. 

b. general foreign policy interests which require a careful treatment 
of church questions (e.g., the European mobilization against Bolshe- 
vism under German leadership) . 

I therefore recommend that the Foreign Ministry be guided by the 
following considerations for the issuance of exit and entry permits, 
foreign exchange permits, and funds for church-cultural items : 

1. The exit and entry of church personages who are as such above 
reproach shall be permitted if, in the opinion of the competent agency 
abroad, a refusal of the permit would provide an occasion for propa- 
gandists exploitation. 

2. German cultural institutions on a denominational basis abroad, 
such as hospitals, schools, universities, etc., shall be kept viable and 
capable of functioning both as regards personnel (through approval 
of the departure of the absolutely necessary replacements) and finan- 
cially (through donations or approval of the issuance of foreign 

1 See enclosure. 



184 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

exchange permits), if in the opinion of the competent agency abroad : 

they are directed in a manner above reproach, 

their disappearance would arouse considerable attention that could 
be utilized against us propagandistically, 

there are no other equivalent German cultural positions in existence, 
or 

there is a danger that if they are given up cultural positions of our 
enemies will gain a foothold (e.g., the Catholic University at Peking) . 

3. In countries with a marked ecclesiastical life, such as Spain, 
Sweden, Italy, Denmark, there should be the possibility of religious 
instruction in our propaganda schools, i.e., in the German schools in 
which foreign children are educated together with German children. 

Weizsacker 



[Enclosure] 

Department Germany 2 Berlin, June 28, 1941. 

e.o.DVIII837I. 

The dispatch of Reich German clergymen involves churchmen who 
care spiritually for the Germans abroad who are organized in their 
own German congregations. In processing the applications for exit 
permits Department Germany also asks the participation of the Chief 
of the Auslandsorganisation and the Chief of the Security Police 
and of the Security Service. Through this participation a position 
is taken both as regards the person of the proposed clergyman and 
also objectively as regards the pastoral post involved. In its efforts 
at consolidating the Germans abroad the Auslandsorganisation con- 
siders itself to be hampered through their ecclesiastical organization. 
The Party Chancellery shares the view of the Auslandsorganisation. 

On the occasion of a report which I gave the Foreign Minister on the 
subject of the participation of the Foreign Ministry in church matters, 
the Foreign Minister expressed himself as opposed in principle to 
special consideration by the Foreign Ministry of German church work 
abroad. 

The Foreign Ministry therefore will support church matters only in 
exceptional cases if there are considerable ethnic German interests 
involved, and will therefore also facilitate the dispatch of Reich Ger- 
man clergymen to foreign German congregations only in isolated 
cases. 3 

Herewith again submitted to the State Secretary. 

Luther 



' Department Germany (Abteilung Deutschland) , a shortened form for Depart- 
ment for German Internal Affairs. 

1 Marginal note : "In my opinion the closing paragraph is too narrowly formu- 
lated. Besides the ethnic German interests purely foreign policy interests also 
come into question. See separate memorandum (St.S. No. 4&3), July 19. 
Weizsacker." 



JULY 1941 185 

[Editors' Note. The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim translated 
by Eric Lewenhaupt (London, 1953) , page 423, mention a letter which 
Hitler wrote to President Kyti regarding the intelligence service main- 
tained by the British Legation in Helsinki. The letter is also men- 
tioned in the book edited by John H. Wuorinen, Finland and World 
War II, 1939-WU (New York, 1948), page 116, which states that 
Hitler demanded that Finland break off diplomatic relations with 
Great Britain because the British Legation served as a center for 
espionage for Soviet Kussia. It is stated that the letter was received 
on July 19 and it is further stated that the Finnish Government took 
up the problem on July 22. No trace of such a letter by Hitler to Ryti 
has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.] 



No. 130 

82/60382-83 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most -urgent Tokyo, July 20, 1941 — 1 : 50 a. m. 

No. 1297 of July 19 Keceived July 20—4 : 20 a. m. 

[Pol. VIII 3982 g.] 1 
With reference to my telegram No. 1295 df July 19. 2 
The translation of the Foreign Minister's declaration follows : 
"Entrusted with the post of Foreign Minister, I have the honor of 
hereby introducing myself to the German (the Italian) Ambassador 
in Tokyo. 

I respectfully request that you transmit my regards to your Foreign 
Minister and inform him that I was unexpectedly entrusted with 
the post of Foreign Minister in the formation of the new Cabinet. 

At the same time I would like to inform you and your Government 
officially of the change of the Imperial Japanese Government. As 
you have perceived from the announcement by the Imperial Govern- 
ment, this governmental change was effected in order first to carry out 
political measures in accordance with the international situation, and 
further to be able to take, as soon as possible, the necessary steps to 
strengthen the inner political situation of the country. Apart from 
these points there were no reasons for the governmental change, and 
the present policy of the Japanese Empire will in no case undergo 
any change. 

I request that you take particular cognizance of the fact [that] 
Japan's policy will rest on the basis of the spirit and aims of the Tri- 

1 The file number ia supplied from another copy (1680/395710-11). 

! In this telegram (82/60379) Ott reported that the new Japanese Foreign 
Minister, Admiral Toyoda, had summoned him and the Italian Ambassador to 
give them the statement which Is printed here. 



186 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

partite Pact, concluded between Japan, Germany, and Italy. No 
change whatever will take place in Japan's attitude toward Germany 
and Italy, as former Foreign Minister Matsuoka clearly expressed it 
to you, on the basis of cabinet decision of 2 July. 3 I respectfully 
request that you also notify your Government of the above. I per- 
sonally was active in the Navy at the time of the conclusion of the 
Tripartite Pact, and had a share in bringing it about. As successor 
of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka, I intend to continue his foreign 
policy and to strengthen even more the close unity of Japan, Germany, 
and Italy, and to march forward in the common spirit. I express the 
hope that you, Herr (Signor) Ambassador, will bestow upon me, 
just as upon the former Foreign Minister, your valued friendship and 
cooperation." 

Ott 



' See documents Nos. 63 and 64. 

No. 131 

82/60376-T8 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most urgent Tokyo, July 20, 1941 — 1 : 55 a. m. 

No. 1293 of July 19 Received July 20—7 : 50 a. m. 

Prince Konoye's third Cabinet 1 has not brought about any stronger 
concentration of national forces, the urgent necessity of which had 
been given as the reason for the reshuffling of the Cabinet. Not 
represented in it, to be sure, are those ministers that belonged to the 
former political parties. Furthermore, the Navy is more strongly 
represented through the appointment of Admiral Toyoda as Foreign 
Minister and Minister of Colonies, and of Vice Admiral Sakonji as 
Minister of Commerce and Industry. The new Cabinet, however, is 
also largely under the influence of big business, which is shown in the 
first place by the fact that the former Director General of the Sumi- 
tomo combine, Ogura, has received the important post of Finance 
Minister. Ogura, who wielded a strong influence in the former Cab- 
inet even as Minister without Portfolio, will undoubtedly try to carry 
out one of his conservative financial policies and therefore, if anything, 
obstruct the heavy demands of the armed forces. Furthermore, Vice 
Admiral Sakonji, as Director of the North Sakhalin Petroleum Com- 
pany, and Admiral Toyoda, as a result of his family connection with 

1 Ott bad reported the formation and composition of the new Konoye Cabinet 
in telegram No. 1284 of July 18 (82/60368). 



JULY 1941 187 

the Mitsubishi combine, have close ties with industry. Business 
circles accordingly show satisfaction with the new government. 

The former Minister of the Interior, Baron Hiranuma, who, as I 
reported, has repeatedly created personal and substantive difficulties 
for Matsuoka, has remained as a very influential person in the Cabinet. 
In spite of strong pressure Konoye could not bring himself to eliminate 
this powerful man. He did, to be sure, make him relinquish the post 
of Minister of the Interior, under whom the police prefects are placed, 
and remain in the Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, but behind 
the scenes his influence is still strong, especially since his friend and 
long-time collaborator, Tanabe, has received the post of Minister of 
the Interior. Furthermore, Hiranuma is close to Lieutenant General 
Yanagawa, president of the "Society for the Support of the Imperial 
Government," who belongs to the Cabinet as Minister without Port- 
folio. Everything indicates that the aim of the Cabinet's resignation 
was to get rid of Matsuoka. This man of fertile mind and animated 
manner had already been long disliked by the conservative elements. 
His oratorical talent and his ability to gain popularity among the 
masses made him appear to these circles as downright dangerous. For 
this reason the press has received strict instructions to ignore him as 
far as possible — which on the whole has indeed been successful. 

Though his resignation is consequently to be attributed mainly to 
domestic Japanese causes, reasons of foreign policy were also involved. 
In spite of his well-known weakness Matsuoka did during his term 
of office show himself to be an advocate of a broad interpretation and 
application of the policy of the Tripartite Pact. He was confirmed 
therein particularly by the personal impressions he received on his 
trip to Germany and Italy. 

As I have reported, he had to fight on that account against strong 
opposition in the Cabinet, in the business circles and among the Anglo- 
philes. On various points, as for example in dealing with the Amer- 
ican proposal, he did not prevail with the policy that we desired and 
for that reason made himself the target of vehement criticisms from 
the nationalist camp. The conclusion of the Neutrality Pact with the 
Soviet Union, 2 which he himself probably regarded as a mistake, was 
strongly held against him after the beginning of the Russian-German 
war, and the resulting reproach that he had put Japan into a difficult 
moral position was cleverly exploited by his opponents. Furthermore, 
his opponents declared that at the last Cabinet session he had, as 
confirmed by Furuuchi, [?] championed the view of Ambassador 
Oshima and of the German Government and was kept in leading 
strings by them. 

* See vol. xrr of this series, document No. 332, footnote 2. 



188 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Konoye's colorless statement after the formation of the Govern- 
ment, 3 which was transmitted by D.N.B., and the vague press com- 
ments on the situation do not hold out any prospect that the new 
government aims to pursue a vigorous policy. Rather, it is to be 
assumed that after Matsuoka's ouster a continued policy of wait-and- 
see will be adopted toward the United States and that still greater 
safeguards in the matter of preparation will be demanded with regard 
to taking action against the Soviet Union. Finally, the circles around 
Konoye and Hiranuma are primarily concerned about China, without 
developing constructive plans for the solution of this problem. 

I am convinced that after a while these obstacles will be overcome. 
In this connection there are the Indochinese operation,* the prepara- 
tions for which are already too far advanced to be called off, the 
impossibility of reaching an agreement with the United States on 
China, and the weight of the current mobilization preparations which 
commit Japanese policy to that of the Tripartite Pact. I should 
therefore like to suggest that no doubts about Japan's attitude be 
evinced by Germany, although for the time being a certain reserve 
toward the [Japanese] Government might be advisable. 

Ott 



s This statement reads as follows: "The policy of this country to cope with 
the international situation is already fixed ; it now remains for us to put it into 
practice with speed and decision. It is my firm belief that the only way to 
realise this is to put our internal affairs in order on the basis of national 
policy. With the earnest support of a population of 100,000,000 I Intend to do 
everything in my power to accomplish the great ideal of founding an empire 
by overcoming all difficulties that may lie in our country's path." See Keestng * 
Contemporary Archives, 1940-19^3, p. 4703. 

* See document No. 126. 



No. 132 

71/50882 

The Foreign Minister to tlie Foreign Minister's Secretariat 

Telegram 

No. 684 Special Train Westfalen, July 20, 1941—3 : 10 a. m. 

Eeceived Berlin, July 20—3 : 20 a. ra. 

For the Acting State Secretary. 

Please notify all Foreign Ministry personnel concerned with prop- 
aganda in the Arab question of the following directive : 

Regard for the French rule in Syria has so far imposed on us a 
certain reserve in supporting the demands of the Arabs for political 
freedom and independence. With the collapse of French resistance 
against England in Syria, the reason for this reserve has been elimi- 
nated. I ask you therefore to support vigorously henceforth the 
wishes of the Arabs for the achievement of unlimited freedom in 



JULY 1941 189 

the propaganda treatment of the Arab question. This propaganda 
must he carried on under the slogan of "The Axis fights for the free- 
dom of the Arabs" ; appropriate Italian cooperation is to be arranged. 

RlBBENTROP 



No. 133 

1527/373706-08 

The Charge d> Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

No. 2324 of July 19 Washington, July 20, 1941—8 : 59 a. m. 

Received July 20—8 : 20 p. m. 

"With reference to my telegrams No. 2146 of July 9 1 and No. 2301 
of July 18. 2 

According to all indications President Roosevelt had postponed for 
the moment his intention to occupy the Cape Verde Islands, the 
Azores, and Dakar. 

Thus the chairman of the "America First Committee", General 
Wood, announced in a press statement on July 18 3 that he had just 
been informed that the military advisers had prevented the implemen- 
tation of Roosevelt's plan. General Wood was doubtless given this 
information by Army circles. 

The fact that the President has actually changed his original inten- 
tion is also evident from the following announcements of two well- 
informed periodicals : The United States News predicts in the issue 
published on July 15 the dispatch of American troops to Atlantic 
bases on foreign territory ; 3 days later Lindley writes in Newsweek 
that the occupation of the Portuguese and French bases had now 
become improbable unless Germany should make motions to occupy 
England or Portugal. Pearson and Allen on July 17 also pointed 
to a repeated change in military orders according to which the orders 
were given to the American Marine landing troops four times and 
withdrawn three times previous to the occupation of Iceland. . 

This change in the President's opinion certainly was decisively 
influenced not only by the grave misgivings of the Army and the Navy 
but also by the reports which were heeded here regarding a strength- 
ening of the Portuguese garrisons on the Azores and the Cape Verde 
Islands, 4 as well as regarding preparations of the French to defend 
Dakar. A further reason for Roosevelt's hesitation to push further 

1 'See document No. 104, footnote 1. 
1 Document No. 121. 

* No report of such a press statement has been found. 

* Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. u, pp. 841-842. 



190 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

into the Atlantic lies in the momentary lack of clarity about Japan's 
next steps. 

A definite prediction about the President's intentions is hardly 
possible at the present time. It is at any rate a fact that at the 
present time — mainly because of American productive capacity — he 
is providing restricted war aid to England ; however he has thus far 
resisted the full and open employment of the Atlantic fleet and he 
has also resisted giving in to the English wish that he personally sup- 
port the propaganda for the entry of the United States into the war. 
The President adjusts his measures to the daily developments at any 
given time, whereby his decisions often represent the character of an 
emotional reaction — be it to the actions of Germany or to the pleading 
of England. His position thus far, would, as reported, 5 indicate a 
continuation of the policy of aid to England while avoiding a binding 
declaration of war, whereby it is being taken into account here that 
after the conclusion of the German campaign against Russia, England 
will demand a clear decision. At the same time he is utilizing what 
is probably his own existing indecision as a tactical expedient by 
means of changes, secrecy, and in part misrepresentation of his actual 
intentions. He thereby calls the attention of the whole country to his 
person, does not commit himself to any decisions and tries, through 
intentional lack of clarity about Ms measures (orders to shoot), to 
bring the opponent to undertake actions which he can utilize as justi- 
fication of his own measures. It is at any rate certain that nothing 
would be more welcome to the President than an incident for which 
he can make Germany responsible. 

Thomsen 

4 Document No. 104. 

No. 134 

F19/373-81 

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini 1 

At present Fuhrer's Headquarters, July 20, 1941. 

Duce: Now that the fourth week since the beginning of the war 
in the east has come to an end, I should like, Duce, to give you a 
brief summary of the situation as it appears to me. 

I read your last letter 2 with hearty pleasure. I share your politi- 
cal views entirely, Duce. Some important new problems have now 
arisen that I should like to refer to briefly : 

1 In telegram No. 1630 of July 21 (B12/B001091) Mackensen reported that 
at 8 : 00 p. m. he handed the letter to Mussolini who read It aloud, translating 
it into Italian for Ciano. Mussolini suggested that the meeting with Hitler 
take place after the Italian formations took over their sector on the eastern 
front which would he in the second half of August. 

* Of July 2, document No. 62. 



JULY 1941 191 

1. France has again started playing her double game; either as an 
aftereffect of the loss of Syria or, as I believe, as a result of the 
budding of new hopes in view of the tying down of substantial 
German forces in the east. Although we had recently, among other 
things, reached an agreement on the landing of miscellaneous war ma- 
terial in Bizerte, the French Government now states again that it 
could permit this only after new concessions of a psychological and 
military kind. 3 In other words: the present French Government 
sees itself in the role of Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna, and 
at the same time forgets that I am neither Metternich nor Harden- 
berg. 4 I do not have to become mistrustful about it now, because, 
as a matter of fact, I have never lost my mistrust. At any rate, 
more than ever, I consider it necessary to be constantly on my guard. 
Moreover, I am not at all thinking of making still more conces- 
sions, because every concession always means the ultimate loss of 
a position without the French Government's seriously committing 
itself to counterservices. To put it differently our concessions, Duce, 
cannot be revoked, while the French Government, on the other hand, 
is always in a position to retract its commitments. 

Nevertheless, this situation gives rise to problems for the solution 
of which we must be particularly concerned, Duce. Because the 
additional safeguarding and development of the sea routes to Tripoli 
and Bengazi gain thereby added significance. 

I consider it the primary goal of our common effort to exclude 
any possibility of a new critical development in the supply situa- 
tion in Libya. Beyond tliat, traffic facilities must further be 
expanded in such a way that the requirements resulting from future 
intentions for this theater of war may be met to the full extent and 
with as little interference from the enemy as possible. 

Perhaps it is conceivable, Duce, that a means for the improvement 
of the present situation could be found similar to the splendid com- 
panionship in arms of the Italian and German army units in Libya, 
and a much closer collaboration could be achieved between the Italian 
and German naval and air staffs which are concerned with the main- 
tenance and protection of communications to Libya. 

I would place at your complete disposal for this purpose the liaison 
staffs of the German Navy and Luftwaffe which have been stationed 
in Eome for some time, and would ask that you call on them for 
assistance within the framework of the Italian High Command. 

I would cite as important tasks in which German military experi- 
ence could prove useful : 

1. Activation of the fighter and antiaircraft defense at sea and 
as protection for the loading and unloading ports against attacks 
by sea from surface and submarine forces. 

! See document No. 113. 

* Karl August von Hardenberg, Prussian delegate at the Congress of Vienna. 



192 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

2. Antisubmarine defense in which, particularly in our transporta- 
tion to Norway, we acquired very valuable experience. We succeeded 
there in only a few weeks in eliminating the British submarines 
completely. .... 

3. Distribution and use of naval and air forces, particularly in 

the convoy service. 

4. Effective immobilization of the Island of Malta as a base tor 
the enemy air force committed against our transports. 

5. Management of merchant ship tonnage. 

I am mentioning these points only so as to leave it to you to give 
an appropriate order in which such a collaboration could take place. 
I ask only that you make such effective use of the German liaison 
staffs that you, too, Duce, in your fight will profit from the results 
of our experience. For it is my ardent desire, Duce, to help with 
our means which are naturally limited to the best of our ability in 
this distant theater of war; not only that Italy may retain her North 
African colonies, but that she may, in addition, satisfy those demands 
which, to my mind, are so well justified that, unless they are granted, 
there will be no peace for Germany either. 

2. Spain. The present attitude of Spain, and particularly Franco's 
latest speech, 5 at last seem to me permeated with the realization that 
not only the freedom of Germany and Italy, but actually the future 
of Europe is at stake in our battle. If, in the end, active collaboration 
could still result, I would be sincerely glad of it. I hope that as far as 
Germany is concerned, our armed forces will regain complete freedom 
of action by autumn at the latest. Collaboration with Spain then 
could, in certain circumstances, still be very advantageous generally. 

3. Turkey. I hope here that with continued success on the eastern 
front, we may perhaps succeed in drawing Turkey more into our sphere 
of interest in order at least to be able to consider those ideas that you, 
Duce, touched upon in your last letter. Yes, it will perhaps be pos- 
sible, as operations progress in the east, to confront the English mili- 
tary leaders with new problems altogether. I wanted to talk with 
you about it, Duce, the next time we see each other. Even the attack 
upon Egypt from the side of Asia Minor would make our military 
situation much easier. 

4. Japan. I still don't quite understand the reason for the Cabinet 
crisis in Japan. 6 I consider it impossible that the Japanese Govern- 
ment should overlook or fail to grasp the unique opportunity that the 
present situation offers it. To be sure, whatever step it decides to take, 
it naturally requires a certain period of preparation. I do not believe 
that Japan will be in a position to proceed against Soviet Russia be- 
fore the middle of August. The measures toward the south too can- 

"Of July 17 1941. The contents of the speech were reported by Heberlein.ln 
Madrid telegram No. 2460 Of July 18 (95/106955-56). See also document No. 157. 
* See document No. 124. 



JULY 1941 193 

not be taken without further ado. I consider it possible that before a 
step, particularly against Russia, is undertaken an improvement in 
Japan's strategic position to the south will have to be assured. On 
one point, I believe, there is no longer any doubt in Japan : Through no 
fault of our own, America, thanks to her Jewish leadership, is not 
only the enemy of Europe but also the enemy of East Asia. Day after 
tomorrow it will, in exactly the same way, be the enemy of the British 
World Empire, and, moreover, its most dangerous enemy. Only the 
narrow-minded stupidity of the present English administration fails 
to foresee this future development, or else, they force themselves to 
shut their eyes to this development. 

The occupation of Iceland,' Duce, has, in these circumstances, only 
strengthened me in my determination to end the war in the east with 
all available means as rapidly as possible. The prospects are favor- 
able for it ! 

After the first breakthrough had been initiated for the destruction 
of a number of Russian armies, as well as the smashing of or attack on 
numerous Russian divisions, some time passed, in order 

1. that these encircled Russian armies, which after all consisted of 
more than a million men, might be destroyed or forced to capitulate ; 

2. that the infantry divisions might be allowed, after conclusion of 
these battles, to catch up with the armored divisions which had ad- 
vanced far ahead ; and 

3. that the general supply base, that is, particularly the railroad and 
the communications network, might be put in order and connected 
with the advancing armies. 

In the latter field particularly a tremendous amount has been 
achieved. Numerous Russian railroads are again operating, other 
lines are in process of having the gauge changed, that is, our supply 
trains are already advancing on the German gauge to far east of 
Minsk. These lines will in a few days, despite all the destruction, 
already have reached or crossed the so-called Stalin Line. After these 
preparations were made, and the infantry divisions had caught up with 
the motorized units ahead of them, I gave the order to attack the Stalin 
Line and to break through at the places foreseen. This operation suc- 
ceeded along the entire front. At the moment there are trapped Rus- 
sian units or armies at eight places along our front. The noose is 
being drawn tighter almost hourly, and I do not believe that any con- 
siderable portions can succeed in breaking through. It will then 
probably take 8 days again before the mass of our infantry will have 
followed the armored units which will have pushed far to the east. 
But I estimate that by the end of next week large portions of the Rus- 
sian armies that were previously stationed at the Stalin Line will 

T See document No. 83. 

6S2-905— 64 18 



194 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

be destroyed. Further actions of annihilation are now being started. 
They will follow very shortly. I already consider it entirely out of 
the question that the Russian Command will succeed in bringing any 
considerable force back across the Volga or even behind the Urals. At 
any rate I am determined to pursue the Russian Army until it is 
entirely destroyed and annihilated. This resolve is also shared by 
the troops. This hard resolve was born under the influence of the 
horror that Bolshevism has only now revealed to us; for the power 
against which we are fighting here, consists not of people, but of devils. 
Every day the conviction grows, both among officers and men, that we 
stepped in at the last possible moment to combat a danger that threat- 
ened Europe to a degree unsurpassed since the Hun or Mongol inva- 
sions. The atrocities that are perpetrated by these beasts defy the 
imagination. My Leibstandarte, for example, came upon an advance 
detachment of the armored group Kleist, which had hurried far ahead, 
been cut off, and finally, after all its ammunition gave out, had been 
overpowered. They were found, all tied up, in a condition so horrible 
that the photographs cannot be circulated even in Germany. The 
consequence of these impressions is a growing fanaticism, even among 
our own soldiers, who prefer not to take prisoners at all any more. 
What we do find here in the way of prisoners is — whether enlisted man 
or officer—- so brutalized and unspeakably debased that again there 
emerges the sharp boundary line between Europe and Central Asia, 
as distinguished from the Far East, from those old highly cultivated 
races, that is, who for thousands of years had to defend themselves 
laboriously in bloody battles against Mongol Asia. 

The German and Rumanian formations attacking from Rumania 
under the command of Antonescu have now liberated large parts of 
Bessarabia and have for 3 days been engaged in crossing the Dniester. 
It is precisely the Rumanian units of this Army group that have fought 
splendidly. Their Chief, General Antonescu, himself is certainly a 
very rare person, not only thoroughly energetic, but also particularly 
competent. Just as gallantly, however, did the 2y 2 divisions of the 
Slovak Army and particularly also the Hungarian units fight. 'Unfor- 
tunately the press cannot refrain from continually re-opening the 
barely healed wounds between Hungary and Rumania. At the 
moment, therefore, in addition to other troubles, I also have the worry 
of preventing the troops of these countries from coming in direct con- 
tact with each other in order, if possible, to avoid incidents ; I believe, 
however, that the soldiers are much more averse to them — if only 
because of the bloody mission they have in common — than the journal- 
ists in the various capitals. 



JULY 1941 195 

The battle in the extreme north is primarily a battle against nature. 
General Dietl 8 in particular first has to cut at least a small path 
through every kilometer covered in order to be able to bring up ammu- 
nition and food. There is, morever, I hear, in the tundra amidst the 
snow and ice, a veritably inconceivable plague of gnats. This is, 
therefore, a war like that in Narvik, in which patience and endurance 
are just as decisive as bravery — three virtues which the Finns especially 
have to an extraordinary degree. They are just as splendidly led as 
they are unprecedentedly reliable and at the same time extremely 
unassuming. A small but brave race of heroes ! 

Your formations, Duce, are now being brought up as rapidly as 
possible in the circumstances and I am convinced that they will par- 
ticipate successfully and advantageously in the second phase of the 
battles in the south. I am particularly glad that this corps of yours is 
a complete and numerically adequate one because this also poses 
simpler problems in the matter of supplies later on. It will be espe- 
cially a joy to me, Duce, to be able to greet you yourself again. This 
time, even more than before, I am convinced that the war is won; for 
after the annihilation of Russia, there will be no power in the world, 
Duce, that can shake our European or your North African position. 
Aside from this, however, we shall succeed in ©laranteeing out of the 
immeasurable expanse of the eastern area, those^ 1 basic economic con- 
ditions that would be calculated, even if the war lasts very long, to 
free the rest of Europe from its ever-present want and its attendant 
anxiety. 

Please accept, Duce, my heartiest and comradely greetings, 
' Your 



* Eduard Dietl, General of Mountain Troops ; Commanding General, Mountain 
Corps Norway In Finland. 

8 No typed signature appears on this -version of the document which is the film 
of a copy made from the carbon of the original. 



No. 135 

199/140808-99 

The Minister in Bolivia to the Foreign Ministry 1 
Telegram 

No. 211 of July 20 La Paz, July 20, 1941. 

With reference to my telegram No. 210 of July 19. 2 

Today's press announces in big headlines that a state of siege has 
been proclaimed and that I have been declared persona non grata. 

'Marginal note: "Shown to the Foreign Minister. R[intelen], July 21." 
s In this telegram (203/141631) Wendler first reported that the Under State 

Secretary had informed him that he was no longer persona grata and that his 

departure was desired by next Tuesday, July 22. 



196 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

The conjecture I made in my previous telegram is confirmed by 
the banning of the daily newspaper La Calle for 4 weeks, the daily 
newspaper Inti and the weekly newspaper Bulletin for 2 weeks each. 
A number of journalists and officers whose personal identity is not 
known have been arrested. 3 The former head of Lloyd Aereo Boli- 
viano, the Keich German Schroth, is said to have been arrested in 
Cochabamba. 

In a statement to the press the Minister of the Interior * states that 
the Government has proof of an intended Putsch by pro-National 
Socialist circles and the German Legation is implicated in the prepara- 
tions for it. Nothing can be revealed about the proofs, however. The 
charges against the Legation are pure fabrications. 5 I request author- 
ization to make a statement to the press to that effect. 8 

I am convinced, furthermore, that the assertions about an intended 
Putsch are also based on a fiction. The Government, which is being 
severely criticized among the broad masses of the population because 
of the increasing cost of living and the scarcity of foodstuffs, is resort- 
ing to its sensational action chiefly for the purpose of silencing the 
opposition by banning the opposition press. 

In the diplomatic corps there is strong criticism of the action taken 
against me. There is thought of suggesting to the Nuncio that he 
undertake an appropriate intervention with the Foreign Minister. 7 

Wendler s 



8 Marginal note at this point: "DNB, Arnold." 

* Gen. J. de la Vega. „ n , ,.„..., ^ 

B In telegram No. 215 of July 21 (203/141644) Wendler reported having learned 
that the material which was considered to incriminate him was a letter allegedly 
written to him by Major Belmonte, the Bolivian Military Attache in Berlin. 
The letter was said to have been intercepted by the secret service of a foreign 
power and made available to the Bolivian Government. Wendler termed the 
letter a forgery and stated that he had never had any relationship with Major 

Belmonte^^ instruction of July 21 (251/164739-40) Woermann for- 

warded to Wendler the test of a note to be delivered to the Bolivian Government 
and if possible also to the press denouncing the action of the Bolivian 

G ° T Marginal note at this point in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "No". 

At the end of the document is the notation : "Under State Secretary Woermann 
has been informed by telephone of the instruction noted on the margin by the 
Foreign Minister. R[intelen], July 21." lomn^msw 

' In telegram No. 398 of July 24 addressed to Wendler at Santiago (203/141660) 
Woermann requested him to render a completely candid account of the back- 
ground for the action of the Bolivian Government, particularly whether there 
were anv compromising actions on Wendler's part. , 

In the reply, No. 396 of July 27 from Santiago (203/141672) Wendler denied 
any compromising activity on his part and insisted that the principal and im- 
mediate factor was the fabricated letter from Belmonte which apparently was 
supplied to the Bolivian Government by the United States. 

See, further, document No. 158. 



JULY 1941 197 

No. 136 

82/60388-89 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 
Telegram 

No. 690 of July 20 Special Train, July 21, 1941—1 : 33 a. m. 

from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 21 — 1 : 55 a. m. 

No. 1110 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 21. 

[Pol. VIII 4118 g.] * 

With reference to your telegram 1293 of July 19. a 

From your report I gathered that the impression which had already 
arisen here that the Japanese Cabinet crisis was mainly engendered by 
the person of Matsuoka was correct. On the other hand the report 
touches only incidentally on the question of the Neutrality Pact with 
the Soviet Union concluded by Matsuoka, which, it was assumed here, 
played a decisive role in the origin of the crisis. Also, you say in your 
statements in one place that Matsuoka made himself the target of ve- 
hement criticism from the nationalist camp because of his American 
policy, whereas it is stated in another placCHiat he is accused of having 
made himself the spokesman of Oshima and Germany and of being 
kept by them in leading strings. These statements are not entirely 
consistent with each other. 

In view of the political interest we have in understanding as clearly 
as possible the reasons behind the ouster of Matsuoka, especially in so 
far as his foreign policy had something to do with it, I ask you to 
comment on the matter again by telegram. 3 Is it true, as assumed 
here, that the reason for the Cabinet crisis was really, in the last analy- 
sis, Matsuoka's mistaken policy in concluding the Neutrality Pact with 
Moscow, by reason of which his continuation in office was considered 
to be no longer tolerable ? 

RlBBENTROP 



1 The file number is supplied from another copy ( 1680/395729-30) . 

1 Document No. 131. 

a In 'telegram No. 1318 of July 22 (82/60399-401) Ott explained that, while It 
was true that Matsuoka had aroused violent criticism from Nationalist circles as 
a result of the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union and of his failure to make 
Germany's views prevail with regard to the negotiations with the United States, 
his fall was brought about "not so much by the nationalists with whom we co- 
operate but rather by that tendency which wishes Japan to observe a wait-and-see 
attitude." "Under the slogan of keeping Japanese policy independent of foreign 
influence these circles fought in reality against Matsuoka's allegedly excessive 
dependence on Germany." 



198 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 137 

82/60395 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most ukgent Tokyo, July 21, 1941 — 10 : 40 a. in., summer time. 

No. 1308 of July 21 Keceived July 21—10 : 20 p. m? 

For the Foreign Minister. 

With reference to your telegram No. 1098 of July 19. 2 

With regard to the Japanese counterproposals addressed to the 
American Government I have told the Deputy Foreign Minister 3 
about my personal objections to the toning down of the passages relat- 
ing to the Tripartite Pact and urgently requested that Ambassador 
Nomura postpone their presentation so that they can be re-examined. 

The Deputy Foreign Minister replied that the instructions had in 
the meantime been, sent, as Foreign Minister Matsuoka had specially 
expedited the transmittal before he resigned in order to commit Japa- 
nese policy to the unbridgeable antagonism toward the United States 
of America. Like Matsuoka, the Deputy Foreign Minister was con- 
vinced that in view of these antagonisms, which have arisen particu- 
larly on the China question, a practical agreement was impossible. 
Moreover, further tension in relations with the United States of Amer- 
ica was to be expected in the next few days as a result of the Japanese 
action against Indochina. In these circumstances the Japanese coun- 
terproposals were (group missing), as I had repeatedly been told, only 
a tactical maneuver to clear Japan of the blame for the failure of 
the negotiations. 

Ott 



'Marginal note: "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 2442, July 21." 
1 Document No. 127. 
' Chuiehi Ohashi. 



No. 138 

B077/E292421-24 

Memorandum, oy an Official of the Department for German Internal 

Affairs 

Berlin, July 21, 1941. 
zu D IX 44. 1 

Subject : Letter of M. Wolodymyr Stachiw of July 2, 1941, 2 addressed 
to the Eeich Foreign Minister recording his appointment as 
Plenipotentiary of the Ukrainian Government. 

1 D IX 44 : Document No. 115. 
' Document No. 115, enclosure. 



JULY 1941 199 

The events from -which M. Wolodymyr Stachiw, in his opinion, 
can derive his mandate for announcing to the Reich Foreign Minister 
his appointment as Plenipotentiary of an alleged Ukrainian Govern- 
ment, in Lwow are briefly described in the enclosed memorandum. 
What is involved is an arbitrary action of the ambitious and active 
Bandera group. The action which it staged in Lwow has no constitu- 
tional significance ■whatsoever from our viewpoint. This view has 
been expressed unequivocally to the leading people of the Bandera 
group by the German military and domestic authorities, which, how- 
ever, presumably does not exclude that the dispute described will not 
be the last one. If nevertheless Bandera and his staff have so far 
been treated leniently this is explained by the fact that the activities 
of this section of the OUN have often turned out to be quite useful, 
and by the wish that the groups of the Ukrainian youth which are 
particularly attached to it should not lose their enthusiasm for their 
cause. 

A reply to the letter of M. Wolodymyr Stachiw in my opinion is 
out of the question. Likewise the matter should not be submitted to 
the Reich Foreign Minister at the present stage. 

Herewith to the Foreign Krister's Secretariat through Under 
State Secretary Woermann, 

Gkosskopf 



[Enclosure] 



Memorandum 



Berlin, July 21, 1941. 
zuDIXM. 8 



■ Subject: Proclamation of the "Ukrainian Government" by Bandera 
followers in Lwow on June 30, 1941. 

Reference: Letter of July 16, 1941, from the Foreign Mini- 
ster's Secretariat and letter of July 2, 1941, from Wolodymyr 
Stachiw to the Foreign Minister. 

The occurrences of June 30 in Lwow represented a surprise coup of 
the Bandera people, i.e., the group of the OUN, the "Ukrainian na- 
tionalists," led by Stepan Bandera; this group doubtless wanted 
thereby to assure themselves of priority over the other Ukrainian 
groups. For this purpose they utilized what was first announced 
simply as a liberation celebration of the Ukrainian nationalists in 
Lwow which the Wehrmacht representatives mentioned in M. 
Stachiw's letter had had no hesitation in attending. Without having 
notified any German authorities at all in advance, Bandera's deputy, 

' D IX 44 : Document No. 115. 



200 DOCUMENTS OX GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Jaroslav Stecjko— after the general welcoming addresses mentioned 
by Stachiw had first been given— suddenly read a proclamation by 
Bandera concerning the establishment of a Ukrainian Government 
in western Ukraine, regarding the prosecution of the war by this 
new state "shoulder to shoulder" with the Reich against the Soviet 
Union, and the appointment of Stecjko as chief of the Government 
of Western Ukraine. 

The fact that the Bandera people could steal a march upon the 
other Ukrainian groups can be attributed not only to their greater 
lack of scruples but also to the fact that they had shown themselves 
to be particularly active. A considerable number of their followers 
belonged to the Ukrainian battalion fighting in German uniforms 
which occupied the Lwow radio station and the town hall; they were 
active in the radio propaganda, etc. _ 

As for the German military authorities they were interested in 
establishing contact with any kind of organized Ukrainian groups 
which for their part supported the measures that were taken with re- 
spect to tranquillity, order, and welfare in the occupied territory. 
As the Bandera people along with their cells which operated withm 
the country seem to have been on the spot earliest, they evidently had 
priority in this cooperation, too. On the German side, naturally, only 
aims of maintaining order locally had been envisaged ; the Lwow meet- 
ing tried to give the situation a political turn . 

Professor Koch, who attended the Lwow meeting as a representative 
of the Abwehr and who had welcomed it merely as a liberation cele- 
bration before the proclamation was read reproached M. Stec]ko 
sharply for the disloyalty of his conduct and left the hall together 
with the other representatives of the Wehrmacht. In the meantime, 
however, the Bandera people had taken another high-handed step by 
disseminating Bandera's proclamation over the Lwow radio. 

As a reaction on the part of Germany, security measures were or- 
dered against Bandera and some of his closest coworkers; they were 
relatively mild, to be sure, but were meant to remind the people con- 
cerned of the realities of the situation. Bandera was told to move 
from the General Government where he had been staying to Berlin. 
There he was placed under house arrest for a while; even now he is 
still on parole, but with freedom of movement within Greater Berlin. 
The same procedure was followed in the case of Stecjko. 

Regarding the situation in Lwow I have heard in connection with 
the matters described that with the controlling participation of Pro- 
fessor Koch a "Ukrainian Territorial Council"— according to another 
version, incidentally, called only a "Ukrainian Council of Trusted 
Representatives" {Vertrawnsrat)— is in the process of formation ; this 
body is supposed merely to be available to the German administration 



JULY 1941 201 

as an advisory organ. It is intended to include the Bandera people, 
too; evidently, however, all differences of opinion have not been 
eliminated as yet. 
Submitted herewith to Senior Counselor Grosskopf. 

Battm 



No. 139 

152T/373705 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States 

Telegram 

No. 696 of July 19 Special Traix, July 19, 1941—1 : 15 p. m. 

from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 22 — 1 : 40 p. m. 

No. 1395 of July 22 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 22. 

For the Charge d'Affaires. 

Please see that the following ideas are circulated in the United 
States, using the channels at your disposal. 

Of all parts of thepopulation in the United States, the Jews, surely, 
have the greatest interest in America's not entering the war, because 
the effects of America's entry into the war will sooner or later be for 
no one so disadvantageous as for the American Jews. In the first 
place one can expect as a certainty that the war will bring to America 
exactly what the Jews feel to be a particular nightmare, namely a 
strictly authoritarian regime that will reduce the possibilities of in- 
fluence for the Jews to a minimum. The tremendous losses certainly 
to be expected in a war of America against Europe will bring out 
strikingly clear the hatred of the Jews which is latent in the United 
States anyhow. People will soon recall that the Jews were the prin- 
cipal warmongers and they will be made responsible for the losses that 
occur. The end of the story will be that one day all the Jews in 
America will be beaten to death. 

I should think that a dissemination of these ideas among American 
Jewry could produce an effect desired by us, and I ask you to report 
by wire to what extent indications of such ideas, which doubtless pre- 
dict the future development correctly, can be observed there even at 
this time. 1 

Eibbentrop 



1 See document No. 150. 



202 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOEEIGN POLICY 

No. 140 

260/170091 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most urgent Helsinki, July 22, 1941 — 5 : 04 p. m. 

top secret Received July 22 — 5 : 40 p, m. 

No. 659 of July 22 
With reference to my telegram No. 652. 1 

1) The meeting of the Cabinet has just taken place. 2 All of the 
members with the exception of two supported the proposal that the 
President authorize the Foreign Minister in his relations with England 
"to go as far as breaking off diplomatic relations." Thereupon the 
President extended this authorization to the Foreign Minister. 

2) The Foreign Minister would be very pleased if the English Gov- 
ernment would take the most recent Finnish answer as the occasion 
for breaking off relations. 3 If this does not take place within the 
next few days, however, the Foreign Minister is resolved to act on the 
basis of the authorization.* 

3) The Foreign Minister in this connection pointed out to me that 
the doctrine was widespread among the Finnish people that Finland 
should not enter the war in the West. The Foreign Minister would 
therefore welcome it if, in case of a breach of relations with England, 
the German press would not represent this as entrance of Finland on 
the side of Germany in the war against England, but simply as the 
cessation of diplomatic relations between Finland and England. 

Bluchek 



L In this telegram (260/170088) Bliicher reported that Ryti and Witting were 
suggesting to members of the Foreign Affairs Committee the breaking off or rela- 
tions with England; that the Cabinet would meet the next day ; and that a sharp 
telegram was being sent to London refusing further British demands and de- 
manding the return of confiscated cargoes. 

* See Editors' Note, p. 185. 
' See footnote 1. 

* See, further, document No. 180. 



No. 141 

129/121118-19 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 

IT. St.S. Pol. 698 Berlin, July 22, 1941. 

The newly appointed Portuguese Minister, Count Tovar, visited me 
today for the first time. We agreed that his communication with the 
Foreign Ministry could take place in the usual manner even before 
the presentation of his credentials. 



JULY 1941 203 

The Minister was very open in the conversation. I note the follow- 
ing points : 

1. Count Tovar expressed unequivocally his fears concerning the 
policy of the United States, especially with regard to the Azores, and 
confirmed that Portugal was not tranquilized by the statements of 
Sumner Welles. 1 In no case was Portugal willing to enter any 
sort of compromises whether open or covert with respect to the 
Azores but would rather fight if the occasion arose. With regard 
to the possibilities of defending the Azores, the Minister said that 
the defensive strength had been greatly increased through the arrival 
of new batteries and troops, so that an operation with a few destroyers, 
for example, could not be successful. Large ships would have to be 
used, and it was doubtful whether the Americans would run this risk. 

2. Kegarding Spanish-Portuguese relations, the Minister said that 
they were iftore cordial than ever before. In all of Spain there was 
only one mWi who stood outside the ranks; this was unfortunately 
Foreign Minister Serrano Sutler. The printing of the abdication 
statement of King Alfonso in the Portuguese press had occasioned 
in him an entirely unjustified and incomprehensible irritation with 
Portugal. 

Count Tovar evaluated the internal situation of Spain very skep- 
tically, particularly her situation with regard to supplies of food and 
gasoline. Portugal was willing to help with provision of food and 
had just now given Spain an unsecured credit for overseas foods, 
especially for the delivery of vegetable oils. 2 Spain's lack of oil was 
to be explained by the fact that in order to obtain foreign exchange 
she sold her oil abroad, especially to the United States, for a much 
higher price than the price she now had to pay for imports. 

3. The Minister said with regard to German- Portuguese relations 
that actually there had never been any political talks between Germany 
and Portugal in recent years. If we wished to begin such talks, 
Portugal would certainly always be ready for them. 

WoERMANN 

1 In a press conference on July 14, Sumner Welles said "that the United 
States hoped that Portugal would remain in control of the Azores and Cape 
Verde Islands and that this country [the U.S.A.] had no Intention of acting 
against them." (The New York Times, July 15, 1941, p. 9, col. 1) 

' Portugal and Spain had signed a trade agreement in Llshon on July 2 pro- 
viding for the supply to Spain of colonial produce, and for the financing of the 
shipments by Portugal. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Bulletin of 
International News, vol. xvin (1941) , pp. 930-831. 



[Editors' Note. On July 22 Marshal Kvaternik, the head of the 
Croatian armed forces, visited Hitler at his field headquarters. 
Hewel's record of this conversation on the German film of files of 
the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (F7/0119-108) is badly damaged 



204 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

and for the most part illegible. The invitation to this visit which 
was to be followed by a trip to the front was transmitted in Kibben- 
trop's telegram No. 631 sent to the Legation in Zagreb on July 14 
(116/66943) . The text of an exchange of letters, between Kibbentrop 
and Kvaternik at the end of this visit was transmitted to the Legation 
in Zagreb in telegram No. 724 of July 29 (116/66962-63) .] 



No. 142 

851/284432 

Memorandum hy Ambassador Bitter 

Special Train, July 23, 1941. 
The OKW informs us of the following : 

"A Danish request for reinforcement of the Danish Army by 
about 2,000 men has been addressed to OKW through the Military 
Attache in Copenhagen. 1 . 

The Commander in Chief of the Keplacement Army 2 is of the opin- 
ion that this request could be complied with, but that it should be made 
conditional on the demand that a contingent of the Danish Army, of 
about regiment strength, should, as in the case of Croatia 3 be made 
available within the framework of the German Army for the fight 
against Bolshevism." * 

OKW asks for our comment. 

I propose that we should agree to Denmark's wish of reinforcing 
her Army by about 2,000 men on condition that a contingent of the 
Danish Army, of approximately regiment strength, in addition to the 
Danish corps of volunteers, will, as a unit, join in the war against 

Kussia. s 

Bitter 



"This is probably an error and should read, "the Commander of German 
Troops in Denmark" (see document No. 198). The German Military Attache for 
Denmark before the German occupation was Lt. Gen. v. Uthmann with offices in 
Stockholm. 

2 Col. Gen. Fritz Fromm, 

1 See document No. 46 and footnote 2. 

•Marginal notes: "Together with General Jodl, I submitted this memorandum 
to the Fiihrer. The Fiihrer agrees with the proposal as set forth above. He also 
thinks that the inclusion of foreign contingents would ease the task of our Army 
later on in the occupation. Hewel, July 30." 

"Ambassador Ritter: The Foreign Minister has been informed. R[intelen], 
July 31." 

"Yes.Rtibbentrop]." ^ iV ^ „ 

*In telegram No. 990 of Aug. 5 (851/284425) Kenthe-Fink reported that the 
German decision in this matter had been transmitted to the Danish General Staff 
by the German Military Commander. For the Danish reply and German reaction, 
see document No. 198. 



JULY 1941 205 

No. 143 

535/23D871 

An Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs to the 

Foreign Minister 

Teletype 

Berlin, July 23, 1941. 
e.o.DIX49. 

I request the Office of the Foreign Minister to have the following 
telegram sent to the Foreign Minister : 

Teletype, Special Train. 
ForiCounselor of Legation Weber. 

At the conference at Leibbrandt's 1 on July 23 the following matter 
was discussed : 

I. The appointment of Reichsleiter Rosenberg as Reich Minister z 
and the decrees in connection therewith will probably be announced 
in the press together with a large military victory. 

II. The Dienststelle Rosenberg claims the right to regulate church 
questions. 3 

In principle it was intended to mark time and, in general, without 
prompting religion, to leave it to the individual in keeping with the 
free exercise of religion. Efforts of foreign countries to contact church 
organizations in the occupied area in order to gain influence are not 
to be allowed. A more sympathetic attitude toward the Ukrainian 
(autocephalic) Church owing to its national ties. 

I should like to remark on this that we must expect efforts by the 
Papal See to make contact with the Greek Orthodox Uniate Church 
in the Western Ukraine (Lwow, Bishop Sheptyzkj) and also to 
approach the Catholic (Polish) population in Western Russia and 
Lettgallia (in eastern Latvia) as well as the Lithuanian population. 

Moreover, the Greek Orthodox churches in the Balkans and in other 
foreign countries will probably try to take up contact with the rem- 
nants of the Greek Orthodox Church in the U.S.S.R. 

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister. 

Grosskopf 



1 Georg Leibbrandt, Ministerialclirektor ; Chief, Political Division, In Reich 
Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 1941-1943. 
a See document No. 119. 
* See document No. 114. 



206 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOKEIGN POLICY 

No. 144 

1527/37372B-30 

The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat 

Telegram 

No. 703 of July 24 Special Train, July 24, 1941—3 : 00 a, m. 

Received July 24 — 4 : 00 a. m. 

Subject : Proposals for mendacious reports. 
For the acting State Secretary. 
It has been shown that England and America are daily flooding 

the world with mendacious reports which in some instances are quite 
clever. Following the motto that offense is the best defense, I there- 
fore wish that every day one or two very clever mendacious reports be 
launched in the world concerning the intentions of Roosevelt or of 
Churchill. According to the type of report the question will be 
whether to plant the reports in the foreign press, to have them pub- 
lished in the German and foreign press, to disseminate them by radio 
or to circulate them through occasional remarks and information 
issued in the course of press conferences. 

The formulation of these reports must be based upon close study of 
the weak points in American or English policy, which is to be under- 
taken in close cooperation with the Political Department. For ex- 
ample, the London radio report that U.S. troops had arrived in 
British Guiana 1 can be used to represent this report as the signal for 
further American troop landings, say, in neighboring Venezuela, and 
to this could be added a large number of further reports in order to 
denounce North American annexationist attempts in South America. 
Other reports should be aimed at exposing in our propaganda directed 
at England the American design to inherit the British Empire. Fur- 
thermore, Boston reports could be disseminated in England concerning 
the difficulties that had arisen between Churchill and Roosevelt on 
account of Iceland because the folly of leaving this island to America 
was being realized in England. These examples are meant to serve 
only as an indication of how I visualize our counteraction against the 
Anglo-American fabrications. 

I am assigning to Dr. Megerle the task of carrying out this counter- 
action in close cooperation with the Political Department and the Press 
Department. Moreover this counteraction is to be included among the 
matters discussed in the daily conference on propaganda questions in 

1 Under the agreement of Sept. 3, 1940 (see vol. xi of this series, document No. 
10 and footnote 4) , the United States acquired the right to lease naval and air 
bases in British Guiana and other British possessions in the Western Hemisphere. 
The text of the agreement for the use and operation of these bases was trans- 
mitted in a letter of March 27, 1941, from the President to the Congress. For test, 
see Department of State, Bulletin, 1941, vol. rv, p. 387. 



JULY 1941 207 

which Dr. Megerle participates. Dr. Megerle -will submit to me 
weekly a short compilation of the false reports planted in accordance 
with the foregoing. 

RlBBENTROP 

No. 145 

FU/0347-S1 

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey 1 

Telegram 

No. 7|7, of July 23 Westfalen, July 24, 1941— S : 15 a. m. 

from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 24-3 : 45 a. m. 

No. 997 of July 24 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 24. 

For the Ambassador personally. 

American and English radio and press reports since yesterday hare 
been asserting that the German Ambassador in Ankara has started a 
vigorous peace offensive. 2 It is said that he has already made in- 
quiries of the diplomatic representatives of the various countries. In 
a lengthy report of the Associated Press from Ankara it is stated that 
there is hardly an Ambassador or Minister of a neutral country in 
Ankara whom the German Ambassador has not yet told that it is his 
country's mission to mediate peace between Germany and England. 3 

These reports are partly on the same lines as the statements in your 
last dispatch on Turkish foreign policy, 4 in which you suggest that the 
idea be considered whether it would not be expedient to let the Turks 
take the initiative in order to clarify the question of England's readi- 
ness for peace after the conclusion of the Russian campaign. This 
might also be advantageous inasmuch as in the event of a negative 
outcome of such an attempt, Turkey would decide more easily to give 
up her alliance with England and to develop further her friendship 
with Germany. 

As to the substantive aspect of these statements, I want to say 
first of all that I consider such a course entirely erroneous because : 

1. We will not make a peace offer either through the Turks or 
otherwise, for our experience with previous offers of this kind has, 
as you know, been completely negative ; 

1 Marginal notes : 

"[For] F[fihrer]." 

"Shown to the Fiihrer. Hew[el], July ..." 

' The texts of DKB summaries of such reports dated July 22 and 23 are on the 
film of files of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (Fll/0353-54). One of them 
has a marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting which reads: "Papen." 

*A German text of this Associated Press report of July 23 is filmed on 
Fll/0352. 

* Document No. 125. 



208 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

2. I consider the idea an illusion that instead of using power politics 
we can bring Turkey into our camp by assigning to her the friendly 
role of a mediator with respect to England. 

I therefore ask you in any case not to pursue this idea any further 
nor to discuss it in conversations with diplomats at your post. The 
above-mentioned English and American reports are obviously based 
on indiscreet talk in the diplomatic corps at your post, in which the 
ideas which you suggested for consideration were rendered in distorted 
form. Such reports are, however, extremely prejudicial to the inter- 
ests of the Reich. Every kind of conversation on questions of this 
nature in diplomatic circles is immediately regarded by our enemies 
as an indication of weakness on the part of Germany and is exploited 
accordingly by the press. I wonder how it is that foreign journalists 
time and again place the German Embassy there in the center of such 
conjectures, which interfere with German foreign policy. 5 

I therefore find it necessary to request that in your conversations 
at your post you refrain in all circumstances from saying anything 
about a peace ofier from Germany or about a possible activity with 
respect to mediation on the part of Turkey or about any German 
plans at all unless you have received appropriate authorization from 
here to do so. 

RlBBENTROP 



e This passage is partly illegible on the document printed and was supplied 
from another copy (F2/0372-68). 



No. 146 

216/147730-31 

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

most urgent Tokyo, July 24, 1941—11 : 50 a. m. 

No. 1353 of July 24 Received July 25—1 : 30 a. m. 

The Japanese Foreign Minister, who had asked me to see him this 
afternoon, received me in the presence of an interpreter in order to 
inform me that the Japanese-French negotiations on the occupation 
of bases in Indochina, 1 as he stated, had resulted in an agreement 
concluded in Vichy on July 20. At present the two Governments 
were arranging for a protocol and a communique which will state, 
among other things, that the integrity of Indochina and French 

1 See document No. 126. 



JULY 1941 209 

sovereignty over the territory would not be affected. The communique 
would be published probably on July 26. 2 

The Foreign Minister then expressed his thanks for the cooperation 
afforded to Japan by Germany. 

In reply to my question as to whether the preparations and agree- 
ments were of such nature as to preclude any local difficulties, Admiral 
Toyoda stated that the agreements would assure a smooth course, 
particularly because the chief of the Japanese military mission in 
Indochina, General Sumita, had discussed all details with Governor- 
General Decoux. I then conveyed to the Japanese Foreign Minister, 
as instructed, the thanks of the Minister for the statement delivered 
to met^t my last call. 3 

In response to his request I then outlined for the Foreign Minister 
the progress of our military operations in the Soviet Union on the 
basis of the available information. The Foreign Minister acknowl- 
edged my report with visible satisfaction. I then asked him to keep 
us informed also in the future of the reports of the Japanese missions 
in the Soviet Union and England, which he promised to do, and fol- 
lowing this asked him whether the report on the reception of the 
Japanese reply by the American Government had already been re- 
ceived from the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. 4 The Foreign 
Minister replied that owing to the Japanese-French negotiations he 
had not yet been able to occupy himself with questions concerning 
America. I reminded the Japanese Foreign Minister of our urgent 
interest to have prompt and complete information on the progress of 
the talks. 

Ott 



* The protocol was actually signed on July 29 and made public that day. For 
text see Department of State, Bulletin, 1941, vol. v, p. 286. Signed simultane- 
ously was a secret agreement which followed closely the text of the appendix 
printed in document No. 126 and which was subsequently presented to the Inter- 
national Military Tribunal for the Far East as Exhibit No. 651. 

8 See document No. 130. 

* See documents Nos. 88, 95, and 127. 



No. 147 

105/113781 

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 

U. St.S. Pol. 707 Beelw, July 24, 1941. 

The Rumanian Minister * inquired today about the future fate of the 

Ukraine and advanced the special wish of the Rumanian Government 

that the future Ukrainian state should not be too large. The 40 mil- 

1 Raoul Bossy. 

682-905—64 19 



210 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1 

( 

lion Ukrainians would otherwise again exert pressure upon Rumania ! 

and on other European countries. In particular the Minister advo- 
cated that former Greater Galicia not become part of the Ukraine, so 
that in this manner a direct connection between Germany and Rumania ! 

would remain assured. The Minister then also asked whether we j 

were cooperating with particular groups of the Ukrainian national- i 

ists, and if so with which ones. j 

I told the Minister that it was still too early to make any sort of ■ 

statements regarding the future organization of the territory of the ' 

former Soviet Union. At the moment the Soviet Union was still an ' 

area of operations. Gradually portions would be taken out of the area 
of operations and transferred to civil administration. I could not 
give him further details. As far as the Ukrainian groups were con- 
cerned, we had a clear policy of not making any one of the feuding 
nationalist groups the matrix of a future government. The Ukraine 
would certainly remain first under military and then under civil ad- 
ministration for a rather long time to come. 2 

"WoERsrANM- 

«'v ln , ^ram No. 2303 of July 25 (105/113793-84) Killinger reported that 
Minal Antonescu had indicated interest In the future of the Ukraine and ex- 
pressed the wish "that no great Slav territory be established on Rumania's 
Doraer. 



No. 148 

BS5/S39972-74 

Memorandum, by the Director of the Political Department 

Berlw, July 24, 1941. 



The Party in the appended letter, 1 the Ministry for Ecclesiastical 
Affairs and the Governor General 2 have recommended that in the 
appointment to high offices in the Catholic Church the right of control 
of the State, which is recognized in the Reich Concordat s only to a 
limited degree (see annex 1),* be extended to the filling of all church 
offices with episcopal powers and expanded beyond the area of validity 
of the Reich Concordat to include the entire area under German 
sovereignty. 

The demand for participation by the State in filling the high offices 
of the Catholic Church has been the subject of dispute between the 
temporal an d spiritual powers in Catholic countries for a thousand 

1 Not found. 

*Hans Frank. 

* See Series O, vol. i, document No. 371. 

'Not printed (535/239975). 



JULY 1941 211 

years. From the standpoint of National Socialist Germany it is a 
matter of course. What church offices this demand is to apply to and 
the form and the time of application are, on the other hand, questions 
of political expediency. 

II 

On occasions of individual cases the question has already been dis- 
cussed repeatedly in a loose form with the Nuncio. Thus just recently 
when bishoprics hecame vacant outside the area of the Concordat 
(Prague, Budweis, among others) he was warned that the Curia was 
creaGhg accomplished facts. 5 

As^gainst an official assertion of our claims there are a number of 
very serious objections which would argue in favor of postponing this 
problem to the time of a basic new regulation of questions of church 
and state. These objections, however, can be overcome. They are: 

a) The right of control, whose extension within the Old Reich 
and whose expansion to the entire area of German sovereignty is 
being demanded, is based on the Eeich Concordat which has not as 
yet been denounced, but which we in practice considered no longer 
capable of application in the majority of its stipulations since it is 
intrinsically outdated. In the case of negotiations or even com- 
munications on the subject of this right of control, the obstacle of 
the express or silent recognition of stipulations of the Eeich Con- 
cordat is difficult to avoid. 

b) Negotiations on services of the Curia which, like our present 
wishes, go beyond the Concordat, lead to new concordat-like agree- 
ments which we do not want and to wishes of the Holy See for 
counterservices. 

Ill 

Nevertheless the Political Department considers it likewise nec- 
essary that those cases of uncontrolled filling of the higher offices in 
the Catholic Church, utilizing the deficiencies of the Concordat, be 
halted and that the Vatican be warned in an appropriate communi- 
cation against continuing the procedure so far practiced. It is a 
matter of finding a form for reducing the objections expressed under 
II a) and b) . This form has been found in that no proposals for a 
new settlement will be made to the Curia but it will be notified of 
a claim by the State. 

It is therefore proposed that the Embassy at the Vatican be directed 
to present a note verbale, a draft of which is appended as annex 2. 6 

We can comply with the wish of the Party Chancellery to treat 
the matter in a somewhat still, exclusively written way for the present. 

6 Weizsacker recorded conversations with the Nuncio about this problem in 
memoranda of May 8 (534/239948) and June 26 (534/239926). A memorandum 
of June 19 (534/239896) shows that Weizsacker also discussed the question of 
the bishopric of Prague with Neurath. 

' Not printed (535/239976-77) . See document No. 241. 



212 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

The probably sols concession which could be made to the Vatican 
in the future would be the summary communication of the reasons 
in case of rejection of the proposed candidates. The Party Chancel- 
lery, too, according to its letter would now go along with this con- 
cession. There is however no reason to come out with this concession 
at this time. 

A memorandum with an explanation of ecclesiastical terms used 
is appended as annex 3. T 

The Party Chancellery has requested that it be given the draft 
of the communication to be directed to the Vatican for comment before 
it is sent out. This would be done through the Department for 
German Internal Affairs. 

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister with the request for 
his decision. 8 

WOERMAKN 



'Not printed (535/239978-79). 
* Marginal notes : 

"To me after return from vacation. W." 

"H. Siegfr[ied] : Please determine as to what had happened with the original. 
Wfeizsacker], Aug. 1." 
"It haB been approved by BAM ; draft Is being prepared. Sifegfried], Aug. 8." 
See document No. 241. 



No. 149 

4699/E226915 

Memorandum, by the Director of the Department for German Internal 

Affairs 

Berlin, July 24, 1941. 
e.o. D VIII 52 g. 

Subject : Removal [Aussiedelung] of the Volksdeutsche from South- 
eastern Europe. 

In the Department for German Internal Affairs it became known 
confidentially that the Fiihrer is supposed to have made a decision 
about the future fate of the German national groups in South- 
eastern Europe and overseas. They are to be resettled in the Reich. 
It is said that Reichsleiter Bormann and the Reichsfuhrer SS are 
informed of this decision. 

In many questions regarding ethnic policy in Southeastern Europe 
it is of decisive importance to know the future of the national groups. 
Thus, for example, the decision which the Foreign Ministry has 
to make as to whether a separate volksdeutsch labor service should 
be established in Croatia or whether the Volksdeutsche should serve 
in the Croatian labor service will depend essentially on whether the 
German national Group there is to be removed within the foresee- 
able future or whether it will be a lasting political factor. 



JULY 1941 213 

The Foreign Ministry constantly has to make similar decisions. 
The Department for German Internal Affairs therefore requests 
the Foreign Minister to ask the Fiihrer himself about this matter. 1 

Luther 



1 See document No. 187. 

No. 150 

1527/373745-46 

The Charge d' 'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry 

V Telegram 

top secret Washington, July 25, 1941 — 6 : 06 p. m. 

No. 2424 of July 24. Received July 26—6 : 30 a. m. 

With reference to your telegram No. 1395 of July 22. 1 
I had the opportunity to discuss the ideas set forth in the telegraphic 
instruction with influential leaders of the opposition. They showed 
great interest and indicated time and again how very much they 
agree with these psychological observations and the evaluation of the 
domestic political situation in America; for example, one of the 
Senators, who has just travelled through a large part of America on 
a speaking campaign lasting several weeks and by so doing was able 
to gather excellent information regarding the present mood in the 
country, mentioned that the ideas under discussion had lately become 
subjects for conversation among American Jews themselves. The 
respected, intelligent and far-sighted Jews shared the same fears that 
in case a scapegoat later had to be found for America's entry into 
the war this would be the American Jews. In 1918 it was the big 
industrialists and Wall Street high finance; this time it would be 
the Jews. The emotionally exceedingly excitable American people 
would then not display the moderation and discipline of the German 
people, but would proceed against the Jewish warmongers with ruth- 
less severity. Out of these considerations far-sighted Jewish circles 
are avoiding taking an active part in the warmongering and leave 
this to radical warmongers in the Roosevelt cabinet and to English 
propaganda. Indicative of this is that some of these Jews are trying 
to enter the America First Committee which is the leading militant 
instrument of the isolationists. In this connection the interview with 
the leading American Jew, B. Baruch 2 several weeks ago is note- 
worthy, [in which he said] that a victory by Germany would not 
represent any kind of economic threat to America. The wealthy 
Jews are alarmed by the warmongering and the anti-business tendency 

3 Document No. 139. 

2 Bernard M. Barueh, American financier, Chairman, War Industries Board, 
1918-19. 



214 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

of the "New Deal", -which is dominated by numerous, often penniless 
but all the more ambitious Jews. Also the opinions of Americans 
who have been here for. many generations are increasing, to the effect 
that they no longer intend to allow themselves to be kept on political 
leading strings and be criticized by Jews who have newly immigrated 
such as Felix Frankfurter, 3 etc. 

The beginnings of such ideas are to be observed all over the country. 
So far, however, there has been no leadership and organization for a 
possible anti-Semitic movement, particularly for the reason that the 
most important media of information such as press, radio and film 
are ruthlessly controlled by the Jews. This control is made easier for 
them by the pro- Jewish policy of Roosevelt. A further report may 
be sent. 

Thomsen 



* Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 

No. 151 

205/142843 

The Charge d'Ajf aires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most urgent Stockholm, July 25, 1941—6 : 30 p. m. 

No. 1048 of July 24 Received July 25— 9: 15 p. m. 

With reference to your telegram No. 1452 of July 24. 1 
Your instruction has been carried out. The State Secretary of 
the Foreign Ministry stated that the Norwegian ships in Goteborg * 
were being most sharply watched. In order to be able to put to sea 
the laid-up ships, which at present had only skeleton crews on board, 
would need at least 2 weeks of preparations. So far as he knew no 
such preparations had as yet taken place. The law regarding the 
supervision of foreign merchant ships provides for definite berths for 
ships which are withdrawn from traffic, but it does not prevent them 
from departing after clearing in accordance with the regulations. 
Boheman took note of my allusion to the fact that the agreement re- 
garding the Goteborg overseas traffic 3 was closely connected with the 
question of the Norwegian ships in Sweden, and of my wish that in 
any case attempts by the Norwegian ships to break out should be pre- 
vented. He asked that further discussions on these matters be post- 
poned until the return of Ministerial Director Hagglof which would 

1 Not found. 

" See document No. 28 and footnote 4. 

* See document No. 91. 



JULY 1941 215 

be at the beginning of August. In any case according to his view 
there was no threat that an attempt to break out would take place.* 

Below 

"In telegram No. 1047 of July 25 (205/142841-42) the Legation reported such 
a thickening of reports as to leave no doubt that there was the Intention on 
the part of the ships soon to attempt a breakout. 

The next day, however, in telegram No. 1056 (205/142844) Below reported 
having been assured by Boheman that the Swedish officials were unable to verify 
any preparations aboard the Norwegian ships for a breakout. 

By telegram No. 1509 of July 28 (205/142845) Elsenlohr directed that Wied 
himself go to the Swedish Foreign Minister and state that the explanations made 
by Boheman were completely unsatisfactory; that the German Government 
•"f,™ certain that the first breakout by Norwegian vessels a few months 
befftpe had come about as a result of the cooperation of English warships Nor- 
wegian crews, and English spies in Sweden ; and with the toleration if not the 
actual help of subordinate Swedish officials. Germany could not accept legal 
explanations and excuses. Sweden was to be warned emphatically that a new 
breakout would have most serious consequences: Germany would cancel the 
Goteborg traffic agreement. 

Below replied in telegram No. 1070 of July 29 (205/142851) that both Wied 
and Giinther were on leave and he had therefore presented the matter again 
. .,; i :? ai1 ' e State Seer etary promised an answer after some days but 
indicated that he feared English retaliation if Sweden went beyond the law. 

See, further, document No. 174. 

No. 152 

230/153286 

An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the 
Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

N ' - 713 Special Train, July 25, 1941—10 : 10 p. m. 

Received Berlin, July 25—10 : 45 p. m. 

Submitted to Ministerialdirektor Schroeder through Under State 
Secretary Woermann. 

Telegram No. 404 of July 22 from Belgrade 1 regarding increased 
communist activity in Serbia has been submitted to the Foreign 
Minister and on his instruction was passed on to the Fiihrer. Regard- 
ing the last paragraph 2 of this telegram the Foreign Minister ordered 
that Standartenfiihrer Veesenmayer go to Belgrade at once. The 
Foreign Minister requests that the matter be taken up further from 
there. 

Weber 

1 Not printed (230/153287-89). 

•This paragraph read as follows: "In these circumstances I would appreciate 
it if Veesenmayer came to Belgrade at the earliest opportunity and I request 
that a telegram be sent regarding the time of his arrival." 



216 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY 

No. 153 

1527/373749-50 

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

ttrgent Washington, July 25, 1941 — 10 : 23 p. m. i 

No. 2435 of July 25 Keceived July 26—3 : 00 p. m. 

For Chief of OKW Ausland; Chief of the General Staff; Chief of 
the Luftwaffe Operations Staff. , 

Evaluation of the situation on the evening of July 25. 

1. The American fleet is dispersed. Even if it were brought together 
in the Pacific the Americans would not dare to attack Japan, because, 
being otherwise inadequately armed, they would in this way stake 
their future on one card with highly uncertain chances of success and 
would commit themselves to a Pacific front. 

2. Consequently America must content herself with empty threats ' 
and possibly economic measures to counter a Japanese initiative. i 
She will not go so far, however, as to provoke a war by doing this. 

3. Thus Japan can do whatever she likes in the Far East and in 
the western part of the Pacific, Consequently America must keep the 
bulk of her naval forces assembled in the Pacific; to disperse them 
increases the existing weakness . 

4. As long as this situation lasts American freedom of action is 
paralyzed. Accordingly nothing remains for America but to seek 

in every way an understanding and accommodation with Japan. I 

5. As long as this objective has not been attained, the U.S.A. must , 
avoid a war with Germany, because the whole Atlantic would, as a I 
result of this, immediately become a zone of war. The Americans i 
would then have to use convoys to secure their indispensable imports 

of raw materials from South Africa and South America, as well as 
transports to the Middle East and England, and would in this way dis- 
perse their fleet more and more. Conducting the war would put an 
even greater strain on the already limited merchant shipping for pur- 
poses of the fleet, etc. America would have to reckon with a war on 
two fronts with dispersed naval forces and insufficient merchant ship- , 

ping. In this case she would lose her imports from the Netherlands 
Indies that are essential to the war effort and at the same time would 
possess neither a complete army for reinforcing and occupying out- 
lying positions nor even an approximately adequate air force. 

6. The result is that the continued serious Japanese threat and the 
incomplete state of American armament paralyze the American free- 
dom of (group garbled) and make an entry into the war against Ger- 
many extremely unlikely. 



JULY 1941 217 

7. If the Japanese threat continues after the victorious conclusion 
of the Russian war the United States of America will not be capable of 
seriously interfering with further German measures. It will con- 
tinue to scatter its increasing production of war material between 
deliveries to England, China, etc., and equipping its armed forces, but 
will not be able to exercise decisive influence in any direction. The 
hope is for a change in case it is possible to drag out the war until far 
into the year 1942. 1 

Bottichek 
Thomsen 



1 Tfelegram No. 2488 of July 29 (1527/373775-77) reiterated the appraisal of 
the situation as laid down in the document printed, emphasizing that a moment 
had arrived "when America not only wants to but has to seek an understanding 
and accommodation with Japan." It stated that the United States needed above 
all time and therefore aimed at avoiding any major decisions in the course of 
1941, both with respect to Germany and Japan. Depending on the needs of the 
situation, Japan was being either "intimidated with empty threats and economic 
measures or wooed with kindliness for the sole purpose of avoiding in 1941 an 
occupation of the Netherlands Indies, not to speak of a struggle for Singapore." 



No. 154 

341/19932C-27 

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in 

Argentina 

July 25, 1941. 

With reference to my telegram No. 686. 1 

For your information. 

An affirmative reply memorandum was given the Argentine Am- 
bassador here on July 22, 2 in which the following is stated : 

The question whether the most- favored-nation clause would stand 
in the way of the conclusion of a complete customs union can be left 
open, because only the granting of limited, preferences is envisaged 
for the time being. Limited preferences, however, according to gen- 
erally recognized international concepts, are not excepted from the 
most-favored-nation treatment even if they should prepare the way 
for a customs union. The German Government for its part, however, 
is willing to contribute to the favorable development of economic 
relations between Argentina and her neighboring countries, and is 

'This telegram has not been found. For previous developments see vol. xi 
of this series, documents Nos. 555 and 698 and vol, in, documents Nos. 166 
and 597. 

' The reply memorandum has not been found. There is another memorandum 
of July 22 by WIehl (341/199329-30) in which he records giving the reply 
memorandum to the Argentine Ambassador who mentioned that it would 
make a good impression in Brazil, but that the plan for a customs union was 
no longer actual. It had been promoted by the former Argentine Foreign 
Minister, he said, but his successor had not yet taken it up. 



218 



DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 



therefore ready to waive its right to take advantage of preferential 
tariffs on the basis of the most- favored-nation clause, in so far as it is 
a question of preferential tariffs that Argentina may arrange with 
Brazil and other South American countries bordering on Argentina. 
In this the German Government proceeds on the assumption that all 
the other countries entitled to most- favored-nation treatment also 
agree. Furthermore it requests confirmation that Argentina, too, will 
not claim such preferential tariffs as may be agreed upon in the future 
between Germany and other European countries. Finally, the Ger- 
man Government assumes that the Argentine Government will no- 
tify it in due time concerning the extent and type of the preferential 
tariffs to be arranged. End of the memorandum. 

In our reply we started from the assumption that the realization of 
a customs union between Argentina and Brazil, and possibly other 
neighboring countries as well, lies in our interest. An economic al- 
liance of the South American countries among themselves will, as long- 
as it is limited to them, make them more resistant to the plans for eco* 
nomic and political supremacy of the United States; a larger South 
American economic area will probably provide a more efficient and 
receptive partner for the Greater German economic area of the future. 8 

WlEHL 

recorded ThTJT&nfn^L ^ B £- S ' %?■ 52J U«ffl/B12OT8-7B) WeizsScker 
r^™=trr.„ ? d i^ ""** 1 **"> Brazilian Ambassador of the view of the 

German Government on the projected customs union. 

No. 155 

2236/476117-18 

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department 

Dir. Ha Pol No. 175 Berlw, July 25, 1941. 

The Food Situation in Greece. 

Minister Altenburg, the Plenipotentiary of the Reich m Athens, has 
been pointing for weeks to the fact that the food difficulties of Greece 
are reaching a critical point, and has advocated German assistance, 
especially for the cities of Athens and Salonika. Up to now his 
suggestions have not been complied with, first because Greek matters 
are primarily Italy's business and also because the Reich Ministry 
of Food, in consideration of our own food situation, categorically 
refuses such help. 

According to the last telegram from Athens from the Reich Pleni- 
potentiary, No. 824 of July 19, 1 the Greek Government has again 
approached him and the Italian Plenipotentiary with an appeal for 
help because of the desperate food situation. The Reich Plenipo- 

1 Not printed (4697/E226766). 



JULY 1941 219 

tentiary reports that in large areas of Greece there has been no bread 
for weeks, the population is gradually dying off, and in the last few 
days there were hunger revolts in Argos. 

The main difficulty is with bread grain. Meat requirements can be 
met in a pinch, and there is plenty of olive oil, even for export. The 
annual Greek requirement of bread grain is 400,000 tons, their ap- 
proaching harvest is 240,000 tons; accordingly they lack 160,000 tons. 
Their own harvest would last to about the end of February. Starting 
in March, 140,000 tons are supposed to be delivered from Bulgaria, as 
the grain surplus from the former Greek and presently Bulgarian 
aresCamounted bo about 120,000 tons. Until now it was assumed that 
the difficulties would be eliminated during these days through the new 
harvest which is already under -way. The Reich Plenipotentiary re- 
ports, however, that, because of disruptions in organization and trans- 
portation, this is evidently not coming about. 

Italy's Plenipotentiary* informed our Plenipotentiary that grain 
was available in Italy, but that payment presented difficulties. Italy 
therefore intended for the time being to supply only 8,000 tons at the 
end of July. Our Plenipotentiary considers it necessary to increase 
this amount to at least 15,000 tons. On Tuesday, July 29, negotiations 
conducted by Minister Olodius will take place in Rome, 3 in which 
Greek food supplies are also to be discussed with the Italians. It is 
intended to aim in these negotiations primarily at adequate grain de- 
liveries to Greece by Italy, if necessary with German support in regard 
to payment through a triangular clearing arrangement ; since because 
of our extensive purchases of tobacco, we already have a considerable 
and growing clearing debt with respect to Greece. Should this not 
be successful, perhaps" one could consider making from 10,000 to 15,000 
tons of grain from Germany available on a loan basis, but only as 
a loan absolutely to be returned out of the new Greek harvest by Sep- 
tember at the latest. However, the Reich Ministry of Food would 
agree to this only if such an action were designated as necessary by 
higher authority. 

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the Deputy 
State Secretary in accordance with instructions.* 

Wieiil 

* Pellegrino Ghigi. 

s See document No. 245, footnote 3. 

* See, further, document No. 323. 



220 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 156 

B12/B0O110O-1O3 

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

most tjkgent Rome, July 26, 1941 — 1 : 50 a. m. 

top secret Received July 26 — 4: 15 a. m. 1 

No. 1668 of July 25 

For the Reich Foreign Minister personally. 

Translation of the letter of July 24 of the Duce z to the Fiihrer. 

"Fuhrer : I lose no time in replying to your last letter 3 and, follow- 
ing your example, I make a survey of the situation. 

France. You are familiar with my ideas, Fuhrer. It was Nicolo 
Machiavelli who first characterized the French in the words: The 
more they promise, the less they give you. There is nothing substantial 
to be expected of them. Weeks and months have gone by, and the 
conversations on the ports in Tunis have not progressed one step.* 
Meanwhile you have liberated more prisoners and Italy has made 
available to France her air and sea bases at home and in the Greek 
(text missing) for the Syrian campaign, which in the last few hours 
has become a Franco-English comedy with an American director, the 
United States Consul at Beirut. 5 In the interior of France a very 
strong revival of Communists and pro-English elements is to be noted. 
De Gaulle reflects the thinking of 90 percent of the French, including 
perhaps the Marshal himself. 

In these circumstances, it is necessary, so far as the Mediterranean 
sector is concerned, to rely entirely on our forces and, above all, to 
effect their constant coordination. Because of this incomplete co- 
ordination painful losses have occurred. The von Tirpitz, for ex- 
ample, was shipwrecked (the whole crew was saved!) 2 miles off 
the coast of San Remo, because it had left Marseilles 2 days too soon 
and without having inquired as to the position of our mine fields 
along the Ligurian coast. 

It is also important to perfect this collaboration, which is already 
in progress, and I am happy to give this collaboration the form that 
you, Fiihrer, desire. 

1 intend to issue instructions to the effect that the present German 
liaison organs now assigned to us be transformed into agencies of 
the Admiral attached to the Admiral's Staff of the Royal Navy or of 
the General attached to the Royal Air Force. These agencies would 
be established as special services with the respective general staffs to 
which they are attached and would be intended, each in the person 
of its chief, to participate in the various studies that will be under- 
taken, as well as in decisions that are reached in regard to the questions 

'Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 2511 to the Special Train Westfalen, 
July 26." 

2 Another copy of the telegram is filmed on F19/369-72. The Italian text is 
found among the Lisbon papers of the Italian Foreign Ministry. 

' Of July 20, document No. 134. 

* See document No. 113. 

Consul General Cornelius Van H. Engert. 



JULY 1941 221 

that you have so clearly defined in your letter. Thus, in addition to 
General von Eintelen at Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces, 
Admiral Weichold would take over the post with the General Staff of 
the Italian Navy, and General von Pohl with the General Staff of 
the Italian Air Force. 

It is important to work together to solve in the best possible way 
the most important problem that faces us in the Mediterranean; that 
of the transportation of men and materials. I believe that there will 
then happen in Rome what is happening in Libya, where Italian- 
German comradeship is fully realized. In order to be prepared to cope 
with possible special situations on the western front, I have again 
brought the 10 divisions of the Fourth Army up to strength, and I 
intend, to set up 4 divisions to guard the Tunisian front. 

Spain. I do not believe that Spain wants to or can do more than 
the dispatching of the volunteer division. 6 In his speech the Genera- 
lissimo burned his bridges behind him but he has not moved from the 
sphere of words into action. 7 I shall continue my efforts to bring our 
plans to fruition, but all this must be done with great restraint in view 
of the oversensitivity of the Spaniards, which is a peculiarity of their 
race. The attitude of Spain is useful for curbing possible indiscre- 
tions on the part of France. 

Turkey. In this sector, too, it is necessary to proceed with much 
moderation. A month ago I was more optimistic. According to the 
last reports that I have received from Ankara, Great Britain's stock 
is rising and this is to be explained as a consequence of the failure 
of the Iraq venture and the Syrian campaign. The Turks will go 
along with us only if they have the mathematical certainty that Great 
Britain has lost the war. Nevertheless we must not give up our work 
and efforts. If Turkey should one day do what Sweden has done — 
that is, let the troops march through B — the fate of Egypt would be 
sealed; and I am more than ever deeply convinced that if England 
is liquidated in Egypt the British Empire will be liquidated. Great 
Britain is aware of this and is constantly fortifying her positions and 
allowing a large portion of American aid to be concentrated in Egypt. 9 

Japan. The recent governmental crisis in Tokyo has causes, aside 
from the official ones, with which we are not familiar. 10 It is my con- 
viction that Japan will remain in our camp, partly because she will 
be forced to by reason of the fact that the help that the United States 
is giving Chiang Kai-shek is constantly increasing. 11 She will not 
begin with the march on Russia ; she will occupy Indochina and that 
will lead to the break with Washington. 

Russia. I have read with the Keenest interest what you, Fiihrer, 
have written me about the campaign in Russia, and about the races 
of which the Bolshevist Army is composed. Precisely because of its 
heterogeneous composition, because of the disorganization in its com- 
mand and because of the bestial stupidity of the people, I have the 



* See documents Nos. 12 and 70. 

7 In this speech of July 17 on the fifth anniversary of the revolution. Franco 
talked about Spain's policy toward the United States and the Soviet Union. For 
text see, ifonatshefte filr Auswartige Politik, September 1941, pp. 764-769. 

8 See documents Nos. 16 and 17. 

" Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. m, pp. 275-298. 

10 See document No. 124. 

" Cf. Foreign Relations of the United Slates, 191,1, vol. v, pp. 598-773. 



222 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

mathematical conviction that your armies will rapidly destroy the 
Russian armies, which have already been severely weakened. As my 
generals tell me, the Italian Army Corps will be able to go into action 
between the 10th and 15th of August. Meanwhile, however, I am 
preparing a second Army Corps, and I could, if necessary, prepare 
also a third. There are men enough. As far as their "morale" ia is 
concerned, it is very good, and their bravery is indisputable, provided 
they are well armed and well led. General Rommel will, I believe, 
have informed you what our divisions are doing around Tobruk and 
in this connection it should be noted that many of these men have 
been living in the desert uninterruptedly for 15 to 20 months. 

I, too, Fiihrer, earnestly desire to see you again. That I will be 
able to do after the 10th of August, and I am prepared to come to 
your headquarters in former Russian territory. I need have no 
scruples about leaving Italy for the Italian people are quietly at 
work and believe more than ever in victory. 

Please accept, Fiihrer, my cordial and comradely greetings and the 
expression of my undying friendship. Mussolini." 

The original of the Duce's letter will follow in a sealed envelope 
by regular messenger leaving tomorrow morning, the 26th, addressed 
to the Foreign Minister personally. 

Mackensen - 

17 "Stimmung" used in the Italian original. 

No. 157 

95/106966-68 

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

secret Madrid, July 27, 1941—12 : 10 a. m. 

No. 2542 of July 27 Received July 27—2 : 45 a. m. 

As I was invited yesterday by the Foreign Minister to his country 
estate near La Granja, where he has been staying since my return 
from Germany, I had an opportunity for a lengthy talk with him. 

After I told the Minister the excellent impression about the polit- 
ical and military developments with which I had returned from Ger- 
many, and discussed with him some urgent current matters, on which 
I am reporting separately, 1 the Foreign Minister sketched out for 
me a detailed picture of the international situation as it affects Spain. 
Answering and treating in detail my various questions and comments, 
the Minister told me substantially the following : 

After the threat of a premature involvement in the war had dimin- 
ished for Spain during the past weeks, the situation had changed 
significantly since the well-known aggressive speech of the General- 

1 In telegram No. 2541 of July 26 (95/106964) Stohrer reported that he had 
discussed with Suner the closing of the Polish Legation. 



JULY 1941 223 

issimo on the anniversary of the national liberation. 2 The speech 
had been premature. It suddenly opened the eyes of the English and 
the Americans about the true position of Spain. Previously, the 
English Government especially kept on believing that only he, the 
Foreign Minister, was pushing for war, while the "wise and thought- 
ful"^ Caudillo would preserve neutrality unconditionally. That 
illusion has now been taken from them. They had come to realize 
that Spain, in understanding with the German Government, would 
enter the war at a suitable moment. This is apparent from consistent 
reports of the Spanish Ambassadors in London 3 and Washington.* 
He t^d no doubt that the English and Americans were in consultation 
with -each other on how to meet this new situation; it was evident 
that our enemies were trying, somewhere at long last, to forestall 
Germany. American propaganda for the occupation of the Azores 
and certain parts of West Africa, togther with the steadily increasing 
activtity of English and especially American agents in North and 
West. Africa, were plain indications of this. More recently, the 
Spanish Government has been receiving information indicating that 
plans were being studied for a landing operation in the Spanish 
zone of Morocco. Neither would he exclude the possibility of a land- 
ing attempt in Portugal to establish a new European front. Tangier, 
too, was threatened, to say nothing of the Canary Islands, which would 
surely be attacked as soon as the Azores were occupied. 5 

The Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco, General Orgaz, who 
was currently in Spain for reporting and who was present during 
part of my talk with Serrano Suner, confirmed the Minister's anxieties 
on the strength of his experiences on a recent visit to French Morocco. 
He explained that it was a matter of common knowledge that every- 
where in West Africa English and American agents were studying 
intensely all questions relating to a landing operation. The attitude 
of General Nogues B was more than doubtful. Almost all the French 
in Morocco were basically followers of de Gaulle. Anti-Spanish 
sentiment was clearly visible. A striking illustration of this was the 

* See document No. 156, footnote 7. In telegram No. 2460 of July 18 (95/106955- 
56) Heberlein summarized Franco's speech of the day before and concluded: 
"Franco's speech is the most open declaration up to now of his position on the 
side of the Axis Powers against communism and democracy and of his trust in 
the final victory of the Axis Powers." 

3 Jacobo, Duke of Alba and Berwick. 

1 Juan Francisco de Cardenas y Rodriguez. 

ml: «#Ew52F t «2 ated Aug ' 10 from the German Information Office III in Madrid 
(1)5/107006-07) records that the conviction was growing that Spain would 
become involved in the war by some act of desperation by the British : an attack 
by way of Portugal; or even more likely from the northwest African coast. 

In telegram No. 2890 of Aug. 21 (95/107026-27) Stohrer reported that the 
Spanish Foreign Ministry had learned that Britian and America were con- 
sidering the project of demanding bases from Portugal both on her islands 
and on her mainland territory, 

'Gen. Auguste Paul Nogues, French Resident General and Commander in 
Chief in Morocco. 



224 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

theft of the code from the Spanish Consulate in Casablanca by the 
French secret police. 

When I interjected that it seemed most unlikely to me that the 
English or American would attempt a landing in Portugal because 
in such an event Spain and we too would be immediately on the scene, 
etc., the Minister replied that Spain naturally would take immediate 
action, but although a deployment plan was in existence, few practical 
preparations had been undertaken for it. The Minister inquired about 
the strength of our troops, and especially the strength of the air arm, 
held in readiness in southern France against all contingencies. I 
answered evasively, the more so because I had no exact information on 
the matter. 

To impress upon me how seriously he viewed the situation, Serrano 
Suner finally explained that only a few days ago he declined the 
Generalissimo's invitation to the mountains to hunt ibex, because he 
could not take the responsibility at this time for being away from 
Madrid and out of reach for several days. 

Stohreb 

No. 158 

203/141669 

The Director of the News Service and Press 
Department to Various Missions 1 

Telegram 

MOST URGENT BERLIN, July 27, 1941. 

Multex 552 

Major Belmonte, the Bolivian Military Attache here, will make a 
statement to the domestic and foreign press on Monday in which he 
will brand a letter allegedly written by him to Minister Wendler as 
a tendentious falsification. 2 The Eeich Government will send a note 
to the Bolivian Government. DNB will publish a detailed report. 

The text of Belmonte's statement, the note of the Beich Government, 
and the DNB report s will be given by NPD. 4 

Every means should be employed to ensure that the matter is prom- 
inently pu blicized in the press at your post and among the people 

1 The designated Missions were listed on the annex which has not been found 
A memorandum by Woermann dated July 26 (199/140876-80) records a 
discussion of that date with Major Belmonte. ' 'After Belmonte had read the text 
of the alleged letter to Wendler he declared most decidedly that he never had any 
relationship with Wendler and that he had never received a letter from him or 
sent one to him. 

J T ? a men lorandum of July 27 to Hitler (190/140859-72) Ribbentrop appended 
!? e ™™ Belmonte's statement, of the note of the Reich Government; and of 
*££ w -4,T epo , ■ this memorandum there also appeared this marginal note : 

The Ffiihrer] agreed to everything, H[ewel], July 27." 
NPD (Nachrichten-und Pressedienst) , News and Press Service. 



JULY 1941 225 

under the catchword, "Belmonte Case," and that the catchword gains 
acceptance. See that comments are made in which the Belmonte Case 
is held up as an action by the President of the United States infring- 
ing the soyereignty of South American countries. In the campaign 
of inflammatory agitation against Germany the U.S.A. President has 
pressured the Bolivian Government into an unheard-of action against 
ar representative of the Greater German Reich. "The Belmonte Case" 
must be made into a slogan characterizing the criminal Jewish gangster 
methods used by the U.SA. President to poison relations between 
nations. Every means should be used to propagate and popularize 
the slogan. 

Report by wire on the reaction and the reproduction in the press 
there and among the people. 5 

Acknowledge receipt. 

Schmidt 



* No replies have been found, A confidential report of July 29 by Likus 
(138/77038-40) stated that the declaration made by Major Belmonte to the 
foreign diplomats and journalists in Berlin created a sensation. 



No. 159 

Nuremberg Document USSE-237 

Adolf Hitler to General Antonsscu 1 

At present Fuheer's Headquarters, July 27, 1941 . 

Your Excellency : Permit me to begin this letter with my thanks 
for your letter which indicated to me not only the accord of our 
views held in common but above all your determination to fight this 
struggle — which in my opinion will decide the fate of Europe for 
centuries to come — at the side of the German Reich to the bitter end. 
I know, General Antonescu, that this is primarily your decision. It 
is your determination, your energy, and your manly bravery which 
made your people embark upon this course; a course, which, I am 
convinced will result not only in new successes but also in a new 
flowering of Rumania. 

. For me personally it is a great joy as well as a satisfaction, which 
is easy to understand, to congratulate you today from the bottom of 
my heart on these great successes. The recovery of Bessarabia is the 
most natural reward for your efforts and those of your brave troops. 

As for myself, I can but thank you for your vigorous leadership 
as well as for the splendid achievements of your troops. These 
achievements and the universal will to arrive at an unselfish coopera- 
tion between German and Rumanian units have been described and 



1 This document was Introduced at Nuremberg but is not in the published 
collection. No copy has been found in Foreign Ministry files. 
68^-905—64 20 



226 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

confirmed to me by the commanders with expressions of the highest 
esteem. 

Just as soon as the pressure exerted from the northwest by Army 
Group South unhinges the defense along the Dniester and the pivotal 
■points southward, I would greatly appreciate it if you would advance 
with yow troops into the area southwest of the Bug and thereby take 
over the protection of this area also. At the same time the Eleventh 
Army, with the Rumanian IV Army Corps under command and form- 
ing the right wing, will, under command of Army Group South, drive 
eastward of the Bug toward the lower Dnieper. 

Permit me, General Antonescu, to add a few more words about the 
course of the entire operations. I am thoroughly satisfied with the 
results attained so far. In general, they are as good as the marching 
capacity of the infantry allowed them to be, considering the truly 
horrible roads. We have many units which in 5 weeks have now 
covered a distance of approximately 700 kilometers beeline, i.e., more 
than 1,000 kilometers in marching. I had hoped that the Russians 
would accept battle near the frontier. From the outset I was of the 
opinion that the claims regarding an early retreat, for instance, beyond 
their great rivers or even beyond the Urals were merely utopian wishes 
of the English. Either they will defend their territory in front of 
their industrial centers or they will have lost it, one way or the other, 
behind their industrial centers. To be sure, the fact that on the basis 
of this necessity which was soberly realized they chose to give battle 
at the very beginning resulted immediately in a number of bloody 
battles; these, however, without exception, ended either with the 
destruction of the enemy formations or at least with their being 
smashed and beaten. Our breakthrough across the Dnieper in the 
direction of Smolensk alone has again cost the enemy 200,000 pris- 
oners, innumerable dead, and the loss of war material, the amount 
of which cannot be estimated at this time. The number of Russian 
tanks which we either shot to pieces or captured is today already close 
to 10,000. Enemy losses of guns and other material are incalculable. 
Replacement of these arms whicli are now lost is impossible. I do not 
have to assure you, General Antonescu, that what I am primarily 
interested in is not at all the winning of space but the annihilation 
of the enemy not only with regard to men but above all to materials. 
To replace man power may be easy for the Russians, to replace good, 
trained fighters is again much more difficult for them; but replacing 
arms and material on this scale is impossible for them. 

This will be particularly hopeless the moment we will have taken 
possession of the most essential Russian centers of production. After 
5 weeks of the campaign I realize that we will attain this goal probably 
at an earlier date than we had assumed. 



JULY 1941 227 

Permit me, General Antonescu, to thank you once more for the help 
which you personally and your brave soldiers are rendering us in this 
struggle and to congratulate you and your people today very specially 
from the bottom of my heart on the recovery of a province, the loss 
of which was unavoidable in the circumstances of the year 1940 and 
which at that time particularly could not have been prevented by 
military measures. 

Please convey these sincere congratulations of mine also to His 
Mijesty, the young King. 2 

tn loyal comradeship, 

Yours, etc. A [dolf] Hitler 

* In telegram No. 2337 of July 28 which was forwarded to the Special Train 
as No. 2549 (222/149845) Killenger reported having handed Hitter's letter to 
Antonescu in Ploesti at 10 : 30 a. m. that day. Antonescu asked that the follow- 
ing provisional oral reply be transmitted to Hitler : 

"As I have emphasized from the beginning, I, the General, shall march on 

to the end without asking for anything and without putting forth any conditions 

J?. a t e «" confldence ir > the Piihrer's [sense of] justice. Apart from the forces 

which Rumania has already at her disposal at the front, I Bhall mobilize all 

the forces that will be needed." 

See, further, doenment No. 167. 



No. 160 

260/170095-96 

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

most urgent Helsinki, July 28, 1941—7: 10 p. m. 

top secret Received July 28—8 : 25 p. m. 

No. 689 of July 28 

1) Today the Foreign Minister told the English Minister the fol- 
lowing: Finnish foreign trade, which had been reduced since 1940 
by England's actions, had been completely blockaded since June 14, 
of this year. 1 Since Finland was waging a common war with 
Germany against the Soviets, England had concluded a military 
alliance with the Soviets and declared her will to help the Soviets 
with all means possible. Because complications were to be predicted 
from this, the Finnish Government has decided to close its Lega- 
tion in London until further notice. The Finnish Government would 
be grateful to learn what the English Government intended to do 
with its Legation in Helsinki. 

The English Minister asked what that meant and whether he should 
leave. 2 The Foreign Minister replied that he saw no other 
possibility. 

1 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 643, footnote 1. 
In the text there is "withdraw" in parentheses. 



228 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

2) The Minister asked whether it was a case of German pressure. 
The Foreign Minister answered that Finnish military and civil 
authorities had found the situation neither normal nor logical. 

3) The Minister asked whether he should leave immediately. The 
Foreign Minister replied that his departure would be arranged as 
well as possible. 

4) The Minister said that the Foreign Minister would probably 
understand that his action would have a great effect in the United 
States. 

5) The Finnish Government will not inform the press before 
Thursday.* In agreement with the Foreign Minister I request that 
the German press : a) not present the matter before the Finnish press 
does, b) minimize the matter, o) not present it as Finland's entry 
into the war against England but only as a break in diplomatic 
relations. 

6) The Finnish Minister in London has so far not been able to 
meet the Irish High Commissioner* who is allegedly abroad. The 
Foreign Minister hopes that Gripenberg can apply for agrement today 
with the High Commissioner. 

7) The Foreign Minister asked me to which Power Finland should 
entrust the protection of her interests in England. I recommended 
Spain. 

Blucher 



* July 31. 

' J. W. Dulanty. 



No. 161 

F2/037S-73 

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

top secret Therapia, July 28, 1941. 

A 2854 

For the Foreign Minister personally ! 

I should like to reply as follows to telegram No. 997 of July 24, 1 
addressed to me : 

1. Regarding the formal aspect : 

The assumption made by the Foreign Minister that the American 
or British agencies' '■'■reports especially prejudicial to the interests 
of the Reich" had their origin and explanation in conversations which 
I am supposed to have conducted with diplomats here — particularly 
as these reports were "partly on the same lines" as the statements in 

1 Document No. 145. 



JULY 1941 229 

my written report No. A 2335/41 of July 14 z is an imputation -which 
is very astonishing to me and which I must reject emphatically. 

The relationship of mutual confidence that must exist between 
an Ambassador and his Foreign Minister if the Foreign Service is 
to function, should preclude the Foreign Minister's making such a 
grave charge before he had asked the Ambassador for a report and 
had studied the facts in the case. 

fl declare that I have at no time and with no diplomat discussed 
a fpeace offer on the part of Germany after conclusion of the Kussian 
campaign." If the Associated Press says that there is no Ambassador 
or Minister of a neutral country whom the German Ambassador 
has not yet told that it is the mission of his country to mediate peace 
between Germany and England, let it be stated, in reply to this ridic- 
ulous report of the Jewish representative of the Associated Press, 
that there is no longer any Ambassador of a neutral power at Ankara 
(with the American Ambassador there is no social intercourse, the 
Afghan Ambassador is traveling, the Iranian Ambassador has been 
ill for some time), and that of the three to four Ministers of neutral 
countries only the Swiss representative can be considered at all so 
far as political conversations are concerned. 

If the Foreign Minister raises the question why foreign journalists 
time and again place the German Embassy there in the center of such 
conjectures which interfere with German foreign policy, I would 
repeat the truism that Ankara has been one of the centers of diplo- 
matic activity of both friend and foe since Turkey acceded to the 
three power treaty. 8 It necessarily follows therefore that the 
foreign journalists, particularly the Jewish ones, are making every 
effort to discredit the representative of the Reich and to frustrate his 
work, after the [British] Intelligence Service has failed to eliminate 
him through an attempt at assassination. 
2-. Regarding the factual aspects : 

Reporting as fully as possible from sources in the diplomatic corps 
regarding the opinions and positions of the enemy powers with respect 
to the momentary situation is in accordance with the repeated instruc- 
tions of the Foreign Minister. In the political talks held for this 
purpose I have constantly pointed out since the beginning of the war 
against the Soviet Union that this war had created an entirely new 
situation in Europe; that the problem of the destruction of Bolshevism 
had created for the first time a united European front, from which 
no country within the frontiers of the Occident could withdraw. 
Therefore Turkey, also, would not be spared an early and clear deci- 
sion as to whether, on the basis of her interests, she ought to be 

3 Document No. 125. 

* Apparently a reference to Turkey's mutual assistance pact with Great Britain 
and France, signed Oct. 19, 1939. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, 
vol. co, p. 167. 



230 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

considered as belonging to Europe and whether she could continue to 
remain an ally of the enemy camp in view of the war which we were 
waging for her interests as well. 

I have in this connection stressed the fact that such a solidly united 
front would mean the end of the war, because it must seem folly 
to every American, to support and continue to wage England's war 
against a united Europe and for Bolshevism. 

That is something entirely different from a "peace offer on the 
part of Germany." 

Naturally it is clear that nothing could be more unpleasant for our 
enemies, particularly the war-mongering Americans, than such a 
development, and that they are therefore even now trying to discredit 
it with all the means at their command. 

In my dispatch of July 14, I dutifully reported the present views 
of the Turkish statesmen on the situation. The Foreign Minister 
has characterized the ideas continued therein as "entirely erroneous" 
and as "illusions." This does not alter the fact that Messieurs Sara- 
coglu and Numan and other members of the Cabinet have repeatedly 
expressed themselves to me in this sense. With what skepticism, on 
the other hand, the political alliance with Turkey is regarded in 
England is clearly revealed by the authentic questionnaire of the 
Intelligence] service forwarded to us by the Turkish Police. I have 
considered it my duty to suggest that we take advantage of such a 
situation. 

If the Foreign Minister in his telegram No. 997 expresses the 
opinion that Turkey can be drawn into our camp only "by way of 
power politics," I should like to state in reply that the policy hereto- 
fore laid down by him and expressed by the Fiihrer in his letters to 
the State President * consisted in a wise exploitation of our position 
of power combined with diplomatic accommodation. 

I did not want to propose anything else for the future either in 
order to secure for us this most important position in the Near East 
without striking a blow. I have therefore kept entirely within the 
bounds of the policy heretofore pursued— a policy which was not 
without success. 

The diplomatic aspect is dominated by military exigencies: If, 
after conclusion of the Russian campaign, the final attack on Egypt 
is to be launched from two directions, then, in the opinion of the 
military, the route from the Caucasus through Iran and Iraq is the 
logical one. But in northern Iraq a strong defensive front is being 
built up with American assistance and considerable manpower. Given 
the long supply line for the German troops, an attack against this 
front could probably not be launched without difficulty. The neutrali- 
zation of the 50 Turkish divisions in this connection is a military 



* See vol. xii of this series, documents Nos. 113 and 514, footnote 7. 



JULY 1941 231 

requirement, which can for the present be achieved only in the 
diplomatic field. 

The Foreign Minister finds that the influences disturbing to Reich 
policy always emanate from Ankara. However, in a period when 
documents allegedly found or secret orientation manuals regarding 
Turkey are exploited as proofs of aggressive intent on the part of the 
Reich toward the partner with which it had just concluded a friend- 
ship pact, and when Mr. Sumner Welles announces that he is in posses- 
sion of sure proof of the aggressive intent of the "Nazi system" toward 
other neutral states, 5 it could not be so prejudicial to the interests of 
the Reich that the German Ambassador at Ankara has the reputation 
of working sincerely for a European understanding which would 
crown the victory of the Reich. 

Let me repeat in conclusion : 

Only a relationship based entirely on mutual loyalty and trust be- 
tween the Ambassador and his Foreign Minister can be the condition 
for any profitable work in the field of foreign policy. I have fully and 
completely kept my promise of March 1939 e in this respect. Should 
the Foreign Minister be of another opinion, it would be in the interest 
of the Reich and in my interest personally that the collaboration be 
terminated at once. 

Papen 



According to the report in the New York Times of July 22, 1941 (p. 1, col. 7), 
Welles stated : "This Government has information that leads it to believe other 
steps of the character taken against Russia are under contemplation." 

Of. Franz von Papen, Memoir* (New York, 1953), pp. 443-446. 

No. 162 

386/211278-80 

The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 
Telegram 

MOST TTRGENT 

top secret Paris, July 30, 1941—1 : 15 a. m. 

No. 2274 of July 30 Received July 30—2 : 00 a. m. 1 

1. Dr. Schwarzmann, for the Foreign Minister. 

2. Armistice Commission, attention Minister Welck, Wiesbaden. 

In today's conversation with State Secretary Benoist-Mechin I in- 
formed the French Government, in accordance with my instructions, 2 
that the Foreign Minister had expressed surprise at the French note 
verbale of July 14 3 and was unable to take any official cognizance of it. 

* Marginal note : "Forwarded as No. 2578 to the Special Train. July 30." 

' See document No. 110. 

a See document No. 113, enclosure. 



232 DOCUMENTS ON GEHMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Inasmuch as this note had announced a delay over [the execution of] 
French obligations in Bizerte, the German return services regarding 
Bizerte have also been suspended.* 

I reminded Benoist-Mechin that I had urgently warned the French 
Government in the conference of July 7 5 not to delay the carrying out 
of the supply movements through Tunis. Apart from the fact that 
the transmission of the note displays a total misconception about the 
situation as between Germany and France, it was also conceived in a 
petty spirit. A f arsighted French policy would have utilized the Ger- 
man campaign against Russia as an occasion to effect immediately 
[Germany's requests regarding] Bizerte and Dakar without asking for 
anything in return, in order to make a French contribution toward 
weakening Europe's western enemy, England, at the very moment 
when the Reich was liberating all of Europe forever from Bolshevism. 

Benoist-Mechin at first answered with the familiar arguments 
which had already been presented by the French Government in the 
note verbale and the preceding talks. France wanted to fulfill the 
obligations undertaken with respect to Bizerte as well as Dakar. The 
state of open war with England which could then be expected with 
certainty and from which the French Government did not shrink 
would nevertheless be difficult to justify before the French public if 
it yielded no hope for improved relations with Germany. There was 
no connection between the French note and the campaign against 
Russia. The ideas expressed in the French note had been drafted 
prior to the beginning of the war against Russia. The commitment 
to the position on the question of Bizerte had been formulated by the 
French Cabinet while he had been away in Syria and in Turkey. He 
very much regretted not having been able to make any changes after 
his return to Vichy. The Reich Government should not overlook the 
fact, however, that France, by this note, did not withdraw from her 
commitments for military collaboration with Germany against Eng- 
land, but merely wanted to assure for herself popular support for 
carrying this out in a most comprehensive and resolute manner. 

I objected to Benoist-Mechin that if France were given an oppor- 
tunity to collaborate with a victorious Germany it was not our task 
to impress the value of this policy on the French people by constantly 

• In telegram No. 227 of July 26 (694/260247-49) Welck reported a conversation 
of General Vogl with Admiral Miehelier in which the Chairman of the German 
Armistice Commission had informed his French counterpart that French attempts 
to link the agreements of the Paris Protocols with political negotiations could not 
he recognized and that the fulfillment of further concessions on the part of 
Germany would have to depend on a change of the French attitude regarding the 
Tunisian question. For further details on the Vogl-Michelier conversation see 
La Ditegation francaise auprds de la Commission allemande d' Armistice, vol. v, 
pp. 5-12. 

* The record of this conference, printed as document No. 82, does not contain 
any warning to the French Government on the part of Abetz. No other record 
of this conference has been found. 



.lilt, IT 1941 233 

making concessions; instead, the French Government itself should 
find ways and means to gain popular support for such a policy. For 
this decision, however, the French Government lacked, by and large, 
the necessary enthusiasm, despite the admittedly good will of some 
members of the French Cabinet. Even if a sharper tone had recently 
been struck against England in official speeches both in the press and 
on the radio in the unoccupied territory, the forbearance toward 
warmongering circles in the United States impressed us unpleasantly 
as (did also the fact that little or nothing ensued in presenting the 
prodigious European accomplishments of the Fiihrer and the justifi- 
cation of the German claim to leadership in Europe. Too many 
French Government departments and agencies were still today nests 
of de Gaullist intrigue, and the Government was devoting a great 
deal less energy to combating these than to the attempt to keep from 
power protagonists of Franco-German collaboration, who disagreed 
with Vichy's reactionary course. 

Benoist-Mechin side-stepped this question of domestic policy with 
the remark that this was outside his responsibility. To refute the 
charge of double-dealing with respect to the United States he cited 
the accord with Japan over Indochina, 6 which he had managed to 
have the Cabinet accept forthwith despite the strongest opposition 
pressure from Washington. 7 

He himself was well aware that the French Government and public 
opinion in France still left much to be desired. He pleaded however 
to place the necessary confidence in Darlan and the ministers ap- 
pointed by him to the Cabinet that they would accomplish the re- 
orientation of French policies and of the French public in favor of 
integrating France into a Europe led by Germany. 

At the end of the week in a Cabinet meeting at Vichy he wished 
again to press for immediate execution of German supply movements 
through Bizerte and, following that, he would ask Darlan to bring to 
Paris any resolution of the French Government to this effect. 8 His 
intervention at Vichy would be made much easier if Darlan were 
given the hope that he would be able to raise political questions, once 
the military measures had been undertaken. 

I told Benoist-Mechin that I lacked instructions on this subject and 
was therefore not in position to make any statement thereon. 

Abetz 

* See document No. 146. 

T On United States pressure on France, see Foreign Relations of the United- 
States, 1941, vol. v, pp. 212, 218, 243-244, 246-247. 

8 In telegram No. 2335 of Aug. 6 (386/211300-04) Schleier transmitted the text 
of a French note of Aug. 4 which was handed to him by Benoist-Mechin. Among 
other matters it listed three conditions which would have to be fulfilled before 
Bizerte could be utilized for supply shipments. The text of the French note 
ha's been printed in La DMgation francaise auprte de la Commission allemande 
d'Armistice, vol. v, pp. 53-56. 



234 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

No. 163 

927/297338-39 

The Charge d' 'Affaires m the United /States to the Foreign Ministry 

Telegram 

top secret "Washington, July 30, 1941 — 5: 28 p. m. 

No. 2475 of July 29 Received July 31—5 : 10 a, m. 

Inf. 648 g. 

With reference to my telegram No. 1686 of June 6. 1 

In recent months the mass dispatch of postcards has proved to be 
particularly effective as a propaganda action which can be carried out 
very quickly and suddenly and which is to be directed at as large a 
group of persons as possible who do not have much intellectual 
training. Therefore through the agency of the [Embassy] press 
officer the mailing of about a dozen cards, each in 100,000 — in words a 
hundred thousand — to a million copies has been organized and fi- 
nanced. They contained sarcastic attacks on Roosevelt and the war- 
mongering members of his Cabinet, reminders of his campaign 
promise to keep America out of war, a reference to the American 
blood sacrifices in the World War, an appeal to American mothers, 
and they asked recipients to write or telegraph in this sense to their 
representatives in Congress and the White House. As all of the 
postcards had the letterhead of the American Congress or of the 
members of Congress concerned and contained mainly material which 
was taken from purely American sources and also appeared in one 
form or other in the official "Congressional Record'''', our hand was 
not in any way recognizable. Alarmed by the success of this cam- 
paign of postcards, the interventionist press is already starting to at- 
tack their being sent through Congress, but so far without success. 

There follows a detailed telegram No. 24 (group garbled) of July 29 
regarding the preparation and effectiveness of these postcards. 2 This 
telegram and the pertinent papers have been destroyed. 

Thomsen 



'This telegram (593/245372-74) was a report on the propaganda activities 
carried on by the Embassy. 

"This presumably refers to telegram No. 2476 of July 29, sent July 31 (1527/- 
373773-74) which lists seven members of the House of Representatives and one 
Senator under whose names such cards were sent. Thomsen particularly 
emphasized the "telling effect" of the card sent out In a million copies by Senator 
Burton K. Wheeler and the great controversy between Wheeler and Secretary of 
War Stimson which had resulted from it. 



JULY 1941 235 

No. 164 

S589/E602987-91 

Filkrer's Directive 
chefsachb Fuhrer's Headquarters, July 30, 1941, 

TOP SECRET MILITARY 

The Fiihrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht 
OgW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 441298/41 g.K. Chefs. 
Byofficer only 

Directive No. 34 

The development of the situation in the last few days, the appear- 
ance of strong enemy forces before the front and in the flanks of Army 
Group Center, the supply situation, and the necessity to give the 
2nd and 3rd Armored Groups about 10 days of time to rehabilitate 
their formations, compel for the moment the postponement of the more 
distant missions and targets assigned in Directive 33 of July 19 * and 
its supplement of July 2S. 2 

I order therefore : 

I. (1) In the northern sector of the eastern front the attack with 
the main effort between Lake Ilmen and Narva is to be continued in the 
direction of Leningrad with the objective of encircling Leningrad and 
establishing contact with the Finnish Army. 

This offensive is to 'be screened off north of Lake Ilmen in the Volk- 
hov sector, and south of Lake Ilmen to be pressed to the northeast only 
as far as securing the right flank of the advance north of Lake Ilmen 
demands. Previously the situation around Velikie Luki is to be 
cleaned up. All forces not required for this mission are to be added 
to the assault wing to the north of Lake Ilmen. The contemplated 
thrust of the 3rd Armored Group upon the Valdai Hills will not take 
place until the armored formations are again fully ready for action. 
Instead, however, the left wing of Army Group Center must be pushed 
ahead to the northeast as far as the flank protection of the right wing 
of Army Group North demands it. 

Estonia is first to be cleared with all the forces of the Eighteenth 
Army ; only then can divisions be brought through in the direction of 
Leningrad. 

(2) Army Group Center, with the utilization of favorable terrain 
sectors, will shift over to the defensive. 

In so far as it is necessary to gain favorable jump-off positions for 
the later assault operations against the Twenty-first Soviet Army, 
some attacks with limited objectives may still be carried out. 

1 See document No. 128. 

'Not printed (8589/E602975-77). 



236 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

For the rest, the 2nd and 3rd Armored Groups are to be withdrawn 
from the front as soon as the situation permits, and be speedily 
rehabilitated. 

(3) On the southeastern front the operations, for the time being, 
will be continued with forces of Army Group South alone. 

Their objective must be the destruction of the strong enemy forces 
west of the Dnieper and for the rest, by gaining bridgeheads near 
Kiev and to the south, the creation of suitable conditions for later 
pulling the 1st Pansergrenadier Division across to the eastern bank of 
the Dnieper. 

The Fifth Red Army, fighting in the swamp area northwest of 
Kiev, must be forced to give battle west of the Dnieper and be 
destroyed. The danger that it might break through to the north 
across the Pripet must be forestalled in good time. 

(4) Finnish Front ; 

The attack in the direction of Kandalaksha is to be called off. 
With the Mountain Corps the threats to the flank from Motovskiy Bay 
are to be eliminated and only those forces left to XXXVI Corps 
Headquarters that are necessary for defense and for the feigning of 
further assault preparations. 

The cutting of the Murmansk railway is now to be attempted in the 
sector of the III (Finnish) Corps, especially in direction Loukhi; all 
the forces suitable for this attack are to be transferred there, with 
any surplus units to be turned over to the Karelian Army. If, be- 
cause of the terrain difficulties, the attack should come to a halt with 
the III (Finnish) Corps, too, the German forces are to be withdrawn 
and added to the Karelian Army. This applies particularly to mobile 
units, tanks, and heavy artillery. 

The 6th Mountain Division is to be moved to the Mountain Corps, 
with the utilization of all available transport routes. Whether the 
rail route through Sweden to Narvik can also be used will be clarified 
by the Foreign Ministry. 3 

II. Luftwaffe 

(1) Northeastern Front: 

The Luftwaffe will shift the main effort of the conduct of the air 
combat to the northeastern front, by bringing the bulk of the VIII 
Air Corps into the First Air Force. The reinforcements are to be 
brought in early enough for their utilization at the beginning of 
the main point of the attack by Army Group North (early on 
August 6). 

(2) Center: 

It will be the mission of the Luftwaffe units remaining with Army 
Group Center to provide the absolutely necessary fighter protection 

* See documents Nos. 172 and 176. 



JULY 1941 237 

before the front of the Second and Ninth Armies and possibly to 
support local attacks. The attacks on Moscow are to be continued. 

(3) Southeastern Front; 

Missions as before. No reduction of the Luftwaffe units employed 
with Army Group South is contemplated. 
. (4) Finland: 

The principal mission of the Fifth Air Force is the support of the 
^fountain Corps. In addition, the attack of the III Finnish Army 
Corps is to be supported at some promising sector. 

The requisite preparations are to be made for the possibly necessary 
dispatch of forces in support of the Karelian Army.* 

Adolf Hitler 



1 The supplement of Aug. 12 (8589/EG03003-006) . 

No. 165 

70/50828-81 

Memorandum hy Minister Bahn 

Westfalen, July 30, 1941. 

Report on the German Mission in Syria From Mat 9 to 
July 11, 1941 

I. Mission. 

On May 6, 1941, at 10 p. m., Ambassador Abetz in Paris transmitted 
to me the order of the Foreign Minister, in line with the general 
agreement reached with the French Government, to fly to Syria and 
there to prepare for the purchase of French arms for the equipment of 
the Iraq Army. 1 Ambassador Abetz informed me that, in the opinion 
of the French, the Levant, of all of France's overseas possessions, was 
most strongly infected by de Gaullism and that High Commissioner 
General Dentz himself was known as an Anglophile. It was, there- 
fore, necessary above all, to overcome the psychological resistance on 
the spot, to get the consent of the Italian Control Commission in Syria 
to the release of the stores of arms, to ascertain the most suitable 
transportation route to Iraq, and to prevent a sabotaging of the ship- 
ments by de Gaullist elements. I received written authorization from 
Ambassador Abetz in the name of the Foreign Minister, and from 
General Vogl in the name of the Armistice Commission. Admiral 
Darlan sent along a representative, M. Guerard, provided with appro- 
priate powers, to accompany me and to establish the contact with 
General Dentz and the French General Staff in Syria. He indeed 
gave me untiring and very skilfull assistance in all conversations. 
Herr Eitel Friedrich Mollhausen, of the Paris Embassy, accompanied 

1 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 476 and footnote 3. 



238 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

me as secretary; the Foreign Ministry placed at my disposal the radio 
operator, Weller. Both gave an excellent account of themselves, as 
did Consular Secretary Hornberger and radio operator Hontsch, who 
were later assigned to me. 

II. Journey. 

On May 7 we flew to Berlin in order to pick up the radio operator 
and some spare parts. On May 8, in the morning, we flew to Athens. 
There I learned late in the evening that Minister Grobba was on the 
way to Iraq * with two bombers and had already landed in Rhodes. 
Through the wireless connection of Field Marshal von Reichenau, 3 it 
was possible to reach Minister Grobba around 4 : 00 o'clock in the 
morning, and to get him to await my arrival in Rhodes. On the 
morning of May 9, I met Grobba and invited him to fly with me in 
my plane to Aleppo and also to have his two bombers land there. I 
assumed — and this was confirmed in the further course of events — 
that the arrival of two representatives of the Reich and a special 
courier of Marshal Petain's at a Syrian airport would deter the some- 
what de Gaullist-minded French officers from making difficulties for 
the German officers and their planes in continuing their flight. But 
this also established a precedent for the arrival of additional German 
bombers. When the three planes made a surprise landing in Aleppo 
late in the afternoon of May 9, the French officers after a short discus- 
sion, took in fact an entirely correct attitude; they made ground 
organization and a guard detail available and invited the German 
officers to dinner in the officers' mess. There over the door hung a 
sign bearing the ambiguous text: "Vivent les Gaulles nos ancetres" 
[Long live the Gauls, our ancestors] . 

A threatening little incident, which was fortunately, however, 
hardly noticed by the French, was averted through the intervention of 
Grobba and me. The French had assigned a lieutenant to the Ger- 
man officers as a liaison officer. The French designation "sous- 
lieutenant" was translated by the German officers as "Sergeant" 
[Unteroffisier] and this apparent faux pas was commented upon 
with loud and vehement protests. The German officers, moreover, 
wanted to inspect the city and the citadel of Aleppo, with its French 
military garrison, in full uniform. This, in view of the sensationalism 
characteristic of Arab countries, would at once have become known 
throughout Syria and prematurely drawn the attention of the French, 
Syrians, and English to our further plans. The rather sharp dis- 
cussion which arose in this connection may have been the first cause 
of certain misunderstandings with which Minister Grobba later on 
had to contend in his cooperation with the German military authorities 
in Iraq. 

' See vol. xii of this series, document No. 435. 
' Commanding General of the Sixth Army. 



JULY 1941 239 

Through orientation on the spot and after talks with Lieutenant 
Commander Voissard, a confidential agent of Darlan's who had mean- 
while arrived in Aleppo, and with the Iraq Consul in Aleppo, I 
realized that the only reliable and quick route to be considered for the 
transportation of arms to Iraq was the Baghdad Railway, but that 
it^ could only be used if the arms were expedited so quickly and un- 
obtrusively that neither the Turks nor the English would have time 
to©repare a sabotage operation. 

III. First Meeting with High Commissioner General Dents. 
Since our He. Ill was unable to land at the small airport near 
Beirut, I flew with Guerard on May 10 in a special French plane to 
Beirut, where General Dentz had come to meet us from his summer 
seat in Damascus. The High Commissioner received me courteously 
but with extreme coolness. Right after the first sentences he stated 
that the mission of Minister von Hentig * had at the time touched off 
a series of disorders, demonstrations, strikes and small revolts, which 
up to now he had not been able to put down completely, and which 
had taken a toll of over 100 lives. I replied that I had not been sent 
to pursue an Arab policy and that I would concern myself with Arab 
questions only in closest agreement with him. It was my task to prove 
that German-French collaboration, for which the Fiihrer had estab- 
lished the principle of "do ut des", was no ideological game, but led 
to tangible results. From this point of view we regarded the Iraq 
question as the touchstone of French good will, and here he [Dentz] 
could win a battle for France. Since I had to conclude from his replies 
that he was by no means informed about the new status of German- 
French relations, I spent about 1 hour in telling him about the policy 
which had led to the meeting of the Fiihrer with Marshal Petain at 
Montoire, 5 and after various reverses, to the new rapprochement 
between the Reich Government and Darlan's Cabinet. In the end 
Dentz stated that he was prepared to give loyal support to the policy 
of Darlan and, together with his General Staff, to consider at once 
what quantities of arms could, without jeopardizing their own fight- 
ing strength, be released for deliveries to Iraq. He had to point out, 
however, that the Army of the Levant was exposed to strong Anglo-de 
Gaullist propaganda, and that, in the event of a British attack on 
Syria, he could not vouch for its reliability. He therefore asked me 
for the time being to see to it that no German officers came to Beirut, 
and that I myself appear camouflaged under a French name. He mis- 
understood my suggestion that I would choose for this purpose the 
name "Robert Renoir," and wrote on the identification card intended 
for me: "R obert Renouard". In reply to his question whether this 

•For the background of Hentig's trip to Syria in January 1941 see vol xi of 
this series, document No. 626. 
1 See vol. xi of this series, document No. 227. 



240 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

was written correctly, I replied that I was glad to get this name from, 
him, "because there were so many things to put together again 
(renouer) between our two peoples." 6 This spontaneous reply seemed 
to please him. From that moment on until the day of the Armistice 
he met me with decided personal cordiality. 

We arranged a second meeting for the afternoon, and I took it 
upon myself to get the head of the Italian Control Commission, 
General de Giorgis, to release the arms that were impounded and — as 
a precaution — to deploy and disperse the planes that were tightly 
packed in the sheds among the various airports. General de Giorgis 
seemed at first not to be greatly edified by the appearance of a German 
delegation. It was possible, however, after a short time to create a 
close, even cordial and comradely relationship with de Giorgis and the 
gentlemen of the Italian Control Commission, due primarily to M611- 
hausen's social grace and his excellent command of Italian. During 
the entire time there was not a single difference of opinion between 
us and the Italians. General de Giorgis and his chief aide, Lieutenant 
Colonel Invrea, performed their duty objectively and dauntlessly. 
Most of the other men, above all, the great throng of civilian officials, 
including primarily Consul General Sbrana, who is equally unpopular 
with the French and Arabs, showed a striking lack of courage and 
were greatly shaken at every atrocity report. 

On the afternoon of May 10, General Dentz submitted to me a list 
of arms for Iraq, drafted by his General Staff, which, however, was at 
first entirely inadequate. When I pointed out that half measures 
were more harmful than helpful, he approved a substantial extension 
of the list, so that the following items were finally scheduled for the 
first shipment : 15,500 guns and 200 machine guns with 900 belts of 
ammunition and B million rounds and four 7.5 field guns with 10,000 
rounds. Everything with the proper equipment, accessories, spare 
parts, etc. This transport, like the ones that followed, was so as- 
sembled that each individual shipment was a unit in itself and was 
entirely usable in the event of the loss of another shipment. 

When General Dentz stated that, according to the information of 
his General Staff, a period of 11 days was needed for the assembling 
and shipment of the arms, I replied to him: "General, permit me to 
make a remark : our armies won their battles through their speed. I 
intend to do the same. You will not let yourself be put to shame 
by a civilian. Eleven days — that is impossible ; the English will know 
about it long before the time expires, they will accuse you of com- 
plicity, bomb the transports, or prepare acts of sabotage. I can give 
your General Staff not 11 days, but 10 hours." Whereupon Dentz 
said : "Would you like to tell an old General Staff officer how this is 

' In the original, the passage within quotation marts ia given in French as 
well as in German. 



JULY 1941 241 

to be done technically ?" And, in response to my question, "may I ?" 
he said "Please dictate." He then wrote down my suggestions: per- 
sonal commitment of a reliable General Staff officer, the placing in 
readiness of all available trucks of the Army, the commandeering of 
the troops closest to the depots for round-the-clock loading, truck move- 
ments radiating to the nearest railroad station ; there, preparation of 
cars and locomotives, collection of the individual transports and assem- 
bling of the final transport train in Aleppo. After a brief scrutiny 
of-the proposals, General Dentz picked up the telephone, saying, "in 
order to give you pleasure," and transmitted the orders literally to the 
General Staff. Ten minutes later the General Staff officer in charge 
of the organization was, in my presence, put on his honor as an officer. 
Seventeen hours later two transport trains with a total of 27 fully- 
loaded cars were assembled in Aleppo. 

When I was informed that the Turkish Government requested ad- 
vance notice of 5 days for each transport through Turkish territory, 
I suggested to the High Commissioner that the Turks be informed 
through his railroad commissioner that he feared the thinly garrisoned 
Syrian-Iraq frontier would be imperiled by Iraq troops who might 
stream back and he therefore requested immediate permission for the 
transit of 200 men, together with material, for the purpose of strength- 
ening the protection of the border. General Dentz agreed to this 
also. Permission was received from the Turks a few hours later. 
The Turks, to be sure, later protested against this deception, but did 
not interfere with the transports that followed. 

In discussing the possible consequences of our transports and a 
possible English attack on Syria, I asked General Dentz about the 
supply situation of the Army and the civilian population. The 
General replied that there were, to be sure, abundant supplies in the 
country. But, as a result of famine propaganda which had noticeably 
increased recently the supplies had disappeared from the market and 
obviously had been bought up and concealed by speculators. Official 
food supplies were practically not available. Depending on the kind 
of commodity, there was enough for two to eight days. I suggested 
that, under the name of Kenouard, I be given unrestricted permission 
for the importation of food from Iraq. We would then on a certain 
key date, throw the goods on the central markets of Beirut, Damascus 
and Aleppo at low prices and through clever allusions in the press to 
additional shipments from Iraq, intimidate the speculators and get 
them to unload their stocks. As soon as the downward movement 
got under way, I suggested that he buy up as large supplies as possible 
in order to assure supplies for the Army and to be able to step in and 
regulate prices on the free market. The High Commissioner was glad 
to accept the offer. (After the imports came through successfully, 

682-905—84 21 



242 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

the prices of the most important commodities fell : grain, sugar, rice, 
and edible fat prices 30 to 50% in a few days. When the armistice 
was signed, the Mandate Government still had supplies sufficient for 
15 to 20 days.) 

On the evening of May 10, I followed General Dentz to Damascus 
and also had my staff follow me from Aleppo. 

IV. Damascus. 

Shortly after my arrival in Damascus, the first German bombers 
arrived there under the command of Major von Blomberg. I asked 
him if possible not to route further planes via Damascus, which was 
too near to the British air bases and also offered the British espionage 
service a convenient field for activity, but via Palmyra, whose large 
airport lay at some distance from the city, completely isolated in the 
desert. There, too, there was less danger of incidents. Furthermore, 
he should also give orders that the German planes stop for only a 
very short time at Syrian airports and do as little refueling as possible 
in order to share the scanty and irreplacable French supply (totaling 
about 4500 tons) . I wired several times to this effect to Berlin. 7 The 
death of Major von Blomberg e and the obvious difficulties in the trans- 
mission of orders to, and communications with the planes intended for 
the operation in Iraq prevented the execution of these suggestions. 
The loss of a number of German bombers would otherwise have been 
avoided and I would have been spared numerous vexatious arguments 
with the French General Staff and the Commandant of the airfield. 
Again and again German planes came to Damascus; again and again 
the pilots made excessive demands for gasoline ; again and again they 
asked for permission for an extended stay in order to await further 
flying orders. The conduct of the German soldiers was, in general, 
excellent. Only the pilots of some transport planes were an exception 
to this and compelled me to intervene and occasionally to act as a 
mediator with the French Commandant. I then arranged in great 
haste for gasoline to be supplied from Damascus and Palmyra; ob- 
tained food supplies, beverages, also articles of equipment that were 
needed for the German fliers, and had quarters and beds pre- 
pared for them. This took, all told, May 11 and the morning of 
May 12, On the morning of May 11, after another conversation with 
High Commissioner Dentz. I reported to Berlin that the latter was 
skeptical about the prospects for Iraq. If Germany wanted to make 
more than a heroic gesture, supplies had to be assured through Turkey 
or through the occupation of Cyprus. At the same time I asked that 
Turkey's consent be obtained for one through train per week, in order 
to assure supplies in the event of danger of an English attack. 



1 An unnumbered telegram by Rahu of May 12 (TO/50270) deals with this 
matter. 
* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 528. 



JULY 1941 243 

On May 12, after the appearance of a British reconnaissance plane 
oyer the airfield of Damascus the High Commissioner placed the en- 
tire country; in a state of defense and concentrated troops on the 
Palestinian border. 

V. First Arms Transports. 

The arms trains meanwhile rolled through Turkish territory. On 
the afternoon of May 12, 1 flew with a small French special plane to 
Ka^nichlie on the northeastern border of Syria, in order to arrive 
simultaneously with the transports at the frontier station of Tel Kot- 
chek, to take over the trains and take them to Mosul. Captain Cornet, 
the aide to the High Commissioner, escorted me. Since the plane had 
heavy sandstorms to contend with on the way, we ran out of gasoline, 
and were forced to land near Hassetche with our last drop of fuel. 

The five officers of this little desert garrison received us hospitably 
and promised to place a car at our disposal for the trip to Tel Kotchek. 
Since I was appearing in the guise of a French merchant from Paris, 
I had to endure 2 distressing hours of a lively question-and-answer 
game at dinner. I used the 5-hour trip through the desert at night, 
disturbed only once by the stone- throwing of anti-French Bedouins, 
to rouse Captain Cornet from his decidedly cool reserve and win him 
over to the common game. Subsequently, he rendered us valuable 
services. At 2 : 00 o'clock in the morning of May 13j we arrived in 
Tel Kotchek only to find that, despite my telegraphic requests, nothing 
was prepared. Obviously the telegrams had not arrived. The Iraq 
station master, whom I had aroused from his bed, had received no in- 
structions. The Iraq locomotive requested was not on hand, nor 
was the Iraq guard, and there was not a trace of Grobba himself, whom 
I had asked to meet us at Tel Kotchek. After much talking I finally 
learned that a few hundred meters beyond the border there was an 
Iraq police station, from which, if necessary, Mosul could be reached 
by telephone. The Iraq station master, who claimed that the border 
police fired at nocturnal visitors, and who called upon the French offi- 
cer to corroborate this, had to accompany me there despite his great 
reluctance. We drove up to the station with flash signals and violent 
honking and by means of promises and threats, got the police ser- 
geant on duty to connect us by telephone with the Iraq general in 
Mosul. A quarter of an hour later Minister Grobba was on the phone ; 
he promised to send at once a locomotive and some guards as far as 
the second station on the Iraq side and to come by automobile himself 
to meet me. He was also going to see to it that eounterdeliveries of the 
provisions that were most important for Syria were made ready at 
once. The first trainload of arms arrived in Tel Kotchek around 6 : 00 
o'clock in the morning, the second toward 8 : 00. With the help of 
the Iraq station master, we were able for a small fee to get a Turkish 
locomotive engineer to attach his locomotive to the cars which had 



244 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

meanwhile been coupled together to make a long train, I got into 
the locomotive and around 10 : 00 a. m. rode across the Iraq frontier. 
In Tel Kotchek I heard rumors to the effect that the English already 
knew about the arms transport and had gotten a friendly Bedouin 
tribe to attack the train at a distance of about an hour and a half from 
Tel Kotchek on the other side, when it was on a curve of almost 90 
degrees, and therefore going very slowly. At the spot indicated a 
troop of Bedouins actually did rush toward the train with rifles swing- 
ing, garments a-flutter, and with loud cries. It was entirely super- 
fluous, for me, however, to unlock my powerful 6.3-mm. pistol and thus 
get the poor engineer to drive faster. They meant no harm, they were 
simply giving us a little ovation with greetings and handclapping and, 
with beaming faces, pointed to the guns that were loaded in open cars. 

Shortly afterward the meeting point agreed upon came into view. 
The Iraq escort personnel were already waiting with a locomotive, 
and a cloud of dust on the highway of the steppes announced the ar- 
rival of Grobba. When the train left the station again, an English 
plane dropped a bomb, which, however, landed in the sand, about 500 
meters from the tracks. On May 13, at i : 00 o'clock in the afternoon 
the transport arrived unmolested in Mosul — about 75 hours after my 
first talk with General Dentz. 

VI. Additional Arms Transports. 

After the food deliveries had been assured and had begun with 
the energetic assistance of Minister Grobba, I flew on May 14 via 
Palmyra back to Damascus. My observations in Mosul had given me 
the somewhat depressing impression of doubt in the efficacy of German 
aid. All sorts of things were lacking : there were no bombs, no spare 
parts, no gasoline — above all, however, so it seemed to me, no firm 
and purposeful leadership. At the same time, the young fliers them- 
selves made the best possible impression. I thought, therefore, that 
through increased arms deliveries, I should so strengthen the striking 
power of the Iraq Army that sufficient time would be won for the or- 
ganization of German supplies. Since it was to be expected, moreover, 
that by that time the Turkish Government, despite its commitments to 
England, would have to approve the transit of German and French 
supplies, I tried to make all necessary preparations for the provision- 
ing of any German motorized units that might arrive. For this reason 
I had urgently requested in Mosul the reopening of the pipeline to 
Tripoli. 

In Damascus I found a mood of great nervousness. At almost the 
same time as we flew over Palmyra, two English Blenheims had at- 
tacked the airport. The Gaullist General Catroux had had leaflets 
dropped on Damascus calling upon the French to rise in revolt. On 
May 15 the airports of Rayak and Palmyra were attacked, and two 
German planes and one French plane were hit in Palmyra. Among 



JULY 1941 245 

the French, only General Dentz himself was entirely calm and almost 
serene in his composure. He congratulated me on the "sportsmanlike 
achievement" of the first arms transport and discussed further deliv- 
eries. We agreed to stagger the trains so that the third should arrive 
in Mosul on May 26, the fourth on May 28, the fifth on June 3, the 
sixth on June 10. There were still available three 15.5 batteries, 354 
machine guns, each with adequate ammunition and all spare parts, 
lGlJjlOO hand grenades, 60 heavy trucks, 20 command cars, 400 binoc- 
ulars, 30 km. of cable ; also optical instruments, telephone apparatus, 
etc. 

The third and fourth trains, in charge of Mollhausen, crossed the 
Iraq border shortly before the English succeeded in blowing up a 
bridge in the northeast corner of Syria, near Kubur el Bid not far 
from Kamichlie. Dispatching of the two last trains was delayed on 
account of repair work which required 5 days — fortunately, because 
in the meantime the collapse of Iraq's resistance had become evident. 

My desperate efforts to bring back to Syria the war material that 
was still stored in Mosul failed. Mollhausen deserves credit for 
getting two trainloads of grain off to Syria through forceful action 
before the English had time to close the border on the very day that 
the German fliers left Mosul precipitately because of a false report. 

VII. War Preparations in Syria. 

At first we all were convinced that the English would not dare 
to attack Syria openly. It was clear that they hoped, through de 
Gaullist intrigues, to win the Army of the Levant and thus conquer the 
country by subversion. And this hope was not unjustified according 
to the information that they were able to get concerning the Army 
of the Levant in the preceding months. But they had not reckoned 
with the attraction of the idea of German-French collaboration for the 
French. We had soon realized that every Frenchman in Syria, every 
officer, and every official could be won over to it if he only retained the 
illusion that he could thereby help his country. While they them- 
selves were slow and hesitant in making their decisions, they expected 
of us rapid and soldierly action and absolute good faith when our 
word was pledged ; however, they were then ungrudging in rendering 
of their reciprocal service and stuck it out. I was therefore on my 
guard against making a promise that I could not fulfill at once. 
This won their confidence and finally they let me participate in their 
most intimate political and economic, nay, even their military 
decisions. 

When it became clear from the more and more threatening 
demarches of the English and American Consuls General, from leaflets 
and bombs dropped on Syrian airfields, that the English meant busi- 
ness, we concentrated our entire strength on influencing the Army 
through propaganda, and on counteracting de Gaullist agitation. 



246 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Guerard, whom I met every night in the hotel between 12 : 00 and 
2 : 00 o'clock, worked with me in drafting speeches which General 
Dentz took, in part verbatim, and repeated before the officers' corps, 
the chamber of commerce, the French colony. The most reliable 
General Staff officers, who had also been influenced by us personally, 
drove to the military outposts, pledged their loyalty as soldiers and 
treated de Gaullism with contempt. Strong pressure was exerted on 
the press, which was influenced by American money; the radio was 
strengthened and reoriented. 

On May 16 1 followed the High Commissioner to Beirut, who within 
24 hours furnished an empty apartment for me with office furniture 
and had an antenna put up for my radio communication with Berlin ; 
he also placed at my disposal three automobiles of the office of the 
High Commissioner which, because of their distinctive appearance, 
had access every where. 

The attitude of the Army was still vacillating. Almost daily I 
received reports of heated arguments in officers' circles and an unfor- 
tunate remark of the High Commissioner's, in which he spoke of "emer- 
gency landings of German planes at Syrian airfields," already exposed 
him to the repeated reproach of insincerity. For this reason he 
received the announcement of the arrival of a 33-man German liaison 
staff under the command of Colonel yon Manteuffel with obvious 
displeasure. He urgently asked, for the sake of making his position 
less difficult with respect to the Army, to the French population, and 
to the English and American Missions, that we refrain from sending 
German officers to Beirut and that he be allowed to deal with German 
military authorities exclusively through me or, possibly, through the 
Italians. He expected, moreover, that the liaison staff would handle 
only questions of traffic between Germany and Iraq. 

On May 17, at the airport of Eayak, which had never been touched 
by our planes, the first Frenchman, an officer, was killed by an English 
aerial bomb. T at once requested that the English Consulates in Beirut, 
Damascus, and Aleppo be closed and the Consuls and their entire 
staffs expelled. This request was complied with upon confirmation by 
Vichy: Thus, English espionage activity was, in general, confined to 
the Americans, who were carefully watched. The request of the High 
Commissioner to have the American Consul General also recalled was 
not granted by Vichy. 

Our relations with the General Staff had, in the. meantime, been 
so strengthened that I was allowed to inspect the French plans of 
defense. In so doing I had to note with alarm that General Dentz 
wanted to take up a position near Kisane, due south of Damascus, and 
confine the defense to Lebanon and the coastline. If Germany was 
really thinking of intervening in Syria — and at this point I could not 
yet doubt that this was so— this decision to abandon Syria was fatal 



JULY 1941 



247 



to our plans and absolutely had to be changed. Guerard and a few 
officers of the General Staff took it upon themselves, at my urgent 
request, to convince the General of the need for a defense of Syria. 
I myself advised him to withdraw his troops which had been sta- 
tioned along the Turkish border to the south, since I thought I could 
guarantee that the Turks would not dare, despite their ardent desire 
for the possession of Aleppo, to enter Syria. At the request of the 
ffigh Commissioner, I had this view confirmed by the Foreign Min- 
isWy in Berlin » and by the German Embassy in Ankara, whereupon 
he withdrew almost his entire northern army, about half a division, 
and had it take up a position south and southeast of Damascus. He 
agreed, I regret to say, only hesitantly to the proposal that the troops 
be made more mobile through the requisitioning of all available ve- 
hicles for the desert war. To be sure, he admitted the correctness of 
Schlieffen's thesis as applied in this area that attack was not only the 
best defense, but the only form of defense, but when motorization 
was finally carried out, it was already too late. Nevertheless, Colonel 
Collet's desertion with 3000 Circassians, almost all of whom returned 
on the following night, offered the welcome excuse for pointing out 
that Collet, against whom I had already warned the High Commis- 
sioner, being the best expert on the Damascene area, was in possession 
of all the plans of defense and that these therefore had absolutely to 
be changed. This argument was convincing, and the General shifted 
the line of defense very much to the south, to the areas of El Kuneitra, 
Esra {I sra?} and Es Suweida, that is, close to the Trans Jordanian 
border. Meanwhile our days were filled with efforts for the improve- 
ment of the supply situation, for the strengthening of propaganda, 
and for combatting the activities of English agents, which the High 
Commissioner with incomprehensible indulgence permitted. It was 
not until a Polish agent was discovered in our house and two English 
reserve officers were seized with a trunk full of teller mines, allegedly 
intended for the German representatives in Beirut, that he decided to 
establish a concentration camp. Also, not until we suggested it were 
secret transmitters watched and put out of commission. Still in 
expectation of Turkish approval for transit, I saw to it that the 
dispersal landing fields in the Jezira district in the northeastern part 
of Syria, near the Baghdad Railway, destroyed after the German- 
French armistice, were rebuilt. 

Through the efforts of Guerard, I was able to establish close and 
lasting contact with Admiral Goutton, Commander in Chief of the 
Fleet and a friend of Admiral Darlan's, and with Air Force General 
Janneckeyn. Both discussed keenly and willingly the idea of Ger- 
man-French collaboration, and seemed greatly impressed with the 

Rintelen telegram No. 23 of May 18 ( 83/61268) . 



248 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

honorable treatment meted out to the defeated French Army by the 
German Command and the German soldiers. 

VIII. Representatives of the Weh/rmaoht in Syria. 

Relations between the representatives of the Foreign Ministry and 
the representatives of the Wehrmacht in Syria could not always be 
conducted without friction. I do not believe that this is to be at- 
tributed to lack of good will on the one side or the other, but prin- 
cipally to the difference in duties and in views. The representative 
of the Foreign Ministry regarded it as his duty : 

1) to bring unobtrusively to Iraq the largest possible quantity of 
French arms ; 

2) in doing this to spare French sensibilities and the French sense 
of honor ; in other words, to persuade, not to command ; 

3) if possible to deprive the English of an excuse for invading 
Syria, by their referring to German interim landings and German 
purchases of arms in Syria ; 

i) to aggravate, nevertheless, with all possible means the differences 
between the French and the English, in order thereby to frustrate and 
perhaps ultimately make impossible a rapprochement on the part of 
Vichy toward English policy. 

Thus, the reiterated demand: as few German officers as possible in 
Syrian or Lebanese cities; reserved behavior at the airfields ; no appeal 
to the rights of the victor. 

The German officers understandably felt themselves to be repre- 
sentatives of a victorious army. They considered it undignified not 
to appear in uniform. They considered their being concentrated in 
the barracks of the Syrian airfields a galling imprisonment. Major 
Hansen of the Department of "Foreign Armies" on the General Staff, 
who stopped for a few days in Beirut, understood and approved our 
attitude. I got valuable hints from his intelligent and calm judgment. 
Unfortunately my wish that he be sent to Beirut as Military Attache 
could not be granted. My relations with Colonel v. Manteuffel, the 
head of the liaison staff, who suffered noticeably from isolation at 
the Aleppo airfield, were difficult. He complained constantly about 
the unreliability and lack of discipline of his subordinates, suspected 
betrayal behind every French measure, and so flew in the face of 
Major de Russe, the especially obliging commandant of the airfield, 
that the latter went to Beirut, spoke of injury to his honor as an 
officer and asked that he be relieved. I had trouble in patching the 
matter up in the General Staff. Shortly after his arrival, Colonel 
von Manteuffel reported to Berlin that General Dentz was under 
increasing English influence. 10 He himself later termed this a mis- 
take. When, after two previous brain concussions, he finally suffered 

10 In telegram No. 67 of May 27 (83/61373) Kramarz requested Hahn's view 
toward this report by Manteuffel. In telegram No. 60 of May 28 (S3/61370-72) 
Rahn replied, expressing the same views as are here recorded. 



JULY 1941 249 

a third, one following an automobile accident, his behavior toward 
his subordinates, his aides and finally also toward me became so over- 
bearing and his statements so contradictory that it seemed to me he 
was in urgent need of a rest and I had to suggest that he be relieved. 
There were hardly any real and serious differences between us. I 
attribute the difficulties that he encountered exclusively to reasons 
ofhealth and climate. 

'%f a more serious nature was an incident with Colonel Junk, the 
leader of the Iraq venture, who called me on May 31 from Aleppo, 
to tell me that the joint German-French defense of Syria had been 
decided upon in Paris with Darlan and Huntziger. He asked at once 
for permission to come to Beirut in uniform in order to discuss the 
details. He intimated, moreover, at decided criticism of the camou- 
flaged activity in which I had engaged and declared that he now 
wanted to "put the cards on the table." I stated that I had no in- 
structions as yet from Berlin on this score, but I called on the High 
Commissioner at once in order to get his approval for Colonel Junk's 
trip to Beirut. The latter declined gruffly; he had no instructions 
from Vichy concerning German- French military collaboration in 
Syria. The announcement of such a collaboration and the arrival of 
a uniformed German officer in Beirut would mean immediate war 
with England, and in the present state of affairs could still lead to 
a revolt in the Army. He finally decided, in response to my request, 
to order Air Force General Janneckeyn from Damascus to Beirut 
and to send him with me by plane to Aleppo. General Felmy " had 
meanwhile arrived there, and it was soon evident from his explana- 
tions that the statements of Colonel Junk were based on a misunder- 
standing. The incident was thus patched up. 12 

A flawless collaboration based on comradeship characterized my 
relations with Captain Roser, the representative of the Abwehr in 
Beirut. Only once was my intervention necessary, when I learned 
that Captain Roser and Major Arnold, who had been sent to Beirut 
specifically for this purpose, had instructions to secretly distribute 
among insurgent Arabs— that is, without the knowledge of the 
French— a shipload of arms destined for Syria. Roser had already 
negotiated concerning this with two of the nationalist leaders, 
Chiikrii Kuatli [Shukri al Quwatli] and Emir Adel Arslan [Amir 

"Hellmuth Felmy, General of the Luftwaffe, head of the German military 
mission to Iraq. 

"In telegram No. 71 of May 31 (83/61402-04) Kami reported Junk's request 
as well as the French High Commissioner's reaction and requested instructions. 
Ribbentrop's Instructions transmitted in telegram No. 97 of May 31 from 
Fuschland dispatched to Rahn as No. 481 (83/61427) read as follows: 

"There are to be no attacks by German planes against the English from 
Syrian territory. They could be considered only if Syria, for her part, should 
be attacked by England and request German assistance. German officers must 
not appear in uniform in Beirut. Please transmit this instruction which was 
issued in accord with OKW to Colonel Junk also." 



250 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOKEIGN POLICY 

Adil Arscdan], who were regarded with mistrust by the French. 
Major Arnold notified me, moreover, of the imminent arrival of about 
20 members of the Abwehr in Beirut in order to carry out this opera- 
tion. It was clear in this connection that, without the knowledge of 
the French, the ship could not berth, trucks could not be bought for 
the transshipment, large quantities of the gasoline rationed throughout 
Syria could not be bought, drivers could not be hired, and, above all, 
the distribution of arms could not be organized in a country that was 
in a state of alert. Moreover, a distribution by the old rebel, Kuatli 
[Quwatli], would have been interpreted by the French as an attempt 
at preparation of an internal rebellion. Also, the dispatch of a 20- 
man military mission to Beirut was contrary to clear-cut German- 
French agreements. Only later was it apparent, to the astonishment 
of Major Arnold and the obvious annoyance of Quwatli, that the 
French had meanwhile been informed and asked to cooperate. A few 
days later Major Arnold went to Berlin to report and did not return 
to Beirut. In response to my urgent request, Major Meyer-Ricks 
was assigned to me on June 22, that is, unfortunately, not until the last 
phase of the Syrian war, "camouflaged as a military attache." I re- 
quested and obtained for him a liaison officer from the General Staff, 
and his zeal and circumspection in reporting eased substantially the 
burden of my work. 
IX. The "Arai Movement". 

After a brief stay in Syria, I found to my astonishment that there 
was, at all events, no Arab movement there. True nationalist senti- 
ment is unknown to the Syrian tribes, a wild, and for the most part, 
unlovely mixture of races and religions, spoiled by greed, intrigue, and 
jealousy, accustomed from olden times to bribery by rival powers. 
What Beirut wants, is opposed by Damascus. What Damascus ad- 
vocates, is considered treason in Aleppo, Horns, or Hama. Inde- 
pendence is the pretext for unbridled speculation— freedom, the shield 
for unrestrained exploitation of the workers by the ruling class. F.ven 
the best racial part, the Bedouins, have succumbed to the general cor- 
ruption and follow whichever power is the strongest, as the jackal 
follows the beast of prey. AH of them demand arms— in order to 
plunder the neighboring tribe; all demand money— in order to extort 
still greater sums from the enemy power. Undoubtedly the European 
powers, above all, the French Mandate Government, are mainly 
responsible for this, and undoubtedly, among the youth of Syria, too, 
forces are stirring that clamor for a cleanup and national concentra- 
tion. At any rate, I found nothing in Syria that would have been 
capable of militant action. At the moment of danger, they all failed, 
the swaggering leaders of the Arab freedom movement. In undis- 
guised anxiety, they asked for our assistance in fleeing abroad, if they 
had not already preferred "as a precaution" to make contact with the 



JULY 1941. 251 

English, There remained only a few groups of professional bandits, 
smugglers, and common thieves, of whom the few genuine rebels, such 
as Fauzi Kauktchi [Fawsi al-Qavruqchi] — he, too, half adventurer, 
half national hero — made use in their struggle. We tried to win these 
groups over to the fight against England and to cooperation with the 
French Army by assuring them that the French were not being paid 
their price in France itself at the expense of the Arabs for the defense 
orjthe Syrian area; that the declaration of the Reich Government 
concerning recognition of the Arab struggle for freedom 1S was con- 
sidered unalterable and that only the fighter would have anything to 
say in the future in the reorganization of the Arab countries. Not a 
few of these people could be won by such and similar statements. 
They fought partly in the ranks of the Army of the Levant, partly in 
groups of their own; some tried to injure the English by acts of 
sabotage, for which we supplied them with abundant suggestions. 
After long and laborious efforts, I had to give up working with the 
old, national groups. Finally it proved to be the most effective 
measure, also with respect to the Bedouins, to threaten them with the 
severest penalties in the future, for every act of plunder, every attack 
on neighboring tribes, every interference with the Army of the Levant, 
and every instance of active support of the English. Through 
messengers I made this known throughout all the tribes — without 
forbidding the acceptance of English money — and, as the French 
found, I was entirely successful. Also, the simple command, trans- 
mitted to the party leaders, to quell all disorders, had the effect that 
the Syrian and Lebanese populations remained entirely quiet during 
the entire campaign; yet I was able to read in the reports of the Office 
of the High Commissioner to the Vichy Government given me for 
perusal that, from December 1940 to April 1941, at intervals of a few 
days or weeks, the French had had to deal with an almost uninter- 
rupted series of petty revolts, strikes, and demonstrations. The au- 
thority of the German name was almost unlimited. It was possible 
to get anything from the population — only they did not want to fight. 

X. German Intervention in Syria. 

At the end of May the conduct of the Army of the Levant seemed 
so assured that its commitment in the event of an English attack 
could be counted on with a fair degree of certainty. So much the 
more necessary was it to strengthen its idea that an attack would not 
be directed against a threatening or already existing German occupa- 
tion of the country. First it itself had to fight; then the German 
intervention could be regarded as welcome assistance and the last 
internal resistance to a military collaboration could be overcome. In 
view of the fact that German preparations, which to our knowledge 

13 See vol. xi of this series, document No. 190 and footnote 4, and document No. 
596. 



252 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

were going on in Greece, were not yet concluded, it seemed in any case 
advisable to exploit any possibility of a delay in the English attack. 
On May 31, Guerard addressed the following telegram to Admiral 
Darlan : " 

"The collapse of Iraq may have the following consequences: 

1. Combined English attacks from the south and east; at the same 
time, in the east, endangerment of the indispensable granary of Jezira. 

2. Turkish reaction aiming for the protection of certain zones near 
Aleppo and along the railroad. 

3. Internal de Gaullist revolt, against which preventive measures 
have to be taken at once. 

4. German-French military collaboration, which should be studied 
under the following aspects : 

a) general policy, 

b) technical possibility of a large-scale operation of assistance 
which alone would be effective, 

c) moral reaction of the French troops (the latter question will 
depend on the effectiveness of German aid, the moment of German 
intervention, the reason given) . 

If there is no certainty of an effective defense of Syria, it is better 
to gain time by statements about our purely defensive intentions and 
to point out that an attack against Syria would start an Anglo-French 
war and shift German-French collaboration from the peaceful sphere 
to the military sphere." 

Thus, Guerard and his friends had themselves already come to 
accept the idea of a German-French military collaboration, and Gen- 
eral Dentz could certainly also be brought around to it — if Berlin de- 
sired it. Without knowledge of the pending German-Turkish discus- 
sions, 16 on which the decisive question of supplies depended, I could 
not be clear on this point. On June 5 and 6, 1 reported to the Foreign 
Ministry that, according to reliable French information, Turkey was 
pressing for an English occupation of Syria, since she was otherwise 
in danger of encirclement and could not permanently withstand Ger- 
man pressure for transit permission. 16 We were, to be sure, hoping 
very much for this and were not particularly edified at the German- 
Turkish Friendship Pact 17 which followed soon after, and whose 
background became comprehensible to us only upon the outbreak of 
the war with Russia. 

Despite all this, I secretly persisted in the conviction that a German 
intervention in Syria would come sooner or later, since, in the cir- 
cumstances, relief for Rommel's army seemed feasible only from 

" See vol. in of this series, document No. 581, footnote 2. 

11 On the German-Turkish discussions of May and June 1941, see vol. xn of this 
series. 

" Rahn telegrams No. 79 of June 5 (70/50373) and No. 81 of June 6 (70/50375). 
See vol. xn of this series, document No. 602, footnote 2. 

" For text, see vol. xn of this series, document No. 648. 



JULY 1941 253 

Syria. Also, I was convinced, after the outbreak of the German- 
Russian -war, that the English would attempt a thrust through Iran 
to the oil fields of Baku and that this could be prevented or, at any 
rate, seriously impeded, from Syria, if we wanted to avoid a break 
with Turkey. 

Meanwhile we tried with all the means of propaganda at our com- 
mand to strengthen the will of the French to fight. Through Min- 
ister Grobba I got in touch with the Arab outlaw, Fawzi al-Qawuqchi. 
As-he had been sentenced to death in Syria, I obtained a pardon for 
him and advised the High Commissioner to establish contact with him 
through a liaison officer. The latter reported upon his return that 
he had come in the nick of time, just as Fawzi wanted to come to terms 
with the English because of the impossibility of an escape on Syrian 
territory. When he heard from us and of the revocation of his 
death sentence by the French, he placed himself with his entire group 
at the disposal of the French for the common fight against the 
British. 

XI. The English Attach. 

Early in the morning of June 8, Anglo- Australian troops attacked 
Syria south of Damascus, near Dera and at other points. The de 
Gaullist units held back. From the leaflets circulated by them and 
the English, it seemed that they had expected to be received with 
open arms by the Army and population in Syria. According to the 
testimony of prisoners, the English expected to be able to occupy 
the country in a few days. Instead of this they encountered a foe 
who was fighting more doggedly every day and was causing them 
heavy losses of men and material. 

I made regular daily reports concerning the various phases of the 
battle and [so did] Major Meyer-Ricks after the arrival of the Mili- 
tary Attache Staff. The British troops, English, Australians, New 
Zealanders, Hindu regiments, and native troops, numerically far 
superior to the Army of the Levant, and equipped with an over- 
whelming amount of material, especially of motorized arms, fought 
badly. The English command was obviously inferior to the French. 
It is incomprehensible that the English should have attacked for 
weeks on the difficult southwestern front and with their superiority 
in motorized forces should not at once have pushed an attack from 
an easterly and southeasterly direction on Palmyra-Homs-Tripoli 
and on Aleppo. The French would have been able to oppose such 
an attack with only a small force. 

It is indicative of the fighting strength of the British troops that 
a handful of Frencli Legionnaires, some 130 to 150 men, succeeded, 
in the final attack on Palmyra, in stopping at least 3500 troops of the 
well-known Major Glubb, 18 equipped with 800 armored cars, machine- 

"John Bagehot Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion of Transjordan. 



254 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

gun carriers, and trucks in repelling them, and, in repeated counter- 
attacks, inflicting severe losses on them. 

Gn the other hand, according to all expert opinion, the French 
fought too much in the classical French manner; slow in their deci- 
sions, inelastic, too intent on security. Also, their fighting spirit was 
strongly affected by emotional elements. It was necessary to call 
on the officers of the General Staff two, three, four times a day, to 
cheer them up, and inflame them by an appeal to their French mili- 
tary spirit and constant reminders of Dakar and Mers-el-Kebir. On 
the day that the war broke out, General Dentz told me — and this 
was the only bitter word that I heard from him : "Now the Near East is 
aflame, and it is you who have set it ablaze." When, on the other 
hand, I asked him, with reference to the reports published concern- 
ing the negotiations in Paris ; 19 "Are not the French northern prov- 
inces worth more than ten Syrias?" he replied merely: "You know, 
indeed, that I shall fight — and to the last man." 

In the afternoon of May [June] 8, with the aid of Captain Roser, 
I organized the departure of the German colony, and this went off 
smoothly. The commitment of strong British naval units on the 
Lebanese coast, which pounded the French positions meter by meter 
with a tremendous outlay of material, in a few days resulted in the 
loss of more than 3000 men. As was expected, General Dentz asked 
for help by the Luftwaffe. I seconded this request most strongly 
in my radio messages, since it seemed to me to be the beginning of a 
logical chain : First the French would ask for German help against 
the fleet, then against the motorized English troops; finally they 
would gladly reconcile themselves to a commitment of German ground 
forces. Not knowing German intentions, I naturally did not express 
these thoughts or make promises of any kind. 

The attack of two German Stuka formations was enough to scatter 
the British fleet and force it to observe the utmost caution. While 
at the beginning it patrolled back and forth in a leisurely way in 
close proximity to the coast, and — as Dentz put it — chased the defense- 
less French coastal positions "for breakfast, as it were," it later 
returned only at long intervals, for rapid and ineffective bombard- 
ments. The spirited attack of the two small French destroyers on 
the far superior British naval force, which led to the loss of an 
English torpedo boat, played its part in admonishing the British 
to observe caution. An English counteraction, which continued at 
night right into the Bay of Beirut directly before our eyes, and 
presented a splendid picture, was unsuccessful and was not repeated. 

On June 10th it was reported that Fawzi al-Qawuqchi, following 
our suggestion, had attacked the pipeline station H-l on Iraq territory, 

° See vol. xii of this series, document No. 559. 



JULY 1941 255 

and, for lack of dynamite, had dismantled the pumps. H-2 had also 
been set afire by Bedouins friendly to us and had burnt out completely. 
At the same time 12,000 hectolitres of fuel oil had been destroyed. 
An aerial photograph which I had made, however, made it appear 
questionable whether destruction had occurred on such a large scale. 
Unfortunately, my intention to destroy the important H-2 station 
with two German detonation experts hastily summoned from Aleppo, 
w»s frustrated at the last moment by the arrival of heavily motorized 
English forces. 

As the English were able, by lavish use of men and material, in 
just a few days to push the attack on Damascus to the French main 
line of defense near Onissus, due south of Damascus, it was possible, 
through our friends on the General Staff, to induce the General to 
launch a counterattack. The plan was to launch a double drive south- 
west, in the direction of El Kuneitra and southeast of Jebel ed Druz, 
on Izra, establish communications between the two groups, thereby 
cut the English off from their southern line of communications and 
then cut them up. At first the operation proceeded according to plan. 
It brought in valuable booty and, in the course of a few days, over 
500 prisoners. Then there was a setback, due in part to the inadequate 
reserves of the French, principally, however, to psychological causes. 
As early as June 11, Darlan's unsure and irresolute speech, 20 in which 
the hard anti-English tone expected of him was completely lacking, 
had had a discouraging effect on the General Staff and the troops in 
the field. On June 18 the State Secretary for Air, General Bergeret, 
arrived and reported to the High Commissioner and the officers of 
the General Staff that German-French conversations in Paris had 
bogged down completely. 21 Not a single one of the German promises 
concerning the restoration, of administrative unity with the northern 
provinces, concerning the reduction of occupation costs, etc., had as 
yet materialized. On that day, Dentz, who was visibly depressed, 
asked me: "Tell me, what are we fighting for here anyway?" I was 
able to calm him, and I believe I convinced him that the principal 
blame for the impasse reached in the negotiations lay with the French. 
Nevertheless, the fighting spirit of the General Staff was temporarily 
paralyzed. On June 21 Damascus fell without any apparent necessity, 
and the political director of the High Commissioner told me, — and 
this was his only comment on this report : "The fall of Damascus bears 
the name of Bergeret." In the night of June 22 to 23, the High 
Commissioner summoned me and told me that the situation was 
hopeless and that collapse was inevitable in 2 or 3 days, because some 
600 — in reality 800 — English armored cars, trucks, and tanks had 

M Apparently a reference to Darlan's radio address to the French people which 
dealt with Franco-German collaboration. 

21 See vol. xn of this series, documents Nos, 616 and 633. 



256 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

arrived, before Palmyra, and would very soon be threatening Homs, 
Tripoli, and Aleppo. Previously he had always had only requests to 
make of me; today he was giving me an order: to flee, for he had 
information that the English would shoot me at once if I fell into 
their hands. Then he added: "I have a further statement to make 
to you. The English assert that they attacked Syria because of the 
transit nights of German planes. That is not true. The attack had 
been prepared long in advance and would have come sooner or later." 
This chivalrous attempt of the old officer to relieve us of the responsi- 
bility for the death of so many French soldiers made a deep impres- 
sion on me. I declined to leave Syria, but promised to go that same 
night to Aleppo with Mollhausen, who was present at the conversa- 
tion. I had already, upon news of the fall of Damascus, sent the staff 
there, together with the transmitter and secret material. 

A few days prior to this I had received the information that the 
native governments of Syria and Lebanon had asked the High Com- ! 

missioner in high-flown, written statements to cease hostilities and 
to surrender. I had in my hands the original of the letter signed 
by Premier Naccache 22 which reflected all the pitiful fear of the 
dangers to life and property. 23 Then when two Syrians close to 
Naccache came to see me and made the naive request that I use my I 

influence with the High Commissioner to declare Beirut at least an \ 

open city — as if it were only a matter of protecting the interests of I 

these Levantine house-owners— I replied to them : "I admire the in- ; 

dulgenco of the High Commissioner. In his place I would have had j 

M. Naccache strung up on the highest cedar of Lebanon. This is the ' 

first thing. And second : If the English occupy Syria, there will be 
total war. That I promise you. You may study it in Alexandria." — 
and there I left them. This reply made the rounds of all Syria, caused i 

much amusement, and won me many friends in the Army. The two 
governments did not insist on their demand. It was not until the day 
of the armistice that M, Naccache is supposed to have distributed his 
letter in the form of a leaflet. 

XII. Economic Matters. 

Shortly after the commencement of hostilities, on June 13, 1 wired 
to Berlin: 24 

"In order to prevent stocks of goods here from falling into the hands i 
of the English, I have arranged that the largest possible quantities 
of scrap rubber, wool, and wire be seized and sent through Turkey 

to Germany. I am trying to load them on the gasoline trains expected | 

here anyway. Prices will follow. I should appreciate receiving \ 

directives regarding prices." \ 



' Head of the Lebanese Government. 

"Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. in, pp. 742-743. 

'In telegram No. 119 (70/50442). 



JTJLY 1941 257 

After the prompt reply from Berlin, the business seemed to get off 
to a good start, but then began an endless and fruitless exchange of 
telegrams with Berlin " because the Syrian merchants, in expectation 
of the English victory and the inclusion of Syria in the Sterling bloc, 
were requesting cash payment for the goods upon their exportation 
to Turkey, but Berlin would agree, as its final offer, to only 60 percent 
upon testing in Istanbul and 40 percent upon arrival in Germany. 
Tills, in turn, was rejected by the merchants on the grounds that they 
haa^io interest in frozen balances in Germany. Although I informed 
Berlin that the French had given me as the sole "merchant" in Syria, 
in appreciation of the food deliveries which I had arranged for, unre- 
stricted export permission, that 2,500 tons of wool were available, and 
that three opinions had been received from the Aleppo Chamber of 
Commerce concerning their quality, that the prices I had been able to 
obtain locally were up to 35 percent below those asked in Hamburg, 
and that I would pay only upon receiving the export papers, the credit 
I asked for was refused me. 

Result: The 2,500 tons of wool and some 200-300 tons of old rubber 
available remained, on the whole, in Syria, and fell into the hands of 
the English. The 170 tons of wool already exported through my 
efforts were sold in Istanbul, at a considerably higher price, for ship- 
ment to Switzerland. 

On June 14 I wired to Berlin : 2a 

"Since the merchants here believe in an English victory and are 
counting on the inclusion of the Levant in the Sterling bloc, the price 
of gold has fallen about 30 percent. Through a direct wire to Vichy 
I obtained approval for the conversion of at least 20 million francs 
into Syrian pounds and obtained secretly the consent of the Office 
of the High Commissioner to my buying gold pieces here. Because 
of the favorable rate of exchange, which will perhaps rise again soon, 
I have started on my own responsibility to purchase gold, since gold 
appears to me more valuable, at any rate, than French francs. I have 
thus far purchased 13,975 Turkish gold pounds at the price of approx- 
imately 7.7 million francs." 

Reply from Berlin : 2T 

"Please discontinue the purchases of gold for the present. The offi- 
cial purchase price of the Reichsbank for one Turkish gold pound is 
18.39 reichsmarks, while the price paid by you amounts to 27.50 reichs- 
marks. There is no interest here in the purchase of gold at such a 
price, even in French francs." 



25 Only a few of these telegrams hare been found. They are filmed on serial 
4756. 
"In telegram No. 125 (70/50449). 
"Unnumbered draft telegram of June 16 by Wlehl (4756/E233839). 



682-90 S — 64 22 



258 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

My reply 88 to this: 

"I proceeded on the basis of the following calculations : The Turkish 
gold pound is worth 25 to 26 pounds in Turkey. Thirty-three French 
francs are the equivalent of a Turkish pound (State Bank rate of 
exchange). If you wish, I shall re-purchase francs in Turkey with 
gold and credit the profit of about. 5.3 million to the account of the 
Embassy, Paris. Please send telegraphic instruction." 

No telegraphic instruction was received. No further gold purchases 
were made. 
XIII. Supplies. 

When I arrived in Aleppo on June 22, after the somewhat dramatic 
farewell with General Dentz, I received a telephone call from the 
Office of the High Commissioner in Beirut: A telegram had just 
arrived from Vichy stating that four battalions with 40 planes were 
being dispatched to Syria as . a reinforcement. This information, 
which had been communicated to the Army, had so strengthened its 
fighting morale, that it would perhaps be able to hold out for the 
8 days it would take until the arrival of the transports. Moreover, 
the Luftwaffe had attacked the English columns near Palmyra at 
quarter-hour intervals and in large part dispersed them. The Bed- 
ouins, recruited and armed by us, were taking part in the battle. The 
small garrison of Legionnaires was holding Palmyra and had thus 
far victoriously repelled all attacks. The gasoline question was again 
decisive, since the supply of aviation gasoline was declining at a furi- 
ous pace. Could we not arrange for transports through Turkey? 

And with this I come to the darkest chapter of my Syrian ex- 
periences: Under pressure from the Eeich Government, the Turkish 
Government had declared itself ready to approve the transit through 
Turkey of German aviation gasoline— some 70 cars. 28 The gasoline 
arrived in Haydarpa§a on June 1 and was there reloaded on the 
railroad on June 1, 2, and 3. To the unending regret of the Turkish 
Government, which failed completely to understand it, the major por- 
tion of the transports first got lost on the Turkish section. New 
reasons were forever being found for the delay : only so many Turkish 
cars could go to Syria as there were Syrian cars in Turkey; yet, there 
were 244 Syrian cars in Turkey as against 40 Turkish cars in Syria. 
Or: the line capacity was insufficient for these movements; yet the 
normal line capacity of some 10 trains in either direction was, accord- 
ing to French authorities, not reached on any one of these days be- 
cause of the sharp decline in trade. Or: Turkish brake regulations 
forbid the braking of cars loaded with fuel, etc. It was nerve-racking. 
Finally I flew in Benoist-Mechin's special plane to Ankara, and asked 
the firm of Schenker, which had been commissioned to make the ship- 

38 Not found. 

28 See vol. xn of this series, document No. 556 and footnote 4. 



JULY 1941 



259 



ments, to send a representative to every Turkish station to find out 
what the "technical difficulties," so often referred to, were. On the 
afternoon of the same day, the Secretary General in the Turkish For- 
eign Ministry, Ambassador Numan Menemencioglu, informed Min- 
ister Kroll, the German Counselor of Embassy, that he was fed up 
with the constant complaints and he guaranteed that the remaining 
gasoline shipments would reach Syria within 4 days. So, after 20 
c«rs had only by dint of the greatest effort, been brought to Syria in 
24-days, it suddenly became "technically possible," to get nearly 50 
cars to Aleppo in 4 days. 

There was another reason also for my journey to Ankara: in the 
middle of June the French Charge d'Affaires in Ankara had re- 
quested Turkish permission for the transit of 750 men in civilian 
clothing and for 7 trainloads of military equipment, but this had been 
refused by the Turks on grounds of their absolute neutrality. 30 Then 
Admiral Darlan's Chef de Cabinet, State Secretary Benoist-Mechin, 
flew here by special plane in order at the last moment to get the 
Turks to change their minds and either to return a portion of the war 
material delivered by the French and never paid for by the Turks, or, 
at least, to obtain transit permission for war material. 31 I had re- 
turned to Beirut on June 24 in order to introduce Major Meyer-Ricks, 
who had arrived in the meantime, to General Dentz and the General 
Staff, and to prepare for the return of my staff, in view of the more 
favorable military situation. In the evening Benoist-Mechin called 
me from Aleppo and asked me urgently to come there. The High 
Commissioner placed a special plane at my disposal for this purpose. 
In Aleppo, Benoist-Mechin told me he had landed in Syria only in 
order to invite me to assist him in his Turkish mission. He did not 
wish to visit General Dentz in order to avoid painful questioning and 
in order that he might not achieve by his replies a similar effect to 
that of General Bergeret on his visit to Beirut. Actually German- 
French conversations in Paris had bogged down completely. And 
yet, the French Government was prepared to do everything; ulti- 
mately, even to go to war against England. Only it could not live 
in a state of war with Germany and England at the same time. If 
the Reich Government still entertained doubts as to the good faith of 
its statements, Darlan was also prepared to give practical guarantees, 
such as appointing General Dentz, who was immune with respect to 
an alignment with England, to the top command in North Africa, and 
requesting the Reich Government to send me there, too. 

The Benoist-Mechin negotiations were, as was to be expected, un- 
successful. The talk might perhaps have taken another turn if we 
had known of the reports of Consul General Hoffman-Folkers and 



* See vol. xn of this series, document No. 651, footnote 1. 
31 See document No. 71. 



260 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 

to which I later on accidentally obtained access in Adana, and from 
which it appeared that the Turks were not deterred by their absolute 
neutrality from channeling through Turkey Norwegian, Polish, and 
Rumanian refugees liable to military duty, in part, evidently, still in 
uniform, by the hundreds, and in Mersin putting them on shipboard 
for Egypt. And this even after the signing of the German-Turkish 
friendship pact! 

XIV. "Desert War". 

On June 27 1 flew with the plane that Benoist-Mechin had given me 
for a few days, via Aleppo, to Beirut. There I learned that the 
English had suggested, through the intermediary of the American 
Consul General, that negotiations be started. 32 I called on General 
Dentz at once. Concerning the English offer and the course of the 
conversation, I wired from Aleppo in the evening as follows : 33 

"1.) Upon my return to Beirut, I learned of the following situation 
report of June 26 to Vichy by the High Commissioner (excerpt) : 

'English offensive in southern Lebanon on the road from Da- 
mascus to Beirut and Damascus in the direction of Horns checked, 
but heavy losses in troops and material. Without reinforcements 
the resistance cannot last more than one week. English troops 
tired out, but have an abundance of rolling stock; also superi- 
ority in artillery, tanks, and machine guns, continuous supplies 
and reinforcements (16th Brigade), future air base Damascus. 

'If the English take Horns, our Air Force would be confined 
to Aleppo and threatened there ; Lebanon, with exhausted troops, 
would be encircled ; [there would be] a grain supply of 12 days 
and hostile native elements. In the event of the speedy arrival 
of the five battalions announced, the offensive could be stopped 
and the resistance extended. But only a substantial reinforce- 
ment with regard to tanks, antitank guns, and air force would 
permit us to drive the enemy back across the border. 

'In the political field : English proposals transmitted by the 
American Consul General: General Wilson prepared to nego- 
tiate concerning suspension of hostilities. At the same time 
nothing was said about a political regime, but the example of 
Damascus would seem to indicate a de Gaullist administration. 
The offer is that officers and officials should have the choice of 
remaining — hence, to join the de Gaullists — or being sent home. 

'Contrary to Catroux's proclamation, no sanctions are being 
imposed on the French who remain loyal to Vichy. No offer 
with regard to the troops; hence, possibly, the hope of winning 
them for the de Gaullists. 

'Conclusion: Long resistance possible if Horns is held, which 
presupposes the immediate arrival of reinforcements. Only if a 
sufficient number of pieces of artillery arrive, can the enemy be 
routed. This depends on negotiations with Turkey, in which con- 
nection German intervention is decisive. The English proposal 

™ See document No. 101 and footnote 4. 

B Telegram No. 191 of June 28 (70/50524-26) . 



JULY 1941 261 

means practically our complete elimination through cooperation 
with elements which are defecting to the de Gaullists. With 
German approval, I recommend sending English prisoners to 
France and, in the event of a defeat, negotiating for an exchange 
of prisoners. 

'I shall not start negotiations of any kind without formal in- 
structions. If resistance has become impossible, I shall, after 
peace and order are assured, destroy the arms and discharge the 
O troops. Dentz.' 
w End of excerpt. 

"2.) Disturbed over English attempts at negotiations, I at once had 
a long talk with the High Commissioner. I implored him not to 
compromise the newly-won laurels of his troops through negotiations 
and offered him further assistance in the equipping of Arab bands, 
with arms, above all, the group Fawzi al-Qawuqchi, in accordance 
with your offer in telegram No. 182 of June 25. 34 It seemed to me 
braver, in an extreme case, to attempt a desperate attack on Haifa than 
to let oneself be starved ignominiously into submission in Lebanon. 
Moreover, there was hope that the promised reinforcement of five bat- 
talions would soon arrive. The High Commissioner stated with 
warmth that he shared this view and put me in entire charge of the 
Fawzi group ; at my request he authorized at once the seizure of 45 
automobiles in order to give the Fawzi group mobility, provided six 
German members of the Foreign Legion as junior officers, ordered 
that arms, gasoline be supplied, sent for an Air Force General and 
gave the order that a transport plane be sent to Salonika at once in 
order to pick up the German arms. I then discussed with Meyer- 
Kicks and an officer of Fawzi's, who had been summoned in haste, the 
plan of action of the Fawzi group : after reinforcement and equipment 
with arms and vehicles, a flank attack on the English group at Pal- 
myra. I am now in Aleppo to make the preparations. When the 
arms arrive, I shall fly with Meyer-Ricks to Deir-ez-Zor." 

On June 24 Fawzi Qawuqchi was seriously wounded in an attack 
on a motorized English column. We had him taken at once in an air- 
plane ambulance to Aleppo, where I saw him briefly and then sent him 
on to Athens in a German plane. So the Fawzi group was without a 
leader, and from past experience this meant: strife, dissolution, 
plunder, anarchy. On the 28th I made preparations for the re-equip- 
ment of the group, and on the 29th flew with Meyer-Ricks to Deir-ez- 
Zor on the Euphrates, where it was to stay at the moment. But what 
we had feared had happened. The Commandant of Deir-ez-Zor, who 
later on also failed us completely in the military field, had not suc- 
ceeded in keeping the group together: it had gone off in the night 
"somewhere to the north, to Hassetche or Rakka." So, after being 
detained by an English reconnaissance plane longer than we liked in 
Deir-ez-Zor, we flew to Hassetche, where I had asked a Sheik of the 
Shammar who was friendly to us to come for a conference, since I had 
been informed that another Sheik of that tribe, who was under the 

84 Not found. 



262 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY 

influence of the English, was planning an invasion of Syria from the 
direction of Iraq. I had grown accustomed from previous experience 
to appearing at such meetings dressed all in white, without headdress 
or arms and to observing and demanding a certain ceremonial. Our 
friend, who had appeared with an imposing retinue, promised to post 
his men at the border in order to impede the advance of the English — 
in return for which he was to receive arms and money after having 
been put to the test— and to send one of his people to his faithless 
cousin with a threatening message from me. In so far as I later 
learned, in actual fact the Iraq Shammar did not budge. 

The Fawzi group was not in Hassetche. However, there were re- 
ports that it had clashed with French troops in Eakka. So we hastened 
to get there, and after much effort, succeeded. I alighted; Major 
Meyer-Kicks flew back to Aleppo without stopping in order to con- 
tinue to observe the military situation in the south. In Eakka there 
was complete chaos. French troops had fired at the Fawzi people 
and killed one of them. Part of the group had gone off into the desert, 
to the north; another part was interned behind barbed wire. When I 
got there and hailed them with the Arab greeting, "Dach-el-arab," 
they were like children. Some wept; others kissed my hand. Others, 
again, talked at me so much that the interpreter could hardly follow. 
They said that the French had given them nothing to eat; they 
had been told that they would be delivered up to the English and that 
Fawzi himself had been sent off to France and would be hanged there. 
I was soon able to calm them. In the night I had the groups that were 
scattered in the desert assembled through messengers, and bade Colonel 
Malartre come to Eakka from Deir-ez-Zor, to map out a joint opera- 
tion. At my suggestion, the Fawzi group took up a position north of 
Palmyra in order to disrupt British supplies, to relieve the small, brave 
band of Legionnaires in Palmyra, and if possible, later on to cover 
their retreat to the north. But the French always had an unfortunate 
touch in their handling of the Arabs. Only 2 days later there was 
another clash. The soldiers of the same Colonel Malartre killed three 
Fawzi people. The group withdrew to Aleppo in indignation and 
the Legionnaires in Palmyra no longer had cover and had to surrender. 
On June 30 I flew back to Aleppo in an airplane ambulance in 
order to organize additional Arab groups as a cover for Palmyra, 
Homs, and Aleppo. I also made contact with the Druses and the 
Kurds , but was called back in haste to Beirut as the result of a report 
of another slackening of the French resistance. General Dentz told 
me that Vichy had at the time informed him that five replacement 
training battalions would be brought to Aleppo in 50 German trans- 
port planes on July 1, or July 3 at the latest. But he still had no 
information as to their whereabouts. To be sure, his troops were 
fighting doggedly, especially after the bestial acts of brutality com- 



JULY 1941 263 

mitted by the English and Australians against wounded and pris- 
oners had. become known, but they were already very exhausted and 
in hope of the promised relief. And this did not come and did not 
come. 

On July 3 Palmyra fell ; on July 4 — almost without a struggles — 
Dpir-ez-Zor. On July 5 I got an urgent call from Captain de Bernon- 
ville, the French Security Officer, to come to Aleppo, where the Fawzi 
peWple had arrived and were threatening public safety. He informed 
mej-moreover, that the French indigenous troops had scattered before 
the approaching English columns and that the road from Deir-ez-Zor 
to Aleppo was practically without cover. So I rode back at once to 
Aleppo, merged the remnant of the Fawzi group with a second group 
that had been hastily set up, under the unified command of Aref , an 
old comrade-in-arms of Fawzi, supplied them that very night with 
arms, ammunition, subsistence and equipment, and the next day, after 
a brief address, had them take the oath of allegiance to the Arab flag. 
This aroused wild enthusiasm and brought ovations for the Fiihrer 
and for Germany. In the afternoon I stationed about 360 of them in 
Meskene and placed them, divided into small groups, under the 
military command of seven German members of the Foreign Legion, 
whom General Dentz had at my request placed at my disposal. That 
same night two patrols pushed as far as Palmyra and Deir-ez-Zor ; 
in the following night the group attacked the airport of Rakka, 
which had been occupied by English motorized units, and killed 10 
Englishmen, took five prisoners, and captured one tank, a number of 
trucks, and miscellaneous military supplies. The English withdrew 
to the north and east, and Aleppo seemed secure for the time being. 

On July 7 I went back to Aleppo, where, upon news of the Arab 
presentation of the colors, numerous delegations, also about 10 
Bedouin sheiks, had arrived from Horns, Haraa, and the environs of 
Aleppo, in order to express their readiness to fight with the Aref 
group. In the midst of the organization of the reinforcements and 
supplies for Aref, I received on July 8 the news from the High Com- 
missioner that he had been compelled upon orders from Vichy to ask 
the English for an armistice. Five hours later, after a breathless 
chase over the rough Syrian roads, I was with him. 

I reported on the conversation to Berlin : S5 

"The High Commissioner told me, in explaining the military situa- 
tion, that he had been forced to wire the English through American 
channels that upon orders from his Government he was asking for 
the immediate cessation of hostilities on land, water, and in the air, 
and for the commencement of negotiations for their definitive termi- 
nation. He asked that a place be named for the negotiations. When 
I suggested that this was not in harmony with his previous attitude, 

K In telegram No. 221 of July 9, dispatched July 10 ; see document No. 101, 
footn